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

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ESSAY

ON

THE MILITARY POLICY

AND

INSTITUTIONS

OF

THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

27908

BY C. W. PASLEY,

CAPTAIN IN THE CORPS OF ROYAL ENGINEERS.

THIRD EDITION.

PART I.

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PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE following work was commenced, and the two first chapters of it actually written, in the spring of the year 1808. The estimate made of the comparative force of the French and British empires, is consequently adapted to that period, when Buonaparte had the resources of all the continent of Europe at his command. I did not think proper to alter that estimate, so as to suit any subsequent state of affairs; because, if he succeeds in his Spanish war, the same will again hold good; if he fails, it will show

the danger which we have escaped; and, in the mean time, it serves as a warning of what we ought to endeavour to avoid and prevent.

The progress of my work has been interrupted, by having been employed, first in Spain, and afterwards on the expedition to Walcheren; since my return from which island, it has been long suspended and much retarded by ill health.

It was my original intention, after three or four preliminary chapters, to have proceeded, at once, to treat of our military institutions, reserving the full developement of the principles of martial policy, and of the offensive system of warfare, for the second part of my essay; and such an arrangement might, perhaps, have been more suitable to the complexion of the times, in which this work was begun. Upon further reflection, however, it appeared, that the

latter not only deserved, and required, to be treated more at large, than I had at first designed; but that, as forming by far the most important subject of the two, they ought to precede the consideration of our military institutions. More than a hundred pages were printed off, before I determined upon this change. For this reason, the introductory chapter, although it sufficiently explains the whole of my plan, as well as the principles upon which I write, may appear somewhat defective in arrangement; which I hope the reader will excuse.

The facts given in the following sheets have been brought forward, solely, with a view of illustrating general principles laid down. I have selected them, in preference, from such of our late operations, as have taken place in countries of which I have some personal knowledge: in other cases, I have endeavoured to profit by the conversation of officers, upon whose judgment I

can depend. Few incidents will appear, which have not already been published in official documents; none, that I do not either actually know, or fully believe, to be true.

Opinions are not, like facts, reducible to any kind of certainty. Every one must have remarked, that, by credible eye-witnesses of the very same events, the most contrary opinions will often be advanced, both as to the motives of those concerned, and the probable results of their measures. Nothing can more strongly show this, than the jarring accounts given, as well as the contradictory inferences drawn, respecting Spanish affairs, by British officers, and others, who have had exactly the same data to reason from.

The present war, in Spain, being one of the most interesting and important, in modern times, I have made frequent use

of it in the following sheets. My opinions upon the character of the Spaniards were formed, during a short, but active, and eventful period; for the last two months of which, I had the honour of serving as extra Aid-de-camp, first to Sir David Baird, and afterwards to Sir John Moore; in which situations, as well as in my previous duties under Major-General Leith, I had continual intercourse with Spaniards of all ranks and classes of society. Should this book fall into the hands of those officers to whom I was known, in Spain, they will see, that my sentiments upon the affairs of that country have not varied from that time to this: indeed, the observations, upon our first Spanish campaign, which will be adduced to illustrate various points in the second part of my essay, were committed to paper, and have been shown to private friends, before any of the narratives, which appeared upon that subject, last year, were published.

I have only alluded to one paper (see the note to page 34), which my official situation as a staff officer, in Spain, gave me an opportunity of seeing, that I otherwise should not have had: this paper, it will be perceived, is not of a confidential nature; and it had no reference to, nor can it be adduced either in praise or dispraise of, our own national measures or operations. To have published or to have alluded to any document or information, officially acquired, of the latter description, which has not appeared through other channels, before a British public (had any of importance been in my possession, which I confess is not the case), would have been equally contrary to my feelings, and to my duty.

I have hopes that the second part of this essay will appear in the ensuing spring: but, exclusive of the introductory chapter, which is common to both parts, I have endeavoured to make, what I now offer to

the public, complete and independent as an essay, in itself.

It has been my object, without confining myself exclusively to the present prospects of Great Britain, to endeavour to analyze the spirit of military policy and institutions in general, so that if I have succeeded in the inquiry, something may be found applicable, to all times and circumstances; but, in what regards military details, little or no new information will be communicated.

If the language, held in any part of this work, should appear too sanguine or decided, I trust, that an indulgent public will ascribe it not to presumption, but to zeal and sincerity. If I have erred in my opinions, they at least open some important matter for consideration, which has been little discussed; and free discussion upon important subjects, when dispassionately conducted, must always prove beneficial.

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TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In the second edition of the first part of his Essay, which is now offered to the public, the author has judged it best to subdivide the subject into twelve chapters, in preference to his former arrangement. The only other alterations introduced are of a verbal nature, none of which in the least affects the tenour of his arguments.

Several notes have been added. Those illustrative of Mediterranean affairs have

been principally taken from Messrs. Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Lord Nelson. The extracts from the letters of his lordship, and of Sir T. Troubridge, of whom, the former seems to have felt the strongest attachment, and both of whom rendered the greatest services, to the royal family of Sicily; both of whom, too, were no less exemplary for their sincerity, than distinguished by their martial spirit; may, it is hoped, convince an impartial reader, not personally acquainted with foreign affairs, that the character of the Sicilian government, given in this Essay, was moderate, and correct; since the very same unfavourable account of the measures of that government, and of the disposition of its subjects, is to be found in the official as well as private statements, of those its most strenuous supporters.

Lord Nelson's letters upon Sardinia are also particularly to be remarked; for, in

treating of the state of that island, which he thought it necessary for us to occupy, it appears, that he wished the British government to act upon the very same principles of policy, which have been inculcated throughout the whole of this Essay. Impressed with a conviction of the propriety and necessity of these principles, the author cannot but deem it highly fortunate, that Lord Nelson's representations of the importance of Sardinia led to no practical results; for it may be inferred, from a document published in the same work, that had we interfered at all in the affairs of that island, measures would have been adopted radically contrary to those recommended by his lordship.

That the policy, in this instance, distinctly laid down, as well as the general statements made, by so renowned a hero and patriot, should have coincided with, or corroborated, his own views of Mediterra-

nean politics, is a circumstance of which the author would gladly have availed himself in his first edition, had not almost the whole of it been printed, before he perused the valuable documents contained in the above-mentioned work.

With respect to the war in the Spanish peninsula, the author has not thought it necessary to bring forward, now, any additional matter, in the form of notes, in support of his opinions. The incidents to which he has alluded, will sufficiently mark the time, when this part of his subject was first sent to press. Subsequent to that period, the accounts of the battle of Busaco and of other important events, have been received; which are too generally known, even in their minutest details, to require that he should remind any of his readers of them: and these, he trusts, will, of themselves, appear to have afforded considerable confirmation, of his views of Spanish and Portuguese affairs.

He has only further to observe, that the professional duties, which at present occupy his time, may retard the publication of the second part of his Essay, considerably beyond the period in which he had at first hoped to complete it.

Plymouth Dock, March 25, 1811.

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TO THE THIRD EDITION.

WHILST the prospect of being able to finish the second part of his work is still remote, the author sincerely congratulates his countrymen upon the hopes of a speedy improvement in one of the most inefficient departments of our military establishment; the defects of which have, for many years, filled his mind with constant apprehensions of the failure and disgrace, if not of the absolute destruction of some British army; and which, had he followed his original

plan of discussing the Military Institutions before the Policy, must, of course, have formed a prominent feature of his subject, and would long ago have been laid open to the world.

What is remarkable, the very pernicious and alarming defect in our military system, now alluded to, which of late has fortunately engaged the serious attention of government, appears to have been totally overlooked by all our writers, and by the public in general. It is to be wished, that it may also have escaped the observation of our enemies. It cannot be concealed from them long; for, if the events of the war have not already opened their eyes, when we reflect how easy it is for any Englishman, who will give himself the trouble, to acquire a general knowledge of the military institutions of France, or of any other foreign nation; who will say, that a Frenchman, by proper exertion and

assiduity, may not, in like manner, make himself acquainted with ours?

On comparing this with the two former editions, it may be observed, that one explanatory note is added; whilst another has been omitted, in which the author had inadvertently deviated from a rule, that he intended to have strictly adhered to, throughout the whole of his work.

Plymouth Dock, October 3, 1811.

ESSAY,

&c. &c.

CHAPTER I.[1]

Introduction,

And Explanation of the Plan of the Work.

In times when the British nation is placed in a situation of danger, to which its past history affords no parallel, menaced with destruction by a much superior force, which is directed by the energy of one of the greatest warriors that has appeared; every man in this country must think with anxiety upon the result; every man must feel, that nothing

[1] This and the succeeding chapter apply to the state of Europe at the beginning of the year 1808, when they were originally written. They have not been altered, for reasons given in the preface.

but the greatest unanimity and firmness on the part of the nation, nothing but the wisest measures on the part of the government, can save us, and with us the rest of the civilized world, from swelling the triumph of the haughty conqueror.

But it appears to me, that this country is by no means in a state capable of resisting a powerful invasion; and that nothing but our naval superiority has saved us from being at this moment a province of France. Some men, judging by the limited experience of the last and present wars, and consequently flattering themselves that there will be no end to our naval successes, may possibly give themselves little concern, whether any thing is added to our other defences or not, as they can sleep in full belief that the scene of action will never be transferred to our own shores.

When we shall come, however, to develope the grand principles upon which naval power is founded, by an examination into the comparative resources of contending nations, and shall impartially apply these principles to Great Britain and France; the latter country will be found so superior in the scale, that, as all her great resources, which have hitherto been chiefly directed, with such fatal energy, to extending her conquests on shore, may hereafter be applied to naval affairs, it seems to me very doubtful, whether we could possibly preserve, for any great number of years, such a preponderance by sea, against France alone in her present

extended state, as to blockade the fleets of that one nation in all its ports. When we further take into consideration, that France can now command, and will employ against us, the resources of almost all Europe; that the great naval powers of Spain and Holland, with the secondary ones of Denmark and Portugal, as well as the Italian states, are now, in fact, if not in name, her provinces; the hope of our being able to rule the waves for more than a limited time against this gigantic empire, appears to me so contrary to reason, as scarcely to deserve a serious confutation. There must be, from the nature of things, in the course of time, a superiority in number of ships and men on the part of our enemies, which may be carried by them to such an overwhelming pitch, as no valour nor skill on our part will be able to withstand.

The time, in which the continent of Europe is likely to acquire that naval superiority over Great Britain, which nature seems to have intended, cannot reasonably be estimated at more than that, in which it may fairly be said to have lost it. So recently as the year 1779, the fleets of France and Spain had a superiority in the British Channel. When we look back to that anxious crisis, and consider, that the combination of force now acting against us does not, like the confederacy of that time, to which Holland afterwards acceded, consist of powers independent of

each other, discordant in views, principles, and interests, and liable every moment to be divided, or even a part of them to arm in our defence, but may be esteemed one great nation exerting all its energy for our destruction; it seems highly probable that we may expect, in less than an equal period of thirty years, to lose the empire of the seas, and may look forward to the possibility of an enemy landing on our shores with as much facility, as we can now ourselves disembark troops in any part of the world.

I should be happy if I could believe myself mistaken in these opinions, but much reflection has only fixed them deeper and more strongly in my mind. Many who may be startled at hearing them thus proclaimed in all their nakedness, will, I am persuaded, find, that they have at times, as it were involuntarily, admitted the truth of them. Whence proceeds the almost general acknowledgement, that no permanent peace can be expected with France? whence the almost general opinion, that it is better to keep up a war, which seems to promise no end? whence can such sentiments so contrary to all the former feelings of men in England have arisen? but from a deep-felt conviction, that, being marked for destruction, our making peace can lead to no considerable diminution either in our naval or military establishments, without hazarding our national downfal, whilst it would on the contrary, by enabling our enemies

to profit freely by their great natural superiority of means for building ships and forming seamen, ensure to them, in a comparatively short space of time, the superiority over us by sea, which almost every man thus tacitly confesses in his heart, they cannot fail to obtain.

Some men, who may be of the same sentiments with myself, may perhaps censure me for bringing them forward to public consideration, as tending to produce a bad effect, by filling the minds of men with notions of a gloomy and desponding nature. It was not without the most mature deliberation, that I ventured on a step, which probably may be so harshly judged; and my conclusion was this, that if I could flatter myself that my voice would rouse the nation to an earnest view of this most alarming part of the dangers to which we are exposed, namely, the probable downfal of our navy, I shall be consoled against any clamour by the consciousness of having discharged a duty of the most sacred, and a service of the most essential, nature to my country. True courage, and true wisdom, consist alone in calculating danger in its utmost extent, in foreseeing and preparing for the worst that may happen. They are equally removed from that rash and presumptuous infatuation, which either cannot see, or under-rates the evils that menace us; and from that wilful blindness, proceeding from real despondency, which makes weak minds shrink from the consideration

of future perils, and as it were refuse to think upon them; both of which dispositions, whether influencing individuals or nations, equally lead to their certain destruction.

However various may be the reception of the opinion, that we shall most probably lose, in a limited number of years, our present preponderating naval power, every man must allow that it is an event at least very possible. Consequently it is the duty of this country to be prepared for such an event, and to take measures for meeting the calamity before it is too late. Let us, whilst it is yet in our power, embrace the opportunity of preparing for the worst; or our posterity, who may find themselves enslaved beneath the iron yoke of a foreign despot, may have reason to weep in tears of blood the improvidence and errors of their fathers.

If, on the contrary, we do not improve our system of defence, either from a supposition, that as our little island is now superior by sea to the whole world, it is always to continue so; or from a hope, that although the royal house of Bourbon, the republic of France, and now its self-made emperor, have all successively attempted our destruction and outdone each their predecessors in their efforts for that end; yet if we can be so happy as to maintain our independence during the life of Napoleon, we may see him succeeded in his government by a set of mild unambitious rulers,

who will preserve perpetual peace with us; or if we trust, that when his presiding genius shall no longer guide that vast empire, it is to fall to pieces, and be divided amongst his generals, as amongst so many successors of this new Alexander, instead of remaining consolidated like the conquests of the Romans; we shall confide our dearest rights, that glorious constitution, that sacred liberty, and those proud national honours, which we have inherited from our ancestors, to such a combination of improbable chances in our favour, as the most desperate gamester would scarcely venture to act upon.

Admitting the probability which has just been stated, that the day may come, and that at no very distant period, when the fleets of Europe may block up those of Great Britain in its harbours, and may disembark the formidable armies of the continent on our shores, it becomes a question, if our present means of defence are not capable of saving the nation, what addition is necessary to be made to them in order to effect that purpose? or whether the superiority of force that may be employed for our destruction, will not be likely to render any effort of ours in that case completely ineffectual?

Gloomy as the latter prospect would be, still it would be our duty to push our exertions for meeting the storm to the utmost, in hopes that Divine Providence, which has so often interposed in

favour of nations, that have not abandoned themselves to despair when reduced to the very brink of destruction, may work some unexpected change in our favour; or at least to have the satisfaction of falling with arms in our hand, in a manner worthy of the antient renown of the British nation, and of the sacred cause in which we should fight, for the last remains of liberty to be found in the world.

But it appears to me that our case is by no means so hopeless. A great object of this Essay shall therefore be to endeavour to prove, that, by certain new measures, and by certain additions to our means of defence, supposing we had not a single ship upon the ocean, we might still hope to maintain our independence. It being evident that every thing must then depend upon a trial of military skill and valour by land; a principal part of this work must necessarily be employed in considering the organization of our military force, comprehending our regular army, militia, volunteers, &c. Defects, where they exist in these establishments, will be pointed out, and improvements suggested to the best of my judgment.

I shall also attempt to trace the grand causes of the general success of our arms by sea, and of our almost universal failures by land; which will involve not only a consideration of our military institutions, but of the policy with which we have conducted our wars.

In the course of these investigations, the important question will be fully discussed, whether by improving our military policy and institutions, we may not have it in our power, now or hereafter, to reduce the French empire, and to increase our own absolute strength so much, as to prevent the destruction of our naval superiority.

As the desire to contribute towards effecting an object so essential to the existence of the country, is the only motive that has induced me to undertake this Essay; this motive must plead my excuse for the freedom, with which I have ventured to speak of our late operations, as far as was absolutely necessary, in order to convince the nation of the necessity of an improved military system. It is the duty of a soldier to defend his country against its foreign enemies: but, by taking advantage of the influence which all men of liberal education may hope to possess in a nation constituted like Great Britain, if he endeavours to lead the public mind to a true sense of the nature of the contest in which we are engaged; he may perhaps, should his efforts be attended with any success, contribute more by his pen towards the defence of the state, than he could do by his sword, in a whole life-time spent in war, in much higher situations.

Every candid person must allow, that officers, who have served with armies in the field, and

who have seen, deeply felt, or even suffered by the defects of our military institutions, are the men most likely to be capable of suggesting improvements. But it is not always officers of superior rank, however exalted in reputation or talents, by whom existing evils are best seen. The heads of our army in England are not likely, from situation, to seize the new ideas that may be suggested by every new expedition, and they are also fully occupied by the high duties of their station. Generals, commanding in the field, have still less leisure to enter into a view of the details that are necessary to be considered in particular branches of the service. If at any time they may be disposed to enter into them, some new enterprise or object of infinitely greater importance will hurry them away, and require their undivided attention. They are warm and deeply interested players in the game of war, in which inferior officers, although equally desirous of final success, have more of the coolness of spectators. If the officers of the British army in general should therefore remain silent, or confine themselves solely to write or speak upon the good points of our military system, a considerable source of improvement in military affairs will be cut off.

Whoever treats of human institutions must be permitted to reveal defects as well as to applaud excellencies, and this I have done with the sincerest

aim at impartial decision.[1] The nature of my plan, after undertaking this work, left me no alternative. I could not help speaking, and I have spoken what I fully believe to be the truth, in which I have, however, confined myself to the consideration of measures and operations alone, sedulously excluding, from the following pages, every thing like censure or even panegyric upon living individuals or existing bodies of men.

If any of the facts or observations contained in this Essay should be adduced in support of an attack, made by any person or party upon their adversaries, it will give me the sincerest concern, by tending to defeat the object for which I write. The failures that have happened in our wars by land, have arisen principally out of the nature of our military policy and institutions in themselves; and these can never be properly or fairly investigated, if all enquiries into them are mixed with disputes solely originating in our internal politics, and which consequently are almost entirely foreign to the subject. The more these questions are discussed together, the less hope there will be of seeing any improvement in a system, whose deficiencies may ruin the country.

[1] If it should prove, that in treating so extensive a subject I have fallen into any errors or inaccuracies, as they will be entirely involuntary ones, I shall be ready to acknowledge and retract them, the moment they are pointed out to my conviction.

Such are the considerations under which I have acted, in presenting to the nation the following picture of its military policy and institutions. If an impartial public will enter into an examination of them, without any reference to individual or party feelings; it may perhaps appear sufficiently evident, that the causes of our disasters by land may be removed, without either increasing or diminishing the power or influence of the executive government, and that consequently we may preserve our national independence against the world without any change in our happy constitution. This will surely be a most gratifying reflection to every patriotic heart in this country, and this I hope will be the inference that may be fully drawn by every thinking reader, after an attentive perusal of this work.

As my opinions may probably widely differ from the prevailing notions of men in this country, I shall endeavour to prove by examples drawn from history, that they are by no means mere speculations, but that the institutions proposed have been successfully tried in former times, and that the military policy recommended has been uniformly attended with an increase of safety, power, and prosperity to the nations that have followed it, and that a contrary system has uniformly preceded or led to the destruction of states.

I shall lastly apply the general principles, developed in the course of the Essay, to the parti-

cular situation of this country, and shall endeavour to show in a military view of the probable operations of invading armies, the fatal consequences that are likely to ensue from our neglecting to improve our military policy and institutions, and to add to our means of defence, before it shall become too late.

Throughout the whole of these discussions, I shall give my opinions upon the prospects we have before us without the smallest reserve or disguise. In disputes concerning trifling objects, it may be allowable, sometimes perhaps politic, to keep the people in the dark; but the man who conceals any part of his real sentiments as to the full extent of the danger of the country, in writing upon a contest, such as the present one, which threatens its very existence, would in my mind act in a manner highly inconsistent, if not highly criminal. Under what pretext could he come forward, and urge us to have recourse to any new measures or additional means of defence, if at the same time he left it to be inferred, that he did not think the nation was in any great danger, or in other words, that any new measures would be almost, if not entirely, superfluous? The absurdity of writing on such a plan must appear so evident, that I hope I need say nothing more in explanation of having adopted a contrary one.

In an appendix to the work, the important subject of military education shall be considered

more in detail, than would have suited the body of a general essay, written upon the comprehensive plan of which I have just traced the outline. Throughout the whole, our military system shall be estimated not merely by its own intrinsic merit, but by comparison with that of our enemies, as far as it has come to my knowledge.

CHAPTER II.

Comparative view of the Force and Resources of the French and British Empires. Reflections arising from the subject, in regard to the probable decay of our Commerce, Manufactures, and Naval Power.

It has been too common amongst men in England for some years past, in speaking on the state of the nation, according as their dispositions have been more or less sanguine or gloomy, either to dwell with unbounded confidence on the public spirit, inexhaustible wealth, and supposed natural strength of the country; or on the other hand, to paint in hyperbolical and doleful terms the vast power and superiority of our adversaries, the wonderful skill of their generals, and the prowess of their armies; which, whilst they have given as reasons for augmenting our preparations of defence, would seem more calculated to leave the impression, that any effort of ours would be hopeless. To avoid these extremes, and to come at the only sure ground of reasoning, with any kind of precision, on the

defence of this country, it is necessary, setting declamation aside, to endeavour to estimate the force and resources of the British empire compared with those of our enemies.

This investigation will form the subject of the present chapter; and although, in so intricate a research, where the materials afforded, even by professed statistical writers, are more scanty and vague than the great importance of their science in this enlightened age would demand, we cannot expect to arrive at conclusions of any great nicety; yet there may be such grounds for reasoning on the subject, as to enable us to judge, with tolerable accuracy, what we have to hope and to fear in the present contest. In this, and indeed in the whole of my Essay, I shall endeavour to lay aside all national prejudices, and must beg an equal impartiality on the part of my reader. There is no other method of approximating to the truth, and on a subject so awfully important, error may lead to ruin. In order to simplify the question, we shall now confine ourselves principally to Great Britain, making only occasional remarks upon Ireland, till the conclusion of the Essay, when some pages shall be dedicated to the consideration of the state of that island.

The five grand and leading points to be considered between nations at war are, their population, their revenue, their means of rearing seamen, the energy of their executive govern-

ments, and the spirit and patriotism of their people.

The population of France, in its present extended state, between the grand natural boundaries of the Rhine, the Alps, the Mediterranean Sea, the Pyrenees and the Ocean, is computed at thirty-two millions of souls: Spain and Portugal contain twelve millions and three quarters; Switzerland, two millions; Italy, exclusive of Sardinia and Sicily, eleven millions and a quarter; Holland, in its reduced state, not quite two millions: total nearly sixty millions of people, forming a state compact and well united by geographical position; to oppose whom, we have in Great Britain about eleven millions of inhabitants; so that the proportion of population against us is more than five to one. If to the French Empire we add the Danish dominions, containing two millions of inhabitants; and such parts of Germany as are in reality, if not nominally, subject to Buonaparte, which will be at least fifteen millions more; we shall have a sum total of population, either under French dominion or irresistible influence, of nearly seventy-seven millions of people; so that, if to our former estimate of eleven millions for Great Britain, we add four millions for Ireland, the proportion of population against us of more than five to one will still hold good.

The second part of our subject, the comparative revenue of the two empires, is by no means

reducible to so much accuracy; but the superiority of our enemies over us in this respect, is certainly in a much smaller ratio than that of their population. Perhaps it may not be so much as three to one; and from the probable confusion and disordered state of the finances of an empire so lately amalgamated, as well as from the great facility which this nation has at present of borrowing, the quantity of money which Buonaparte can at any time command, may bear even a much less ratio than the above to that which we can raise.

Rather than involve myself in a labyrinth of financial calculations, that must be founded upon documents continually fluctuating, which I have not the means of procuring, I am willing to take, for the present, the subject of finance in the most favourable view possible for this country. Let us therefore admit, that the vast empire which we have to oppose, with a population more than five times greater than ours, is only able at this moment to command twice the disposable revenue that we can apply to the services of the state, after defraying the charges of our national debt: flattering as this supposition may appear, in which I believe I have rather over-rated our revenue than otherwise, we shall find, on estimating the value of money in the two empires, that our enemies can effect much more with the same sums than we are able to do.

Our naval and military establishments, as far as regards the pay and allowances of officers and men, are notoriously the most expensive in the world; so that without entering into minute inquiries, we may probably be warranted in stating, that thirty thousand continental troops may be maintained at less expense than twenty thousand British. Some abatement ought therefore to be made in our comparative revenue from this cause. Let us now, taking up the subject in a more enlarged view, endeavour to look forward into futurity, and consider whether we have any just right to flatter ourselves that our finances are likely to continue permanently in a much more flourishing state than those of the continent; or whether, on the contrary, it may not be more probable that, in a limited number of years, the revenue of our enemies may so increase, as to become superior to ours in a much greater ratio than it is at present.

On entering into the discussion of this question, we may remark, that it is generally acknowledged, that the taxes in this country have been carried to a far greater extent than in any other. All articles, many of which, in other countries, are either free or moderately assessed, are here burdened with high duties; and there can scarcely be a doubt, but that an extension of a similar system to France, and the other countries composing the empire of Buonaparte, would consider-

ably augment their present revenue. It is even more than probable, if the wishes of the people could have any influence on the mind of this mighty emperor, who acknowledges no other law than the sword, that the conquered countries would be happy by an increase of taxes, to purchase an exemption from the oppressive contributions that are levied on them, and the burden of the maintenance of the numerous French armies, whom they have been feeding and clothing for years. When we look back to the rapid improvement in our own revenue, which has been doubled and even trebled within the memory of man, although the population of the country has not materially increased during this period, nor has its wealth been augmented in so great a proportion, there seems no good reason, why a similar system may not be tried with equal effect on the continent of Europe.

It is true, that in a free country, where taxes are only imposed by voluntary consent of the representatives of the people, a greater revenue may be raised with equal ease to the subject, than in any other country equally wealthy, not enjoying the same happy privilege. But it will hardly be asserted, that this advantage alone can enable us for a permanency, with our eleven millions of people, to pay more than double what the same number of French subjects can afford to pay to their government. Buonaparte has only to fix

his rates of taxation; and whatever he chooses to impose must be paid, if within the bounds of possibility. No one will dispute the inclination or the power of the French emperor, to push the financial resources of the continent to their utmost stretch in order to annoy us. The capacity of himself and his ministers will as little be doubted. In pursuing the speculation concerning the probable success of their financial efforts, we must of necessity touch upon the grand question of what is the true source of national wealth, and consequently of revenue; a question which, being foreign to my usual studies, I would otherwise more willingly have declined.

There are two contrary opinions as to the source of national wealth, which have each their partizans, and have both been illustrated by eminent writers. The first is the agricultural system, or that of those political economists, who contend that the real source of the wealth of any nation is to be found in the quality and state of improvement of its soil; in short, that agriculture, not commerce, is the true fountain of revenue. This doctrine, the full dévelopement of which we owe to the continent, has lately been brought forward to public notice in this country, in a clear and masterly manner, by Mr. Spence, in a work entitled "Britain independent of Commerce." But when we take into consideration, what will scarcely be denied, that France Proper is, generally

speaking, equally fertile and well cultivated with our own island, if not more so; and that even under the old monarchy, its nett revenue was always superior to that of Great Britain, at the same period, notwithstanding many abuses which have since been removed; that Holland and the Netherlands are improved perhaps to their utmost capability; that Italy and the German Provinces dependent on France are by no means ill-cultivated; and that Spain and Portugal are perhaps the only portions of this new empire much below par in point of improvement: such of my readers as admit the truth of Mr. Spence's opinions, must also allow, that the French empire may, in process of time, easily furnish revenues to its ruler, exceeding ours in nearly the same ratio of superiority as its population.

In support of this, we have the authority of the celebrated author of the Wealth of Nations, who, although he has not declared himself an exclusive advocate for the agricultural system in its full extent, admits that it was the nearest approximation to the truth, that had been published in his time, on the subject of political economy. The whole tenor of his book appears considerably to favour the same system; and accordingly, when he draws a comparison between the revenues of France and Great Britain at the period he wrote, he reasons on exactly the same grounds. and deduces the very same inference,

the most strenuous partizan of the agricultural sect would have done. We shall quote his words.

"The French system of taxation," he observes, "seems in every respect inferior to the British. "In Great Britain, ten millions sterling are annu- "ally levied upon less than eight millions of "people, without its being possible to say that "any particular order is oppressed. From the "collections of the Abbe Expilly, and the ob- "servations of the author of the Essay upon "the Legislation and Commerce of Corn, it "appears probable, that France, including the "provinces of Lorraine and Bar, contains about "twenty-three or twenty-four millions of people; "three times the number perhaps contained in "Great Britain. The soil and climate of France "are better than those of Great Britain. The "country has been much longer in a state of "improvement and cultivation, and is, upon that "account, better stocked with all those things "which it requires a long time to raise up and "accumulate; such as great towns, and conve- "nient and well built houses, both in town and "country. With these advantages, it might be "expected, that in France a revenue of thirty "millions might be levied for the support of the "state, with as little inconveniency, as a revenue "of ten millions is in Great Britain."

If on the contrary, we espouse the opposite system of political economy before alluded to, and maintain, with the partizans of that sect, that commerce and manufactures are the principal sources of national wealth and prosperity, and that it is by means of our great superiority in these, that we have been enabled to pay, without distress to the country, taxes so much heavier and on so much greater a scale, in proportion to our population, than can be afforded by other nations; it behoves us to consider, whether these commercial advantages, which we now possess, are founded on a permanent basis of intrinsic strength, in which case we may hope to preserve them for ever; or whether we may not be liable to be deprived of them, by means which it is completely out of our own power either to prevent or to counteract. Our external commerce is known to consist principally in importing materials or produce from other countries, such as our own island either does not or can not produce; whilst our exports, exclusive of tin and coals, consist almost entirely of manufactured goods, the greater part of the raw materials for which are supplied us from abroad. Hence if foreign nations in general, whether from anger, caprice, or any other cause, refuse to sell us their raw materials, and to buy our manufactured produce, it is evident that our external com-

merce, and consequently, according to the doctrines of the commercialists, our prosperity and riches must come to an end.

This general combination of almost all foreign nations against our commerce, however improbable it may formerly have appeared, is now in a way of being realized. By the absolute decrees of Buonaparte, all the ports of the French empire, and of the lesser states under his influence, are shut against our manufactures. Our Copenhagen expedition only anticipated a little the period of their exclusion from Denmark. The Emperor of Russia, after having drawn us into an unnecessary and inglorious war with the Turks, which shut us out from the Levant, has also declared against us. If the Americans should proceed to extremities, as they seem inclined, our manufactures will be excluded from the markets of almost the whole world; and our foreign trade will be confined to so very few and such very distant countries,* that it may be considered as upon the eve of being nearly annihilated, in comparison of what it was a few years ago.

* It has been laid down as a maxim in political economy, that the trade carried on by any nation with very remote countries, is infinitely less beneficial than its trade with the neighbouring states, although the same quantity of capital may be employed in both. Wealth of Nations, Book ii. Chap. v.

The advocates for the commercial system must therefore, whilst they contemplate the present state of affairs, come to a still more desponding conclusion than the agriculturalists; for with the approaching decay of our commerce and manufactures, they must foresee the certain ruin of our finances, which they believe to depend entirely on the flourishing condition of the former.

Such is the prospect we have before us at present; but even if we could anticipate the improbable event, of a peace hereafter being made upon such advantageous terms, as to restore us on an equal footing to the markets we have lost; have we any just ground to expect, that our manufactures are always to maintain their present superiority over those of other nations? When we come to analyze this superiority, it will be found to consist in our being able to sell goods of the same quality cheaper than the people of other countries can do, which depends on a combination of the following circumstances: command of capital; ingenuity and skill of workmen; perfection of machinery; and price of labour. Now the latter circumstance is, even at present, against us, labour being dearer here than in most other countries. We surely cannot expect to keep secret our improvements in machinery, nor always to monopolize superior skill and ingenuity, unless we could prove ourselves to be a higher race of beings than the rest of mankind. Our superiority of capital is as little founded on

any thing intrinsically and exclusively inherent in the nature or constitution of this country. It cannot, as Mr. Spence observes, last long. "When "capital is at all acquired, it rapidly accumulates; "and even supposing our capital to increase in the "same degree with that of our rivals; this event "would reduce the profit of stock so low in this "country, that we should be willing to lend it, as "the Dutch did, to any other nation, which in "consequence of the cheapness of labour could "afford to give more for it."

In this most favourable view, therefore, which we can take of the probable fate of our commerce and manufactures, it appears, that they must either decline from their flourishing state, or even if they do not considerably decline, that the commerce and manufactures of the continent are likely to rise by degrees to a superiority over ours, nearly proportioned to its superiority of population and other resources; so that upon the whole, in whatever point of view we consider the subject of national wealth, whether we suppose with the commercialists, that it is derived principally from commerce and manufactures, or with the political economists of the other sect, that the true source of it is to be found in the cultivation of the ground, we must equally allow that the present comparative superiority of our finances is of a precarious and transitory nature. But it is evident, that these two opposite systems of political economy comprehend

every object and consideration on which wealth can possibly be founded, and since they both lead to this inference, if we should choose to steer a middle course between the two, and judge, that not either of them exclusively, but both to a certain degree, are right, and that the sources of national wealth are to be sought in a modification of these systems, we must also of necessity come to the same mortifying conclusion. There appears to be therefore no doctrine or principle of reasoning, on which it must not be allowed, as I again repeat, that the revenues of the French empire may become superior to ours in nearly the same ratio of its superiority of population.

As long as the war is kept up on its present footing, whilst the very inferior fleets of our enemies are either blocked up in harbour, or obliged to confine their operations to a run from one port to another; it is evident that the advantages for forming seamen are greatly on our side, and that the crews of the privateers or of the small coasting vessels of the continent, that sneak from one anchorage to another, cannot form the ground-work of a marine capable of contending with the colossal navy of Great Britain. But our superior advantages for rearing seamen would terminate with the termination of war. The coast of Europe, from the Baltic to the Adriatic, would then be seen swarming with numerous vessels navigated by continental seamen, who, with the same experience, may be supposed

capable of acquiring equal skill with our own. Having just stated my reasons for believing, that the commerce of Europe is likely to acquire a great and decided superiority over ours; it is difficult to suppose, even making every allowance in our favour, that we shall be able hereafter, in case of some years' peace, to bring more than half the number of able seamen into competition with those of the continent. But even if we could flatter ourselves with the improbable hope, that our manufactures will always maintain their superiority over those of Europe, and that they may be allowed a free market every where; it by no means follows, that any indulgence will be extended to our navigation, the nursery and source of that naval power, which has been the main obstacle to Buonaparte's ambitious views of universal empire, and which must ever be beheld by him with a jaundiced eye, and with a heart full of envy and hatred. It may be indifferent to him or to any future ruler of France, how many weavers and button-makers are bred in Great Britain, or whether the eighteen kinds of ingenious artists, said to be employed in the manufacture of a pin for a woman's petticoat, diminish or increase in number in this country; they may even allow free vent to our wares in the French empire, on the liberal principle held by many eminent men, that the benefits of commerce are reciprocal; but the state of our navigation, and the number of our seamen, every one of whom

they must dread as the warlike follower of some future Nelson, must ever be serious objects of jealousy and alarm; and, in peace as well as in war, they will endeavour, by their internal regulations, to depress the one and to diminish the other.

If, therefore, they condescend to buy our commodities, it will be easy for them to allow them only to enter their ports in continental vessels, navigated by continental seamen. This will be the same conduct of which we ourselves showed the example, when, by our famous Navigation Act, we so much crippled the marine of our rivals the Dutch, when with a fleet equal to our own, but with inferior resources, they disputed with us the palm of naval pre-eminence. Long experience has proved the efficacy of this system; the case is exactly parallel; and it is idle to say, that any nation that has the power may not hereafter employ the same measures with equal success.

It may be said, that the British nation would not be base enough to submit to such terms, as to be allowed to supply the continent with manufactures, at the expense of our own navigation, giving up entirely the power of transporting them: but in reply it may be asked, whether it was not nearly a similar case last war, when our wares were circulated in the enemy's countries, by means of and to the exclusive encouragement of the navigation of neutral states, some of which were actually subjects or under the controul of France? and would

not this practice still exist, if Buonaparte, who admits of no half measures in war, had not cut it short?

After this example of what we have already been glad to do, from the anxiety we have of getting customers for our manufactures, by any means or channel whatever; is it to be expected that this anxiety will leave us all at once on the return of peace? Is it not on the contrary much more probable, that we shall accept the offer made us by the continent of buying our wares, even to the prejudice of our navigation, if they allow us no other alternative, on our refusing this humiliating condition, than the exclusion of both the one and the other from their ports and their markets.[1]

[1] An objection may perhaps be made to my publishing these observations as well as similar ones in the course of this Essay, which it may be said tend to point out to foreign nations the best mode of ruining our commerce and navigation. No such objection can possibly be made, by those who understand the character, or who may have perused the political and military works, of our enemies. So far from being ignorant of the British Navigation Act and other commercial or naval regulations, the best accounts of them, with the most profound observations, both upon the spirit and effect of them, are to be found in French writers. The French know perfectly well all the weak points of this country; but unfortunately we do not seem to know them ourselves; and it is surely better that they should be known, or foreseen and remedied, whilst it is not too late, than that the discovery of

We shall now proceed to consider the energy of the executive governments of the two hostile empires, and in this point of comparison, France may probably appear to possess a decided superiority.

It must certainly be allowed, that there can hardly be a finer field for exertion, nor greater encouragement held out to exalted abilities, than in this country, where there is an opening for men to advance themselves by their personal merit to the first dignities of the state. But, as the talents that lead to the greatest eminence in Great Britain, are of a nature principally parliamentary, that is to say, not such as qualify their possessors for the management of a war, but for managing parties in our senate: as eloquence, finance, and a knowledge of our domestic affairs, which may be entirely unconnected with the knowledge requisite for succeeding in external warfare, are crowned with the highest distinctions in this country; our rulers at all times may generally be supposed, from the very nature of things, somewhat deficient in the skill and energy requisite for planning and conducting warlike operations upon sound principles.

If even, as in France, where its emperor and the first dignitaries of the state are all distinguished, and

our weakness should come upon us with all its horrors, in the hour of peril, when the fate of the nation may turn upon the cast of a die.

have risen by their military skill, superior talents for war led to the first offices in England; our executive government is so much embarrassed by the necessity of maintaining parliamentary influence, and all its measures, right or wrong, are sure to be so warmly attacked by the existing opposition; that a great part of the time of his Majesty's ministers is required to be wasted in self-defence, in order to repel the incessant assaults of their parliamentary opponents, and to preserve themselves in office. Besides, in all appointments under the executive part of our government, both diplomatic and military, so great a regard is paid to parliamentary interest, which is not always united with the other necessary qualifications for these important situations, that it is universally allowed, that we have not often seen, and that we are less likely, in general, to see these offices so ably filled in the British service, as under Buonaparte. He has no professed parties to manage, no declared attacks on his measures to avert or repel, no loudly expressed popular clamours to silence, and no jarring interests to conciliate, in the appointment of his officers civil or military. He is, therefore, left free to choose only such as have the talents requisite for effectually serving him in his great object, the preservation of his own power, and the destruction of his adversaries.

But as parties must exist, and discontents will take place, in all countries, which have been reckoned by political writers always the more dan-

gerous to the executive government, in proportion to the fears of the discontented, and to the violence with which they may find themselves obliged to stifle or conceal their feelings; it is probable, that Buonaparte and his ministers may be obliged to employ a considerable portion of their time in watching over the state of public opinion in France,[1] and that their minds may be harrassed with much more anxiety on that account, than can reasonably be felt by a British

[1] When Sir John Moore's head quarters were at Mayorga, (December 26th, 1808,) the author had an opportunity of ascertaining, that this is actually true. Amongst other intercepted dispatches, was an official report from Paris, upon the state of public opinion, addressed to the emperor in person. This paper stated, "That the disaffected or desponding "were at that time spreading opinions of the most unfavour- "able nature to the success of the war in Spain. That it "was asserted, that the English would land a strong corps "in the north of the Peninsula, and would occupy such a "position near the frontiers, as to intercept the great com- "munication by way of Bayonne, so that the French armies "acting in the centre, or in other remote parts of Spain, "would run the risk of perishing for want of the necessary "supplies of every description from France, which in that "case would be completely cut off." It was also said, "that "some old prophecy was circulated amongst the people, "importing, that the first disasters that were eventually to "lead to the downfal of the French Empire were to originate "in Spain." The whole of the report was written in the most unreserved manner, and the opinions of men stated in almost as plain language, as they could be given in an English

ministry, in warding off the attacks of parliamentary opponents, in this country.

Hence, whilst we are disposed to admit the superiority which the French empire may be supposed to have over Great Britain in warlike affairs, at the present moment, owing to the absolute power possessed by its ruler, we must not carry our belief of this superiority beyond a certain limit; nor must we stop short, as is usually done by superficial reasoners, in despair and lamentation, on account of the embarrassments thrown in the way of our executive government by the nature of our constitution. When we proceed to analyze the subject a little more closely, we shall find, that war by land as well as by sea, in order to have any hopes of success, must be carried on upon the very same principles, as far as regards the deliberative part, or policy, which is the province of the statesman; we shall also find, that the executive part of war, both by land and by sea, is the same; for it must be admitted, that in order to be well conducted upon either element, it requires the very same talents and qualities in the agents employed, from the commanders in chief down to the lowest seaman

newspaper, however unpleasant they might be supposed to the feelings of Buonaparte.

Many of the intercepted papers were committed to the flames the same evening; and perhaps this report, which was examined by several officers of the staff, may have shared that fate.

or soldier in a fleet or army. Hence, if the British nation always succeeds by sea, and always fails by land; and if the French nation, on the contrary, always fails by sea, but constantly succeeds by land, the real causes of success or failure cannot, in either case, upon any sound principle of reasoning, be ascribed to the freedom of the one nation, and to the despotism of the other.

If the difficulties entailed upon the executive government of this country, by the parliamentary labours of His Majesty's ministers, were in themselves insuperable, they must of necessity have been equally pernicious to us in naval affairs, by affecting our navy as well as our army; so that we ought in all cases to have failed in war, not only by land, but by sea. Since events, however, have proved the contrary, it follows, that the difficulties, which have been obviated in one service, may with equal facility be obviated in the other, and that the superior energy of executive government, which it must be confessed that the French empire at present possesses, is no serious cause for that apprehension which it has often excited. On the contrary, it may be inferred from history, that a nation enjoying a free constitution, must sooner or later have a decided superiority, in the vigour of its executive government, over another nation not possessed of the same advantage. When a free government acts upon wise principles, whether military or political, it always preserves a permanent and medium degree

of vigour, which in critical times often rises in proportion to the danger. It is the nature of despotism, on the contrary, always to act in extremes. Under a wise, virtuous, and warlike prince, it has therefore by some philosophers been considered a happy system of government, and has by all been allowed to be the most vigorous, particularly in offensive war. But when the throne is filled by a prince of a weak or indolent character, despotism not only, as it always does, tends to break the spirit and degrade the character of a nation, but it becomes, of all forms of government, the most thoroughly impotent, and the most completely contemptible in every species of warfare. Posterity may therefore see the sceptre, now swayed by the mighty hand of Napoleon, in possession of some effeminate Arcadius ruling over a despicable herd of slaves; but, in all human probability, the fate of this country must be finally decided, before the French empire can considerably degenerate from its present vigorous and warlike character; so that if we hope for safety, we must look for it in our own wisdom and valour alone, not in the possibility of future cowardice and folly on the part of our adversaries.

For this disadvantage, which at present attends our warlike measures, we may perhaps console ourselves in the superior spirit and patriotism of the people of this country. Independent of the generous feeling of national spirit and pride, that has often been seen to animate to great exertions the

people of a state, which has held a respectable rank among the nations of the world, under a native government, however bad; we have a still more sacred and durable principle of action, which scarcely any other nation can boast; I mean that noble spirit, that additional incentive to loyalty and patriotism, which arises from the freedom of our constitution, and the impartial administration of our laws; the blessings of which come so much home to every individual amongst us, that cold indeed must be the heart, and weak the head, of him who would not undergo every danger and privation, or who would shrink at any sacrifice, for preserving them from destruction. Such, am I persuaded, would be the general feeling in England, in the event of invasion; and certainly, of all the spectacles presented by history in modern times, none, if we have the good fortune to survive the present contest, will be regarded with greater admiration by succeeding ages, than the noble effort exhibited in this island; when, at the commencement of the present war, threatened with a formidable invasion, which our ordinary military establishments were incapable of resisting, four hundred thousand Britons started at once from the various occupations of civil life, and voluntarily took up arms in defence of their country.

But whilst we allow due weight to the superior public spirit and patriotism of this country, without which indeed it will be difficult or impossible for us

to resist the power of our enemies; the natural pride, which induces every Briton to glory in this superiority, must not be carried too far. Patriotism and all other sentiments, partaking of enthusiasm, however deep and lasting their seeds may be sown in the mind, cannot be kept in a perpetual state of exaltation. They are apt to lose their force, unless strongly excited and kept alive by some urgent necessity, by some striking impulse, that comes home, not only to the head, but to the heart, and as it were, to the eyes of men. Whenever this country is invaded by a foreign army, it is to be hoped, that the force which we may have previously organized, and the resources which we may have prepared for our defence, will be used with the greatest possible energy. But if our insular situation keeps the sense of danger away from our eyes, and remote from our feelings; if invasion, the threat of which will be constantly held out, shall be delayed so long as to come to be considered a mere bravado: if the great body of the people, or their representatives, ignorant of the nature of warlike operations, of which this island happily has not lately been the scene; ignorant of what can be done, and of what cannot be done, by a country partly over-run by hostile armies, should, from popular or insular prejudices, be led to prefer some imperfect kind of military force to a much better one, under the notion that it is more constitutional; or to reject some necessary system or measures of defence, because

they shock old ideas and habits; just as if any kind of system could be considered constitutional, that was not capable of saving our country in the hour of danger: if, I say, from such feelings and prejudices, we persist in half measures, and remain contented with defective establishments, till the storm shall burst upon us all at once like a thunder-bolt; we may find, that enthusiasm however exalted, and patriotism however fervent and sincere, will not be able to command impossibilities. We may find, that brave, well organized, well disciplined armies, that strong and well provided fortresses cannot spring up all at once, like the work of magic, because a free people wills it should be so; because a people, who feels the want of them too late, who feels too late, that without them the existence of the country hangs by a thread, has been sleeping in security in the idle belief, "that a "nation of freemen, animated with a general de- "termination to resist a foreign yoke, can never "be subdued."

This maxim, which men so triumphantly apply to the prospects of this country, is one of those prejudices, which is contradicted by the testimony of all history; but which, as it flatters our comforts, our indolence, and our national pride, has been too generally received by us, and may do us infinite mischief.

If we were at this moment unprovided with ships and seamen, and our arsenals empty of naval

stores; if blest and contented in our own island, like the late unambitious, happy, and virtuous republic of Switzerland, we had been living for centuries, pitying, but never mixing in, the sanguinary wars of Europe by land and sea; till on a sudden, like the state I mentioned, we found ourselves on the point of being swallowed up by an unprincipled invader; would, I ask, our being the freest and most patriotic nation upon earth, in the case supposed, enable us to build, equip, and man a fleet, all at once capable of defending the passage of the Channel against the navy of Europe, and of preventing a disembarkation of its armies on our shores?

No one will be absurd enough to maintain so wild an opinion; and yet, if the will and enthusiasm of a free nation are not sufficient for forming a naval power, for building ships and manning them on any emergency, why should they be capable of forming suddenly a great and well organized military establishment, which must be, like the former, the result of the foresight, the labour, and experience of many years? Can fortresses, any more than ships, be built on the spur of occasion and necessity? If the being born under the most excellent and happiest government in the world cannot possibly, of itself, qualify a man for acting as an admiral, a captain, or a seaman in a fleet; is it not also absurd, to suppose this a sufficient qualification to make him start up, all at once, a general, a captain of a company, or even a good soldier on shore?

All that distinguishes a soldier in outward appearance from a citizen is so trifling; the military step, the exercise of the firelock, the words of command; every thing, in short, requisite for putting a battalion through the usual manœuvres of a review, is so simple, that any men, with good will and intelligence, may soon acquire them. Hence we have volunteer regiments all new, officers as well as men, who may appear to admiring multitudes almost as perfect under arms, as the oldest regiment of the line; and so, if the fleet of England were anchored in the Thames, the citizens of London, might in a short time be taught to work the guns, and man the decks of a line-of-battle-ship, with as much apparent spirit and alacrity as the seamen and marines of the Victory. But send these fresh-water sailors to sea, and they would scarcely be less inferior to our hardy tars, than an army, composed of such seemly officers and soldiers would and must be, at their first outset in a severe campaign, to veteran troops.

Where would be that habitual contempt of danger and of death, so foreign to the feelings of civil life? where would be that implicit respect, and that unbounded obedience, to the will of superior officers? where would be that ardent spirit to attack, that unconquerable firmness in defeat and calamity, derived from the mutual confidence, which all ranks have in each other? where would be the minds broken in and prepared to bear all the extremities

of hardship, wounds and disease, often without shelter, attendance, or even pity?

These are the only qualities that constitute soldiers, and form an army deserving of the name, and as these, like the merits of the mathematician or philosopher, cannot be estimated by outward show, although they are only to be acquired by the stern unrelenting discipline and constant habits of years; it may be pardonable for a people, whose country, happily for them, has not been a prey to the calamities of war, and who therefore cannot truly judge of the nature and duties of the military life, to entertain the pleasing fancy, that as they have the good will, they have at any time the power of rivalling the exertions of the veteran soldier in its defence, whose garb and outward appearance they may in a few months assume.

The idea, "That a great nation determined to "be free can never be subdued; that a band of "free men is equal to a host of slaves; and that "the satellites of despotism, however disciplined, "are ultimately to be destroyed by the generous "efforts and invincible spirit of a patriot army;" may be very suitable to poetry, and pleasing in the mouth of a tragic hero; and like the maxim believed by the common people of this country, "That one Englishman is equal to two foreigners," it may even be useful in some cases; but it is in reality no less devoid of truth, and should equally

be banished, with contempt, by all just reasoners on the defence of states.

The page of history exhibits to nations, if they could attend to it without being deluded by vanity and pride, the instructive lesson, of one state constantly overpowering another, not by superior freedom, virtue, and patriotism; for the free, the corrupted, and the enslaved have equally flourished, and equally fallen in their turns; but by having more numerous, braver, better organized, and better commanded armies, with a more vigorous system of martial policy, and a better mode of repairing disasters in war.

In reading the eloquent descriptions of the writers of antiquity, who were all either citizens or passionate admirers of free states; we are apt, in the natural admiration of virtue and patriotism, which every generous mind must feel, to dwell upon the triumphs of Marathon and Salamis, and, like their venerable narrators, to ascribe these victories to the freedom of the conquerors; but we forget the downfal of the free states of Greece, by the arms of the Macedonian monarch. The destruction of the Persian empire is attributed to the despotism of its government; but we forget that the Parthians, possessing only a part of that empire, and having just as little pretension to political freedom as their predecessors, baffled or destroyed the Roman legions in the brightest epoch

of their military skill and valour. We are apt to dream, that as the citizens of Greece and Rome went into the field equal or superior to their adversaries, so would the citizens of England, who are equally free; but we forget that in Greece and Rome, all the citizens were exercised to arms and military manœuvres from their youth; they were engaged in constant wars, generally in their own country; and their discipline, at least that of the latter, was more rigorous than the discipline even of our regular army; so that, when attacked, they met invasion with well-trained warlike troops. Their citizens were in fact almost all soldiers, and nothing else; but the citizens of England are either men living on their income, men of learned and studious professions, or traders, farmers, artificers, and labourers, and would go into the field, on their first essay in arms, no soldiers in any sense of the word.

In modern times we console ourselves, by the example of our revolted colonies in North America, who were able eventually to succeed, in asserting their independence against the efforts made to keep them in subjection. But we forget the grand causes of their success; the feeble and temporizing half measures employed by our government; the smallness of the force sent, and the great distance from whence it was to receive its supplies; as well as the general inactivity of our commanders, added to the combination of other nations more powerful than ourselves in their

favour, and for which we were scarcely a match, if America had been out of the question. We look to the success of the French, when animated by the spirit of liberty, in repelling the combination formed against them; but we forget that France had, at the commencement of the revolutionary war, a large regular army, and was covered by an almost impenetrable frontier, strongly fortified both by art and nature. We forget that the greatest successes and aggrandizement of the French, with the most decided superiority of their military force over that of their neighbours, have taken place, since they have lost even the shadow and hopes of freedom. We forget the fate of the Belgic provinces, and of Poland, in their late struggles for independence, in spite of all the patriotism displayed by the natives of these countries. We forget that eighty thousand Russians were routed by a small corps of Swedes at Narva, and that these cowardly fugitives, in a few years afterwards, became the bravest troops in Europe. Was it that the Russians at Narva were slaves, but had afterwards become free men at the battle of Pultowa? Was the superior prowess of the Swedes then occasioned, by the recollection that they were citizens of a free state, under Charles the Twelfth, who is said to have sent word to the senate of his country, that he would depute one of his boots to preside in their assembly? [1]

[1] Charles XII, étant à Bender, trouvant quelque resistance dans le sénat de Suede, écrivit qu'il leur enverroit une de ses

If liberty is, of itself, to do so much in war, how came it that the same Swedes, who under that despotic Charles had been so formidable in Europe, when they had afterwards abolished despotism, and established a limited monarchy in its place, and remained in possession of the very same resources as before, proved completely impotent and contemptible in war? How came it that the free descendants of these warlike slaves lost their military character; and, when they joined in the coalition against the king of Prussia, instead of carrying terror into the heart of Germany, as in their former wars, confined their efforts to the defence of a corner of Pomerania, miserably skulking behind the walls of their fortresses?[1] Did not Prussia, under Frederick the Great, make a successful struggle against an immense superiority of force; yet where was the free government that Prussia could boast of at that period? Had she not a Trenck immured in her dungeons, at the time when her heroic military efforts were the admiration of the world? In our own times were not the same Prussians at Jena defeated and dispersed by Buonaparte, with scarcely a shadow of resistance, although their country has

bottes pour commander. Cette botte auroit commandé comme un roi despotique. (De l'Esprit des Lois, l. v. c. xiv.)

[1] Montalembert's Letters give a striking picture of Swedish affairs at that period.

neither lost nor gained in political freedom, since their fathers drove the French before them, with almost as little difficulty, in the battle of Rôsbach?[1]

Since then, nations, which have either been free, or have been animated with the most enthusiastic desire of liberty, have often been subdued, or kept in subjection, by foreign armies; since nations, that have been formidable in war under an absolute government, have even sometimes become insignificant when they had acquired a more free one; and since the armies of the same nation have, without any change of constitution or domestic government whatever, been at one time almost invincible, and at another time cowardly and contemptible; it is evident, that we ought not to lay too great a stress upon the freedom of any nation, which is a secondary consideration in war; unless its rulers have the wisdom to plan, and possess, or are entrusted with, full powers for enforcing the most

[1] It is curious to look back to the utter contempt, which the Prussians of those days entertained for the French army. Tempelhof, in relating a dashing enterprize of fifteen hundred cavalry, who drove eight thousand French out of Gotha, enumerates amongst the prisoners made by the Prussians, a number of actors, lacqueys, cooks, friseurs, milliners, &c. and amongst the booty all manner of scents and essences, besides powdering gowns, parasols, ruffles, parrots, &c. provided by the French officers to please the ladies! (Geschichte des Sieben-jährigen Krieges. *Erster Theil*, 231 Times are now wonderfully altered.

effectual measures, in order to ensure its success; unless, in short, its military institutions and policy are equal or superior to those of its enemies.

We must, therefore, whilst we glory in the freedom, the public spirit, and patriotism of this country, not give way to the empty delusion, that by them alone we are to be invincible. It is our duty to make preparations for fully meeting invasion, exactly such as any other government, that had no confidence in the patriotism of its subjects, would make. Then, when the day of invasion arrives, the enthusiasm of the nation will be an useful aid, and may accelerate or contribute to the success of measures wisely planned.

But if, previous to invasion, we trust to enthusiasm in itself, as a great or principal agent of defence, it will do us infinitely more harm than good, by inducing us to relax, instead of increasing the vigour of, our preparatory measures; whereby we shall lose all the advantages of patriotism, which, it is evident, cannot be of the smallest utility in war, as long as it is confined to speeches and sentiments, and does not lead to action. Besides this great evil, I need scarcely add, that the self-sufficiency and confidence derived from this kind of enthusiasm, which induces men to over-rate their own powers, in looking forward to situations, in which they have not been tried, and to under-value the force and powers of unknown enemies, is, of all other feelings, when the hour of trial comes, the most likely,

on the least unexpected reverse, to sink into panic terror, and despondency.

Having thus, to the best of my judgment, taken an impartial view of the force, resources, and energy of the French and British empires, and considered what probable variations may ensue hereafter in the several objects of comparison: let us now turn our attention to the important question, whether we have any just grounds for believing or hoping, that we shall always preserve our naval superiority over the French empire? a question, in which our reasoning must be founded upon the foregoing comparative view.

Ships (it will be allowed by every one) are an article of expense. Of two hostile empires, therefore, the power that has, and is likely in future to have most money, in order to buy materials and naval stores, and to employ most shipwrights, will be able to build and equip most ships. I have already shown that that power is France.

The power that has the greatest population can put most men into its ships after they are built; and that which rears most seamen by its ordinary commercial navigation during peace, will be able most speedily to man its fleets with good sailors at the commencement of a war, and most readily to replace their loss during its continuance. That power is, or will be, France.

That the French empire, therefore, with so decided a superiority, in every point upon which

naval power is founded, and with a more vigorous executive government, may be able in the course of time to equip a navy of more than double in force to ours, manned by seamen equally or nearly as skilful;[x] and that consequently we are likely eventually to lose the empire of the seas; (for the most enthusiastic admirer of British valour must confess, that it could hardly resist such fearful odds,) appear to my mind propositions almost demonstrated. They are propositions which would never have been doubted in this country, until we

[x] Most men in this country, and even some foreigners, dazzled by the splendour of our present naval greatness, do actually believe, or are inclined to believe, that superior seamanship is, as it were, the exclusive privilege of Englishmen; and that, by some kind of instinct, men born in the British islands must always be more skilful mariners, than men born in other countries. This supposition is not however justified by the experience either of the present or of former times. The Dutch were formerly our superiors in naval skill. The French and Spaniards, in the American war, were reckoned equal to us in point of seamanship. The Danish and American seamen, even now, are by many considered nearly equal to our own. The Greeks and some other Mediterranean seamen possess a degree of spirit, activity, and skill, which might, if they adopted square-rigged vessels, render them equally fit for the navigation of the ocean, alike respectable and formidable both in commerce and in war. Some amongst the best seamen in His Majesty's navy are at this moment foreigners, as is allowed by several officers, and which every one, who has often been on board British ships of war, may have observed.

became blinded by our late uninterrupted career of naval glory and success. The resources of the house of Bourbon, before the French revolution broke out, were not much more than half of the resources of the French empire in its present state; and they ought to be estimated still lower in relative force, owing to the strength of the other vigorous and independent continental nations, by which France was then surrounded. Yet in the year 1780, when, on the opening of parliament, ministers were violently attacked, for having, in the course of the preceding summer, allowed the enemy's fleets to gain a superiority in the British channel, Lord North repelled the charge of neglect and mismanagement, and justified the conduct of administration, on the fair and manly ground, "That it was "absolutely impossible for Great Britain, by any "exertions whatever, to maintain a decided naval "superiority over France and Spain combined."[1]

[1] This minister stated, (in the abstract of the debates given in the Annual Register for 1780,) "That it was impossible "for Great Britain alone to oppose an equal number of ships "to the whole united force of the house of Bourbon; but if "she even equalled or exceeded them in point of numbers, "still the wide arrangement of her naval service, which was "indispensably necessary for the protection of her numerous, "exposed and remote dependencies, must at any rate, not-"withstanding any skill or judgment in the disposition, afford "an opportunity to the enemy of obtaining a superiority in "some particular port."

The truth of his lordship's assertion, for true it is, as any man who reflects upon past history must admit, was scarcely questioned at that time, even by men of the opposite party. If, therefore, our senators of those days could have foreseen the vast increase of force now acquired by our enemies, would they not have treated any man as an idle dreamer, who should have speculated upon our being able, with our present resources, to preserve the sovereignty of the seas, against such a colossal empire, for any length of time?

" Even in the time of Louis the Fourteenth, France had a decided naval pre-eminence in Europe; and her officers, in their contests with the fleets of other nations, seem to have felt a sense of superiority, and to have possessed a spirit of daring enterprize, similar to that which now distinguishes the British Navy. The following quotation from the Abbé Raynal, describing the rise and fall of the maritime power of France, is well worthy of our serious consideration; for what has once been done may be done again; and what has happened to one nation may to another.

" Louis, qui saisissoit, du moins, toutes les idées de grandeur " qu'il n'enfantoit pas, établit un conseil de construction dans " chacun des cinq ports, qu'il ouvrit à la marine royale ou " militaire. Il créa des chantiers et des arsenaux. En moins " de vingt ans, la France eut cent vaisseaux de ligne.

" Les forces s'essayerent d'abord contre les Barbaresques, " qui furent châtiés. Ensuite elles firent baisser le pavillon à " l'Espagne. Delà, se mesurant avec les flottes, tantôt séparées, tantôt combinées, de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande,

If my reader will therefore enter into the subject of this chapter, with the same unprejudiced spirit, with which his father would have viewed the question thirty or forty years ago, or with which a German or an American may now view it, he will probably own, that the conquests of the French by land, which add to the power and resources of their empire in every respect, may be compared to the growth of a goodly tree upon a mountain, which, as its trunk and branches increase in size and beauty, sinkes its roots deeper and wider into the

" presque toujours elles emporterent l'honneur et l'avantage " du combat. La première défaite mémorable, qu'essuya la " marine Françoise, fut en 1692, lorsqu'avec quarante vais- " seaux elle attaqua vis-a-vis de la Hogue quatre-vingt-dix " vaisseaux Anglois et Hollandois, &c.

" Depuis cette journée, la France vit décliner ses forces " navales, qui ne se sont pas rétablies.

" L'Angleterre prit dès-lors une supériorité, qui l'a portée " au comble de la prospérité. Une nation, qui se voit aujour- " d'hui la première sur toutes les mers, s'imagine aisément " qu'elle y a eu toujours de l'empire. Tantôt elle fait remonter " sa puissance maritime jusqu'au temps de César; tantôt elle " veut avoir regné sur l'océan du moins au neuvieme siecle. " Peut-être un jour les Corses, qui ne sont rien, quand ils seront " devenus un peuple maritime, écriront et liront dans leurs " fastes, qu'ils ont toujours dominé sur la Mediterranée. Telle " est la vanité de l'homme; il a besoin d'aggrandir son néant " dans le passé comme dans l'avenir. La vérité seule, qui vit " avant et après les nations, dit qu'il n'y a point eu de marine " en Europe, depuis l'ere Chrétienne jusqu'au seizième siècle." —(*Hist. Phil. et Pol. &c. Liv.* xix.)

earth; whilst, on the contrary, the naval power of Great Britain, which has been founded upon an extraordinary series of victories, that do, in themselves, add nothing permanent to the resources of the nation, resembles an oak planted in a flower-pot, which, the more rapidly it increases in size, beauty and apparent strength, is only hastening so much the sooner to the period of it final decay and dissolution.

CHAPTER III.

Of Colonies:—the importance of various kinds of colonial and insular dependencies estimated:—that the greatest insular empire, which can be formed, could not preserve a naval superiority over the continent of Europe.

In the comparative view of the force and resources of the French and British Empires, given in the preceding chapters, I said nothing of our numerous colonies in various parts of the globe. These were omitted for the more easily simplifying the subject, and partly from a wish to simplify it, partly from a belief, that our foreign possessions in general do not add greatly to our power; and that some of them may even tend, now, or hereafter, to diminish the strength of the country. In entering into a discussion of the reasons, which led me to form such an opinion, the nature and value of colonies shall first be estimated, by considering them simply and singly by themselves, distinct from all other objects. This is perhaps the only way, by which it can be fairly determined, what effects they may produce upon

the military strength of a nation. If this question should be determined in a way unfavourable to the policy of indiscriminately multiplying the number of colonial possessions; a second question will arise, whether there may not be good and strong reasons, at all times, for occupying some colonies, notwithstanding the disadvantages attending them; and, whether a nation may not be placed under such peculiar circumstances, at some particular period, as may considerably palliate or lessen the evil effects, which numerous colonies, of a certain description, may appear generally to produce, by weakening the strength of a state? Such is the mode in which it is proposed to examine our colonial system, and it may be hoped, that we shall be enabled to form a judgment sufficiently accurate, upon the true merits of that system, without entering into any detailed statements or investigations of the amount of the revenue and resources of each of the numberless settlements that contribute to compose our great colonial empire.

Let us go back to the state of Europe before the commencement of the French revolution, and suppose, that Great Britain and France, with the same natural and internal resources which they possessed at that period, had been both without colonies; and in point of naval power, commerce, and manufactures exactly equal. Let us suppose that, under such circumstances, both nations foresaw and prepared themselves for a furious contest, such as

afterwards took place. Great Britain, by a vigorous administration of her revenue, might then, no doubt, have set on foot a regular army and war-militia, of at least three hundred thousand effective men;[1] of which from the state of Europe at the time, one half would have been fully adequate for home defence. Hence she might have had a disposable force of one hundred and fifty thousand men, with which she might act in foreign countries; such a force as might have decided the fate of continental warfare. Her friendship would therefore have been courted and her enmity feared, by the whole world, whilst her own domestic safety would have stood on the firmest basis. Such being the state of affairs, let us imagine the trumpet of general war to sound in Europe, and let us suppose that whilst France, as she did, directed the principal efforts of her armies to the subjugation of the other continental nations, Great Britain, on the contrary, was actuated chiefly by the wish of acquiring colonies; and that, by a vigorous employment of her military forces, she would have fully succeeded in the attainment of that object, and become the mistress of thirty such islands and

[1] That this supposition is not too far stretched, will appear, by looking back to the great army, formerly kept on foot by Prussia, a country inferior to Great Britain in resources of every kind, and absolutely without commerce and manufactures.

fortresses as Minorca, Malta, Lampedosa, Corfu, Zante, Procida, Capri, Gibraltar, Ceuta, Madeira, Teneriffe, Porto Rico, Nevis, Tortola, &c. &c.

It is well known, that such possessions as I have just enumerated, do seldom or never, of themselves, afford a revenue more than sufficient to pay the expenses of their civil government; nor can their population add in any material degree to the strength of the warlike establishments of the mother-country; the utmost which it can do, and that only, in cases when the inhabitants are so much attached to their rulers as to disregard the risk of the loss of their private property, being the assistance of a few battalions of raw volunteers in case of actual attack. Hence all the charges, of maintaining the necessary number of troops, as well as of the construction and repair of works of fortification, which may be equally indispensable for their security, will fall a dead burden upon the mother-country. In the supposition of naval power on both sides being equal, the ordinary garrisons, for the defence of each of these possessions, could hardly be averaged at less than five thousand men. We might therefore, after the acquisition of thirty such islands and fortresses, instead of gaining any additional strength, entirely lose the use of a force of one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, that might be required to defend them; and as much of our revenue, as was necessary for paying this great body of troops, would be swallowed up and lost to all

other national purposes. But, if we suppose, in which I believe we shall by no means under-rate the advantages of such possessions, that the beneficial effects, which they, by their own intrinsic resources, can produce upon our commerce and manufactures, may be so great, as to enable us to pay fifteen thousand men more, with them, than we could have done without them: still it is evident, even in this more favourable view of the subject, that such colonies would lead to the pernicious consequence of reducing our disposable force from one hundred and fifty thousand men, to one third of that number.

Hence, keeping always in mind the hypothesis, under which we have been reasoning; after both nations should have fully succeeded in their respective objects, when France might find herself, in consequence, at liberty to employ her superior armies, swelled by the conquest of Europe, in an attack upon Great Britain, which her naval power (by supposition equal to our own) would enable her to carry into effect; it would be no difficult task for her, to overpower the portion of our army, to which we had reduced our military establishment at home; whilst we could derive no assistance from the remaining part of it, parcelled out into small garrisons, divided from the mother-country, and from each other, by the sea. Such is nearly the system we have been pursuing, and such has been the tendency of it, since the great change in

Europe occasioned by the French revolution took place: the annihilation of a part of our disposable military force; impotency in all the grand objects of warfare not connected with maritime power; disappointment in all our expeditions, whenever we have aimed at more than the attack of an island; want of confidence on the part of our allies; and a certain degree of contempt on the part of our enemies; of whose progressive aggrandizement to the gigantic degree of power, which they now possess, our colonial policy has caused us to remain almost passive spectators.

If the insecurity of such possessions, as those of which we have just been treating, has not yet been felt, it has hitherto been thrown into the back ground, solely by the superiority of our naval power. But when the fleets of the French empire shall hereafter be able, once more, to meet us on equal terms upon the ocean, that very moment, all the petty colonial possessions, which we have been so painfully acquiring, will lie open to invasion; and, whether my estimate of their importance be deemed right or wrong, it will equally be allowed, that they, with all the advantages and inconveniences attending them, must inevitably fall into the hands of an enemy, who will be able to spare infinitely more troops, both for the attack and defence of them, than we shall be able to afford; so that, with the exception of two or three places of great intrinsic strength, such as Malta and

Gibraltar, which can hardly be wrested from us, till the enemy shall have gained so decided a naval superiority, as to cut off supplies of provisions from them, the rest of the frail fabric of our colonial power, as far as it is founded upon such possessions, may be expected, in a short time after it is once in danger, to fall entirely to pieces.

Whilst colonies, in general, have always been considered beneficial to the commerce of a nation, this advantage, as I have shown, may be dearly purchased by the state of weakness, to which some kinds of them may reduce a nation engaged in foreign war. But there are colonies of another description, by the possession of which, a nation may not lose, but gain, in strength and resources. I mean such large, fertile, and populous ultramarine possessions, or islands, as can afford a revenue more than sufficient for paying the expenses of their civil government, and of their ordinary garrisons, both in peace and war; and which, by their population, can materially assist in manning the fleets and recruiting the armies of the mother-country. Such are our East Indian possessions; such would our North American colonies have been, if, by a mixture of greater moderation in our councils, with greater vigour in our military operations, we had succeeded in preserving them in obedience. Such would Egypt also be to any country that should occupy it.

Colonies on this great scale have a further advantage, that their security is, in some degree, independent of naval power; for their intrinsic strength and resources are such, that if the mother country rule them in a wise and equitable manner, so as to give the natives, in general, no cause to desire a change of masters; and should have taken proper steps for forming these natives into good soldiers when necessary; the conquest of them, by a foreign nation, although considerably superior in military force, and equal by sea, may be an enterprize of great hazard and difficulty. Before this object could be finally accomplished, the warfare might be protracted through several campaigns; and the assailant might be obliged to employ such great armies, and such a profusion of means in the contest, as might expose him to considerable danger from the revolt of some discontented province at home, or from the attack of a third power on his own frontiers.

The truth of these observations was fully proved in the seven years' war, when we succeeded in driving the French out of North America; which, it may be allowed, we hardly could have done, since we had no decided naval superiority at that period, if the people of our colonies had not entered into the contest, with as much spirit as ourselves. The immense military force, which we have created in India, out of the natives of that country, who, like the people of all countries, may be made formida-

ble, or at least respectable in war, by a government that chooses to adopt a judicious system for the purpose, is another proof of the great strength that may be derived from possessions of this kind, when properly managed. But it is to be observed, that all distant colonies must be weak, when attacked, unless their resources of every kind have been fully and skilfully appropriated to the purposes of defence; and the natives will, in all cases, as they cannot possibly be actuated by the strong incentive of national pride, take little concern in the contest; unless their existing government should have shown a fellow feeling for their prosperity, or should have given them reason to believe, that it acts, upon the whole, with more justice and moderation towards its subjects, than has been or would be shown, under the same circumstances, by its adversary.

If Egypt, which I have instanced as a colony of this kind, was reduced in one short campaign, after it was occupied by the French; it was, because they had not full time, nor (by reason of the destruction of their fleet) proper means, for taking advantage of the population and other resources of that country; the former remaining hostile to them in their sentiments; and the latter, from circumstances, in a confused and disorganized state. Yet the capability of maintaining so great an army, without any considerable supplies from France, is a pretty solid proof of intrinsic value; and if circumstances had permitted the French to conciliate,

arm and discipline the peasants of that country,[1] its intrinsic strength might have been no less apparent.

Another instance of a colony, which, if wisely administered, would add to the military strength and resources of any power that possessed it, is Sicily. But the alliance of that country cannot be said to be of any benefit to us at present. Sicily has for some time past swallowed up fifteen thousand excellent troops, British, or foreign under British discipline and in British pay. We moreover expend upon Sicily, by way of subsidy to the court of Palermo, as much of the revenue of the nation, as would probably pay another little army of ten thousand men; so that, in the light in which I consider the subject, we lose entirely by Sicily the use of a disposable force of twenty-five thousand men; and it may be asked, for what?

Is the advantage derived from that island, to our commerce and manufactures, a national compensation, sufficient to counterbalance so great a national sacrifice? Is the enrichment of half a dozen master-manufacturers, with the employment afforded to a few hundred, or say a few thousand workmen at Birmingham and Manchester, an advantage worth

[1] They could only have done this by drawing large sums of money from France, which being out of their power, their own army was as much as they possibly could maintain in Egypt. And even that could not have been done without grievously oppressing the natives.

purchasing so dear? When the people of England see the opulent tradesmen, whom I have just mentioned, roll past in their carriages, emulating the splendour of our ancient nobility; and glory in the fine effect produced by such possessions on our public prosperity; let them recollect, that, but for Sicily, we might have added twenty-five thousand men to Sir John Moore's army in Spain; in which case he might have fearlessly attacked either Soult or Buonaparte, and might have destroyed either the one or the other, if they had dared to wait for him. It may be said, that Buonaparte in that case would not have ventured to divide his force; granted: but under the same supposition, Sir John Moore need not have remained so long in a seeming state of indecision and uncertainty; Buonaparte's operations would have been less bold, or at least less decisive and less successful; ours might have been more so; in short, the whole campaign might have changed its face.

In establishing a colonial empire, therefore, which has been, and will probably still be, a favourite object of this country, our aim should be to grasp at great possessions, like those which I have last mentioned, that would add to our resources and military force, instead of annihilating a great portion of both. But as long as we hold Sicily, or any other similar possession, of however great intrinsic value it may be, without applying its revenue and resources to our own purposes, in return for the

protection which we afford to it, it can only be compared to a mill-stone round our necks. It would be much better for this country, as things are at present, that Sicily were sunk at the bottom of the ocean. In our passion to keep the French out of it, we act exactly like the dog in the manger. If this system could, however, in the least contribute eventually to prevent the purposes of France, our disinterestedness and generosity to the court of Palermo would be deserving of the highest encomiums; but it is evident that, in the end, we cannot possibly hope to make any impression on the power of an increasing enemy, by acting in a way that so much enfeebles our own.

Even if we pursued a better system of policy, and looked more to our own interests, and to our future preservation, in the acquisition of colonies; it is to be observed, that of all kinds of empires, of equal resources, a colonial and insular empire is generally the weakest; its force being always divided; and the increase of its force (divided as it is) not bearing by any means the same ratio to its increase of magnitude; which is nearly the case, at least to a certain extent, with an empire increasing by conquests made upon its own frontiers, or on some great continent.

The first of these disadvantages, attending a colonial and insular empire, will scarcely be disputed; the second will be understood, and indeed both will be put in the clearest point of view, by

considering the great difference that would take place, in the power added to Great Britain, by the acquisition of such an island as Sicily, under two different suppositions.

First, That it were added to the British empire, as a distant colony.

Secondly, That it could, by any miracle of nature, be annexed to Great Britain itself, so as to form an integral part of our territory.

In the first case, a regular army of a sufficient strength must always be kept up; and a separate civil government, which would also be absolutely necessary, must be maintained, in the distant possession. A great part of the resources added to the British empire by a colony of that nature, must therefore be absorbed in the defence of the colony itself; for which object, as circumstances became more or less critical, exactly so much more or less must be deducted from the disposable force of the empire.

If on the contrary, according to the second supposition, such an island as Sicily could miraculously be added to Great Britain itself; it would not so materially increase the extent of the country, as to require a much greater army for home defence, than would have been necessary without it; and a separate civil government would be quite superfluous. Hence in this second case, in which the island acquired would be to Great Britain exactly on the same footing, as an acquisition made by conquest

upon a land frontier; almost the whole of the revenue, of the population, and of all the other resources of the new possession, might be fairly added to the disposable force of the British empire.

The superiority, however, in point of strength, which an increasing continental power will generally have over another power of equal resources, increasing in the same ratio, by ultramarine conquests, cannot hold good, in all cases, beyond a certain extent. After a continental empire has attained a certain magnitude, great chains of mountains, extensive forests, or deserts will interpose themselves; which may form greater obstacles to its farther progress, than the sea; and may be more prejudicial than that element could possibly be, to the security of all conquests made beyond such natural barriers; when vigorously attacked by a rival power, whose resources may, from geographical position, be more free and unembarrassed. If we could imagine, for instance, that, at any future period, the natives of Italy could be again united into one vigorous and warlike state, like the Roman commonwealth;* whilst all the rest of Europe, excepting Great Britain, should be split into weak, ignorant, and barbarous governments, ruling over

* This has been a favourite wish, and has afforded constant subject for speculation, amongst the modern Italians. The concluding chapter of Machiavel's Prince, intitled, "Esortazione a liberare la Italia da i barbari," is to this effect.

nations effeminate and divided: If Italy and Britain, such being the state of things, should both contend with equal ambition, and with equal energy, for the empire of the world, as the natural resources of the two countries are nearly equal, and the sea would be common to both, our posterity would, in Spain, enter the lists upon equal terms with their adversaries; but, in France, when we compare the difficulties of the passage of the Alps with that of the channel, the British would possess a decided superiority, in their supposed military struggle, over the descendants of the Romans. Even at this moment, the Pyrenees, and the various mountains in the interior of Spain, with the general badness of the roads, present obstacles so formidable to the operations of the French in that country; which affect us, whose supplies and movements are facilitated by our command at sea, in so much less a degree, that this advantage on our side, skilfully turned to account, might render a British army in Spain equal to a much greater body of French troops.

The strength of an Empire, composed of several islands or possessions divided from each other by the sea, will be further modified by the geographical position of its respective parts. The union of Great Britain and Ireland is, for instance, rendered by nature as strong as can well be imagined; since mutual aid and supplies may be transmitted from one island to the other, if either were invaded,

with great facility; nor could the communication well be cut off, even by an enemy considerably superior by sea. Consequently the united strength of the two islands, may appear little inferior to that of one great island, equal in resources to both.

Upon the same principle, the strength of an empire of any kind, whether insular or continental, will be greater or less, with equal resources, in proportion to the facility with which its several parts can afford each other mutual assistance when attacked; and to the difficulty which an enemy may find, in supplying and supporting his invading force. These circumstances will depend upon the length of march, and difficulties of movement and subsistence, in war by land, and upon length of voyage by sea. Considering the subject in this view, it would appear, that, if France and England were exactly equal in naval and military power, and no third nation interfered, they would carry on an insular warfare, in the East and West Indies, upon equal terms; but in the Mediterranean, France would have a decided advantage.

A power founded upon an accumulation of islands is therefore weak, not only in proportion to the multiplicity of its component parts, but to the length of voyage between each of them and the great island, that may be considered as the mother country of the whole. Hence it may appear, that there is no extent to which we could possibly increase our insular empire, that would place it in permanent

security against the other European nations united under one government. Our adversaries cannot, from the nature of things, always continue completely impotent in maritime affairs; so that, when once able to show themselves in force upon the ocean, they could never want opportunities, at some future period, of attacking us to our disadvantage; for the whole of our weak points could not be, at all times, sufficiently guarded; and as their naval power gradually increased, they might follow up their colonial enterprises with increasing vigour and success.

Now the most passionate admirer of colonies will perhaps hardly assert, that the resources, afforded by our East Indian possessions (although strong themselves against invasion), or which may be afforded by further acquisitions, in the eastern hemisphere, or in the Pacific Ocean, could have any great influence in offensive or defensive war, in Europe, or even in the West Indies. But as some of my readers may not readily be disposed to believe, that our colonies, in general, add so little to the strength of the empire, or that we hold them on so precarious a tenure, as would appear from the above observations; let us wave this question for the moment, and, reasoning on the same grounds with the most strenuous advocates of a colonial system, let us suppose, that we should hereafter augment the number of our insular dependencies to the utmost, and that it were fair to reckon all additions of this

kind (with the exception of those very remote possessions which have just been mentioned) as so much positive strength, without making any deduction whatever from their value.

Viewing the subject in this light, as the total population of the Mediterranean islands cannot much exceed three millions and a quarter of people:[1] as that of all the Baltic and other northern islands (including Iceland and the Ferroes) may scarcely amount to seven hundred thousand:[2] and as the

[1] Sicily is supposed to contain 1,500,000 people: Sardinia, 456,990: Corsica, 166,813: the Balearic islands, 167,000: Malta and Gozo, about 80,000: Corfu, 70,000: Cefalonia, 70,000: Leucadia, or Santa Maura, 6,000: Ithaca, 3,000: Crete, 300,000: Cyprus, by one account, 50,000: by another, 100,000: Scio, by one account, 60,000: by another, 113,000: Rhodes, 30,000: Santorin, 10,000. The accounts of the population of the rest of the Mediterranean islands, and even, as it appears, of some which I have enumerated, are imperfect, vague or discordant: but from the best information, which I have been able to procure, I consider myself warranted in believing, that the estimate given in the text, for the total amount of insular population in that part of the world, will be nearly correct.

[2] According to Boetticher's Tables, the Danish islands in the Baltic contain 497,252 inhabitants. Cronstadt has been supposed to contain 60,000 people; but it must be observed, that these are principally seamen, or others in actual employment under the Russian government, serving in the ships of war, or in the dock yards, &c.: a great influx of mariners of all nations, trading with Russia, also swells the population of

West Indies, even before the dreadful contests in St. Domingo took place, which, with the other events of the last and present wars, may probably have considerably reduced their population, cannot be supposed to have contained more than one million and three quarters of people, computing free men and slaves, of all colours, indiscriminately;[1] we

Cronstadt; the natives of this small island itself perhaps not forming one tenth part of the whole. Oeland is said to contain 8,000, and Aland 9,000 inhabitants. I have at present no precise information as to the population of the other Baltic islands. Iceland contains 50,000, and the Ferro isles 5,000 inhabitants.

[1] Mr. Pinkerton, who quotes his authorities, and the periods at which the various estimates were made, states (in his Modern Geography), "That the population of the French "part of St. Domingo was formerly supposed to amount to "520,000 souls: Cuba was supposed to contain 300,000: "Jamaica, 280,000: or according to another account, "325,000: Porto Rico, 10,000: Grenada, 19,493: St. "Christopher's, 30,300: Nevis, 10,600: Antigua, 40,398: "Tortola, 10,200: Martinique, 88,870: Guadaloupe, "101,971." Barbadoes (according to Guthrie) contains 79,120. The proportion of West Indian population not included in the above, could hardly, I should think, have swelled the total amount to more than one million and three quarters. The revolution that established an independent black government in St. Domingo, and the great body of the natives of all the other islands being slaves, render, it will be evident, our own possessions in the West Indies, as well as those of any other civilized power, weak against invasion. Otherwise, the West Indies, if inhabited by free men, and

shall find, that the whole of this motley and heterogeneous mass, if added to Great Britain and Ireland, would only increase the force of population, which we have to oppose to more than seventy millions of souls united under Buonaparte, from fifteen to not quite twenty-one millions of people. Without entering into any new discussions as to revenue, &c. which would be nothing more than a repetition of the principles, upon which we reasoned in the last chapter; we must therefore be forced to draw the same inference, that resulted from our former more limited view of the subject; namely, that although Great Britain were, at this moment, literally queen of the islands of the world, and absolute mistress of them all, we could still entertain no just grounds for hoping, that by means of the resources of such an insular dominion, however well organized, we could possibly preserve a naval superiority, for more than a limited period, against the vastly greater power and resources of the other states of Europe, forming a great continental empire, with France at its head.

To proceed with what yet remains undiscussed of our present subject; we shall next observe, that when colonies are so poor, as not to be able to make good to the mother country the expenses of

united either under a native or foreign government, to which they were attached, would offer by no means an easy conquest.

maintaining them, the only good reasons that can be given for occupying them, must be of a nature almost purely military. The principal and perhaps the only case, that can render the possession of such colonies at all desirable, or their subjection to the enemy a matter of serious regret, is when they can be considered good naval stations; which implies a safe and commodious shelter for the warlike and commercial fleets of a nation, as well as a convenient place of arms for the assembly of its military expeditions.

In order to illustrate the manner, in which the importance of a possession of this kind ought to be estimated, let us suppose that we had at this moment no footing in the Mediterranean; and that it were absolutely necessary for us, as a maritime power, to occupy one or more points in that part of the world; and that circumstances rendered it practicable for us to establish ourselves where we pleased; Malta and Minorca might probably be amongst the first that would draw our attention; and in deciding between these, and the several other naval stations that might present themselves, of which I shall only select one more for the sake of comparison, we should be guided by the three following considerations.

First, the nature and extent of the anchorage that they could afford. Minorca and Malta have both excellent harbours: they have also dock-yards, with every thing requisite for the repair of ships,

except dry docks:[1] but a fleet cannot get out of Mahon harbour with a south-east, nor out of the port of Malta with a north-east, wind.

Arsachina Bay, with the rest of the anchorage formed between the coast of Sardinia, and the Magdalen Islands[2] in the straits of Bonifacio, offers shelter to a still greater fleet, than could be accommodated in the ports either of Malta or Minorca; and it has two entrances, so that ships anchored

[1] The construction and repairs of dry docks are peculiarly difficult and expensive, where there are no tides. Toulon is the only place in the Mediterranean, to the best of my information, that has dry docks.

[2] The Magdalen islands are a cluster of little islands and rocks, of which the largest are Madalena, on which is a town of the same name, containing about six hundred inhabitants; Cabrera with about fifty inhabitants; Spargitore; and Santo Stephano. These islands, as well as the coast of Sardinia opposite, are wild and rugged, and much overgrown with brushwood. Very little corn or vegetables are raised by the inhabitants, who are almost all shepherds or herdsmen; excepting those of the town of Madalena, most of whom are sea-faring people. Cabrera, the longest (though not the largest) island, is about four miles in length, and about two miles wide, at its broadest part. The anchorage between these islands and Sardinia, is divided as it were into two bays, communicating with each other, and with the sea on both sides. Arsachina bay is the first that presents itself as ships enter this anchorage from the eastward. To the second bay, which is much smaller in extent, the officers of Lord Nelson's fleet gave the name of Agincourt Sound.

there may put to sea in all winds. Arsachina Bay may, therefore, making allowance for the want of a dock-yard, be esteemed the best naval station of the three.

The second consideration to be attended to is geographical position. The importance which a naval station may derive from this point, will vary according to time and circumstances. For the occasional rendezvous of a fleet watching Carthagena or Toulon, Mahon harbour or Arsachina Bay would be the best situation: for operations more towards the Levant, Malta, or other harbours, which I shall not enumerate, might have the preference.[1]

The third point of comparison, is their strength as military positions. Malta, as I have before stated, is so strongly fortified, that it can hardly be reduced except by famine. Minorca is now in a defenceless state; the fortifications having been so far dismantled by the Spaniards, that after an army has made

[1] Some naval stations may have a still happier geographical position for the purposes of maritime war, than either of the three, which form the subject of our present comparison. Walcheren, for instance, in possession of the British, would deprive the French in a great measure of the navigation of the Scheldt: and, if we can conceive our own country, at some future period, to lose its naval superiority; the Isle of Wight in the hands of an enemy, with a blockading squadron at Spithead, would render our great naval arsenal, and the harbour of Portsmouth, almost entirely useless to us.

good its landing, superior force will decide the fate of the island, without the necessity of a siege. Cape Mola, however, on the eastern extremity of the entrance of the harbour, offers a fine position for a fortress, that would be infinitely stronger than the former Fort St. Philips, which was situated on the opposite side: but the time that would be required, and the great expense that must be incurred, before such a work could be completed, are circumstances that much diminish the value of Minorca in its present state.* In regard to Arsachina Bay, the

* When two small possessions are equally valuable in other respects, and neither of them is fortified; if the one affords no good situation for a fortress, and the other an excellent one, the latter, of course, will be greatly preferable. Hence Minorca, by means of this advantage, will be superior to most places of equal importance in other points. If Malta itself were unfortified at this moment, I do not know, whether it would be considered to possess any position, in natural strength superior to Cape Mola.

When a nation has it in its power to attack two naval stations, of equal value in other respects, the one completely defenceless, and the other strongly fortified, which would require an obstinate siege, it is always better to undertake the siege, than to occupy the former on a speculation of fortifying it. A siege may be over in a month or six weeks, after which your conquest may be safe for many years, or even through the whole course of a war. But if you engage in fortifying a defenceless place, you may labour several years before it can be rendered respectable, and your establishment, during the interval, can never be considered safe,

Sardinian Islands having been unmolested by the enemy, we have profited freely by the anchorage, without being at any expense whatever; but if Sardinia, instead of being neutral, were hostile to us, we could not, of course, make use of its harbours, without conquering the whole country. In that case, it might be necessary to construct some trifling works of fortification, on a few points, upon the Magdalen Islands, and the main land of Sardinia, for the protection of the naval station there; but towards all the expenses, which a nation might incur by the occupation of Sardinia, it must be remembered, that that great and fertile island would itself be able to contribute liberally.[1]

whilst the enemy can send a fleet to sea. When a siege is not advisable, even the blockade of a strong place, when practicable, with a view to reduce it by famine, as we did in regard to Malta, may be preferable to the plan of occupying and fortifying a defenceless place, of equal value in other points.

[1] The state of Sardinia is thus described by Lord Nelson, in a letter to Lord Harrowby, dated the 11th of October, 1804.

"We know every thing respecting Sardinia which is "necessary; that it has no money, no troops, no means of "defence. I will only mention the state of one town, "Alghiera, fortified with seventy large cannon, and contain- "ing 10 or 12,000 inhabitants. It has forty soldiers and a "governor, not one of whom has been paid any wages for "more than three years. They levy a small tax upon what "comes in or goes out of the town. Guns honeycombed

There are several other excellent naval stations in the Mediterranean, of which we shall take no notice, having done enough to illustrate this part of our subject. A few words may, however, be said upon Lampedosa; an island, which by the important political discussions between France and England, that took place concerning it, was dragged from its former obscurity, and held up to the universe as one of the causes of the present war between the two countries; a war which has eventually involved all Europe in its vortex, and the effects

" for want of paint, and only two carriages fit to stand " firing; and the governor shows this, and says, ' how long " can we go on in this manner ?' This place was intended to, " and would in our hands, possess the whole of the Coral " Fishery; but for want of active commerce, grass grows in " the streets. I could repeat the same of the miserable state " of the city of Sassari, where there is a regular university " established, now in misery."

Lord Nelson, in another letter addressed to Mr. Jackson, states, " that the revenue, after the expenses of the island are " defrayed, does not give the king 5000l. sterling a year." And yet, amidst all the weakness and poverty of the country, considered as an independent state, the taxes fall very heavy upon the people, whom, in a hasty visit to the north coast of Sardinia in February, 1804, I found loud in their complaints of the grievances under which they labour; nor had their discontented spirit escaped the observation of Lord Nelson, who mentions it particularly and strongly in many of his letters. So deplorable are the effects of bad government upon countries the most favoured by nature.

of which, some way or other, are felt by every nation, and almost by every individual, in the world.

For the geographical position of Lampedosa, we shall refer the reader to the map; and, perhaps, it may appear sufficiently advantageous. The greater part of this small island is covered with brushwood; and its only inhabitants are a Maltese farmer, with his family and servants, who is proprietor of a flock of sheep, and of a herd of cattle, and who grows very little more corn than is necessary for his own consumption.

There is a small creek in Lampedosa, fit only for receiving merchant vessels, but incapable of affording shelter to any ship of war larger than a sloop. There are few convenient landing-places on the coast; but the island affords no strong position for a fortress, which, in such small possessions, is absolutely necessary, if any value is attached to them; or if any government stores of importance are kept there, which might otherwise be exposed to destruction, on every temporary absence of the fleet.

Such, therefore, is Lampedosa; a place without resources, without strength, and, to sum up every thing, without a harbour;[1] a place, in short, com-

[1] The author was serving in the Mediterranean, when the present war broke out: circumstances naturally excited his curiosity in regard to Lampedosa, but not being able to visit that island personally, he anxiously sought for the best information that could be had regarding it; and was not a little

pletely insignificant, worthless, and contemptible; yet for which, it would appear, Great Britain was, at one time, disposed to give up Malta,[1] the strongest fortress, and one of the best harbours, in the world; and which, with its appendage Gozo,

surprised, after examining the reports and plans of intelligent naval officers, who actually surveyed it, and consulting a commissary of acknowledged abilities, who was sent for the purpose of ascertaining its resources; besides having often conversed on the subject with the farmer himself, who frequently came to Malta; to find, that it was such a wretched place, in every respect, as he has described it. As no engineer has examined it, and no observations have yet been made, sufficiently extensive and minute, to enable a decided opinion to be given as to its capability of improvement, it remains to this day a matter of doubt, whether it is possible, by any expense whatever, to convert the miserable creek of Lampedosa into such a harbour, as would render it worthy of being considered a naval station. It is also doubtful, whether, by any reasonable expense, it could be fortified, so as to make it tenable against a vigorous attack for more than a few days. If the practicability of all these great works were ascertained, the next consideration would be the expense of them; and, from circumstances, we may perhaps be warranted in concluding, that any thing done in Lampedosa might cost nearly double of what the same undertaking would cost in England; so that, before we could convert Lampedosa into a great naval station, we might be obliged to expend as much money as may have been laid out upon the East and West India docks, and upon the fortifications of Dover and of Chatham put together.

[1] See (in the collection of State Papers for 1803) the Official Letters of Lord Whitworth, &c.

contains an active, orderly, and industrious population of about eighty thousand souls.

From the Mediterranean let us now cast our eyes northward, with a view of comparing the importance of the naval stations in the Baltic. There are only two in that part of the world (leaving Carlscrona out of the question), that are worthy of our attention, or even of our acceptance, if all were freely offered to us. These are, Copenhagen and Cronstadt; and as we are at war, both with the Danes and Russians, we certainly have a right to attack, and to keep either or both of these places for ourselves, if such a measure should appear necessary, for the preservation of our naval power, or even of our naval influence over the northern nations.[1]

[1] Whether the refusal of our demands upon Denmark, in 1807, was a sufficient cause to justify us in making good those demands by force of arms, is a question, upon which I say nothing. But now that we have been at war with that country for nearly three years, a new question presents itself, most completely distinct from the former; that is, whether, since the Danish government has held out nothing to us, but the language of irreconcilable hatred and defiance, we can foresee any end to the contest, until we are either ourselves destroyed, or until we break the strength of the great combination acting against us, of which Denmark (particularly its Baltic islands) forms a most essential and vital part? We have seen the Danes, for more than two years, manfully exerting themselves to do us all the mischief in their power; and it is surely idle to expect, that they will ever cease to do us further mischief, unless we deprive them of the means.

In geographical position, Copenhagen must be allowed to be infinitely preferable to Cronstadt: besides, that Zealand, and the adjacent islands, being blest with a fertile soil, with great advantages for commerce, and inhabited by a fine race of nearly half a million of people, of an industrious and naturally of a warlike character, would amply pay us for the expenses of their defence; whether we should think it best to occupy the whole, or a part of them;[1] so that, instead of being a dead burden upon our revenue, and a drain upon our population, like Cronstadt which has no resources of any kind, Zealand would add to our strength in every way.

In respect to its tenability, if in our possession, Zealand is equally superior to Cronstadt. The latter, for some months of the year, may be considered a part of the main land; the sea, in that remote corner of the gulph of Finland, being frozen over every winter. The channels, on the contrary, which protect Zealand, are only said to be frozen, on an average, once in five or six years, others say, once in ten years; and to transport troops, with the necessary apparatus of war, with ordnance as well as commissary's stores of every description,

[1] The diocese of Zealand (including Zealand, Moen, and Bornholm) contains 345,740 inhabitants; that of Funen (including Funen, Langeland, Laland, and Falster) 151,512. Total 497,252.

from Jutland, by way of Funen, over the ice,[1] and to succeed in sieges in the depth of winter, when the ground is as hard as solid rock; all of which operations might be necessary before an enemy could wrest Zealand from us; would form, upon the whole, no easy enterprise.[2] Indeed it may appear to those, who will consider the subject a little in detail, an enterprise of so much difficulty

[1] According to information given me (in Zealand) by a Danish gentleman, "when Reaumur's thermometer stands at "about 10° below the freezing point, the waters between "Zealand and the lesser islands, as well as the great Belt and "the Sound, are commonly frozen. This happens generally "once in five or six years. But the channel from Laaland to "Holstein is very seldom frozen over, not perhaps oftener "than twice in a century."

[2] There are two fortresses at present in Zealand, Elsineur and Copenhagen. The former I have not examined. The strength of the latter principally depends upon its wet ditches, which would be frozen in winter; and its works are very extensive. It would become a question, if we occupied Zealand, whether it might not be worth our while, to construct a new fortress in that island, whose strength should be independent of water defence? The solution of this question would depend upon two considerations: first, whether the risk of our losing the island, in its present state, by an attack over the ice, would actually be very great, a point which, I must confess, appears to me doubtful; secondly, whether the labour and expense of retaking it would be greater than the labour and expense of fortifying it, in such a way as to secure it to us during the severest winters.

and hazard, that few generals would have any sanguine hopes of success, nor perhaps the smallest desire to embark in such an undertaking; neither is it my opinion, that Buonaparte would order the attempt to be made, if he knew that we were determined upon obstinately defending Zealand if attacked, and had fully made up our minds to lose no time, in using every effort in our power, to reconquer it when lost.

Should this opinion, however, be erroneous, and should our enemies prove equally determined with ourselves to have possession of Zealand, let the risk be what it may, it will appear, on a little reflection, that, by means of our naval superiority, we shall have every advantage in the contest, that a nation can reasonably hope in war. For five years out of six, or for nine years out of ten, a small garrison would enable us to keep undisturbed possession of Zealand; to command, and to profit by, all the resources which its present government derives from it; whilst the enemy, to whom it would, from circumstances, prove a much more difficult task to make himself master of it, than for us to drive him out, could, if he succeeded in an attack upon it, only promise himself quiet possession for a month or two at the utmost: perhaps he might scarcely have had time, after a tedious struggle prolonged through a whole winter, to pull down the British flag from the walls of Copenhagen and of Elsineur, before he might be alarmed by the sudden appear-

ance of sails on the horizon; and a British fleet, with some hundreds of transports, full of troops and warlike stores, might be seen approaching in formidable array, to rob him of the fruits of his momentary success. This reasoning, in regard to the nature of the contest in Zealand, is founded on a supposition, that both parties should act with energy and foresight, which they would surely do, if they thought the object of importance. Should we again occupy Zealand, the chances that an enemy would be able to take it from us, under all circumstances, would no doubt be fully calculated, upon sound military principles; which being done, such an event could never come upon us by surprise: and it is not therefore too much to expect, that we might have previously made arrangements, which, as soon as the official account of the loss of that island arrived in England, would enable us, instantly to send off a fleet and an army, fully adequate for the recapture of it.

Zealand therefore is, in every point of view, the only naval station that would suit our purposes in the Baltic; no other island in that sea, except Cronstadt, being possessed of a harbour: and as for Cronstadt, since its situation is bad, and we cannot defend it if we had it, the only object which we could have in attacking it, would be to destroy it; an enterprise which we may keep in view, and of which we may hold out constant threats in order to intimidate the Russians; but which we should not

attempt, whilst we have any thing of greater importance to employ our arms.

I have been induced to enter more largely into the subject of insular possessions, from observing, that, with the exception of our West Indian Islands, which have always been estimated more or less important, in proportion to their magnitude, population, and fertility, which appears to me the only just mode of estimating the value of any ultramarine possessions; all other possessions of this nature, which we either have acquired, or have had it in our power to acquire, have generally been reckoned, by men in England, the more desirable, in proportion to their want of resources of every kind; and the more easy to be defended, in proportion to their natural weakness and insignificancy.

Sicily, for instance, which, next to Great Britain and Ireland, is the finest island in the world; which contains a million and a half of inhabitants, and might furnish a revenue of more than one million sterling to its government; which possesses strong fortresses and military positions; with excellent harbours, and commodious roadsteads, favourable both for the purposes of war and of commerce:[1]

[1] Syracuse is an excellent harbour. Lord Nelson's fleet anchored and watered there in 1798. The convoy of transports with the Russian troops destined for Naples rendezvoused there in 1805. Augusta Bay is spacious and safe in every wind. The harbour of Messina is generally full of ships, but not equal to the former in safety. The road of

this noble island, which in all former ages has been considered a prize worthy of the arms of the greatest nations upon earth,[1] which was the granary of the Roman empire, and which may, in a military, if not in a commercial, view, be considered of more value than all the West Indies put together; has, by some wonderful turn of thinking, lost all its importance in the eyes of the British nation; and has been deemed of no more use, in respect to

Milazzo is said to afford good anchorage in all but westerly winds. That of Palermo is exposed, but it has often been the rendezvous of the British fleet. There is a mole at that city, and one at Girgenti, for trading vessels. Trapani offers an anchorage sufficiently good for merchant vessels. Syracuse, Augusta, the citadel of Messina, Milazzo, Trapani, &c. are places either strongly fortified, or so much favoured by Nature as to be easily defensible.

[1] It is remarkable, that Sicily, that "Terra potens armis "atque ubere glebæ," as Virgil has so aptly styled it, has never made any figure under a native government. It has been the fate of the Sicilians to be always ruled by foreigners, or to be divided amongst foreign masters. They have successively been governed by Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Saracens, Normans, for a short time by the French, by Spaniards, &c. Sicily may soon, perhaps, offer to the two great rival nations of modern times, if one of the two does not, as usual, shrink from the contest when the hour of danger comes, a field of battle, such as Pyrrhus predicted that it would offer to the two great rival powers of antiquity: Ἐπεὶ δὲ Σικελίας ἀπετυχὼν (Πύρρος) ἐξέπλει, μεταστραφεὶς ὀπίσω πρὸς τοὺς φίλους· Οἵαν (ἔφη) Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ἀπολείπομεν παλαίστραν.—Plutarch. Apoph.

our affairs, than as it enables us to maintain the harbour of Malta, and to supply the inhabitants and garrison of that little post with provisions. Sicily is therefore considered as a kind of appendage to Malta, an opinion which posterity may perhaps refuse to believe, that any individuals amongst us, in the present times, could possibly have entertained. By the same mode of reasoning, Great Britain, with all its resources, might be considered as an appendage to Portsea island, and the isle of Wight. Yet if the followers of Mahomet, when they meditated an invasion of France, after having over-run the greatest part of Spain, had been recommended, first to conquer Britain; and if it had been set forth by the adviser of that measure, that the occupation of Great Britain would drain the treasury of the Caliphs of a million pieces of gold annually; without affording them any thing in return, except the inestimable advantage of being able to keep quiet possession of Portsmouth harbour; these unenlightened Mussulmen, who could know nothing of the balance of trade, nor could have ever compared the merits of the mercantile and agricultural systems of political economy, would, I fear, have been disrespectful enough to our present ideas, to have laughed to scorn the proposer of, what in their ignorance might have appeared to them, so absurd a scheme, and would have treated him either as a buffoon or a madman.

We shall now treat of the last point, which we

promised to consider, namely, "whether a nation "may not be placed under such peculiar circum- "stances, at some particular period, as may con- "siderably palliate or lessen the evil effects, which "numerous colonies of a certain description" (which we have defined to be such as are thinly peopled, poor and sterile,) "may appear generally "to produce, by weakening the strength of a state."

A nation will be placed in this advantageous situation in regard to colonial warfare:

First, when she is equal by sea to her adversary, and possesses a great superiority of disposable military force.

Secondly, when with a disposable military force, either equal, or even much inferior, to that of her adversary, she possesses a great superiority by sea. This being our case at present, let us examine the effects of this advantage.

Let us suppose, that two hostile nations have each colonies of equal extent, and guarded by the same number of troops, in a part of the world equally remote from both the mother countries. Let each nation, for instance, have five islands, with an equal force of twenty-five thousand men, distributed in garrisons throughout the whole. If these nations are equal by sea, neither of them could make any impression upon the colonies of the other, without sending superior armies to the scene of action. But if one of these belligerent powers were greatly superior to the other by sea, she might,

without danger to the security of her own possessions, leaving only a thousand men in each, collect the rest of her troops into an army of twenty thousand men, with which she might attack, and reduce her adversary's settlements, one after the other, either by actions in the field, by sieges, or by blockades if necessary. The same advantage of a decided naval superiority holds good, though not in so great a degree, in the attack of colonies and islands on a larger scale; and even in continental warfare, when the country, which is the scene of action (like Spain) is of a peninsular form, or has a great extent of coast. This advantage, in short, is so great, that any nation, which possesses the absolute command at sea, as we do now, may easily conquer all the islands in the world, provided she pursues that object steadily, employing great armies in the attack of every place, where obstinate resistance may be looked for; and not allowing herself to be deterred from her purpose, by occasional defeats or reverses, such as are to be expected in war. These should only be considered as incentives for greater exertion; or as reasons for a change of measures, when disasters may appear to have arisen, not from want of force or of military skill, but from an erroneous policy towards the people of the country invaded.

The advantage of a great and commanding supe-

riority of naval power, is no less conspicuous in the defence of insular possessions. Whilst our fleet rules the ocean, our colonial possessions are secure, with much smaller garrisons than would be required under less favourable circumstances. An enemy, for instance, who would attack any of our possessions in the West Indies, at this moment, would expose a fleet, and an army of considerable force, without which he could do nothing, to almost certain destruction. The colonies, which he attacks, may be of two kinds. Either they may have a fortress of such strength as to require a siege; in which case, the chances are, that before he can have opened his first batteries, our superior navy will have destroyed his ships of war and transports, and have thrown reliefs into the place; or may have facilitated the assemblage of an army, to cut him to pieces. If the colony, which he may attack, should be without a fortress of any kind; his fleet would be in this case, as well as in the former, equally liable to destruction; and his army, after the conquest, having no strong place to secure it, when we in our turn should become the assailants, would also fall an easy prey to us. To give only one particular instance of the beneficial effects, which our superior naval power may produce, in the defence of insular possessions, we may mention Malta, for which under the present circumstances, in my opinion, one

battalion of regular British troops is a sufficient garrison; but which, if we had not this naval superiority, could hardly be thought secure, with less than six battalions. Thus we may derive, at the present moment, the greatest possible benefit, from the occupation of islands and colonies, enjoying the advantages of their commerce, &c. with the least possible draw-back, on account of the expenses of their defence.

The acquisition of such possessions, therefore, provided they do not prevent us from employing our disposable force in more important objects, as was done by our West Indian campaigns in the last war, cannot but be beneficial to us, as long as we can maintain our naval superiority: and although the conquest of them may, from the fatal effects of climate acting upon troops exposed to the hardships of war, often cost us very dear; yet, when obtained, they are by us so easily defended, that, where we have once got a footing, we should never be too hasty in abandoning positions, which some new turn of affairs may afterwards render it desirable, or even indispensable for us, to recolquer, under much less favourable circumstances. Consequently, our true policy is to keep what we have got; to increase with judgment, but never voluntarily to diminish, our insular possessions; in respect to which, we ought, however, always to make due discrimination, between such as are, and such as in reality are not, worthy of our serious attention. Whilst we take

measures to place the security of the former above accidents, we ought not to waste any great portion of our military force in defending the latter, which we may safely leave with very trifling garrisons, or sometimes even with none. For if any French admiral, eluding the vigilance of our fleets, should think proper to seize the opportunity of plundering or laying waste our little remote settlements, which we might not think it worth our while to garrison with regular troops; we may, by retaliating tenfold upon the coasts of France, soon put a stop to such excesses.

It has been sufficiently shown, in the former part of this chapter, that all the great advantages which we now possess over France, in insular warfare, will be transferred to that power, the moment she shall be able to meet us upon equal terms by sea. I have also attempted to show, that if our insular dominion were carried to the highest pitch of power and grandeur of which it is capable, we could not reasonably expect to maintain our present overwhelming naval superiority against the continental empire of France, which, by the bounty of nature, possesses all the resources upon which naval power is founded, in a much greater degree than all the islands of the world put together. But, as was observed in the preceding chapter, the vast maritime resources of the enemy, which, after a long peace, no possible effort of ours could enable us to withstand, are rendered in a great measure useless,

by our superior fleets in time of war.[1] Upon war, therefore, the preservation of our naval power, under the present state of Europe, entirely depends: and surely, since we have no choice left us, it is our wisest policy to carry on the war in such a way as to alter the present state of Europe; in short, to dismember the continental empire of France, if we can. For until that empire either falls to pieces of itself, and many suppose that this great fabric, the work of political wisdom and of military skill, is to be overturned by chance; or until it is dashed to pieces by the vigour of the British arms; it is almost

[1] The French government does, however, even at the present moment, contrive to form seamen, &c. with more activity than is generally imagined in England. The masters of the Chasse-marées and other small coasting vessels, are obliged to receive on board, as part of their crew, a certain number of naval conscripts, for whom they are made responsible. In this situation the young conscripts get over their sea-sickness, and being kept in constant alarm, they acquire the habits of alertness and activity, as well as the management of boats and some little degree of naval skill. After having been trained in this manner for a certain time, they are by rotation transferred to the ships of war. The masters of these small vessels, after clearing from the principal sea ports of France, are also obliged to take in timber and other naval stores, at particular places, as a part of their cargo for the voyage back, which they deliver over to the officers of the imperial dock yards, from whom they receive payment of a portion of the freightage, and are promised the whole at the end of the war. Sometimes these vessels are taken or driven on shore, but not without great risk, by our cruizers.

universally allowed, that we can have no security in peace.

But if we continue looking on, with our hands folded, in anxious expectation of the dissolution of the French empire,[1] like the clown in the fable, who stood offering up vows to Hercules, instead of putting his own shoulders to the wheel, it is possible, that the fickle deity, to which we trust our fate, may, in like manner, turn a deaf ear to our prayers. The chances to which we look forward may disappoint our hopes, and the French empire may not fall to pieces. What then is to be done? Not daring to make peace, we shall, in that case, have nothing before us but the gloomy prospect of eternal war. And what kind of a war will it be? a war solely defensive; a war of fear against hope; a war, in which if we should prove constantly victorious, we gain nothing; in which if we are beaten, we lose every thing. And as, in our wars, we have generally acted in a way that makes us poorer and weaker, instead of richer and stronger, by the conquest or alliance of lesser states; if we persist in the same system, the people of England, instead of rejoicing in victories, which they know will only lead to fresh demands upon their income, will listen

[1] Horace has well described, what to some men may appear, a similar state of anxious expectation.

"Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille
"Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum."

with sullen indifference to the account of every new achievement of their fleets and armies. When at length the fortunes of individuals shall sink under the pressure of accumulated taxes, and no means can be found of replenishing the public treasury, unprofitably emptied, in the conquest of possessions abandoned almost as soon as gained, in eternal plowing, digging and sowing, without ever reaping in the field of war, which we have plentifully moistened with our blood; the universal voice of the nation, disgusted with a contest so tediously protracted and so ruinously managed, may again loudly call for peace; and in signing that peace, we shall not only put our signature to the voluntary surrender of our naval and commercial power,[1] but

[1] After a peace is made, the commerce of the world will, in all probability, subside from its present unnatural state to its ordinary level; that is to say, it will become nearly such as it was in former times; before our late wonderful and unprecedented series of naval victories enabled us either to monopolize, or to give laws such as we please to the trade and navigation of all the nations of the earth. Now if we go back to the latter part of the seventeenth century, we shall find, that the shipping of England was only equal to one fourth of the shipping of Europe; the proportions being at that time estimated by Sir William Petty (in his Political Arithmetic, first published in 1676) as follows. "The "United Provinces, 900,000 tons: England, 500,000: Ham- "burgh, Denmark, Sweden, and Dantzick, 250,000: Spain, "Portugal, Italy, &c. 250,000: France, 100,000;—total "shipping of Europe, 2,000,000 tons."

we may perhaps also sign the death-warrant of our national independence, and of all those personal

These proportions had, according to Dr. Campbell, considerably varied before the middle of the last century. That author (in his Present State of Europe), dividing the shipping of Europe, at the time he wrote, into twenty parts, assigns only six of these parts to Holland. He likewise, assigns six to Great Britain: to France, two: to Spain and Portugal, two: to the subjects of the northern crowns, two: to the trading cities and sea ports of Germany, and of the Austrian Netherlands, one: and to Italy and to the rest of Europe also, one.

Of twenty ships trading to China, in 1747, only eight were British; six out of the remainder being Dutch; and the French, who usually had their proportion, being excluded that year on account of the war. In 1761, the Dutch employed one hundred and fifty-two vessels, in their herring fishery, upon the coasts of Scotland and Shetland, besides one hundred and twenty-two in their Iceland fishery; whilst the Scotch had only seventeen vessels employed. In 1762, however, we are told, that the British (although they had fewer vessels) were upon the whole more successful, in the herring fishery, than their rivals. In 1764, the British trade with Denmark was almost annihilated. In 1765, the Danes, French, and Spaniards were either hurting us, or gaining the superiority over us, in our trade with Leghorn. The British trade with Messina had sunk to one-third of what it was formerly: and in the Levant, the French, at that period, sold three times as much woollen cloth as we did; although formerly we had out-sold that nation in the same proportion. In 1774, the British trade with Portugal had fallen off to one half of its former flourishing state. Out of 8,084 ships that passed the Sound that year, 2,447 were Dutch, and only 2,385 English. The French cod fishery at Newfoundland

rights and liberties, which have so long exalted us above the herd of the nations of modern times.

It will probably be owned by all men, that naval

employed 273 vessels, and 15,137 men (a greater number of men than found employment in ours). Of 768 trading vessels, that arrived at Hamburgh in 1775, only 242 were British; and out of 32 that brought herrings from our own coasts, none were British. The French imports, both at Hamburgh and Bremen, exceeded ours in value that year. I have taken these details from Macpherson's Annals of Commerce.

The Author of a work, intitled "Political Essays, &c. "1772," in making a comparison between the commerce of Great Britain, and that of other nations, reckoned the Dutch greatly superior to us, and indeed to the whole world, in their East Indian trade. In their fisheries they were equally superior to us. Their Baltic trade was also immensely great, insomuch that they exclusively supplied the southern markets with Baltic products of every kind. With regard to other branches of their trade, for want of precise information, he has not entered into particulars; but it sufficiently appears, that, upon the whole, he considered the Dutch of those days much superior to us in commerce, and exceeding us in the number of commercial seamen.

He is of opinion, that the French manufactures of that time were superior to our own, and more to be dreaded by us than those of all Europe beside. France exported to Europe, 120,000 hogsheads of sugar from her West Indian islands, whilst we from ours only exported 68,000 hogsheads. He quotes an author, who considered the French Newfoundland fishery four times greater than that of Great Britain. And without following him into further particulars, when he comes to make the comparison, he states, "That the number of

victories do, in themselves, add nothing permanent to the resources upon which naval power is founded; and if it be admitted, as I have attempted to prove,

" French commercial seamen was 62,300, whilst ours (reckon-
" ing our coasting trade to employ 30,000; our plantations,
" North America included, which we have since lost, 12,300;
" our home fisheries, 12,500; our Newfoundland fishery,
" 7,500; and the rest of our trade, 10,200) amounted at
" that time to 72,500; a number of seamen not much
" exceeding that of France."

If an enquiry into the former state of things be allowed to be the fairest mode of reasoning, in regard to what may happen hereafter, under similar circumstances, it will appear, from the foregoing statements, that I by no means judged harshly of our future prospects, in stating my opinion (see page 29), that Great Britain will not be able, after the termination of the present war, to employ more than half as many commercial seamen as the continental empire of France.

Should we choose to go still deeper into this subject, and trace the history of the navigation of the world, from the earliest periods to the present times, we should find that the advantages derived from commerce have always been of the most fluctuating nature, and subject to sudden changes (leading to total revolutions), some of which have been already noticed, in the limited period treated of in former parts of this note; so that the strength which various countries have, at different times, derived from their superior commerce, has been of all others the most transitory and precarious. Taking history for our guide, we shall therefore be forced, however painfully, to confess, that the common notion of men in England, that we shall be able always to engross the whole commerce and manufactures of the world, in the way we have done lately, does, of all speculative opinions upon

that small and distant islands, such as we have in general been amassing, add little to the resources, and still less to the military strength of a nation, which under some circumstances, they may even tend to diminish; it follows, that we are acting on a system of policy, in which further success, with a great outward show, will add but little to the substance of our power. France, on the other hand, is acting with vigour on a system of conquest, which constantly adds more men to her armies and more

human affairs that was ever entertained, the most literally and truly deserve the epithet of chimerical. If we should be imprudent enough, to allow ourselves to be guided in our warlike operations by such a notion, we may add another melancholy instance, as a warning to future states, that any nation which trusts its safety and existence to trade and shipping, will find sooner or later, that it has been building on a foundation of sand.

Montesquieu, in his "Grandeur et Décadence des Romains," has most decidedly given this opinion: "Les puissances "établies par le commerce peuvent subsister long-temps dans "leur médiocrité; mais leur grandeur est de peu de durée. "Elles s'élevent peu à peu, et sans que personne s'en apper- "çoive; car elles ne font aucun acte particulier qui fasse du "bruit, et signale leur puissance: mais lorsque la chose est "venue au point, qu'on ne peut plus s'empêcher de la voir, "chacun cherche à priver cette nation d'un avantage qu'elle "n'a pris, pour ainsi dire, que par surprise." This opinion has, since Montesquieu's time, received additional weight, by the surprising increase of the navigation of the United States of North America; and no less by the late downfal of the Dutch.

money to her treasury, and which increases, in every respect, the resources upon which all permanent power, naval as well as military, is founded. It may consequently appear, that we are arrived at the greatest degree of power to which our present system can raise us, and that, by a further adherence to it, we may fall, but can rise no higher. Now, it is evident, that an increasing power must in the end destroy a stationary one, although they may start at first with equal strength. We are therefore likely, in process of time, to fall a sacrifice to the gigantic power of our enemy, unless we endeavour:

First, to increase our own absolute power by conquest, not of paltry little islands and fortresses alone, but of such great, fertile, and populous ultramarine possessions, whether insular or continental, as will add considerably to our strength and resources.

Secondly, to give such effectual aid to our continental allies, or to those nations which may be disposed to take up arms for their independence, as will enable them to reduce France within her ancient limits.

Of these two objects, which from my train of reasoning appear so essential to the existence of this country; and neither of which can be effected by money, nor by victorious fleets alone; the first has not yet even been attempted, except in the West Indies; unless we can call our annexation of

Corsica to the British crown in 1794 an attempt: if so, it was a very poor one; since our hearts failed us, and we gave up our point on the very first difficulty we met with.

The second of these two great objects has, it must be allowed, sometimes been attempted by us; but not having acted upon a systematic plan, the result of sound policy, and of a thorough conviction of its necessity to our national existence, it is no wonder that we have always failed in the end. We have generally determined, all at once, on the spur of the moment, to send out an army, in consequence of some event, which we had either not foreseen, or for which, if foreseen, we had made no preparations nor equipments, nor formed any vigorous plan of operation to take immediate advantage of it. In our military affairs by land, we have therefore more often acted by chance than by foresight. But as Montesquieu has well observed, "It is not chance "that rules the world. The Romans," says that eminent writer, "as long as they followed one line "of policy, had an uninterrupted career of success. "When they abandoned that system of policy for "another, they met with nothing but reverses."[1]

[1] Ce n'est pas la fortune qui domine le monde: on peut le demander aux Romains, qui eurent une suite continuelle de prospérités, quand ils se gouvernerent sur un certain plan, et une suite non interrompue de revers, lorsqu'ils se conduisirent sur un autre.

Grandeur et Décadence des Romains. Chap. xviii.

The same reasoning may be found to apply to the British nation at this moment, so that all the most striking causes of the failures of our arms by land may be traced to our national policy, an investigation into which will form the subject of some of the following chapters.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Martial Policy.[1]*—That the Policy of the British Nation, to which we owe our greatness, has become too narrow for the present times:—that our naval triumphs, and our military disasters, are the natural result of our own measures.*

THAT the safety of nations is, in a great measure, independent of fortune, so that their every increase of strength and power must originate, almost entirely, in the wisdom and energy of their own measures, and that their downfal, whenever it happens, ought to be ascribed more to their own imbecility, than to any external force, which may be the instrument of effecting it; are doctrines, in which Montesquieu neither stood single nor original. The same doctrines have been maintained by the most enlightened philosophers and historians in every age from the earliest times; at the head of whom may be placed the wise Polybius; who, as he combined in his own person the character of the

[1] By martial policy, I mean, the spirit and views with which war may be conducted.

soldier and of the statesman, and as he had before him, in the various states of antiquity, a sample of every form of polity that can well be imagined, may be allowed to have been perfectly capable of judging truly upon the grand principles of war and government; principles which, as mankind is the same in all ages, always have been, and always will remain, immutably the same.

Polybius commences his history, by requesting his readers, whilst they follow him in the chain of great events, not to suffer themselves to be led away by the admiration or interest excited by his narrative, from reflecting on the true cause of the successes of the Romans; in which, he undertakes to prove to posterity, that their was nothing either wonderful or extraordinary. When he comes to the conclusion of the first Punic war, he again calls our attention to this proposition in the following memorable words:[1] "Now (says he) the truth of "what we originally asserted has been made "evident, that it was neither by the favour of "fortune, nor by a surprising combination of "chances, as many among the Greeks believe, "but with the most reasonable prospect of success,

[1] Ἐξ ὧν δῆλον τὸ προτεθὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς οὐ τύχῃ Ῥωμαῖοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως, ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασιν ἐπικρατήσαντες, οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλοντο τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολμηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατώρθωσαν τῆς προθέσεως.

Polyb. Lib. i. cap. lxiii.

" that the Romans, after having tried their strength
" in such a number of great enterprises, not only
" daringly attempted, but happily succeeded in
" winning the empire of the world."

Since the history of after-times has only added fresh proofs of what Polybius, upon a much more limited experience, thought proper to advance, we shall run no risk in the present day, should we venture to lay down as a maxim, that if the talents and energy, the skill and valour of a nation, possessed of considerable resources, are uniformly directed to the attainment of any one object of ambition; if that object is inflexibly pursued, by its successive kings or rulers, seconded by the general zeal of their subjects; if, at the same time, the neighbouring states are either distracted by other pursuits; or if with an equal desire of obtaining the same object, they are impeded by the nature of their civil governments, in such a way, that their efforts in emulation or jealousy, relax, after a temporary exertion of vigour; then the nation that pursues this system of vigorous policy must, of necessity, acquire its object, and in that object become superior to all others.

That object with us has been commerce, wealth, and naval dominion; and we have gained them.

That object with the ancient Romans was to subdue all nations that surrounded them; they

followed it, as we have done ours, and they became the lords of the world.

That object with the French has been to follow the footsteps of the Romans. The family of Bourbon, the Republic, and the present ruler of France have all had that object in view; they have pursued it with constant foresight, and with almost unremitting ardour; and they have nearly gained it. We are now the only barrier, the last step of the ladder to be surmounted, before these new Romans seat themselves on the proud pinnacle of exaltation, and look down upon the prostrate nations as the slaves of their invincible arms.

To carry the parallel still farther: as the Romans, with all their energy, wisdom, and patriotism, were employed for several centuries in completing the subjugation or incorporation of the little states of Italy; as they were even on the brink of destruction from the formidable invasion of Hannibal; till, after these painful and tedious struggles, they found themselves so superior to other nations, in their military institutions and policy, that in a comparatively short space of time they made themselves masters of the rest of the world: so the French, after their perilous situation under Louis the Fourteenth, and even at the commencement of their revolutionary war, after so many destructive campaigns, abounding in hard-fought battles, laborious sieges and alarming reverses from time to

time, to the astonishment of Europe, on the renewal of war after the peace of Amiens, with scarcely an appearance of difficulty, overthrew, or exposed the comparative impotence and debility of those supposed formidable powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia: so the British navy, that had for centuries been contending with great exertions of valour, but with little marked superiority, against those of rival nations, has, almost all at once, in the course of the last and present wars, arrived at the astonishing degree of glory and dominion which it now possesses.

There is an additional incentive, that will actuate a nation going upon the vigorous system which I have imagined. The moment that its decided ambitious views and increasing power become conspicuous, they will cause serious alarm and excite opposition in other states. Hence, to nations that have a land frontier, their exertions will be farther stimulated by the necessity of subduing or of being subdued. This was the case with the Romans, and has been the case with the French. The same necessity has acted upon us, in prosecuting our object, but in a different way. As we had no land frontier, and the popular sentiment has always, at least since we had any claim to the title of a free people, been against standing armies; the maintenance of a naval superiority was not only a favourite object of policy, but, by degrees, became the only safeguard of our existence as a state.

It is not always however, perhaps seldom, that the ambition of a nation has been directed with a permanent degree of energy towards any object, before the necessity of succeeding in that pursuit has been deeply felt. This strong sense of necessity will often precede, or lead to ambition; and when that ardent passion, with the spirit of exertion arising from it, have once been called forth in bodies of men, and have been confirmed by habit, so as to grow into principles or rules of conduct; they will generally survive the causes which may at first have given birth to them. Hence a nation may go on increasing its power, after the necessity which first compelled it to adopt that policy may no longer exist. If we look back, for example, to the early part of the Roman history, it can hardly be doubted, that if the Romans had not adopted that strenuous system of military policy which rendered them the lords of Italy, some other of the little neighbouring states, perhaps the Samnites, whose firm and warlike character demands the admiration of posterity, would, in all probability, have undertaken, and must have succeeded in, the same enterprize. Who can say, that this reflection, or in other words, the necessity of subduing or of being subdued, may not have been the principal or the only cause that made the Romans, at their first outset, a decidedly warlike and an ambitious people?

When they had attained this object, the Romans

began to extend their views farther; for it is difficult for a nation, which has been long habituated to arms, all at once to sink into the calm occupations of peace: but if they had been disposed to relax, and probably they might by degrees have relaxed from their former policy, it was soon put out of their power. They saw the Carthaginians acting vigorously upon a system of warfare, by which that enterprising people would, in the course of time, have made themselves masters, not only of the great Mediterranean islands, but of Spain and Gaul, where there were no states capable of withstanding their superior energy. Now what prospect could the Romans have had of maintaining their independence against such a gigantic empire, if (as we do now) they had allowed their enemy to go on unmolested in his career of conquest, instead of manfully stepping forward to check him in his growth? The necessity, therefore, of subduing or of being subdued, may again be considered the principal cause which induced them to display that energy, with which they acted in the Punic wars. This was the cause which gave fresh vigour to their ambition, and kept alive their martial spirit, which, perhaps, might otherwise have died away, and been succeeded by the love of ease, and the pursuits of luxury or of trade, in a short time, after their conquest of the other Italian states had left them nothing to fear, from former rivals of their native peninsula.

After the end of the second Punic war, the wars of the Romans were no longer justified by necessity; nor were their conquests of unoffending princes and commonwealths palliated by the smallest regard to decency or moderation, in their treatment of the vanquished, towards whom they acted more as robbers than as legislators. But their love of war and of conquest, before that period, may be deserving of the highest encomiums and admiration; since, without it, they must have submitted to become the slaves of some other people, not more worthy than themselves to command: and it is also to be observed, that their transactions up to that period, evinced greater moderation, and a more strict regard to justice, than have been shown, by most other nations, in former or succeeding times. Ambition, therefore, by which I mean the wish to extend the power and dominion of a nation, is only criminal, when it passes the limits of necessity; but before it passes these limits, it is a virtue, and the want of it is a most pernicious and glaring defect, both in the character of a people and of its rulers.

All nations must, at some period or other of their history, incur the kind of necessity which we have been describing; the necessity, of either basely sinking into a conquered province, or of becoming warlike and ambitious. But woe be to the nation, which either does not or will not see that necessity,

until its case becomes almost hopeless. If my reasoning in the preceding chapters be correct, that necessity, which we have hitherto felt only by halves, will soon come fully home to the British nation. The time is arrived, or is rapidly approaching, in which we may find that our warlike and ambitious views, if confined to the ocean alone, will not be able to protect us; that our system of warding off our adversary's blows, and screening ourselves behind our wooden walls, will no longer save us from destruction; that like other great nations, which have preceded us on the theatre of the universe, we must become a warlike people by land as well as by sea; that we must, in short, conquer upon both elements, or in all human probability we shall, on both, be conquered.

The mercantile ideas, the notions of the great importance of commerce and manufactures, that became generally diffused throughout this nation, about the beginning of the last century, might of themselves have completely extinguished our martial spirit, and made us exclusively a nation of traders, like the modern Dutch, destitute of every sentiment, but the grovelling wish of acquiring wealth; and we, with our wealth, must soon have fallen a prey to some poorer and more warlike neighbour; if our commercial pursuits, which set the interests of our merchants at variance with those of the merchants of other countries, had not fortunately led to national quarrels, and involved us

in wars from time to time. Our policy in conducting these wars, which arose out of the mercantile spirit of the nation, was to aid our continental allies by subsidies alone, or with only a very small portion of our military force; using every exertion to fit out powerful fleets, by means of which we could ruin the enemy's commerce, and employ the greatest part of our land forces in robbing him of his colonial possessions.

As long as the continent of Europe was divided amongst a number of independent states, none of which singly was much superior to us or to its neighbours in strength; and of which even the smallest and weakest were, to a certain degree, safe, owing to the jealousies of the greater powers; this policy was as good as any that we could have pursued. Under this system, not only our colonial and naval power, but our commerce and manufactures, equally prospered. We have been favoured with the custom of all nations; and whilst we glory in the thought that our ships rule the ocean, we reflect with almost equal exultation, that our cloth and our buttons adorn the bodies, and that our cutlery is to be found in the hands of Negroes, of Tartars, of Europeans, and of Americans. Whilst this vigorous system of colonial, commercial, and naval policy was gradually coming to perfection, the splendid valour, that has always characterized the British nation, rendered any portion of its armies, however small, of considerable weight, whenever

government chose to throw them into the scale of continental warfare. Hence our arms were formidable in Europe under King William and Queen Anne, and even till after the middle of the last century: but soon after the commencement of the last war, when the balance of power upon the continent of Europe began to totter, and latterly since it has been completely destroyed, by the superior energy which the French acquired by acting, in war, upon new principles, whilst all other nations persisted in following the beaten track; our own system of national policy gradually began to degenerate from good to indifferent, and it has at length become no longer suited to the circumstances of the world. It has become completely inadequate for any grand or permanent object, which we can propose to ourselves to effect. It is even inadequate for the preservation of any of those darling objects of our pride and ambition, which under former more favourable circumstances it was the means of obtaining. We must therefore either adopt a new system, suited to new times, or perish.

If we wish to preserve the naval superiority, the commerce and manufactures, which God who inspired our ancestors with the wisdom, vigour, and industry necessary for obtaining them, has placed in our hands; we must no longer look upon our armies as a secondary consideration, and our wars by land as a mere pastime, in which success, good

of bad, is almost a matter of indifference, provided the sea flow between us and the scene of action. We have an arduous task before us. It is no less than to overturn the great continental empire, which threatens our destruction. A necessity, that will brook no ordinary measures, strongly urges us to the attempt: and if we set about this noble enterprise with the spirit of men; if we make the attack upon this colossal power, before it is well knit together and firmly consolidated, whilst anger and revenge yet rankle in the hearts of the great mass of population of which it is composed; and if we transfer to the conduct of our operations by land, the same wise and vigorous system of policy which has made us by sea almost invincible; there remains, in my mind, little doubt of our ultimate success.

But until we adopt a more enlarged system of martial policy suited to the present times; till we shall shake off with disdain the narrow or dastardly spirit, which would confine British valour and enterprise within the limits of what, with a mixture of overweening presumption and of unmanly humility, we have been pleased to style our own element; till we shall send forth our armies to fight the enemy on the banks of the Ebro, the Elbe, or the Loire, with as much confidence as we believe we should feel in fighting upon those of the Thames; till we plant the British flag on the mountains of Sicily, on the Appennines, or on the plains of Champagne, with the same undaunted hearts, with which we

now display it on the ocean, or on some beggarly rock that is encircled by its waves; till we come forward in the face of the universe, with a view to the applause of the present and of future ages, and, throwing the gauntlet to our adversary, boldly challenge him to meet us hand to hand in any part of the known world; it is my opinion, that we shall see all the efforts of our armies, whilst we remain a nation, terminate, as they lately have done, either in disappointment or disgrace; and this, I confess, might be of little importance, at least so it might be considered by men who are indifferent to the glory of their country, if it did not appear almost self-evident, that upon these efforts, sooner or later, our existence must depend.

From the want of this daring spirit in our national councils and policy, all our failures, all our disasters by land have arisen. Yet we scarcely find one political or military writer, who has yet gone beyond the secondary causes of the bad success of our armies. At one time it was supposed, that the British soldiers were inferior to their adversaries; and thus the bravest men in the world were stigmatized with undeserved contempt by others, who never looked danger in the face. Now that their incomparable valour has, by repeated victories, under every disadvantage, over the conquerors of the rest of Europe, burst through the cloud of obloquy, and shone forth conspicuous to the world like the noon-day sun; men have been

obliged to guess at some other cause. And accordingly, at a time when our naval heroes fill the world with their fame, the race of Peterboroughs and of Marlboroughs on shore has been supposed to be extinct; just as if heroic leaders can possibly be wanting in a country, that produces such valiant men; or as if heroism were of a particular element, and a British chief, before he possessed it, must be some years immured in the gloom of a cock-pit. Others, who allow the superiority of our troops, and that we have generals fit for commanding them, throw all the disasters our armies have incurred, upon the defects of our commissariat, or of some other unfortunate military department. Others again, particularly the opposition for the time being, attribute every failure to his Majesty's ministers. When some continental expedition of ours (as they have done in general) arrives too late to effect its object; when the country, which it was to have defended, is found already over-run; or the allies, whose cause it might have retrieved, are conquered; then a grand outcry is made against the neglect and misconduct of ministers, who are alone made out to be the guilty persons, the cause of the dishonour of the British arms, and of the downfal of nations. Not only are they charged with things, for which they ought to be considered responsible in their official capacity, but with all the errors and misconduct of their inferiors; with every thing, in short, that can afford matter of

regret or of censure; and no allowance is ever made for the unfavourable circumstances, under which, they may, at times, have acted.

Now as we have seen that these complaints, and these failures have been general, whoever is minister; that men of the most opposite characters, parties, and views, have guided the helm of affairs, and that all of these men have uniformly prospered in war by sea, whilst, on the contrary, the expeditions by land, which they have planned, have either failed, or even the most brilliant victories have led to no permanent benefit; it is evident, that neither our naval successes, nor our military disasters, are exclusively the merit or the crime of any one administration; that, in short, no change of ministry will ever bring a remedy, until, as I said before, we adopt a more manly and enlightened system of martial policy.

When such a system is once adopted, all the secondary, though serious, causes of our disasters will be either entirely done away or rendered less hurtful. We shall find, that the British constitution, in its present state, is not only the best form of government, for promoting the happiness and wealth of the subject, but the best and most vigorous in every kind of warfare. We shall find, that no ministry can be formed, which will not be capable of supporting the honour of the British arms by land, as well as by sea: they will do it upon both elements, or on neither.

But that we may place in a stronger light, the doctrine which we have advanced, that the disasters of a nation in any kind of warfare ought to be ascribed more to its own measures, than to any external force, we shall proceed to analyze our present system of martial policy a little more closely; and, what posterity may consider wonderful, or almost incredible, in the same nation at the same period, it will appear, on the most general view of the subject, that the spirit with which we have acted in naval war, is radically contrary to that with which we have acted in war by land; and, on a more minute investigation, they may be traced every where by their effects, having produced a contrary system, even in the smallest details of the naval and military services of this country.

In order to illustrate this proposition, let us suppose that such an event were to happen, as the destruction of a British fleet of forty sail of the line, and let us consider what would be the consequence of it, under two different suppositions?

First, that the same spirit prevailed in England in regard to naval war, as actually does prevail in regard to war by land; that is to say, that the nation were actuated by the same unambitious, wavering, timid policy, in conducting both.

Secondly, how would the news of such a calamity be received, and what effects would it lead to, feeling, as we do now, the great importance of naval war?

A fleet of forty sail of the line is therefore, in

both cases, supposed to be destroyed; but if we could also suppose, that after destroying our fleets, the enemy had no army to attack us; and that, by some revolution in the national spirit, we had become indifferent to commerce, not caring, provided we lived happily at home, whether we were rich or poor; and also perfectly indifferent, whether the number of our manufacturers increased or not, it is evident, that the loss of the greatest fleet would be felt, to a certain degree, as a matter of little importance. Consequently the first supposition would be perfectly realised; so that we should receive the news of such a disaster, in the same manner, as we now receive the news of the failure of a British army. Feeling in this way, the loss of a fleet might give rise to no inquiries, no courts martial. If such took place, they would merely be matters of form. Nobody would be punished, or even perhaps censured, unless the strongest proofs of flagrant misconduct should be brought forward. Some not unamiable sentiment of humanity, a consideration of this man's former services; pity for that man's wife and children; aided by all the powers of parliamentary interest, and by favour of every kind, would be set actively to work to screen the guilty.

The people might be indignant for a time, but their anger would die away into regret; or, at most, it would only vent itself in peevish complaints against ministers, for ever having wasted the public money in such a useless and chimerical attempt, as

that of forming a navy capable to cope with the fleets of so great a power as France; a measure, which, under the circumstances that have been imagined, would appear superfluous to the safety, and might be represented as dangerous to the liberty, of the British nation. Such would be the consequence of our military policy being suddenly transferred to naval war. After the first serious disaster, we should abandon ourselves to despair; and, shutting ourselves up in our own island, we would give up maritime affairs for ever.

Let us now reverse the scene, and according to the second supposition, let us consider, what would be the consequence of the destruction of a great British fleet, feeling as we do at present in regard to naval war.

After the first moments of grief and consternation were over, the nation would, with one voice, demand an inquiry into the causes of the disaster. If it proved that it had been owing to neglect or mismanagement on the part of administration, either in not having procured proper information of the enemy's force; or in not having sent a sufficient number of ships, when there were some to spare; or in having parcelled out the fleet into two or three small squadrons, under different admirals with independent orders, when it ought to have acted in body; or that, owing to the disorganized state of some important department, the ships had been in want of provisions, without stores, or out of repair:

in all these cases, ministers, or a part of them, if convicted, would at least lose their places. But, it might be possible, that no part of the neglect or mismanagement would be found to rest with ministers: this, courts martial would decide. If the disaster should prove to have arisen from misconduct in the commander in chief, or any of the officers of the fleet, they would atone for their errors by the forfeit of their lives, or by being condemned to linger out an existence of ignominy, worse than death. It is possible, however, that, upon the strictest investigation into the disaster, no absolute misconduct might attach any where; but that it might prove to have been one of those misfortunes, which may happen in spite of every human precaution; for what nation can reasonably expect always to command such wonderful success, as we have hitherto enjoyed on the inconstant ocean? At all events, every exertion would be used to repair the loss, in order once more to meet, and give battle to the victorious enemy. The warehouses and timber yards of merchants and of builders would be ransacked to supply the necessary stores; the parks and forests throughout the country would be stript of their trees; all the ship-wrights of the kingdom would be collected in the royal dock yards, and the roads would be seen covered with artificers, travelling rapidly from the interior to lend their aid. The work would go on night and day. A new fleet would speedily be

built and equipped. The merchant vessels in all our ports would be emptied, in order to fill it with fighting men. Large detachments, or volunteers, from the artillery, the regular army and militia, would be hurried on board, to supply the place of marines. Quotas of men would be furnished by all the counties; and the commanders, if such had been employed, whose sole, or whose principal claim was their parliamentary interest, would be thrown upon the shelf, in order to make room for a Rodney or a Nelson. In the mean time, the cities, the fields, and manufactories would be thinned, and the citizens of England converted into soldiers, would be assembled with arms in their hands, in camps or cantonments near the coast, in order to repel the formidable invasion, to which the country would lie open.

Such, in all probability, would be the consequence of the destruction of a great British fleet in the present times. Instead of sinking under such a calamity, we should only rise more determined, and more terrible; and why? because every man amongst us sees, that our naval superiority, which formerly might have been considered merely as an object of national pride and ambition, has, by degrees, become the only safeguard of our existence as a state.

If the principles, upon which we have reasoned in the two preceding chapters, were generally allowed to contain a just view of the state of the

world, the British nation would see, that the best, or perhaps the only sure, mode of preserving its independence, is to anticipate the enemy, and either to destroy him, or to weaken him in such a degree, as to place our naval power (until we lose which, we can scarcely be conquered) in permanent security against his attacks. This would at once lead us to adopt a new system of martial policy, such as has been recommended in this chapter, not contrary to, but more enlarged than our present one, upon which it would be founded, and with which it is in fact identified, both in spirit and in object.

Then the same feeling would be excited, and the same consequences would arise, from the failure of a military expedition, which I have pictured as likely to ensue from the destruction of a fleet. Instead of resigning ourselves to womanish despair, after an unsuccessful attempt to free any part of the continent, or any great island, from the yoke of France, we should only be roused to greater exertions. And the world would be astonished at seeing or hearing of a British army, more numerous, better equipped, more ably commanded, making its appearance on the spot, which might have witnessed some former humiliation, eager to avenge the national wrongs, and to wipe out the memory of past disgrace.

If we acted thus vigorously in offensive war, as we have done in naval, and as we should most probably do in defensive war, what nation upon

earth could resist us? The usurper of Europe, bold as he is, might have cause to tremble on his throne. And the people of the world, who have hitherto had so little reason to place confidence in us, since they have generally seen our armies reimbark and leave them to their fate, the moment that the hour of serious danger drew near, would flock to our standard by myriads; and would look up to us, with respect and veneration, as their saviours, their instructors, and their models, in the art of war, and in every manly art.

It may appear to some men, that the vigorous system of external war and even of conquest, which I have recommended, under a belief that it is become necessary to the existence of this country, might, if ever carried into effect, be prejudicial to our domestic liberty: perhaps if I show, that the same opinions have been held before me by the most zealous enemies of arbitrary power, whom this country has ever produced, my readers may be more inclined to give up this notion, than by any thing, which of my own authority I can advance upon the subject.

We shall first quote Algernon Sidney. That writer, in his Discourses concerning Government, dedicates a section to prove, that "that is the best "government, which best provides for war;" in which he reasons upon the very sound principle, that no government can be considered perfect,

which does not equally guard against destruction from external, as well as dissolution from internal, causes.

He therefore states "that government to be "evidently the best, which, not relying upon what "it does at first enjoy, seeks to increase the number, "strength, and riches of the people. All things," he adds, "in their beginning are weak. The whelp "of a lion newly born hath neither strength nor "fierceness. He that builds a city and does not "intend it should increase, commits as great an "absurdity as if he should desire that his child "might ever continue under the same weakness, in "which he was born. If it does not grow, it must "pine and perish; for in this world nothing is perma-"nent: that which does not grow better will grow "worse. This increase is also useless, perhaps "hurtful, if it be not in strength, as well as in "riches or number; for every one is apt to seize "upon ill-guarded treasures: and the terror that "the city of London was possessed with, when a "few Dutch ships came to Chatham, shows that "no number of men, however valiant, are able to "defend themselves, unless they be well armed, "disciplined, and conducted. Their multitude "brings confusion; their wealth, when it is like to "be made a prey, increases the fears of the owners: "and they, who if they were brought into good "order, might conquer a great part of the world,

" being destitute of it, durst not think of defending " themselves."

The whole of this passage applies exactly to the present state of the country, and recommends a policy, to which, if we do not enlarge our views, we shall act directly contrary. We have been increasing prodigiously in wealth; and this increase of wealth has had a favourable effect upon our population: but our system of employing our armies in the conquest of petty colonies, instead of large and rich ones, counteracts these advantages, and prevents our military strength from increasing in the same proportion. Britain is the child, whose growth, by a further perseverance in her present policy, will be effectually stopped; whilst France, by a contrary system, has grown to a gigantic size, nor has she yet done growing.

We shall oppose another authority to those, who think that aggrandizement and civil liberty are incompatible; the authority of Harrington, a man whose name must be equally remote from the smallest suspicion of a view to favour arbitrary power. This writer, who flourished at a time when notions of traffic had not monopolized the minds of Englishmen, and shut their hearts against all other feelings, in his famous Plan of a Commonwealth, after having observed that there are two kinds of free governments, one for preservation, and the other for increase, gives the decided preference to the latter; and accordingly models his imaginary re-

public for war and conquest; holding out to it as its object the empire of the world, to which he says England could not do less than aspire, and for these reasons:

First, the facility of the enterprise.

Secondly, the danger which England would incur by the omission of such a government, should some other country seize the opportunity of acting upon these principles before her.

"Columbus offered gold," says he, "to one of "your kings, through whose happy incredulity "another prince has drunk the poison, even to the "consumption of his people; but I do not offer you "a nerve of war that is made of purse-strings, such "a one as has drawn the face of the earth into "convulsions, but such as is natural to her health "and beauty. Look you to it, where there is "tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, it "must end in death or recovery. Though the "people of the world, in the dregs of the Gothic "empire, be yet tumbling and tossing upon the "bed of sickness, they cannot die; nor is there "any means of recovery for them, but by ancient "prudence, whence of necessity it must come to "pass, that this drug be better known. If France, "Italy, and Spain were not all sick, all corrupted "together, there would be none of them so; for "the sick would not be able to withstand the sound, "nor the sound to preserve their health without "curing of the sick. The first of these nations

"(which, if you stay her leisure, will in my mind
"be France) that recovers the health of ancient
"prudence, shall certainly govern the world: for
"what did Italy when she had it? and as you were
"in that, so shall you in the like case be reduced
"to a province. I do not speak at random, &c."

Our more modern writers have, almost all of them, in treating of the principles of war and government, fallen into the error of blending these grand subjects with other considerations, which may be almost foreign to them, and certainly are of a very secondary nature, such as the state of commerce and manufactures in a country. Hence, however great their talents, they have so bewildered themselves by their researches into national wealth, that they have rendered themselves incapable of judging truly upon the causes of the strength and safety of nations. Accordingly we do not find that any of them, even the most celebrated, in their speculations upon probable events, have equalled Harrington; who by keeping these grand subjects, which we have just mentioned, unmixed with extraneous matter, clearly saw, that any nation, that would again adopt the martial policy of the Romans, might overthrow all others, and obtain the empire of the world. Succeeding events have fully confirmed the opinions of this enlightened man. His prediction, which weak minds might take for inspiration, has nearly been verified. The martial policy, upon which we have only acted by halves, and which

escaped our view, whilst we were striving to court employment, as the artificers, labourers, and shopkeepers of all nations, has been adopted in full by the French; and we, as Harrington feared, seem at this moment to be upon the eve of sinking into a province of their empire.

Who, we may ask, was the most profound philosopher, or who profited most by the experience of past ages? Was it Hume, who undervalued the effects of conquest, in treating of our ancient victories in France? Was it Adam Smith, who talks so lightly of war, as to say, that almost the only advantage to be gained by it, in modern times, is the entertainment and the interest which the people of a country derive, from reading the exploits of their fleets and armies in a newspaper?[1] Was it General Lloyd, who has endeavoured to delude the people of England, by pronouncing, that their country cannot be conquered again, although it has often been conquered before? Was it these, and other modern writers, previous to the French Revolution, whose opinions, in spite (it may be said) of the conviction afforded by the events of their

[1] See Wealth of Nations, Book V. Chap. iii. I must confess, that the description of war alluded to is applicable to the unambitious principles, upon which we now seem to be acting; by which, as Dr. Smith observes, we can gain nothing but amusement; but by a further perseverance in which system we may (what he has not foreseen) lose our country.

own and all former times, would tend to establish as a maxim, "that no one nation can possibly "overcome another?" Or was it Harrington, who finding all history nothing more than the narrative of the rise and fall of nations, has traced the true causes that led to these revolutions, with the wisdom of a philosopher and with the spirit of a soldier;[1] and who consequently foresaw, that what has once been done, might and would be done hereafter, whenever the same causes came to operate under similar circumstances?

In a former part of this chapter, I said that our national policy was as good as any other, whilst any thing like a balance of power remained on the Continent; but if our ancestors had seen the state of the world with the comprehensive views of Harrington, they would have judged, that that balance of power must some time or other be destroyed, by the first nation that acted with Roman spirit. They would therefore, instead of leaving the future fate of England at the mercy of fortune, have adopted that spirit themselves, and have endeavoured to acquire by a vigorous system of external war such a formidable power, as would have rendered the conquest of Europe (consequently of England) by any other nation impossible; and would have made our future existence

[1] A man may possess the spirit of a soldier, who never wore a sword. Harrington was not a soldier by profession.

independent of foreign coalition or assistance. Our ancestors, setting out upon such a principle, would have seen the necessity of increasing their population to a par with that of the other great powers; and as they had no land frontier on which to extend themselves, acting exactly as they did, in regard to the important objects of naval power and commerce, but considering small colonial acquisitions as a secondary matter; they would have grasped at all opportunities of acquiring the resources in which they were deficient, by incorporation or conquest of the neighbouring continental nations. And most noble opportunities have presented themselves at various, it may almost be said, at all periods of our history. Let us look back, for instance, to the former powerful and flourishing state of Holland before the last war. If Queen Elizabeth had accepted the offer made by that country to put itself under her protection, Britain and Holland well administered, to which, by a vigorous system of policy, we might have added the Netherlands, would have given us such a degree of positive strength, as to secure our existence against any other power. The exploits of Gustavus Adolphus, who took up the very cause from which Elizabeth shrunk; a cause in which, like him, she might have blended religion with war, show how easily we might have effected, what a nation, so poor in resources as Sweden, attempted with success.

Another instance, of the strength that an increasing power may acquire on the Continent of Europe, is Prussia, which was originally a weaker state than Hanover. Supposing Hanover had increased in a similar way under our management in the north of Europe, we should by this means have become in some degree a match for France; so that we might either have adopted a moderate line of conduct, and contented ourselves with repelling the attacks of that nation; or if we found, that her inordinate ambition left us no other alternative than that of destroying or of being destroyed, we might have drawn the sword in this inexpiable war upon equal terms, and with a fair prospect of success. Such of my readers as may be disposed to deny that this opinion, as to the strength we should derive from continental aggrandizement, is true, must also deny, that any administration which we have seen in this country, for the last century, has acted with the smallest particle of common sense.[1] If the alliance of

[1] In order that this expression may not appear presumptuous, I beg to remind the reader, that I have in no part of this chapter, in an unqualified way, censured the martial policy, upon which the nation has hitherto acted, as unwise: I have only said that it is becoming so by degrees. It is wise in winter to wrap one self in furs and flannels, and to keep up blazing fires, for the sake of preserving health: but as summer approaches, the same motive causes the furs to be thrown off, and the fires to be discontinued.

Austria, now as at all former times, be of any value; if such a power as Prussia, before it was nearly destroyed, was worth purchasing, to fight against France, by millions of British gold; would it not have been a much stronger coalition, if an equal force had been identified with our own empire; in which case, such a country would have paid millions into the British exchequer, instead of robbing us of our treasures, in consequence of promises, which a weak or treacherous native government might afterwards be unable, or unwilling, to fulfil?

CHAPTER V.

The same subject continued.—The secondary causes of general failures in war defined.—Of the politics of war.

We shall now enter into the consideration of the secondary causes of the general failure of any nation in war, which are, although we have chosen to assign them a subordinate place, the only causes that come home to the feelings of the people in any country, and by which alone their indignation or their regret are ever forcibly excited. These, which may be generalized into three heads, are either, defective military institutions; an erroneous treatment of the natives of the country which is the seat of war; or a mistaken policy in regard to other powers, which are either neutral, or at least not principals in the quarrel.[1]

Defective military institutions are only to be judged, by their unfavourable effects upon the general character of an army, which they degrade;

[1] The consideration of the two last subjects comprehends the politics of war.

and upon its operations, which they tend to impede. But although these defects always cause an army to be looked upon with a certain degree of contempt, nothing can be more unfair and illiberal than this manner of considering the subject. No army has the power of improving itself; and the great body of individuals, who compose it, can do nothing more than lament its deficiencies. The sole glory and the sole disgrace of good or bad military institutions, ought therefore to be attached to the executive government in every country: and in a free state like Great Britain, the ministry should be, and at all times has been, considered fully responsible for them. But as the military institutions of no country can be made perfect all at once, it is to be observed, that no British ministry ought to be censured, in an unqualified manner, for the defects in our military establishments; if it should appear, either that they received them in a much worse state from their predecessors; or that having received them in the same imperfect state, they may not have had fair time to inquire into and to improve them.

An army may fail, either from want of discipline; which implies that it is formed of officers and soldiers insubordinate and ignorant of the common routine of regimental duties; or from being badly organized, in one or in several departments; or from a general want of science in its officers; or lastly, from having at its head a commander in chief, destitute of military talents and of enterprise. All

these evils come under the first head, as they arise principally, or solely, from bad military institutions: and any one of them may occasion the failure of an expedition, perfectly well planned, as far as regards the deliberative part; and fully adequate in point of number of troops, and equipment.

The general principles upon which a nation ought to act in war, in order to avoid the disasters arising from the two last mentioned causes, are as follows:

First, endeavour by every means in your power to make, and to preserve, the people of every country which you enter, either as a conqueror or as an ally, your friends; for the people (by which I mean almost every individual in a nation, exclusive of the legislative and executive powers, and of a part of the nobility) is in all countries the strongest party.

Secondly, as there are some powers, whose friendship in war is likely, upon the whole, to be more fatal to you than their enmity, decline or refuse the alliance of such states, even if pressed upon you; courting only the friendship of states of a contrary description.

Thirdly, respect in all cases the law of nations; avoiding a crooked, intriguing, timid policy. Be a true friend to your allies in their utmost adversity. Be an open, a determined, a terrible enemy. Support not only your interest, but your dignity: for whenever you forget the latter, you lose sight of the

former. An insult should therefore be resented more deeply than an injury. The honour of a great nation, such as we are at present, should be as spotless as that of a soldier; but it will be found, that unless, by adopting a more manly system of martial policy, we set ourselves above fear, it will be impossible for us to set ourselves above reproach.

Since the character of no two nations is exactly alike, nothing can be more dangerous than to lay down fixed rules of conduct for all countries indiscriminately. If the nobility and gentry in any country are of an active high-spirited character, you have only to endeavour to make as strong an interest amongst them as possible, since they will naturally lead the great body of the people by whom they will be beloved and respected. But if, as in most arbitrary, or at least despotic, governments, the rich and noble are of a depraved, effeminate, and tyrannical character, then, the moment that their country is made the seat of war, their authority is at an end; and if, in fear of offending them, you do not embrace the opportunity of conciliating the rest of the nation, your enemy may arm it against you. In your endeavours, you must, however, either scarcely interfere at all, except by promises; or you must suffer yourself to be guided by the wishes of those whom you mean to please, not by what you yourself would wish in the same situation. In pursuing this necessary object of making friends in every country in which you act, you must take

great care not to revolutionize; that is to say, you must not confound the views of the people with those of the populace. The most rigid obedience to magistrates must be every where exacted, as in times of profound peace; and, above all, no arms must be intrusted into the hands of any body of men, without appointing proper officers to head them, either from your own army, or from such part of the gentry of the country, as may be in your interest; for an armed rabble must soon degenerate into bands of robbers and murderers, who will lay waste their own country, and render the cause which they may profess to support (however popular at first it may have been) odious and contemptible to all mankind.

Sometimes the people of a country, which is the seat of war, may have such an inveterate national hatred against you, that it may be almost impossible to conciliate them, whilst any hope of resistance remains. In that case you must not despair, but employ more numerous armies in the enterprise; and when you have prevailed by force of arms, (for there is a force in war which nothing can resist,) you will, in process of time, by mild and humane treatment, be able to eradicate these unfavourable impressions, and reconcile the vanquished to you by degrees. In making any changes with this view, you ought not, after your power is firmly rooted, to act implicitly according to the wishes or feelings, but according to what you judge to be

best for the real good of the people whom you wish to conciliate. The affection of a nation is by this mode slowly gained; but the power, to which it conduces, rests on a permanent basis. If you wish to reap an immediate benefit from the good will of the country in which you act, you may perhaps succeed more readily, by flattering the passions of men with vague professions of friendship, than by deeds. The French have exerted themselves with much assiduity, and have often derived great assistance in their operations by acting on this last mentioned system: but they have understood better how to promise than to perform; how to overturn the power of former governments, than to cement their own by the love of their new subjects, whom they have proudly trampled under foot in the insolence of victory. Hence the French empire may be considered weak, if any nation of equal spirit, and of greater moderation and justice, were to attack it. It would be highly desirable for us, if we could subsidize such a nation to fight our battles; but I do not know where we are to find an ally of this description, unless we look at home.

Since the only object in war is, or ought to be, success; a prince, or a nation, who in their external warfare either neglect or refuse to adopt such measures as have just been recommended, act in the most weak and infatuated manner: for by so doing, they either insure the destruction of an army, which might otherwise have been sufficient to

conquer a country; or they voluntarily incur the necessity of employing perhaps a hundred thousand men, in an operation, for which, by making allies in the country itself, thirty or forty thousand might have been fully adequate.

The British government, when long established in any foreign country, has generally succeeded in the end, in this difficult branch of the politics of war; but we have sometimes failed, especially at our first outset, and from the most opposite causes. When the people of any country are discontented with their situation, it may more generally be ascribed to a bad administration of their laws, than to any radical defect in the laws themselves. Partial change, therefore, not revolution, is much the wisest and safest policy, for a government that wishes to establish itself in the hearts of its foreign subjects, instead of throwing them into confusion. But we once unfortunately forgot this maxim. We transplanted the principles of our own constitution to the ungenial soil of Corsica, and by thus suddenly attempting a total revolution in that island, we drove its natives into rebellion against us. In other cases, in a laudable desire to keep down the spirit of Jacobinism, by not drawing a just line between the populace and the people, we have outraged the feelings of all classes of men; so that without gaining a single friend, we have made whole countries our enemies. Sometimes, in our military operations, our wish to conciliate, carried beyond a cer-

tain limit, has caused us to commit practical cruelty, as shall be shown hereafter. In some countries, with a view to arm the people, who had shown a spirit of resistance to the French, we have unhappily put weapons of destruction into the hands of the rabble; and let loose a body, dreadful to their own countrymen, contemptible and insignificant against the common enemy. We have always been too sparing of our manifestos, proclamations, and addresses to the natives of foreign countries; forgetting, one would think, that the press is so powerful an engine in our own. We have sometimes expected to gain the favour of nations, which neither understood, nor valued commerce, by the offer of commercial advantages; which, although in time they would have proved real and substantial benefits to the people in general, would have ruined the monopolies of the only men who practised trade. No wonder that such offers, instead of conciliating, were represented as a delusive bait, in order to cover some sordid or selfish view of our own merchants, to the prejudice of their customers. It must be confessed, however, that where we have failed, it has not been from want of sincerity. We have acted with the best intentions, and have principally been led astray, by judging of men abroad by ourselves; not considering that Britain stands alone amongst the nations, essentially different in character from them all, unparalleled and unequalled in many points. We are ourselves, for instance, a high-

minded people. We say that we would rather perish than allow a foreign power to interfere in our domestic affairs. Hence, from our fear of offending the national pride, and other high feelings, which we ourselves possess, in the people of countries where no such feelings exist, we may often hurt them in more tender points; or we may render ourselves contemptible by a conduct, which not knowing how to appreciate, they may erroneously construe into imbecility instead of delicacy.

We now come to the last point in war, that is, the policy to be observed by a great belligerent power in regard to other states, which may be neutral, or at least not principals in the quarrel. Before I enter upon this subject, I must again observe in the strongest manner, that no great power, in the critical situation in which Great Britain now stands, was ever saved by coalitions. We must trust alone to our own arms. Wherever we display our standard, we must draw the sword with the spirit of principals, not of auxiliaries; and we must never cease to increase our own power by conquest, until we make ourselves the strongest power in Europe, by land as well as by sea. If we neglect to use every exertion in our power to effect this purpose, it may prove of little use to us or our posterity, should we by any chance escape being enslaved by France. For if that empire were to fall to pieces, new difficulties and dangers would gather around us. Germany might become so powerful as

to act the same part in Europe which France now does. Spain might, as she formerly did, threaten to reduce us to a province: or, if we ever suffered ourselves to dwindle into a third power, how could we promise to ourselves, that two of the neighbouring states might not coalesce, in order to divide our country between them?[1]

If the principles laid down in chapter third be admitted, we ought, if we find France herself unassailable, to conquer in Holland, in the Netherlands, and in the north of Germany: since continental are in general more beneficial than insular conquests, and the nearer home that we can act, the better. But as circumstances may not always directly favour our wishes, we must watch opportunities of acting with constant energy upon plans previously digested, in order to effect our great object, that of diminishing the power of our enemy, and of increasing our own. We must assist our allies when we cannot conquer for ourselves; we must attack islands, when it may not appear convenient to attack the continent; but we must never neglect to employ our arms in vigorous external warfare somewhere,

[1] I think Buonaparte once dropped a hint of a coalition between France and Britain, by which these two powers might easily have divided the world between them. The British government would have too much wisdom and virtue to give into such a scheme; but we can never answer for the wisdom and virtue of other nations.

although, if we had been free to choose, we might have fixed upon another scene of action.

When war, either by sea or by land, has broken out between two great nations, there can be no safe neutrality, for any third power, except an armed neutrality.

It has been the policy of all warlike nations, after they have once attained the highest rank, in point of strength, to allow little independent kingdoms and commonwealths to exist around them; and even, when they have gained any advantage over other great states in the neighbourhood, to multiply the number of these little states, by the subdivision of their adversary. This they have done for two reasons. In any war the governments of these little states cannot possibly remain neutral, should either of the two belligerents think proper to demand their assistance. But although they are apparently free to choose, the history of the world has shown, that such governments always rank themselves under the banners of the most powerful. The rulers of such states are therefore, in reality, the vassals of the strongest; but their nominal independence sweetens the bitter pill of subjection, which may not otherwise be so easily made palatable to their subjects. The subdivisions of the continent form, at this moment, the strength of France. The confederation of the Rhine, composed of a race of men, who probably hate the French as much as we do, has been artfully framed by Buonaparte with

this view. But by the same principle, if we could suppose the comparative strength of Austria and of France to be suddenly reversed; then all the little princes, who compose that confederacy, forgetful that most of them owe their power to Buonaparte, instead of acting the part of courtiers in his palace, and of generals in his camps, would instantly turn their backs upon him; and he would have no satisfaction, but that of loudly lamenting the ingratitude of mankind.

We have at this moment so great a naval superiority, that it might reasonably be expected, that all the islands of the world, even though independent, as well as every commercial nation, which is divided from the continent of Europe by the sea, would declare for us, and follow our standard, as the confederates of the Rhine follow Buonaparte. This would actually be the case, if we adopted a more vigorous system of martial policy. But other powers seem to see our situation better than we do ourselves. What can be the cause that the united states of North America (a body whose whole soul seems wrapt up in commerce) do not declare at once for us, since they are not strong enough by sea to command that kind of neutrality[1] which they them-

[1] Holland, in the former state of Europe, being protected against France, by the strong barrier of the Netherlands, was placed, in every war between that power and England, under nearly the same circumstances in which the United

selves desire? I can discover no reason, except that they foresee the consequences likely to arise from our timid policy, and balance between present interest and future favour. Should they make war against us, it will neither excite in my mind the smallest anger nor the smallest surprise. Mankind have in all ages worshipped the rising sun.

Whilst it may, as we have observed, be politic in the greater power to leave lesser states independent; it is the policy of the secondary belligerent power to reduce such states into the form of provinces of its own empire, either by conquest, or by incorporation. Such is the policy of Austria, when at war with France. Such is also the true policy of Great Britain, in regard to all the lesser states, whose territory may become the theatre of war, excepting Portugal, which it is not necessary for us to conquer,

States of America now find themselves. Hence, with a view to the preservation of her commerce, that mercantile nation always followed the stronger naval power. The king of Prussia has thus noticed this striking feature of Dutch policy. "A la suite de cette puissance (meaning England) se range "la Hollande, comme une chaloupe, qui suit l'impression "d'un vaisseau de guerre, auquel elle est attachée." (Hist. de mon Temps. Chap. 1.) Could Holland at this moment be suddenly transformed into an island, her subjection to France would immediately cease, and her dependence upon England would begin. Such a nation, however free in appearance, is always a province of some greater state. The power of choosing masters is its only privilege. If it chooses wrong, it may be destroyed.

because Spain interposes between that little kingdom and France.

That part of our national policy, which, in my mind, deserves the most unqualified censure, is the constant desire, which we have shown, to court the friendship of all nations indiscriminately, even the most weak and contemptible; a policy which, for the reasons just stated, has always ended in the overthrow of our allies, and in disappointment to ourselves. It is to be hoped, now that we have had such ample and such recent experience to convince us, that the alliance of petty states, to a nation in our situation, is a burden, not a benefit; that we shall no longer waste our resources in attempting to restore such allies to their former dominions: a labour which we shall find as endless, and as unprofitable as the task of Sisyphus. It is such an inevitable fatality of the lesser states to follow the stronger in war, that if we were, by the greatest expense of blood and of treasure, to succeed in overturning all the potentates set up by Buonaparte, and to re-establish the Stadtholder, the king of Sardinia, the republics of Switzerland, Genoa, and Venice, the grand duke of Tuscany, the Pope, &c. &c. if we were even to place on the thrones of the little states, into which Europe is now divided, branches of our own royal family, or English noblemen; still, if we left the subdivisions of the continent in their present state, we should find, on a new war, that we had only wrested the sword from one set of

enemies, and transferred it into the hands of others, no less ready than the former to employ it in our destruction: we should find, that whether the ruler of the Dutch be called King Louis Napoleon, or Prince of Orange, Holland will always be equally our inveterate foe; until we either reduce it into a province of Great Britain, or make ourselves stronger than France by other conquests. "From "a principle of justice, to persevere in the deter- "mination of supporting, and re-establishing such "states, is (as Mr. Leckie has observed) like in- "sisting that a dead man should stand on his legs, "because he was able to do so when he was alive."[1]

[1] This writer (in his Historical Survey of the Foreign Affairs of Great Britain) has strongly reprobated the above system. The principles upon which he reasons, appear to me sound and convincing; but he has, in my mind, carried the application of them too far, in censuring all continental alliances, and all operations upon the continent, too indiscriminately. He is the first Englishman in the present times (at least to my knowledge), who, shaking off the national prejudice that has lately crept in amongst us against foreign aggrandizement, has brought forward to public view, the doctrine formerly entertained in this country; the truth and propriety of which have scarcely been for a moment doubted by any other nation in the world; namely, "that a stationary "power cannot possibly resist an increasing one; and that it "is therefore right for a nation in our present situation to "conquer from a principle of self-preservation."

This has always been my opinion, since I first began to turn my mind seriously to a consideration of the future prospects of the British nation. My Essay was begun before I had an

The greater powers require more management from both parties. Their true interest is, that neither of the belligerents should become too powerful, perhaps irresistible, by subduing the other. The existence of such powers is therefore more useful than prejudicial to the weaker of the two, and their alliance is carefully to be courted. In the present state of Europe, there are no powers to which Great Britain can look for effectual assistance. She must first assist them to obtain greater

opportunity of perusing Mr. Leckie's publication, but I feel myself much indebted to that work, since it has led me to consider the importance of insular possessions more fully than I should otherwise have done. The result of my reflections upon this subject has not been favourable to Mr. Leckie's opinion of the great strength which we might attain by forming an insular empire. Such an empire would certainly make us much stronger than we are, but not strong enough to resist France, in the present state of the world.

In treating of insular possessions, it will be observed, that I dwell much upon Sicily. This I have done, partly on account of its superior importance; but principally because, having visited that island as a traveller, in 1803, and afterwards having served there in 1806, I have advanced nothing in respect to it, except from my own personal observation.

Mr. Leckie has entered into the State of Sicily much more fully and minutely than I am either qualified, or (in a work like the present) should have been willing, to do. The accuracy of his picture of that island, for which I can vouch (as far as my knowledge goes), induces me to place great confidence in his authority in regard to the state of the north of Italy, and of the Greek islands.

strength, before they in return can contribute towards her security. To say nothing of Russia, Spain and Austria are the only nations which are worthy of our assistance as allies, because they alone, if once set up, would be able to stand of themselves. They are not only the only nations that would have the power, but probably the wish, to remain independent; since the people of no other countries of Europe, however uneasy they may be under the French yoke, either feel, or have felt, the spirit of great nations. Some of the smaller states, such as Denmark or Switzerland, may perhaps also have a considerable degree of national pride; but when the power of maintaining independence in any country ceases, the wish either soon dies away of itself, or is easily extinguished. I grant that, as was before observed, if Spain and Germany were re-established, they might be so ungrateful and so unwise as to coalesce against us; but such a coalition is not, like that of the lesser states with France, a matter of inevitable necessity; and the chances of it will not be much to be dreaded, provided we take care to omit no opportunity of increasing our own strength by conquest, whilst we assist our allies; for we have no instance in history of a first rate power having ever been destroyed by a coalition of its neighbours. The only thing truly dangerous for a nation is to be a second, or a third rate power.

Much, as has been seen, depends, in this branch of policy, upon the comparative strength of the two belligerents. If your adversary is a great deal stronger than yourself, but has not, from circumstances, the power of making an immediate attack upon you; you must employ the intermediate time in strengthening yourself, by every effort possible; but beware of drawing any third power into the contest, although in every respect a desirable ally, unless you are fully prepared, and determined to support that ally, in such a vigorous way, as to render his overthrow a thing impossible; since your enemy, after destroying him, will be so much the more able to conquer you. All our alliances with other powers, during the last and present wars, have, for this reason, terminated upon the whole to our prejudice, except as far as regards our naval superiority, which we could scarcely have gained, if France had not been fully occupied upon the continent.

Another point to be considered is, not only the strength and resources, but the character of the rulers, and of the people, of a nation, with which you have an alliance in view; as well as the probable nature of the operations.

If you could promise yourself, that the theatre of war could always be confined to the enemy's country, the more allies you have the better. But if you cannot hope to keep the war out of the country of your allies, avoid above all things the friendship of

a state, whose rulers are thoroughly detested by its people. Let such a government remain neutral, giving it no encouragement whatever to declare on your side: for it is weak at home, and must be destroyed, unless you support it with an overwhelming force; by which you would dissipate, not increase, your own strength, defeating thereby the only object for which an alliance in war is desirable.

If your enemy should himself declare war against such a government, you are not obliged to interfere in a quarrel not directly your own. By acting vigorously in some other part, you may as much assist that government, as if there were a positive treaty between you: you may even, perhaps, save it. Should your enemy, however, prevail in the contest, you may then carry your arms into that country, and meet him there single-handed, with a fair prospect of success: and if you drive him out, you may either annex the country to your own empire by right of conquest; or restore it to independence, if it has a strong desire, and sufficient power, to preserve itself in that state under a better government. When unfortunately you have formed such an injudicious alliance, use your influence to persuade your ally, for his own sake as well as for yours, to adopt wiser and more humane measures towards his subjects, in order to make himself strong against foreign invasion. Should your advice be obstinately or contemptuously rejected, then look carefully into his conduct; and if you find any flaw

in his title deeds, or that he has not strictly fulfilled every part of the mutual agreement between you, charge him with his perfidy, and withdraw your assistance from such a ruinous cause. Should a government, thus detested by its subjects, also labour under the additional defect of being one of the lesser powers, as such powers always waver in their councils, the chances are, that if you search deeply, you will discover that your ally may have formed some conspiracy to betray you to your enemy, whenever a favourable opportunity shall offer.

To a reader who will reflect deeply, what has already been said upon these subjects would be sufficient: but as our personal feelings do interweave themselves with all our reasonings upon the affairs of nations in such a way, that the very measures which we would admire in any of the great states of antiquity, and which would even meet our most full approbation and applause, if related of our ancestors, may shock us at the present moment; I must, however unwilling to enter largely into any kind of political discussions, explain more fully, that the principles which I recommend, and which may appear (what is called) Machiavelian,[1] are in

[1] Machiavel in his political works has stated all the means, good and bad, by which a prince or a common wealth may increase their power, and he has illustrated every thing by examples from history. So Mr. Colquhoun, in his Police of

reality the most Anti-Machiavelian that can be imagined: so much so, that it will be impossible for us, unless we become an ambitious and a thoroughly warlike people, even with the best intentions in the world, to act in a way at all reconcilable, either to the law of nations or to any just notion of true honour.

We refuse to be a conquering people; yet it is extraordinary, that with this doctrine in our mouths, we have constantly been conquering. Ambition has been held out as a kind of crime; yet we have got over our scruples in regard to little islands and rocks. We should shudder at the idea of taking Danish Zealand: but the conquest of that worthless lump of red clay, called Heligoland,[1] is received with

the metropolis, has stated all the tricks, by which a dishonest livelihood may be obtained. But no one has, for this reason, ever thought of branding that author with the title of an advocate for vice or villainy. And it is, perhaps, equally unfair to stigmatize Machiavel, as the preacher of a criminal ambition, which he has merely described, but not recommended either to individuals or to nations. I have thought this explanation due to the name of so celebrated a writer, which probably would not have been associated with any thing atrocious, if he had not boldly published to the world, "that the Papal authority was the cause of the ruin of Italy."

[1] The description of Heligoland given in the text is literally true. It is a high mass of red earth of the consistency of chalk, of a triangular form, little more than three quarters of a mile long, and half a mile across at its broadest part.

the greatest applause and joy in England: no outcry is excited on the occasion; on the contrary it is earnestly hoped, that Denmark may be prevailed upon to let us keep it at a peace. Now if the one be a crime, the other is a crime: both, or neither. It is equally criminal, and much more mean and contemptible to pick a man's pocket of half a guinea, than to rob him of a thousand pounds on the highway. If conquest be robbery, let us rob like Alexander, not like the pirate. Where would have been the difference, I ask, between our wish to occupy Lampedosa, and a wish to occupy Sicily?

Two thousand inhabitants live in a town partly built upon this lump, partly upon a beach of small extent below it. The communication between the upper and lower towns is by a stair-case, the only mode indeed by which the former is accessible. The natives lived, before the English took possession, by pilotage and fishing, having no means of subsistence on the island itself. The salvage of vessels was also a source of profit to them. In the winter of 1807, when I visited Heligoland, no less than twelve vessels were to be seen shipwrecked in different parts, either upon that island, on a small sandy island near it, or on various reefs of rocks. So much for the harbour between the two islands, which, bad as it is, can only admit the smallest merchantmen. The ships of war anchor out of gun shot in an open road-stead, so that Heligoland (but for its light house) is scarcely necessary for us as warriors, however valuable it may be to us as smugglers.

One thing in favour of Heligoland is, that it is naturally very strong (almost impregnable), and a few hundred men are a sufficient garrison. Hence it can put us to little expense, whilst its inhabitants can find employment,

since they both belonged to the same prince, the justice or injustice of our views, in both cases, would have been the same; only that Sicily would have been of use to us, Lampedosa of none; the former would have increased our strength, the latter would have diminished it; the former would have made us formidable, the latter most probably ridiculous, in Europe.[1] May not our vaunted moderation reasonably be believed, by other nations, to have arisen more from a timid and narrow policy than from a love of justice?

If any man in this country foresees the downfal of Spain and Portugal, but consoles himself with the idea that we shall keep Ceuta and Madeira for ourselves; I beg to put to him this plain question, whether it would not be much more useful, and infinitely more glorious for this country, if the thing were equally practicable, to make ourselves masters of Spain and Portugal at once? This I think will hardly be answered in the negative. Then I shall put a second question, whether the justice or injustice of depriving Ferdinand the Seventh of Spain or of Ceuta be not exactly the same? For my part I see no difference, and so far from being more Machiavelian, I say that I am less Machiavelian, than he who looks forward to keep Madeira or Ceuta, where we were first admitted under the show

[1] At least if we had tried and failed in an attempt to convert Lampedosa into a naval station.

of friendship; since that would be a pitiful artifice, contrary to the law of nations;[1] an artifice which I

[1] It must be understood, that I by no means venture to insinuate, that the British government, in its late occupation of Madeira and of Ceuta, has any secret or selfish views. I have thought proper merely to put the case, because I have heard men, who most strongly reprobate ambition on a great scale, speak in the highest approbation of ambitious views on a small scale, even when they can only be carried into effect, by what appears to me the most unwarrantable means.

The prospect of keeping Ceuta and Madeira for ourselves has been agitated, in conversation or otherwise, by individuals in this country a thousand times, and never, to my knowledge, otherwise than in terms of applause, both as to the policy and justice of it: so much so, that if government were at any future period to refuse to restore these places to their proper masters, I do not believe that this conduct would excite any indignation in the minds of the people of England.

How did we first get possession of Gibraltar and of Minorca at the commencement of the last century? Was it not by conquest under the mask of friendship; a mode of conquest which, of all others, every impartial man must allow is the most contemptible? It is extraordinary, that not a single murmur was ever raised against the conquest of these two places, which has always been a very popular measure in England; whilst the destruction of Tippoo Saib in India, who would have destroyed us if we had not destroyed him, a measure not only perfectly just, but of the most indispensable necessity, has been loudly reprobated, because (I suppose) it was a great and glorious enterprise, achieved in the face of day. At least I can discover nothing else in which this measure differs from any of the other measures, that have led to the aggrandizement of the British dominions.

disdain, and a law which I reverence. From what was said before, it appears sufficiently evident, that a great nation may choose its allies in war; and if it did not suit my view of affairs, that we should act as allies in the Spanish Peninsula, I should recommend to go there as declared conquerors, with the sword in one hand and the law of nations in the other; not in the insiduous, sneaking manner in which Buonaparte secured his first footing in that country. He has been compared to Alexander, and justly in many points; but Alexander never would have acted in such a way.

Let us now consider the consequences of our unambitious policy. We are at war with some nation. If we get hold of a worthless rock we keep it, but if we conquer some great island or province we generally give it up at a peace. By our humane and moderate conduct, (for such is our general conduct) we may, during our temporary occupation, have surmounted the prejudices and secured the affections of the natives. The war ceases: their former government resumes its power. Under some pretext or other (which the articles of the treaty give us no sufficient reason to take up), all our principal adherents are either persecuted and disgraced, or even put to death and banished: and we are burthened with the support of the families of the victims to our cause; or they wander about the world in a state of beggary. The people of the country, which we have abandoned, are oppressed

more than before by their former masters, who believe, perhaps truly, that we have shaken their allegiance, and that on any new occasion they would be glad to take protection under the British flag. Is this conduct of ours, I ask, reconcilable either to wisdom or to justice? Does it not, on the contrary, give the people of the world an impression, that we are the most selfish and tyrannical of nations, since we make them over without reluctance, to the revenge and cruelty of their former governments, or of any government, if by so doing we can gain good terms for ourselves at a peace?*

* Hence the people of some countries, whose feelings and interest would equally prompt them to fight for us, to a man, could any dependence be placed upon the firmness and consistency of our national councils, remain passive spectators of our operations, or even join our enemies.

Witness the conduct of the Minorquins, who are a moral, orderly and industrious race, qualities calculated to render them good soldiers and seamen; yet not one of whom ever entered our service, or offered us the smallest active assistance, much as they preferred the British, to the former government of Spain.

To give another instance of the truth of this doctrine: when Sir David Baird took the Cape of Good Hope, only one planter joined him, and he was an Englishman born, and had even once been an officer in the army. The inhabitants, however, in general testified great joy at being once more under the British government. Being accused by the officers of inconsistency and insincerity, because they had rendered the army no assistance whatever, they said, that had Sir David

What is the effect of such a policy, when we display our standard in some new country, the natives of which have any degree of judgment or resolution? They either ask or endeavour to learn our views. We probably offer them some advantages, which they neither wish for nor understand: and we profess that we only intend a temporary occupation. The brave and highminded, disdaining to be sold at a peace for some West Indian island, immediately fly to arms to oppose us. The self-interested, the timid and the servile, looking forward to recommend themselves to their former masters, become equally our enemies. Men of all characters and parties forget their domestic feuds, and unite against us. Hence even if we gain a partial success by force of arms, our power is in constant danger, either of being subverted by open insurrection, or of being undermined by secret conspiracy.

If we acted on a contrary system, and declared that we would maintain our conquests to the last extremity; our adversaries, who in that case would form only a part, not the whole of a nation, after

issued a proclamation, pledging himself that the colony would not be given up at a peace, they would have joined him to a man; but without some such promise, they were not inclined to mark themselves out for certain destruction out of mere good will to us, knowing that in all probability, the British government would make them over again to their former masters.

being subdued in the field, would soon be reconciled to us, by our humane conduct, when they knew that we would not forsake them. The self-interested would dread to embark in any conspiracy against such a determined nation: on the contrary, they would make a merit with us of discovering and counteracting all plots, and of repressing all discontent, amongst their own countrymen.

Our unambitious, unwarlike policy is thus the cause, which has either formed or added strength to French parties, in all countries in which we have ever acted.[1] It was almost the only cause, that combined and armed the natives of Spanish South America against us, and inspired them with an almost incredible degree of horror and aversion at the sight or name of an Englishman. It is a cause that has hitherto tended to make us hateful or contemptible, wherever we have carried our arms, even where it has not actually contributed to our ruin or disgrace, as was the case at Buenos Ayres.[2]

[1] I find this opinion, which was formed from personal observation, fully confirmed by others, who have had equal or better opportunities of judging than myself.

[2] This is the opinion of almost every officer, whom I have met, who served on that expedition. It will appear evident from a perusal of the proceedings of Whitelocke's court martial, &c. Sir S. Achmuty, in his letter to Mr. Windham, dated Monte Video, March the 6th, 1807, states, that until a promise, not to give up the country to Spain at a peace, is

We shall now practically explain what we before advanced, that a great nation may, without the smallest deviation from justice, choose its own allies and its enemies in war. It has already been stated in a former part of this Essay, that our present alliance with Sicily is pernicious, not useful, to us, by which it was consequently implied, that if ever we carried our arms into that island, it should have been with a view to conquer it for ourselves. No one will pretend, that any external power could have forced us, by threats or otherwise, to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the present government of Sicily. Such an attempt we might have spurned at and resented. Had that alliance, on the contrary, been calmly proposed to us, surely we were at liberty to decline it. If that government chose to go to war with France, or France with it, it was no concern of ours. We are not obliged to be the champions of all the little potentates of the world, unless we please. All that the law of nations required of us was, to leave Sicily neutral, and to

made, " we must expect to find them" (the great body of the natives of that province) " either open or secret enemies." As the British generals were positively ordered not to give such a promise, Sir S. Achmuty's letter implies a prediction of the catastrophe, which afterwards took place.

It was, however, much more manly in the ministry of that time, to forbid any promises being made, although such promises might have insured the success of their measures, if they were not fully decided to keep Buenos Ayres.

offer its rulers no injury, as long as they abstained from any act of hostility against us. This was actually the case at the commencement of the present war. We enjoyed all the benefits from Sicily which we now enjoy, without the smallest expense, and no other disadvantage than the shelter of its ports to a few French privateers; a disadvantage so trifling, that I should not have mentioned it, had it not been the only one.

This state of affairs was not, however, of long duration. The present government of Sicily admitted a French army into its continental dominions, and by providing for the subsistence of that army at its own expense, actually paid tribute to France.

By these acts the government of Sicily commenced direct hostilities against Great Britain, which we were fully authorized to resent by a declaration of war. It was not necessary for us to inquire (nor, if we had inquired, could we possibly have discovered the truth) whether it was a fear of Buonaparte, or a hatred of the British nation, or both, which thus converted the present government of Sicily into a vassal of France. If a brave and well-armed traveller is attacked on the highway by a robber, he instantly cuts him down. It is not his business, when he finds his life in danger, to consider whether the ruffian who threatens it, may not have been forced to assault him, against his own will, by a more powerful robber, whom he dares not disobey.

Naples and Sicily, by the acts on the part of their government which I have mentioned, no matter whether those acts were voluntary or involuntary, had become provinces of France; and as such, I say, that by the law of nations, and by every law, human and divine, we had a right to conquer them both.

If we had taken possession of Sicily for ourselves in 1805; I shall not say, if we had conquered it, because from the badness of the military institutions of its government, the small regular army in that island was unable, and from the evil administration of its laws, the people would have been unwilling to oppose us;* we should, by this time, have found

* The opinion, which I have here advanced respecting Sicily, is fully confirmed by the testimony of Lord Nelson. "The state of Sicily," says his lordship (in a letter to Lord Sidmouth, then Mr. Addington, dated the 28th June, 1803) "is almost as bad as a civilized country can be. There are "no troops fit to be called such, with a scarcity of corn never "known before, and of course bread so dear that the lower "class is discontented. The nobles are oppressors, and those "of the middle rank wish for a change, and although they "would prefer us to the French, yet I believe they would "receive the French rather than not change from the oppres- "sion of the nobles."

In a subsequent letter to the same, upon the same subject, dated the 24th of August, Lord Nelson observes, "I see "clearly, if we have not a little army to take it, the French "will. I am sorry to say, that the mass of Sicilians wish "for a change of government; they desire us, but if we will "not go there," &c. &c.

ourselves about seven millions sterling richer than we are at present; a reason for going to Sicily as conquerors by no means to be despised: for, great as our national wealth is, we may find, some day or other, that it is not inexhaustible.[1] Our commerce and manufactures, which have in this interval benefited little, might have benefited greatly; a second reason for conquering Sicily. That island itself would have increased in prosperity and in happiness under our protection; a third reason for conquering it. And lastly, our power in Sicily would, by this time, have been firmly cemented by the love and respect of a grateful nation; whose population would have furnished us with a faithful and formidable auxiliary force.

Instead of which, by adopting a contrary policy, and by going to Sicily as allies, not as conquerors, we have been supporting in that island a government, not only hateful to its subjects, but doubtful in faith to us; and by a solecism in politics, which,

[1] Five years have nearly elapsed since we entered Sicily as allies. If we had entered it as conquerors, we should have enjoyed the revenue of the island; and saved the subsidies, &c. paid to its government, I believe, not only after, but before that period. We can hardly estimate the former at less than five millions, nor the latter at much less than two millions sterling. When I say, in the text, that we should be seven millions richer, I do not mean that we should have absolutely hoarded that sum. We should have expended it in the purchase of strength and power.

I believe, no other nation in the world ever committed, we have been paying tribute to that government for the privilege of being allowed to defend it, when it cannot defend itself; contrary to our own interest, and to that of the whole Sicilian nation, by which it is not even considered in the favourable light of a native government; for the Sicilians have an antipathy to the Neapolitans, and consider them as much foreigners, as they do the Spaniards, the French, or the English.

Such an alliance, when the hour of invasion draws near to Sicily, will be found to rest on as treacherous a foundation, as a house built upon the lava of its native Ætna. The volcano will explode when we least expect it. The miserable ally, whom we have vainly been attempting to support, will see no other hope of safety but in turning against us. Should his submission not be accepted by our haughty adversary, he will be crumbled into dust, and, in his fall, may involve the disgrace of a British army, which will find itself alone, unassisted, and (if it should be destroyed) unpitied by a single native of a country, which it has been professing to protect.[1] Having thus described what actually have

[1] The regular army of Sicily is small, and contemptible: the soldiers, however, are fine, and I have known officers in it, who would have done credit to any service. But all are trampled upon and discontented. If an army is bad, it is not certainly its own fault; but no matter whence the evil arises, the army of Sicily is so bad, that we can place no

been, and what might have been, our proceedings in Sicily, I leave to my reader to decide, whether our conduct towards that island, if it had been actuated by greater ambition, would not have been more just, more generous, and more honourable, as well as infinitely more wise.

If we change the scene from Sicily to the Continent, I can see no plea on which our conduct can be reconciled to the feelings of the continental nations in general. Whilst the horrors of the war have not affected either France or England, from whose disputes it principally arose; the people of other

dependence upon it. If the French landed in Sicily, the native troops would either fly from half their numbers, or they would desert by hundreds, as they did in Naples.

There is a militia in Sicily of considerable numbers, established by laws that are never enforced. As the men are neither armed nor exercised, this militia is merely a long string of names, an army upon paper only.

The people of Sicily detest the French; so much so, that they still glory in the memory of their vespers, a massacre which has been carefully handed down by tradition, all over that island. But a doubt arises, whether they may not hate their present government (and, in course of time, even its supporters) as much or more than the French. When we first landed in Sicily, a peasant asked me whether the Sicilians were not in future to consider themselves subjects of King George. On my explaining that we came as allies, not as usurpers, he walked sullenly away, saying, if that was the case, he wished to God that we had never entered his country. In Sicily this is a general feeling, too well known to admit of dispute or contradiction.

states have been the only sufferers: their countries have been over-run and plundered by the French armies; whilst their merchant vessels have been destroyed, and their commercial seamen carried into captivity, by the British navy. Now, I beg to put the question to any candid man, whether a merchant of Hamburgh, who has been robbed of ten thousand pounds, in some way or other, by a French general, is likely to feel more indignation, because that man was born in France, and is the subject of a despot, than when he hears that an equal portion of his property has, in the shape of prize-money, found its way into the pockets of an English admiral?

As the loss of commerce and navigation can only forcibly extend to the mercantile body, who have little influence in most other countries; whilst the oppressive conduct of the French armies has come home to the feelings of every individual in Europe: for this reason, it might be expected that the people of the world would universally favour us. But whilst by our unambitious system, we act in a way that renders it impossible for us ever to destroy or break the strength of our enemy; they, in their natural wish to get rid of their present sufferings as soon as possible, can see no reasonable prospect of an end to the contest but in our downfal. Thus by our refusal to adopt the principles of a warlike people, we transfer upon our own heads all the hatred, which other nations have cause to feel against

the French; and until we adopt a more daring policy, the united voices of the people of the world, whilst they pray for the blessings of peace, will offer up secret vows for our destruction.

The rulers of other nations have, however, no reason to find fault with us. They either declared against France without our solicitation, or at any rate they would not have joined us, had they not believed it for their own interest so to do. Yet, more owing perhaps to our unambitious, unwarlike policy, than to any just cause of complaint against us, we seem to have acquired little respect and no gratitude from the continental princes, who have received our subsidies with an air of superiority, as if they were doing us a favour, by pocketing our guineas. If we had interposed with a British army to save Austria, in the battles of Marengo or of Austerlitz, we should by such conduct have made ourselves both glorious and terrible in Europe. Instead of which, by confining ourselves to pecuniary aids, by a display of wealth, not of power, we have neither made ourselves beloved nor feared.[1]

[1] To prove how little those who were the most indebted to us, have either felt esteem or gratitude for our favours, see the celebrated King of Prussia's observations on the policy of the various European powers. (Hist. de mon Temps, chap. 1.) That monarch, after describing his own ambitious views of increasing his power in Germany, which he qualifies by the term of "arrondir l'état," is reluctantly obliged to confess, that "La Prusse ne pouvoit agir alors" (at his accession to

The eagerness, too, with which we have sought to buy the alliance of any other state, however weak and contemptible, or however insolent or perfidious its former conduct towards us may have been, has evinced little regard for our own dignity: and how can those who seem to think poorly of themselves be respected by others?

Prussia, after having so often profited by our

the throne), " qu'en s'épaulant de la France, ou de l'Angle-
" terre. On pouvoit cheminer avec la France, qui avoit fort
" a cœur sa gloire, et l'abaissement de la maison d'Autriche.
" On ne pouvoit tirer des Anglois que des subsides destinés
" à se servir des forces étrangères pour leurs propres
" intérêts."

In another passage, making the same comparison, he speaks of England with still greater asperity. " Les Fran-
" çois veulent vaincre pour faire des conquêtes. Les Anglois
" veulent acheter des princes pour en faire des esclaves; tous
" deux donnent le change au public, pour détourner ses
" regards de leur propre ambition."

For my part, I cannot read such observations without indignation. However selfish the motive of the British government, in first concluding an alliance with the King of Prussia, might be, still that government acted the part of a faithful friend, and adhered to him when he seemed on the brink of destruction. If he could not command the language of gratitude, which his heart seems to have been incapable of feeling, why express to the world his ill-dissembled hatred and envy of those to whom he owed so much? Why even pretend a kind of contempt for a nation, by which his misfortunes were so much pitied, and his great actions so much applauded?

subsidies, abruptly turned against us; and not only cheated, but derided and insulted us, by the shameful seizure of Hanover. This insult we certainly went through the form of resenting by a declaration of war; but it was a declaration only.

When Prussia afterwards thought proper to quarrel with France, then, instead of flying with open arms to receive her again into our friendship, the utmost, surely, that policy required of us, was to grant her a truce; but we should never either have forgotten or forgiven her former insult, until she humbled herself in the dust before us. The lion in the fable was obliged to put up with a kick from an ass, but not before he was on the point of death. If the British lion is not dead, he must be walking in his sleep, since every ass may, in the present times, kick him with impunity, and the next moment fawn upon him as if nothing had happened. I have pitched upon this act of Prussia as the most glaring instance of the contemptuous treatment to which our humble, unaspiring spirit has exposed us. But what power can be mentioned, from which we have not experienced, at some time or other, similar humiliations, when the dignity, not the commerce, of the British nation, has been the point at issue? Those who think, that if we should ever carry our arms into the north of Germany, it would be more proper for us to reinstate such a treacherous power as Prussia in its former dominions, than to conquer them for ourselves, must, in

my mind, have very extraordinary notions both of justice and of policy.

Another consequence has arisen from our want of dignified feeling. All men must recollect the desponding language formerly held in this country, in objection to any measure universally allowed to be for our interest. Was the occupation of Malta, for instance, the point in question? Then it was immediately said, that Russia would not allow it, or that Austria or Prussia might put it in their veto. Turkey would take umbrage at one thing: Sardinia would object to a second: the Pope to a third: Algiers to a fourth. Any power, in short, was to lay down the law to Great Britain. Thus, like the nursery maid, who stops the restless child in the midst of his play, by dreadful stories of some phantom that is coming to take him; we have often cramped ourselves in our operations, and have allowed ourselves to be terrified into inactivity, by our apprehension of drawing upon us the resentment of other nations; to which we ourselves ought to have dictated in a lofty tone, if they had presumed to speak one word in disapprobation of our measures.

Will posterity believe, that this unmanly timidity may not have been the true cause which clipped the wings of our national ambition, and made us imitate the grovelling ostrich, when we might have soared like the eagle; which has confined our arms to the conquest of poor and contemptible posses-

sions, instead of great and useful ones; which made us search for harbours in Lampedosa, when we might have found them in Sardinia[1] and in Sicily; which made us conquer Surinam instead of Holland; Heligoland instead of Denmark; Guadaloupe instead of the Netherlands; ships and cargoes, under Prussian colours, instead of Prussia itself.

The acquisition of things which are of little value, certainly excites little jealousy in others. Paltry conquests excite little or none, and are scarcely even talked of, after the account of them has appeared in one gazette. Great conquests excite great jealousy, and give rise to loud and continued clamours; but the warlike spirit, by which alone they can be effected, commands respect; and

[1] Extract of a letter from Lord Nelson to Lord Hawkesbury, dated the 22d of June, 1804. "If I were at your lordship's "elbow, I think I could say so much upon the subject of "Sardinia, that attempts would be made to obtain it; for "this I hold as clear, that the King of Sardinia cannot "keep it, and if he could, that it is of no use to him. That "if France gets it, she commands the Mediterranean, and "that by us it would be kept at much less expense than "Malta; from its position it is worth fifty Maltas," &c.

In a letter to Lord Sidmouth, written about ten months before, when it was supposed that the French intended to seize upon that island, he says, "Sardinia will be lost with-"out a struggle, and yet the majority of the Sardinians "would fly to receive us; but, if we will not, then they "will receive the French, rather than remain as they now are, "oppressed by taxes, and by no means protected from the "Barbary States."

increasing power gradually changes the respect of other states into submission.

The Romans, when Hannibal was at their gates, had not a single ally. Strong in their own spirit and valour, after fortune, and even hope, seemed to have abandoned them for ever, they sought for safety only in themselves, and there they found it. But when they had triumphed over Carthage, and had no longer need of foreign assistance, all the nations vied with each other for the honour of serving under the Roman eagles, both by sea and land. A useful lesson for us, now that we are abandoned by the universe, and are either at war, or on the point of being at war, with all mankind. Thank God, we have still sufficient power in our hands to make allies by the Roman method, if we choose to adopt it; the only method by which a nation, in our present situation, can either make, or hope to preserve, one single friend.

CHAPTER VI.

The same subject continued.—Of the want of information, and inadequacy of force, that have been prejudicial to us in our military operations.

A NATION engaging in any kind of warfare, without a deep-felt sense of the absolute necessity of attaining its object, must act more often (as was observed) by chance than foresight; and unforeseen difficulties in war are, by the bulk of mankind, magnified into impossibilities: hence they either cause the sudden abandonment of an enterprise, or at least they produce a vacillation of measures, both in the cabinet and in the field; so that, whilst the minds of men are fluctuating between hope and despair, the finest opportunities of action are lost, and ultimate success becomes impossible. This, in a few words, is the history of all our military failures, which we shall now endeavour to analyze a little more in detail.

A general want of information has been complained of by the British army. Countries have been found quite different from the notion entet-

tained of them: the maps and plans of them in our possession have proved erroneous; and we scarcely know an instance, in which the disposition of the natives has not disappointed our expectations. What has been the cause of all these errors and deficiencies? What could have prevented us from having as good maps, as good statistical and political accounts, of most countries, as are in possession of their native governments! Such things are either publicly offered for sale, or at all events they are, somehow or other, to be had for money: and had materials been thus procured, we could have found no difficulty in striking off any number of copies of maps and plans, or in drawing up military memoirs upon every country of the world, to guide us in our operations. Yet, however easy it may be to collect such information, and to make such arrangements by degrees, it cannot be done on the spur of the moment, after the troops have got orders to march to their different points of embarkation, or when they are lying at Cork, at Spithead, or at the Downs, waiting for a wind. These arrangements are the work of science, and of foresight; and surely they would have been fully made before the present time, had the nation felt more strongly the importance of its wars by land. The want of them has been felt by us not merely in our expeditions to new or remote countries. Even in countries where we have fought in former times, countries that have been traversed by hundreds of British

travellers, (what has afforded mirth to our enemies, to us it is too serious a subject for merriment) we have often proved misinformed in the most important points; and our ignorance has, in all cases, greatly contributed to our failures. For want of such arrangements, the proper secrecy that ought to be observed in fitting out an expedition is also defeated; because the officers, whose duties require them to be well provided with plans and information, are left to hunt for them in various shops and libraries all over the metropolis; and the unusual demand of some particular article, gives rise to conjectures which are circulated in every part of the kingdom,* and may even find their way to France.

Another evil, that has arisen from not having hitherto acted systematically upon a plan of this kind, is the discouragement of the spirit of observation in individuals. A man may understand perfectly the art of surveying, and consequently may be capable of collecting in every country the most useful plans and charts, and of rectifying their errors by his own observations; he may be qualified for compiling and digesting the best military

* This observation struck me very forcibly last year, before I sailed on the late expedition under the earl of Chatham. I was buying some maps for the occasion in London. The person in the shop told me, that he was sure the expedition must be going against Antwerp, because the officers of the navy and army had suddenly bought up almost all his charts of the mouth of the Scheldt, &c

information; or he may be capable of penetrating the true causes that render the people of any country satisfied or discontented with their governments; but all these researches and pursuits demand considerable exertion both of mind and body; they are generally attended with great expense, and sometimes with danger. A traveller from any one nation residing in another will therefore, in preference, employ his time in amusement and dissipation; or will confine himself to the study of the antiquities, or of the arts and literature of the country which he visits. In short, he will always follow some pursuit pleasing or useful to himself, which the making of observations that would be of any service in war seldom or never can be, unless he has before him the prospect of some reward from his own government to animate him in his labours. These remarks will account for the very unsatisfactory information which government has generally received from British subjects of the most acknowledged talents, who have been called upon to give their opinion upon the state of foreign countries, which they may, at some former period, have had every opportunity of examining.

The French, on the contrary, who hold out encouragement to those who present them with useful information, or who compose able memoirs upon any country, not merely at the moment when they may happen to want such information, but at all times; and who have a particular office in their

war department for receiving, preparing for use, and distributing military information of every kind, are seldom or never at a loss, from ignorance of the state of any country, to which they carry their arms. They have lately boasted that they have accurate maps of the British dominions, with soundings of our coasts, plans of our fortifications, &c. and I can easily believe it.[1] It is in the power of the British government to imitate, or to improve

[1] An American gentleman (in a Letter on the genius and disposition of the French government, lately published) observes, that "throughout all France, the note of military "preparation drowns every other indication of activity, and "the thirst of conquest appears to supersede every other "desire." After expressing his astonishment at this spirit, which he says he found not merely actuating the French government, but pervading the whole nation; he proceeds as follows: "From the commencement of the revolution "particularly, emissaries have been scattered over Europe, "in order to study and delineate its geographical face. The "harvest of their labours, now deposited in Paris, has furnished "the imperial government with a knowledge of the territory "of other powers, much more minute and accurate than "that which the latter themselves possess. The *Depôt de* "*la Guerre* occupies, unremittingly, several hundred clerks "in tracing maps and collecting topographical details, to "minister to the military purposes of the government. All "the great estates of Spain were marked and parcelled out "long before the last invasion of that country; and it is not "too much to affirm, that those of England are equally well "known and already partitioned." This account of the spirit of the establishment is just, but its magnitude, and the

upon a system so essential to success in war; and it may be presumed that steps have already been taken

minute details, into which it is said to enter, are probably exaggerated.

It does not matter with what views we may act in war, but wherever we act, we must have proper plans and information, if we wish to succeed. There is no country in the world to which, however unlikely it may now appear, we may not be induced to send a British army hereafter. We ought therefore to have the best maps of them all, from California and Chili to the deserts of Tartary. Who could have foreseen in the year 1805, that a British army would act either in Spain or in the Baltic? Yet within the short period that has since elapsed, almost the whole of the Spanish peninsula has been traversed by our officers and soldiers; and we have seen one corps of British troops act in Danish Zealand as enemies, and another destined to act in Sweden as allies.

A general outcry was made against Buonaparte at the commencement of the present war, because it was said that he had, during the short interval of peace, employed military men as his commercial agents in this country. Whether this was true, in all cases, I know not, but if it was, I see no proof of injustice in such conduct. He has acted unjustly enough in many respects, to render it unnecessary for us to bring superfluous charges, on that head, against him. Buonaparte had a right to appoint as his commercial agents whom he pleased; instead of soldiers, he might have appointed priests or lawyers, or even tailors to that situation: and it is the known and acknowledged duty of authorized agents, from any foreign government to another country, to give their own superiors every information in their power respecting that country. This is equally the duty of them all, from the ambassador at court to the consul at the seaport

for this purpose; since the institution at Paris, which we have alluded to, is so generally known,

town: and if the latter is to be considered in the invidious light of a spy, because he is a man, who, from his former profession, is capable of giving his government good instead of bad information, by the same rule every traveller may be considered a spy, for there is no traveller so stupid, whose observations may not perhaps be of some use to his own government, should it afterwards declare war against the country in which he travelled.

On the other hand, every nation has a right to lay down what rules it chooses in respect to foreigners in its own dominions. We therefore should have been perfectly justified in refusing to receive military men as commercial agents; and Buonaparte might have been obliged to give up his point. But as he would have had as good a right to suspect our officers, as we had to suspect his, he would have been warranted in totally excluding every British subject, who ever wore a cockade, from the French territory. The Chinese go still further, by confining foreign agents to factories on their coasts; and we may do the same, should we be again apprehensive of French agents in time of peace; but then France would retaliate by similar regulations which might not be convenient. In short, the only thing, which we can do, after all, is, instead of either fearing or complaining of foreign agents, to appoint agents of our own, of equal or greater qualifications, to reside in other countries.

Sir John Stuart, in evacuating Egypt, left behind him Captain Hayes (of the engineers) and Captain Missit as agents, an appointment afterwards confirmed by government, who gave these officers the brevet rank of majors. The former perished, in a manner never well elucidated, at the period of an action between the Turks and their Albanian soldiers (who had mutinied), at Rosetta. The latter after-

and the evils arising from the want of something similar in this country, have been so loudly lamented.

If we have not hitherto had information as good as the French, it must, we again repeat, be ascribed to our own narrow system of martial policy. How

wards joined General Fraser in Egypt, and was mentioned by him in his official dispatches. Captain Leake of the artillery has lately been employed as a British agent in Greece. So far from doing wrong, government perhaps would do better, if they more frequently appointed military men as their agents. I have given these instances to show, that the conduct of Buonaparte, during the late peace, whether just or unjust, was not so contrary to our own principles or practices as has been vociferated.

If any thing can be lamented or reprobated in our own system of foreign affairs, it is, that we have too frequently seen acting, in the capacity of British agents abroad, men either without knowledge of any kind, or who, if they have possessed any knowledge of commerce, have confined it solely to speculations for their own private advantage. Some of them, one would think, had not the proper use of their eyes; for, when our generals have consulted them previous to landing in a country, where they had passed half their lives, they have been unable to give any account of it. That such things have happened will, I believe, be allowed by most officers of experience in the army. And we must draw the distinction between the mere traveller and the authorised agent resident in a foreign country. It is not a point of duty with the former to make observations: with the latter it is; for even without positive instructions to that effect, he ought to be prepared to answer all questions that may be put to him; and neglect of duty, whether arising from want of zeal or of capacity, is culpable.

could our successive administrations be expected to have entered deeply into all the previous calculations and inquiries necessary to enable them to succeed in war by land, when they seem (in common with the public in general) to have considered the success of their armies, as a matter of secondary, if not of doubtful, importance? The honest and industrious tradesman, who has no intention of going beyond the limits of a morning's walk from his own home, will certainly not purchase, nor can he be expected to waste his time in the dry and unprofitable study of a road-book; although if he should suddenly take it into his head to travel, and no such book is to be had, he may severely suffer from a want of the information contained in it.

Independent of (what may be called) the artificial inadequacy of force produced by the causes treated of in the last chapter, it will appear, on examining into most of our military expeditions, that the numerical force sent, and means employed, have generally been calculated on too small a scale for the object in view. This may have arisen, partly from the imperfect or erroneous information upon which the British government may have acted; partly perhaps from erroneous reasoning upon such points of our information as were accurate; and partly from our injudicious colonial system, which has tended to waste our resources.

But it must be observed, that if not at the time when most of our expeditions have sailed, we have

always, at least, before they finally disappointed our hopes, had a great surplus of disposable force, so that necessity can never be admitted as a just cause of the remarkable inadequacy of numbers employed by us in our wars by land. It is no economy, either of money or of lives, to make war by driblets. As views and maxims drawn from commerce seem to have had great influence in our military operations, we ought to have adopted the true principles of commerce, and dealt in war by wholesale. In imitation of the great and enterprising British merchant, we should have sent out our armies by fifties of thousands at a time, in order that we might have had princely returns; not by tens of thousands, like the timid trader, who risks little, but whose gains are trifling; or who, by cautiously shifting his capital from one branch of commerce to another, sees bolder competitors outstrip him in them all; and perhaps ruins himself at last from a fear of bankruptcy.

Almost every where it has been a system with us (and a bad one it is), to employ in our expeditions no more than are barely sufficient, if well managed, to match our enemy in the field, in those countries which we have proposed to wrest from him; instead of acting with a great and overwhelming force in some one point, and from thence attacking others, and beating him in detail. Yet owing to the bravery of our soldiers, more than to the vigour of our measures, we find, that in our colonial warfare

where the enemy has not had the power of pouring in fresh troops against us at will, we have generally succeeded in the end. Witness the events of the war terminating in 1763, in which we drove the French out of America and the East Indies, a war signalized by a series of brilliant achievements, in which both generalship and soldiership were equally conspicuous. About the time of our disasters on the Continent under His Royal Highness the Duke of York, who never had the means to give him a fair chance of success, our commanders in the West Indies were carrying every thing before them. The very same troops that were driven out of Holland in 1799, afterwards beat the best of the French veterans with inferior numbers in Egypt.

When Sir John Stuart landed in Calabria, although the French had a very large force in the kingdom of Naples, it was spread over a great extent of country; a considerable corps was occupied in the siege of Gaeta; and the only force that could act against him was General Regnier's division of about 10,000 men stationed in the Lower Calabria. Regnier was obliged to leave some garrisons. He therefore brought only 7500 men against our 5000. If he had acted on the defensive in that strong country, we should most likely have been repulsed, or we might have been obliged to reimbark without doing any thing: but as he had written a book to prove that our successes at Alexandria arose solely from the misconduct of General Menou,

he could not do less than attempt to show his own superiority of military talents under similar circumstances. He therefore descended into the plain, where he was instantly attacked and defeated. It is evident that, in the situation just described, the French force in Calabria was for a short time insulated, and that if Calabria had actually been an island, five thousand British might have gained possession of it in spite of double their numbers of the best French troops, headed by a man who was reckoned one of their most promising generals.

When Buonaparte disembarked in Egypt to conquer and colonize that country, he had with him 40,000 men. General Fraser landed there with 5000. The failure of our second Egyptian expedition therefore requires no comment. It may be said that we meant at first only to occupy Alexandria, nor did we fail in that object; but as we attempted more and did fail, my observation as to our general inadequacy of force still holds good; and it may be presumed that whatever might have been our first view of the enterprise, our force was not afterwards considered sufficient even for holding that city; otherwise why give it up before it was attacked?[1]

The failure of this expedition, and of that to the Dardanelles, in which no military force was employed, led to a more vigorous effort, when the

[1] Unless a change of policy was the cause.

attack upon the Danish fleet was resolved. The Crown batteries, supported by some block ships, and by a formidable train of gun and mortar boats, were so fully capable of keeping off and repelling any naval attack; that an attempt to intimidate the Danes by means of a fleet alone, which could neither have got near enough to injure their capital nor their shipping, must have terminated as fruitlessly as our former experiment upon the Turks. The number of troops employed on this occasion was adequate to the object; but if, according to our usual system we had sent only eight or ten thousand, the garrison of Copenhagen, with the volunteers of that city, the militia of the island, and even the peasantry, all would have been upon us, and would probably, after destroying a part of our army, have obliged us to beg to be allowed to reimbark.

The force employed in the second expedition to Buenos Ayres, although perhaps adequate, if better managed, to the reduction of that city, has hardly been considered sufficient to insure the tranquil possession of all that part of South America:[1] much less to conquer and to establish itself on both sides of that vast peninsula, by acting in two corps, as was

[1] Sir Samuel Achmuty (in his Letter to Mr. Windham of the 7th of February, 1807, describing the state of the province of Buenos Ayres after the capture of Monte Video,) gave an opinion, "that it would require 15,000 men to conquer and "to keep that country."

at first proposed;—the most gigantic enterprise, that was ever perhaps chalked out by the government of any country, for such a handful of men to effect by force of arms.[1]

Independent of the misconduct and incapacity of the commander in chief on that occasion, which most materially contributed to the total disappointment of all our views in Spanish South America; our first expedition to that country was planned on a scale so completely inadequate for any permanent purpose of Transatlantic establishment or warfare,

[1] The force put under the orders of Brigadier General Craufurd (rather more than 4000 men) was sent for the purpose of conquering the province of Chili. Had that officer proved so far successful as to establish his footing in that country, he was directed to apprise Brigadier General Beresford thereof, "and to concert with him the means of "securing, by a chain of posts or in any other adequate "manner, an uninterrupted communication, both military "and commercial, between the provinces of Chili, and Buenos "Ayres." (See the instructions from Mr. Windham to General Craufurd, dated October 30, 1806, in the Appendix to Lieutenant General Whitelocke's Trial.)

The above plan was formed, before the capture of Brigadier General Beresford's little corps was known in England. In consequence of that disaster, the design upon Chili was abandoned, and the force destined for that enterprise became a part of the army afterwards assembled in the province of Buenos Ayres under Lieutenant General Whitelocke, which in all was only 10,000 strong: so that, after securing Monte Video, 8000 men was the utmost that he was able to muster in his attack on the capital.

that its disastrous termination, by teaching the natives to despise our military efforts, paved the way in a great measure to the failure of the second.

Our first expedition to Lisbon, which was so brilliantly commenced, although it afterwards fell short of public expectation, did however terminate in the deliverance of Portugal; where the French, from the posture of the Spanish armies, found themselves at that time in an insulated position. Our naval superiority may often enable us to attempt with success such enterprises as Maida and Vimeira, which might give the enemy infinite trouble; and diversions of this kind, if only considered preparatory or accessary to a general system of more vigorous operations, may be highly useful:[a] but it is only enlarged views, and armies adequate to much grander objects, that can enable a nation ultimately to succeed in war. In fact, we have scarcely yet aimed at any thing more than diversions; and when we have, at various times, had it in our power to make some great effort against our enemy, we have preferred making two or three of our little diversions, by a force, which, if acting in body, might have overwhelmed one of his armies, the loss

[a] Sir John Stuart's corps would have formed but a weak division in a French army. The troops that fought under Lord Wellington at Vimeira (although this battle was certainly on a much greater scale than that of Maida) would scarcely have been considered by the French a *corps d'armée*.

of which he could scarcely have repaired; or might have wrested from him some country that supplies him with men, money, food, and other warlike stores: all of which would have been a dead loss to him, and so much positive gain to ourselves. According to our unhappy mode of systematically dividing our force, as if we thought it would be taking an unfair advantage of an adversary to send more men against him than he has got ready, or can speedily assemble to oppose us with, in any part of the world; our military enterprises may be almost entirely disregarded, so that they cannot even be considered as diversions. Knowing that they hazard little or nothing by such feeble attacks as we have generally made, the French can fearlessly employ the great body of their armies in overwhelming our continental allies; which being once done by a system radically contrary to ours, the reimbarkation of the troops employed in our expeditions, after an almost useless waste of money and of lives, follows as a matter of course.

Had the British nation been actuated by a more vigorous spirit of martial policy, at the period when Spain awoke from the lethargy of ages, and displayed an energy, which no one, not even the vigilant Napoleon, foresaw, or believed her capable of exhibiting; then was the time when we had the noblest opportunity of commencing our great task[1]

[1] Viz. the dismemberment of the French empire (see page 118).

to advantage, by throwing in our whole undivided military force, in support of a cause so intimately connected with our future safety. Great and generous as our efforts certainly have been, greater indeed than any exhibited by our military history in these latter times; yet as, generally speaking, our first ideas of the contest in Spain seem to have been founded on so shadowy a basis, as an enthusiastic confidence placed in the wonders which we believed were to be achieved by Spanish enthusiasm, not upon an enlarged view of the comparative resources and organization of the countries at war; the force which we employed, as well as the system which we have acted upon in the peninsula, has proved from first to last inadequate to the object in view.

At the period of the commencement of this generous struggle, the light which I had derived from history forbade me to put any confidence in the vulgar prejudice, "that a nation of armed "citizens, generally wishing for independence, "cannot be conquered by a vastly superior military "force;" nor could I foresee, from past experience of our national policy, that the British government would have displayed so much energy as it has done, in the cause of its ally: I had therefore no sanguine hopes of the result, but I must confess that I did hope, if Spain were eventually subjugated, that we ourselves would at least take warning, and prepare for the possibility of meeting the same fate,

some time hereafter, under the same circumstances, if we did not make use of the interval in improving our military system.

When Castanos, by superiority of numbers, surrounded and took the army of Dupont; when the inhabitants of Saragossa and Valencia so obstinately resisted, and triumphed over the desperate attacks of the French, who were obliged from all points to retire behind the Ebro; then nothing but Spanish patriotism was talked of in England, and all manner of impossibilities were expected from it. After the end of the same year, when events had awfully proved the inferiority of new levies, and exposed the precarious situation of a nation, which has neither an establishment of well-disciplined troops, nor of fortresses, to oppose to veteran armies; instead of profiting by the lesson, and seeing these important facts in their real light, we suddenly became as loud and unreasonable in our abuse, as we had formerly been absurdly extravagant in our admiration, of the Spanish levies; and for a long time afterwards we accused these brave men, the victims of their attachment to the cause of their country, of want of patriotism. Want of patriotism was most unfeelingly thrown out against the heroes who buried themselves in the ruins of Saragossa, against the young students of the universities, who served as private soldiers, and nearly perished in the disastrous operations of Blake, against the many thousands of unhappy men, the flower of

the youth of Spain, who from a want of good officers, and of all the essentials of an army, which are not to be acquired in a few months, or even in a few years, were unable to withstand their warlike invaders in the field, and who (small as the proportion of them that have actually fallen in battle may be) have been wasted away, by an accumulation of evils ten times more destructive than the sword.[1]

[1] We have in England an unreflecting way of saying that the Spaniards, from the advantage of fighting in their own country, may, after every defeat, disperse and reassemble at will, as if they were men of a peculiar species, exempt from the hardships of war. On the contrary, I do not know whether the Spaniards may not suffer more misery, than either the French or English. They are always half-starved; for if our commissariat be defective, their's is a perfect chaos. They are often half naked, and without shoes. At the period of Sir John Moore's retreat, a contagious fever prevailed among the Marquis de la Romana's troops, owing to the hardships which they had suffered in Biscay. A man's being in his own country can neither feed, clothe, cure, nor shelter him; if food, clothes, medicine, and lodgings are not to be found. To me the distresses of the Spaniards were the most moving sight that I ever beheld. Men, whom a few months before I had seen full of health and courage, and who, if they had been better disciplined, were capable of destroying the French to whom they were opposed, in rags, without a cloak to cover them, in the depth of winter, worn out by wounds or disease, with despair in their countenances; such was the condition of the Spanish sick. I once saw a great number of open carts full of poor men, in the lamentable state just described, stop at a village when the snow was on the ground, where, instead of the shelter and food which they expected,

Those, however, who ascribed the misfortunes of the Spaniards to any thing but a want of good-will in their own cause, were soon confirmed in their favourable opinion of that nation by the most convincing facts. What stronger proof could be desired of patriotism in any country, than that the people of Asturias and Galicia, after they saw themselves abandoned by a gallant body of more than 25,000 British troops,[1] disdained to submit to that very French army, from which it was generally supposed, that we had made a fortunate escape, in being able to effect our reimbarkation, after a rapid retreat.

If the people of this country had not suffered themselves to be deluded by a kind of enthusiasm, similar to that of the Spaniards, it might have been foreseen, that whatever temporary success our allies might obtain, or whatever they themselves might believe, they must, whenever there was time to bring the force of the French empire against them, be beaten in the field: that if we sent only a small army to their assistance, it not having troops of the

they found that almost every house of it had been burnt. What became of them afterwards, God knows! I can scarcely, however, suppose that one of them is alive at this moment. These are no common sufferings.

[1] Such was our force in December, 1808, before we began to retreat.

same quality to support it in the day of battle, was likely to be sacrificed: and that therefore, considering the whole of the new Spanish armies much less in real than in numerical value, we ought to have sent a British army, large enough to cope with any force which the French could bring against it in one point; in order to enable us, not merely to defend ourselves, but to act from time to time upon a system of offensive warfare. We should consequently have endeavoured, soon after our first outset, to have employed an army of fifty or sixty thousand men in our Spanish war; to have doubled that number, if possible, and to have kept it complete by every exertion in our power. And surely we cannot boast much of the excellence of our military institutions and policy, if with such vast resources, and having nothing to fear at home, we cannot take the field, even with more than a hundred thousand soldiers, in any one point abroad, when the safety of Europe, and eventually our own, may depend upon the effort.

As such a system was not adopted, the inadequacy of the force composing Sir John Moore's army, from which such fine things had been expected, was soon exposed to the world. That general saw himself threatened by double his number of French troops, and as he placed no confidence in the Spaniards, and in fact seemed to reckon every armed man in Spain as a cipher, it is no wonder that under such impressions, he shrunk

even from a defensive warfare in the mountainous country, where the defects of his allies would have been less pernicious; and that the complete abandonment of the cause of Spain, a cause which he believed that the Spaniards themselves had no wish to maintain any longer, appeared to him a duty, that he owed to his country, for the preservation of the army under his command.[1]

If his Majesty's ministers had been influenced in their view of the war in Spain by these opinions, Portugal of course would have been lost, and the affairs of the peninsula in general would have been in a much worse state than they are at present; so that what Sir John Moore might have done, had he acted under different impressions, would to this day remain a matter of doubt; and it might be

[1] Extract of a letter from Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, dated Corunna, 13th January, 1809. "Your lordship "knows, that had I followed my own opinion as a military "man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. "The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish "force to which we could unite, &c. &c. I was satisfied "that no efforts would be made to aid us, or favour the cause "in which they were engaged. I was sensible, however, "that the apathy and indifference of the Spaniards would "never have been believed; that had the British been "withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed "to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army, to "convince the people of England, as well as the rest of "Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the "inclination, to make any efforts for themselves."

disputed, as warmly as it was at the period of our reimbarkation, whether his army would or would not have been destroyed, had he, instead of giving up the cause as hopeless, taken a position on the frontier of Galicia, and made the most of his allies, such as they were. But as government chose to make a second effort, I humbly conceive, with all due respect to the memory of that great man,[1] that the series of important events subsequent to his retreat has proved that, although the army under his command was inadequate for deciding the fate of Spain, still it was capable of doing something; fully capable at least of maintaining its footing in the peninsula, in which it might have derived considerable assistance from the Spaniards; and as the war between France and Austria broke out immediately afterwards, such a system would have

[1] Sir John Moore was certainly great, in every sense of the word; as an officer skilful, gallant, and zealous; an excellent subject, a true patriot, a high-minded, amiable man. And surely those who, admitting all this, merely state their opinion, that he was for once mistaken, advance nothing that ought, in justice, to be considered derogatory either to his talents or reputation. Buonaparte seems equally to have mistaken the character of the Spaniards, or he would certainly have been prepared to act more vigorously at the commencement of the contest. In all probability he must have supposed that the army, which he had in Spain in May, 1808, was capable of overwhelming all opposition. By his former experience in Italy, in Germany, &c. he would have been fully warranted in such a supposition.

been not merely practicable, but highly advantageous to the common cause of Spain, of Germany, and of Britain. The total expulsion of the French from Portugal, with the improvement of the Portuguese army to the respectable state of discipline which it is now said to possess, are advantages certainly not to be despised; and these are the direct consequences of Lord Wellington's second expedition, in which he commanded a force not greater than our original army. The battle of Talavera (a parallel operation to that which probably would have taken place, had Sir John Moore persevered in the purpose for which he advanced into Leon) proved that the Spanish troops, although very inferior in point of discipline, are something; for without them the British might have been destroyed. If Sir John Moore had fought any where on the frontier of Galicia, instead of fighting after his harassing retreat to Corunna; as the army would have been both less exhausted and more numerous, surely the chances are, that we should have been equally, if not more capable of beating the French in the former, than in the latter supposition, particularly if we had acted in concert with the Marquis de la Romana, who, it must in candour be confessed, showed every disposition to act in concert with us.*

* The Marquis de la Romana was requested by Sir John [illegible] to move forward, and co-operate with him in his

The operations of the Portuguese under their own generals, as well as of the corps under Sir

intended attack upon Soult, which he did. When Sir John Moore gave up that intention, he wrote to the Marquis, requesting him to protect the circuitous retreat of the British army by way of Benavente, &c. to Astorga; stating at the same time that his own object in this movement was to cover and defend Galicia. He further expressed a desire, that Astorga might not be occupied by the Spaniards, and that the high road towards Corunna might be left clear for the use of the British troops. It would also appear, that Sir John Moore wished the Spaniards, if pressed, to fall back into Asturias. All these requests were most punctually complied with by the Marquis de la Romana, excepting the proposal that he should retreat into Asturias, which did not meet his views; but he made Sir John Moore acquainted with his reasons for objecting to this measure as soon as possible, through Colonel Symes. It therefore became impossible for him, not to cross us somewhere on the high road to Corunna; but that was only at one point, at Astorga; and he left us half that city to ourselves. Nothing could be fairer.

On the second or third of January, 1809, the Spanish head quarters were at Ponferrada; ours were at Villa Franca, our rear guard being at Cacabelos at the same time. All these places are so situated, that the communication was then open between the two commanders in chief, as may be seen by the map. On the afternoon of the third, the advanced part of the French infantry (or perhaps, as some thought, their dismounted cavalry) came up, and attacked us at Cacabelos. Sir John Moore drew off his troops at dusk, when the skirmishing ceased, and retreated without halting through Villa Franca to Herrerias; in consequence of which movement all further communication or concert between him and Romana

Robert Wilson, were something, and had their weight. The perseverance of the Spaniards to this

became impossible. These are the facts. For official documents, see Mr. James Moore's Narrative, &c.

In Colonel Symes' letter to Sir John Moore, above alluded to, dated Mansilla, the 25th of December, 1808, the Marquis says, "that wherever else he may go, it is impossible for him "to send any part of his troops into Asturias, as the roads "are now impassable; the snow has fallen in unusual "quantity, &c." Under these impressions, it is evident, that the Marquis must have seen no alternative between either crossing our line of march at Astorga, which was as much an inconvenience to himself as to us; or being cut to pieces with his whole army: and admitting, that the road from Leon to Oviedo was impracticable, or even very difficult at that season, Sir John Moore surely was of too liberal a character to have persisted (after the receipt of Colonel Symes' letter) in wishing the Spanish army to be exposed to so great a risk for so trifling an object.

So much for the Marquis de la Romana's actions, by which alone we have a right to judge of the character of men: and if being near the enemy is the post of honour, it must be confessed that he almost always had that post, from the time that Sir D. Baird first reached Astorga, till the 3d of January, when his communication with us ceased. Compare his, the British, and the French head-quarters during the interval, and the truth of this observation will be seen. That his intentions were as cordial as his actions, may be inferred from this consideration; that he may naturally be supposed at times to have had his doubts, whether we might not retreat and reimbark, as afterwards proved the case; and if he had allowed himself to be influenced by such a suspicion, it was evidently his interest, and that of his country, to deceive us,

moment, under a similar series of disasters to what they experienced before the period of our reimbarkation at Corunna, may be allowed to have proved, that however deficient in the power, they are still strongly animated by the inclination, to defend their national independence: for surely, if we calculate the comparative number of the French and British armies in the peninsula, as our enemies

if possible, by keeping us in the dark, in respect to the full extent of the danger to which we were exposed. Instead of which, with all the frankness and sincerity of a true soldier, he sent the British generals the best information in his power, stating the whole amount of the enemy's force without reserve or disguise, and giving his fair opinion, as strongly as any British officer could have done, upon the defective and disorganized state of his own army.

Liberal and generous as the people of this country are, we are sometimes too hasty in judging unfavourably of foreign nations, by the conduct of some individual, which may shock our feelings. In our indignation at the treason of Morla, and at the duplicity or incapacity of others, we seemed, for a moment to have forgot the heroism and sufferings of Palafox, and the noble perseverance of Blake, Romana, and a number of illustrious Spaniards besides, whose names would do honour to any country. We should be very angry ourselves, did the writings or actions of such men as Tom Paine, excite in other countries the smallest suspicion or doubt of the general loyalty and patriotism of the British nation. I should have been happy, had there been no cause for writing this note, in explanation of what was said in the text.

have always been three or four times stronger than ourselves, and have constantly been endeavouring to frighten us out of the continent, by threats of driving us into the sea; when we come fairly to consider what can hitherto have prevented them from realizing these bravadoes, by exterminating us; there is no possible cause that can reasonably be assigned for this extraordinary inactivity and impotency on their part, excepting the obstacles which are thrown in their way by the resistance of our allies, however disorganized and undisciplined they may be. We cannot well reason upon the imbecility of Buonaparte, or of the commanders whom he has employed in Spain. We generally find that he has made good his threats to a day, in all his other continental enterprises; because the nations, with which he has been at war, after sustaining one or two defeats, have become panic-struck, and submitted to any terms he was pleased to dictate. The Spaniards have sustained, in a short period, more complete defeats than any nation we read of in History, excepting the Romans, at the commencement of the second Punic war, and they remain still unsubdued. It might therefore appear just, to admit the superiority of Spanish and Portuguese patriotism to that of all the other continental nations; but if we deny the reality and substantial effects of these sentiments altogether, we shall be forced to consider the existence of a British army in the peninsula,

at this moment, almost as great a miracle, as any recorded in the Sacred Scriptures.*

* The French are forced to admit the reality of Spanish patriotism, by which they have most severely suffered. In a letter from Soult to Joseph Buonaparte, dated from Puebla de Sanabria, the 25th of June, 1809, after detailing a great number of harassing operations in Galicia, of which the most important part was Marshal Ney's finding himself incapable either to take Vigo, or to make good his way to Orense, according to a preconcerted plan, he gives the following general view of the state of affairs in that province.

"Before I conclude this report, I shall take the liberty of "presenting to your majesty some observations on the present "situation of Galicia. This province is still in a state of "fermentation. The threats of death and of conflagration, "employed by la Romana; the numerous agents acting in "his name; the executions which he orders; the devastations "which have inevitably taken place from the frequent "movements of the troops; the ruin of most of the inhabi-"tants; the absence of every authority which might represent "your majesty; the influence of the priests, who are very "numerous; and the great majority of those who are against "us; the money which the English distribute; the distress "of the French generals, who, for want of means, are often "incapable of paying the agents whom they employ; all "these causes contribute from day to day to increase the "number of enemies, and render the war in this country "very murderous, exceedingly disagreeable, and of very "remote issue. We must fight much longer before your "majesty can reap any advantage from it, unless your "majesty adopt the system of fortifying seven or eight "important posts, capable of containing a garrison of from "5 to 600 men, a hospital and provisions for four months,

Unquestionable, however, as the merits of the Spanish patriots may now appear, we have seen

" in order to keep in check the people, and close and guard
" the principal débouchés, of which the enemy would then
" no longer be able to avail himself; as, also in order to offer
" to the columns that should act in the province, points of
" support, whatever direction they may follow; thus they
" might receive assistance, and deposit their sick. This last
" consideration is a very powerful one; and I must not
" conceal from your majesty, that it has a great effect upon
" the minds *(sur le moral)* of the soldiers, who, in the
" present state of things, are liable to perish through misery,
" or under the blows of the peasants, if they have the misfor-
" tune to be wounded or attacked by a fever, and to find
" themselves at a distance from a place of safety, to seek for
" assistance.

" Gallicia might, I think, at the expense of one million, be
" put in a state of defence; and assuredly no money would
" ever be employed to better purposes; so much the rather,
" as in the sequel, the number of troops which now are neces-
" sary there, might be diminished. Under this impression,
" I had prevailed on Marshal Ney to cause Lugo to be
" fortified, and to order the construction of three blockhouses
" on the line of Villa Franca, the places of Tuy, Monforte,
" Monterey, Viana, and the Puebla de Sanabria; all of which
" are capable of containing ordnance, and have an inclosed
" line with remains of (other) fortifications *(une enceinte et
" une reste de fortification)*; at the same time they might
" easily be restored, and would perfectly answer the purpose.
" There are, if wanted, some other posts fit to be made instru-
" ments of defence, without causing any very great expense.

" If this measure, which I consider as urgent and of certain
" result, be not adopted, it will become necessary to send
" reinforcements to Marshal Ney, were it only with a view

nothing yet, which, in my mind, warrants us in hoping that they will be able to save themselves.

" of supplying his losses, and keeping open the communi-
" cations. Though at present he may be strong enough to
" resist the united corps of Romana and Carrera, if they
" were to present themselves in line, yet, as their system is
" that of harassing continually, and avoiding a general action,
" they would, in course of time, waste the strongest army,
" and would, at length, even destroy it, without fighting,
" if it were not supported; and the loss of men would be
" incalculable, whilst the point aimed at had not been
" carried.

" It may probably not fall any more to my lot to discourse
" with your majesty on the subject of Galicia; I have
" therefore thought it my duty to communicate to your
" majesty the observations, which my stay in this part of
" your majesty's states, and the knowledge I have acquired
" of the temper of its inhabitants, have enabled me to make.
" And I have the honour to supplicate your majesty to have
" the goodness to excuse this digression, in consideration
" of the motives which have dictated it." (See official papers (A) relating to Spain and Portugal, ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 19th of March, 1810, containing the original and translation of the above. I have followed the translation given, except in two or three words).

There was another French official report or dispatch (to the best of my recollection of a much earlier date than the above), detailing an expedition of a strong column of the enemy's troops from Corunna into Asturias, who succeeded in penetrating to Oviedo. On their route they had to fight their way at the passage of every river; and, what is remarkable, when they thought proper to evacuate Asturias, and march back to Corunna, they found the Asturians and

They will probably persevere, as they have done hitherto, in attempting to raise new armies, after every new disaster. A number of excellent officers and soldiers may be formed during the contest; but it is impossible, as long as they have to deal with such a vigorous adversary, that the great body of their armies, however liberally we may supply them with money and arms, can ever be good. Whatever may be imagined, on a hasty view of the subject, by men in England, a constant series of repeated defeats in great battles; after which, the military stores, which we may have given them, fall into the hands of their enemy; whilst they themselves wander, in small corps, about the mountains, subject to every kind of misery, half-starved, half-naked, and almost broken-hearted; until, by degrees, they pick up courage again to assemble,

Galicians in arms, posted on the other banks of the same rivers, and opposing them as vigorously as before. I have not a copy of this report in my possession, but all my readers must recollect it, as it was published in every newspaper.

After these strong evidences in favour of the people of Asturias and Galicia, would it not be more candid in those officers of the British Army, who, at the period of our retreat, believed that these people had no patriotism at all, to admit that they themselves were mistaken, than to persist in an error injurious to the character of so great a part of the Spanish nation? I must, for one, acknowledge, that the determined conduct of the people of these provinces has much surpassed my expectations.

and be again defeated and dispersed: this is, upon the whole, a kind of school, more calculated for destroying the spirit, than for improving the discipline or valour, of the Spanish levies. When once the efforts of the Spaniards shall degenerate from a war of the people into a war of the populace, from a war of armies into a war of irregular bands, who can only subsist by the plunder of their own countrymen; (and this change must of necessity take place, as their hope of ultimate success gradually dies away) then we may conclude that the game is nearly up. The French may certainly continue to lose great numbers of soldiers in this desultory kind of warfare; but Spain will be laid waste, depopulated, and conquered. When Spain is conquered, there can be little hope that we shall be able to defend Portugal against Spain and France, or rather against Spain and the rest of Europe united. We must, therefore, if we wish to prevent all these evils, adopt more vigorous measures both military and political. We must send such a force as will enable us to resume the offensive, and to protect the formation of new Spanish armies, as effectually as we have done that of the Portuguese army. Trusting in our own valour and discipline, we must take the brunt of the war upon ourselves, and meet the enemy in pitched battles; not however despising or despairing of our allies, but deriving all the aid from them which they are capable of affording us, and using all our influence and power to improve

them. In the mean time, our present force in the peninsula seems inadequate for any permanent object. It is barely adequate to prolong the war, and to maintain its ground, for a certain time, after which the chances are that it may be destroyed.

The risks which we have already incurred in the Spanish peninsula, have certainly been great, but they only prove to me the necessity of acting in future on a grander scale, in order to avoid similar situations, from which we may not always be able to extricate ourselves by such hair-breadth escapes. This line of conduct may, by some men, also be considered very hazardous; but every measure in war is attended with its danger, and we shall have grand objects and noble hopes before us. Half measures, on the contrary, will extinguish hope, and lead us not merely into danger, which is the element of the warrior, but experience has proved that they must always end in disgrace or destruction.

From the above brief survey of our late military operations, it therefore appears, that a general

[1] The hope of success, in any kind of warfare, must be exactly proportioned to the magnitude of the force employed. The greatest army which we could send to Spain, if events disappointed our hopes, would, in all probability, only lose its rear guard. A small army, on the contrary, by which we can destroy nothing, may itself be destroyed. Acting on a grand scale is therefore not merely the boldest, but, it appears to me, even by far the safest policy for Great Britain.

inadequacy of force has been conspicuous throughout almost all of them, up to the present day. This inadequacy of force has not only contributed most materially to the failure of all our expeditions that have failed; but one would think that, without some unexpected good fortune, some blunder or misconduct of our enemy, or some surprising achievement of our own army, it ought to have occasioned the failure even of many of our enterprises that have succeeded; and, in all cases, it has stopt us short in the career of victory, and has confined us to the repulse instead of the destruction of our adversary. It is this inadequacy of force that makes our bravest generals, like the late lamented Sir John Moore, instead of the enterprising spirit that might be expected from the implicit confidence which they may place in the valour of their troops, feel a despondency arising from the dreadful responsibility of being at the head of a handful of brave men, who so often run the risk of being overwhelmed and sacrificed. Unlike the daring confidence of Agathocles, who commenced his operations in Africa by burning the transports which carried him over, the first thought of a British general, when he lands in any country, is to secure a good place of re-embarkation, which he foresees, sooner or later, must be the end of his career.

Now it is so difficult in human affairs to calculate justly upon future events, that it is no reproach to

the government of any country to have been mistaken in its view of some military enterprise, before it was put in execution; but it is always a disgrace to every government to fail in an object, which it has once attempted.

The inadequacy of force employed in any expedition at its first outset, although if not remedied it must inevitably lead to the most disastrous consequences, is of all evils the one that may be the most easily remedied in war; provided that the army is strong enough to keep its ground till reinforcements arrive. But as the officers of an army, trusting in the foresight of their superiors, always embark with some confidence of success; when these hopes are disappointed, and their force proves inadequate, it has more generally with us given rise to a despair of doing any thing, than to the more manly and more military wish of being reinforced. It is like all unexpected difficulties, which, although they ought not, do more often tend to damp than to arouse the spirit of exertion. Instead of damping, they might however always be expected to excite that spirit in a British army, if in our national councils we were actuated by a more vigorous system of martial policy.

Compare the spirit of a British army, in which, after some glorious victory or even after a series of victories, almost every officer (and the opinion of officers are soon found out by the soldier) looks forward to a retreat and re-embarkation in the face

of a superior force, if not to a capitulation, as the end of his labours; compare, I say, this spirit with that which must have animated a Roman army. Compare, for instance, our proceedings at Cintra, with the conduct of the Consul Licinius, whom, when defeated and obliged to retreat by Perses king of Macedon, we find maintaining in calamity the spirit of a conqueror, and, with the approbation of all his principal officers in council assembled, haughtily refusing terms of peace to his victorious enemy.

Whence does this difference arise? Not because the officers and soldiers of the Roman legions were either braver or more patriotic than the officers and soldiers of the British army are at this moment:[1] but because the Romans acted in war, both by sea

[1] It has been the fashion of the learned of modern times to look up with an extravagant degree of admiration to the Romans, as if there were any thing really wonderful in the military exploits of that nation, or which has not been, or may not be, equalled by men in the present times. Gibbon observes in his first chapter, "that the weight carried by a "Roman on a march would oppress the delicacy of a "modern soldier." Had that great historian served his apprenticeship to modern warfare in a regiment of the line in America, instead of an English militia regiment at home, he would have spared this ill-judged sarcasm upon the delicacy of modern soldiers. The musket and ammunition, with the knapsack, &c. under which the modern soldier both marches and fights, are no trifling weight. The winter campaigns without tents, to which modern soldiers have been so

and land, with the policy and principles of warriors; with ambition, with hope, with foresight, with views no more to be diverted from their object than the sun can be altered in his course. We on the contrary seem to have been too often acting, in our wars by land, with the policy and principles of any thing but warriors; without ambition or energy, with views as fluctuating as the weather-cock, without confidence in ourselves, and consequently without the confidence of others.

quently exposed, might have astonished even the stubborn mind of a Roman veteran.

Others have thought proper to assert, that the Roman legions, by their superior hardihood, were little liable to disease like modern armies. This is much the same kind of notion, which some men in England entertain in respect to the Spaniards (see the note to page 197) at the present moment. Were there no proofs to the contrary in ancient authors, we might reasonably refuse to credit this peculiar healthiness of the Romans as a thing impossible. War cannot now be, and therefore never could have been, carried on without great hardships, and these hardships kill more men than the sword. But to give only one instance of the fallacious nature of this opinion, we shall quote the following passage from Cæsar. " Atque eæ copiæ ipsæ hoc infrequentiores " imponuntur, quod multi Gallicis tot bellis defecerant, " longumque iter ex Hispaniâ magnum numerum deminue- " rat, et gravis autumnus, in Apuliâ circumque Brundisium, " ex saluberrimis Galliæ et Hispaniæ regionibus omnem " exercitum valetudine tentaverat." (De Bello Civili, Lib. iii. Cap. ii.)

The inadequacy of our force, and the despond-ing spirit of the army, which is a natural conse-quence of it, cannot long escape the observation of the people of the countries in which we act: they are too evident, to men of judgment and reflection amongst them, even at our first appearance. Hence, however they may detest the French, and it will be difficult to name a country in which the French are not detested, they naturally shrink from embarking in the same cause with a nation, which holds out to its allies nothing but despair. The disorganized population of every country must, when they first take up arms, look to some regular army for support, for example, and for orders; but the moment they discover, that that army (as is often the case with us in our expeditions) looks principally for protection to them; and that its general, from some motive which they cannot understand, will neither directly nor indirectly assume any kind of command over them, then their hopes will at once vanish, and their exertions cease.

Is it reasonable to suppose, that men, in any part of the world, will unite with us, and expose their lives and property to certain destruction, from a principle alone of hatred to the French, or of attachment to some former government, which they know cannot possibly stand of itself, even if they should succeed in a re-establishment of it? I say, to certain destruction, for that is the only prospect,

which our alliance can afford to the people of other countries, as long as we shall continue to act on so small a scale, and with such a timid policy, in war. How can they be expected to join a British army, which they foresee may, if threatened by a superior force, fly to its transports, leaving them on the beach, to be slaughtered, or pardoned, at the pleasure of an exasperated conqueror. It is true, that we may give those who have joined us, the permission of embarking with us, if there is room in our ships, and an offer of employment in our own service; but can this reasonably be considered sufficient encouragement? May not the foreign soldier, who eats our bread in the West Indies, or even in England, be sometimes filled with secret indignation, when he recollects that the appearance of a British army first tempted him to take up the musket, in order to drive out a body of hateful oppressors from his country; that that army afterwards abandoned the cause, for which alone he became a soldier; and that he now finds himself degraded from a patriot into a mercenary, and an exile from his own country? the only country in the world, probably, in which he takes the smallest interest.

To any man, even an Englishman who has never quitted his own fire-side, who will reason without passion or prejudice upon the conduct of the people of other countries towards British armies; this may appear a just solution of one of the chief causes of

the general disappointment of our hopes of assistance.

In fact, it may be considered wonderful that, under such circumstances, we have ever found a man to join us in any part of the world; but bodies of people, like individuals, may be so far blinded by anger and revenge, as well as by ignorance, as to forget all maxims of prudence. Hence we find that, in some countries (the kingdom of Naples for instance), the unreflecting populace has always been ready to fly to arms, on the least encouragement from us. But, in all cases, whether the inhabitants have, or have not, joined us in any great numbers, or whether they may have taken up arms before, or after, we made our appearance amongst them; it must be allowed, that our presence has either caused their country to become the seat of war, or has at least protracted the contest, for a much longer period than would otherwise have been the case. I need hardly observe, that the sufferings of war often bear hardest upon the most peaceable part of the community, who take no share on either side; and as we have generally acted on a system, by which we could not promise to ourselves, even at our first outset, any well-founded hope of more than temporary success, we can scarcely pretend to have any just claim to the gratitude of the people of other nations, whom we have endeavoured to assist; since we have only exposed the great body of them to unnecessary sufferings, and tempted our own

immediate adherents to stake their lives and fortunes in the most ruinous of all lotteries, a lottery without a prize.

Akin to the policy of encouraging the people to take up arms in some country, which you find yourself suddenly obliged to abandon from the inadequacy of your force, is that of conquering a possession, and immediately afterwards evacuating it.

When we made our appearance the second time at Alexandria, our former conduct, compared with that of the Mamelukes, the Turks, and the French, had rendered us so popular, that the people of Egypt universally favoured our views. From the period that General Fraser, abandoning his schemes of further conquest, confined his troops within the walls of Alexandria, our adherents began to fall a sacrifice to the fury of the Turkish and Albanian soldiers; which, after we finally evacuated the country, had neither limit nor check of any kind. The villages, which had shown great zeal in our cause, are said to have been in part if not totally destroyed, and in some cases man, woman and child, put to the sword.

In 1807, we made an attack upon Danish Zealand for the purpose of seizing the fleet in the harbour of Copenhagen, and we succeeded in that object, immediately afterwards evacuating the island. What has been the true nature of the war in which we have been engaged with Denmark ever since that

period? The government of that country has expressed great animosity against us, and would no doubt destroy us, if it could. But as it has not the power, at present, of injuring us more seriously than by the occasional capture of a few ships, which are to the marine of England as drops in the sea, all the effects of its impotent revenge, as well as of our retaliation; in short, all the sufferings of the war fall solely upon its own subjects, particularly on the poor Zealanders.[1] The numerous trading vessels, fitted out by that people, have been swept from the face of the ocean: their mariners (excepting a small portion serving in gun boats, or in privateers) are either pining in dungeons and prison-ships in England, or out of employment at home: many of their merchants, it may be presumed are ruined: and their commerce and navigation are thus not only totally extinguished; but, from the present prospect of affairs, it must seem to them, extinguished for ever. Besides which, they can never for a moment think themselves safe from a new attack upon their island, equally destructive with our former one, whenever the increasing naval equipments of their government may again excite

[1] "Quicquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi," may most truly be said of the state of the Zealanders. Often as this passage has been quoted, I think we may safely venture to challenge any one to produce a more literal or just application of it.

our apprehension and jealousy. Is it possible to conceive a kind of warfare more calculated to keep alive the eternal terror and hatred of the people of Denmark?

If we had, on the contrary, completely conquered and kept possession of Zealand in 1807, I see no reason why the inhabitants of that island might not be, at this moment, as quiet subjects as any in his Majesty's dominions.

It must be observed, that although we do not seem either to know or to feel our national strength, except upon what we call our own element (and there we fancy we are always to drive the universe before us;) the Zealanders had too convincing proofs of it, not to see, that the superiority of Great Britain over Zealand is irresistible and overwhelming, and therefore, although we had left only a small garrison amongst them, it is not likely that they would have ventured on so rash a step as to attempt the destruction of that garrison. Had they looked forward to the prospect of succeeding in such an attempt, how could they know that we might not revenge the fate of our soldiers, by returning in greater force, and exterminating them? They well know that we would have the power to do so if we pleased.[1]

[1] Reflections of this kind must of necessity occur to men before they will rise against a very superior force. Small garrisons suffice to keep quiet the most hostile countries,

All this has been said in supposition of the Zealanders remaining actuated by an implacable spirit of hatred against us, had we kept possession of their island, but why should this have been the case?

It would have been no disgrace to them, no disparagement either to their valour or patriotism, to yield to our irresistible force. That force, wielded with moderation and justice, would have commanded obedience and respect: and these feelings must gradually have ripened into attachment; for it would have been and is the true interest of every man in that island, rather to submit to the dominion of Britain, and to partake of our commercial prosperity; than to be subject to the French under a nominal independence, a situation

provided that the nation, to which these garrisons belong, has the power of supporting them by an overwhelming force, and is known to be of a determined character. This is precisely what constituted that *terror Romani nominis*, so frequently in the mouth of the Roman historians. If we acted on a vigorous system of martial policy, the terror of the British name, which would be a natural consequence of it, would stand us instead of many thousands of soldiers.

We have felt so little of the true martial spirit, that if the people of other countries could bring themselves to judge of us not by our deeds, but by the language held in many of our political writings, in which nothing is more common than a fear of the hatred of this nation, and of the jealousy of that, they must suppose us, instead of what we are, to be the weakest and most faint-hearted race of men existing.

ruinous in the extreme, and not less degrading than the former.

It has been regretted by a great number of very worthy men in this country, that we should ever have been involved in hostilities with Denmark; and this regret has originated from feelings that do them the highest honour. Without entering into an unnecessary discussion, by saying either that I do or do not fully agree with them, in these laudable sentiments, I must observe, that from whatever cause any one nation may be engaged in a contest with another, it ought never to make war by halves. Although a man may be the first to give provocation in a private quarrel, no one will applaud him, if he allows himself to be murdered, when the matter comes to blows, instead of doing every thing in his power to disarm his exasperated adversary.[1]

After the sword was once drawn against Denmark, it is evident, that we neither made our cause more nor less just, by evacuating Zealand, instead of keeping it, as we kept little Heligoland, and all the Danish West-Indian islands. The conquest of Zealand, by which we should completely command the navigation of the north, and deprive the enemy of one of his most important places of arms for the future invasion of England, would have been highly advantageous, not only to us, but to its natives, whom we should have been fully able to

[1] See the first note to page 84.

protect against Buonaparte; although he (their present master) would not be able to protect them one moment against us, if we acted with a due and dignified sense of our own strength. By conquering the Zealanders, we should have been their best friends; by leaving them nominally independent, we are their bitterest enemies. Who can say that they may not, at this very moment, ascribe our not having conquered them to our own base and selfish views as traders; for by so doing, we should have been obliged to protect their commerce, their wealth, and prosperity; which, by the principles of the law of nations, of which we profess ourselves such zealous advocates, we now have the privilege of destroying for ever? *

* In the above remarks upon Danish Zealand, I have reasoned upon general principles, which will apply to the people of all countries under similar circumstances. I may now be permitted to say a few words as an eye-witness, having served on the expedition under Lord Cathcart, in 1807. As it was a thing new to a British army, to be employed in a war of direct aggression, I was curious to observe the effect which this system would have upon the minds of the people.

The day that the troops landed, I was with the advanced guard, and entered into conversation with a respectable-looking peasant, who came to his door to see us march past towards the capital. He seemed quite indifferent about the war, and enjoyed the appearance of the soldiers as a fine spectacle. He was particularly delighted with the well-appointed hussars of the King's German legion, and broke out into an exclamation, "how beautiful!!"

To recapitulate, in a few words, the substance of this and of a part of the preceding chapter; by acting

After the surrender of the fleet, when we had free communication with Copenhagen, we met with nothing but civility from the people of that city, whom we enriched with our custom. In company with two other officers of engineers, I made a tour of great part of the island. We experienced every where politeness, and even hospitality. Those who seemed to feel most deeply the evils of our attack, lamented that their government should have taken so much pains in equipping a fleet, which could only serve to draw upon them the jealousy of France or of England.

The discipline of our army excited, in many instances, the gratitude of the inhabitants, who found their houses and property less injured than they expected would have been the case. The affair of Kioge had struck great terror into the peasants; and I believe, upon the whole, the only body decidedly hostile to us, was the populace of Copenhagen and of Elsineur. But, had we kept the island, it would have been the interest of the better class to have discouraged this spirit; and good treatment, with the employment which they would have found under us, or by means of us, would soon have conciliated the whole of the population of Zealand.

Such is, to the best of my observation and belief, the state of public feeling that did exist, and that would have existed, in Danish Zealand, if we had not evacuated it. It was certainly much more favourable towards us than I could have foreseen; but it explained to me at once the facility which the French have found in conquering many countries supposed by us to be very hostile to them.

Men in England, judging of the general disposition of the Zealanders by the furious invectives of the Danish government against us, and at the same time working up their ideas,

on so small a scale in war, without ambition, and without a determined resolution both of supporting our allies, and of maintaining our conquests, to the last extremity; we may fairly be said to act:

First, as our own enemies; because our conduct either makes those take up arms against us, or refuse to arm in our favour, who otherwise might be willing and able powerfully to assist us: and the failure of our feeble attacks, aided by feeble insurrections, consolidates the power of France in all the conquered countries;[1]

how they believe they would themselves resent a similar attack, to a very vehement tone, without entering fully into all circumstances, have pictured to themselves a terrible notion of the implacable hatred which the Zealanders must always feel against us. This wonderful hatred is, in a great measure, a phantom created by our own imaginations. No such hatred certainly existed after the bombardment of Copenhagen: if it does exist at present, it can only be ascribed to the naval war which we wage against the prosperity of the island.

[1] The French, when they have acted upon the system which has been described, have proved equally unsuccessful, notwithstanding all their supposed wonderful military talents, &c. &c. What was the issue of Humbert's little expedition to Ireland in 1798? As he had no transports to escape, and seems to have been a brave determined man, he very properly did not surrender till he had given us as much trouble as he could. He and his officers, after they became prisoners, were treated with distinction and hospitality; and, by all I can hear, mutual compliments passed between them and us

Secondly, as the enemies of the people of all nations, wherever we carry our arms, whether as

Those of his soldiers, who had not fallen in the field, were taken proper care of, and afterwards exchanged. Such was the fate of the French.

In the mean time, whilst their chiefs were thus, like generous enemies, paying due attention to general Humbert, the British soldiers, on their part, were not idle. They were busily employed in hunting down, hanging and shooting, as rebels, all the unfortunate Irish peasants, whom a hatred of the British government, and a belief of being treated with great injustice and tyranny, induced to take up arms, under the erroneous title of patriots, in favour of the French army.

Hence it appears, that a regular army, acting in a foreign country, incurs a risk so much smaller than any armed peasants who may join it, should their mutual efforts fail, that unless its force is such as to insure a fair hope of success, nothing can be more unjust than for its officers, after any disaster, to abuse the people of the country, who have, of the two, by far the greatest right to complain.

The fate of our own allies, in every country, has been exactly that of the Irish who joined Humbert; for the French have thought proper always to treat the vanquished peasant, whether his cause be good or bad, as a rebel.

Whilst the natives of the countries, in which we have acted and failed, are thus executed or reduced to beggary, in consequence of having favoured us, we have given vent to our disappointed and indignant feelings in two ways.

First, we have loudly cried out against the atrocious and unjust conduct of the French, and with great reason and truth on our side; but this does no good to those who suffer from it, nor does it prove any thing, which every man, all over the world, did not or does not know, though he may not dare like us to express his sentiments.

allies, or as conquerors; because we all at once expose their country to the horrors of war, and then, in a short time afterwards, reimbark; so that we must appear, as it were, to make war by caprice, without any object at all, regardless of the sufferings of others, to whom our friendship and our enmity are thus equally fatal.

If we conquered and kept; then the people of the world, who were subdued by us, would hope to remain at rest, for an indefinite period, under our protection: but as we conquer and evacuate, as we begin an expedition, and despair in the middle of it, they can never know when they are to be at rest; but must live in continual apprehension and terror of a repetition of such calamitous visits from us, once every two or three years. May not, for instance, the quiet and peaceable part of the inhabitants of South America, of Egypt, of Zealand, of Walcheren, and of numberless other countries, which we have suddenly entered, and as suddenly evacuated, after making them the seat of war,

Secondly, we have inveighed against the want of spirit and the insincerity of our former allies. This may, by other nations, who see things in a way of their own, be considered unreasonable and illiberal; and to those, who are the actual victims of an unsuccessful attempt in concert with us, it may even appear very ferocious and inhuman; although they will be too prudent to say so, when they are reduced to the state of exiles and suppliants in England.

either for some well-intended object, which they know, or soon find out, to be impracticable, or for some purpose of our own, such as the seizure of a fleet in one of their ports, which they may consider selfish in the extreme; may not, I say, these unfortunate people as much shudder at the sight of a British squadron on their coast, as our own ancestors did at the approach of the Danish pirates of former times. However just the causes of our wars may have been, and however scrupulous our adherence to the law of nations in the mode of conducting them, it may be allowed, that the necessary results of the system, which has been described, are the best calculated of any that could have been invented, finally to insure to us, in some cases, the contempt, and in all, the horror and aversion, of the people of the countries in which we act. The French system of war is highly to be reprobated, it is detestable in many respects, as it affects the prosperity and feelings of other nations. But instead of wasting our time in reviling French principles, it would be much more worthy of the British character, were we to examine into the effects of our own. The former we cannot possibly alter or amend, the latter we may: and we should certainly be the noblest people that ever existed, if our practice were consonant to the pure maxims of justice and of humanity, according to which we seem almost always to have intended to act.

CHAPTER VII.

Of the war in Spain, viewed according to the principles of a vigorous martial policy.

THE history of mankind has proved that war is an inevitable evil. The justice of going to war, for a necessary object, has never for a moment been disputed in any age or country, except by a few fanatics. War should not be lightly entered into, nor should any warlike enterprise be rashly undertaken: but when once undertaken, those who have drawn the sword should never give way to despair, on account of difficulties or dangers, foreseen or not foreseen. The art of war is the art of surmounting difficulties, and of setting danger at defiance; and the only test of great statesmen, and of skilful generals, is, the being able with smaller means to surmount greater difficulties than those of some rival nation. Success is the grand, the only object in war; an object that ought never to be lost sight of. But, in aiming at success, despise partial or

temporary advantages. Never stand still in the pride of victory, whilst any thing more remains to be done. By so doing, you may lose a kingdom, whilst you are exulting in the conquest of a province; like the improvident chess-player, who, from his eagerness to win a few pieces, loses the game. Vary your means in war according to circumstances; but never for a moment lose sight of your end. Every thing that opposes your success is an obstacle to be surmounted by force or by art.[1] Every individual, who prevents it, is either an open enemy to be destroyed; or a real (if not an intentional) enemy to be deprived of the power of doing harm. Such are the true principles of martial policy; let us apply them in their full extent to the present war in Spain.

Before we enter into this discussion, I must observe, that if, as men in England seem to do, I could consider the assistance which we have afforded, or may hereafter afford, to the Spaniards, as a matter of pure generosity; I should then say, that it would at first have been proper for all men of power and influence amongst us to have checked, rather than encouraged, the disposition which the people of England showed to pour their treasures into the lap of Spain; that, at all events, nothing could have justified us, in wasting any great portion

[1] Fu il vincer sempre mai laudabil' cosa,
Vincasi o per fortuna, o per ingegno.—ARIOSTO.

of our national resources in aid of that country, because the government of no nation can be said to act fairly towards its own subjects, when it is generous to another nation at their expence: if, however, contrary to the interest of Great Britain, we had unfortunately entered into a positive engagement to assist the Spaniards, from such an idle motive as generosity alone; the moment that we discovered any want of cordiality, or any breach of promise, on their part, towards us; it would have been a duty which we owed to our own country, to reproach them with their insincerity in the face of the world, and to withdraw all further assistance from such an unprofitable cause.

Reasoning, however, upon the principles which have already been developed, I must entirely deny that the dismemberment of the French empire, were we to effect it, could justly be considered as a measure of pure generosity, on our part, to any foreign prince or nation: it is with us, a measure of self-preservation and of necessity; and we are principals in every war that tends to that object.

Had such been our views, there is no country in the world, which we could have chosen for the theatre of action, where all imaginable circumstances, physical as well as moral, could have possibly favoured us so much as they did in Spain. We did not enter the lists, in alliance with a weak and corrupted government, such as formerly ruled that country; which, upon the first reverse, would have

submitted to the enemy, giving up half its territory, and declaring war against us, as the price of peace. We had the whole Spanish nation for our allies. The extraordinary hatred and antipathy of that nation to the French: their desire of amity with England, which has even grown into a proverb in their language;[1] the mountainous and difficult nature of their country, which makes up, in a considerable degree, for their inferiority in point of discipline and of military skill; its peninsular form, which throws such a vast advantage in war, into the hands of the power that rules by sea; every thing, in short, boded success to us and to our allies: the only thing against us was our national system of always making war by halves.

Owing to the oppressive nature of their former political and religious institutions, the people of Spain, with many excellent qualities, can boast of few men of liberal education, or of minds cultivated by study and reflection. Hence they carry, to a great degree, a disposition which they have in common with all nations that possess much national pride; they are sanguine in the extreme, wonder-

[1] "Con todo el mundo la guerra, y paz con Inglaterra." This disposition to a friendly intercourse between the two nations is mutual. Of all foreign nations, there is none to which British subjects acquire so strong an attachment, after a few years' residence amongst them, as to the Spaniards. I never met with a single instance to the contrary.

fully credulous of every thing that flatters their wishes, however improbable; and equally incredulous of every thing to the contrary. They never saw clearly the extent of their danger. When they first took up arms, they were insensible of their own defects, and they generally believed that their raw levies, by virtue of enthusiasm, would carry every thing before them, and march straight to Paris.[1]

It is not surprising if, whilst they were full of such notions, they should have discovered little anxiety for the assistance of the British troops; yet it cannot in justice be said, that they at any time absolutely declined it.

The junta of Galicia, it is true, requested that the British corps, whose services were offered to

[1] This was the general opinion of the new Spanish levies, which I have heard repeatedly expressed both by officers and soldiers. Foreseeing how miserably they would be disappointed, I never listened to such language without a mingled sentiment of melancholy and of pity. After their defeats, when the Spaniards no longer talked in so wild a style, the British agents, who had been employed in Spain, and who had given a fair account of former enthusiasm, were, by many men in England, absurdly charged with having deluded the government of this country, from a supposed incapacity, if Englishmen, and even from an insinuated treachery, if foreigners. If either the government or people of England ever placed any great confidence in such enthusiasm as has been described, they have no cause to blame their agents: They voluntarily deluded themselves.

them, might go to Lisbon, in preference to landing at Corunna, as was proposed; but it is well known, that their neighbours, the Asturians, at all times, expressed their desire of having a British army to co-operate with them; and to come to the fair state of the question, as long as Portugal was in possession of the French, how could we have rendered Spain a greater service, than by destroying the enemy's force in her sister kingdom? Junot's army was accordingly attacked, and completely defeated; after which, instead of being again attacked with double fury, and destroyed or taken to a man, which the Spaniards and Portuguese, and even many of our own officers, seem to have expected would follow, or at least be attempted, as a matter of course, it was embarked in our transports, and proceeded quietly to France.

The people of Spain may, perhaps, at first have undervalued the assistance of British troops, whose formidable character, underrated even by their own countrymen, is not properly understood by any set of men in the world, those only excepted, who have fought against them in the field; but, whatever the Spaniards might think of our troops, the moment that Junot's army was expelled from the peninsula, we were invited into Spain. Why invite us sooner? When the Spaniards came by degrees to lose their enthusiasm, or ill-founded presumption, but without losing their patriotism or spirit of resist-

ance, they saw, in the strongest light, the necessity of the support of British troops; and their anxiety on this head has been constantly increasing. Hence Sir John Moore's advance in 1808, and Lord Wellington's in 1809, were measures equally requested by them in the most urgent manner; and the return of the latter into Portugal was most strongly deprecated. The operations of both these generals in Spain were certainly of considerable advantage, and tended to disconcert the enemy's projects; but they have equally disappointed the hopes of the two allied nations; and, whilst they have, in my mind proved the necessity of acting on a greater scale, they have, at the same time, brought to light a number of difficulties, which have been often used as arguments for giving up our point, but which, by those who are not disposed to shrink from difficulties, may be considered fair incentives for us to persevere with greater energy in the contest.[1]

One of the principal objections that have been made to increasing our force in the Spanish peninsula, is the difficulty of subsisting an army in that

[1] The wise and active conquer difficulties
By daring to attempt them; sloth and folly
Shiver and shrink at sight of toil and hazard,
And make the impossibilities they fear.
ROWE.

country.[1] This point, on the contrary, ought to be one of the greatest inducements for us to carry on the war there with vigour. When we find the part of the country, in which we act, exhausted, we can, by a few days' march, fall back upon the coast. The sea will supply us with provisions, however numerous we may be, so that we may live in plenty, while the French are starving in the interior. We may also take such positions in the strong mountainous provinces near the coast, as will enable us most materially to interrupt, or to cut off their supplies from France. By sending, for example, a strong army to Biscay, this object would be effected. The French, it will be recollected, did not venture into the interior of Spain, till they had driven Blake out of that province. A British corps in Biscay[2] would, for any thing that I can see to the contrary, be just as safe as in Portugal; and it would have the excellent harbour of Santona, and that of Santander, in its rear,[3] besides several creeks calculated for the small craft of the country.

[1] Henry IV. of France is said to have thus expressed himself, upon the prospects of an army invading Spain: "Quand on y va fort, on meurt de faim: quand on y va "foible, on est battu."

[2] This is supposed for illustration's sake, not absolutely recommended, as the best measure that could be adopted.

[3] *Santoña* was described to be an excellent harbour by the

So much for what regards the absolute want of food. But it has been found, that even without any actual scarcity, our armies in Spain have never been properly supplied with provisions.

This, it is acknowledged by all men, has partly arisen from our own defective system of providing for the wants of our armies. The remedy to this difficulty, as far as it goes, is to make use of the understanding which God has given us, and to set about improving our own system with proper ardour and energy.

The want of provisions in Lord Wellington's army, and indeed all the difficulties and distress, which that army suffered, appear principally to have arisen, either from the obstinacy, ignorance, and perverseness, of the generals with whom he had to co-operate; or, from the want of wisdom, energy, and power, of the supreme central junta or ostensible government of Spain.

Now it is absurd to suppose, that it can either be congenial to the wishes or feelings of the Spaniards, that our army should have been ill-treated by their rulers, or by their generals. It is not their fault, as a nation, that their affairs are badly conducted, or their armies, at times, badly commanded. Let us

officers of the navy, and by those officers of engineers who examined it. The harbour of Santander is not equal to the former, but the transports, which brought the Spanish army from the North of Europe, made use of it

look at home, and we shall find that our own commanders have not always been the best that could have been chosen out of the long list of general officers. The proper mode for us to act is, therefore, not to put ourselves in a passion with the Spaniards on account of these evils, which are more pernicious to them than to us; but to perform the part of true friends, by endeavouring to remedy them. They truly deserve to be considered our friends, notwithstanding all the grievances of which we have cause to complain; for it may be allowed, that they have as much been fighting the battles of England, as we can, at any time, be said to have been fighting the battles of Spain.

The remedy, in order to prevent the recurrence of similar evils hereafter, is to demand, that the general of a British army, acting in co-operation with the Spaniards, shall have the chief command of the combined troops, with the absolute disposal of provisions, of military stores, and of the means of transport. Hence, as we cannot suppose that any British general will so far forget the principles of honour and humanity, as to engross to his own army a greater share of the supplies than its numbers entitle it to, the hardships of both English and Spanish soldiers will be equally divided, and a complete concert and unity of action established.[1]

[1] Although the Spanish general, with whom Lord Wellington had to co-operate, reserved for his own army almost

The necessity of having one head, not two, to a combined army, has been proved by the history of the world in every age; and I see nothing in Talavera, except a new proof of it.

Divide even a British army into two parts; let it act together, one half commanded by one general, the other by another, both equal in authority; and, in cases of disaster or extreme distress, the officers and soldiers of one half of a British army, so constituted, will look upon the other half of it with an evil eye; and if they are attached to their own general, or put confidence in his abilities, they will most certainly accuse his colleague of having (probably, they may say, from some unworthy motive) exposed them to be cut to pieces, or to perish of hunger.

the whole of the resources of the country, at times evading, sometimes even refusing, his lordship's demands of a fair proportion of them for the British troops, it appears that even the Spanish soldiers were also in extreme distress; yet I cannot suppose that he had any premeditated intention of treating us ill. He probably did not or would not foresee the sufferings of the combined armies; and how could a stubborn old man, worn out with personal infirmities, who must use on every occasion the eyes and ears of others, either find out, or have energy enough to remove, the true causes of them? These sufferings account sufficiently for the hostile disposition, which the Spanish soldiers are said to have evinced towards the British; and which the latter, in all probability, could not have been backward in resenting, if they did not, in reality, draw it upon themselves.

Those, who are conversant with ancient history, will recollect the inconveniences which the Romans often suffered from the jealousies of their consuls, when both took the field together. In examining our own annals it will be seen, that in conjunct expeditions, where there must, from the nature of things, be a certain independence of command, every failure has uniformly been followed by mutual complaints and recriminations between the admiral and general employed; and these feuds have always been more violent in proportion to the greatness of the loss or disgrace sustained, and to the imperfect state of discipline and equipment of the two services, at the period in question.

Our demand of the chief command of every combined army in Spain, although it might have shocked the feelings of the people of that country, at the time of their first successes, must afterwards have appeared to them perfectly just and reasonable. The Spaniards, like other nations, have always been disposed to throw a greater share of the blame of every disaster upon the general who commanded them, than they have been willing to take upon themselves. As their confidence in their own generals gradually diminishes, their confidence in the British generals must of necessity increase in the same proportion; and thus a measure, which it would, perhaps, at first, have been impolitic to propose to them, may have, in course of time, become not merely desirable, but easy of attainment.

Those, who see any great difficulty in getting the Spaniards to accede to such a proposal, must either have a very poor opinion of our own influence and talents, or must imagine that our allies are strangely contrary in character to all the rest of mankind.

The chief command, however, would not of itself enable a British general to succeed in co-operation with the Spaniards, as long as men of the untractable character, with whom Lord Wellington had to deal, retain their situation at the head of the Spanish troops acting in the field. Of what use would it be to issue orders, which, if not openly disobeyed, would be secretly counteracted, by the ignorance, inactivity, or obstinacy of the Spanish chiefs? It is therefore essential, that such men be either totally displaced from the service, or put into garrisons not liable to be attacked, if they are without talents. If they have talents, the common cause ought not to lose their services; let them, therefore, command in some province, where it is not necessary that they should act in immediate concert with a British general. They are obstacles, in both suppositions, to the success of the war; and, as such, are to be removed, by depriving them of the power or opportunity of doing harm.

I admit that men, of the character which has been described, will not voluntarily give up their commands; but these men have their enemies, or rivals, amongst their own countrymen, equally powerful with themselves; and, after every defeat, the people

of Spain have shown themselves more inclined to tear the unfortunate general to pieces as a traitor, than to make any allowance in his favour. If, therefore, we can prove to the government and people of Spain, the incapacity of such men, with the evils which have arisen from their refractory spirit, our influence in that country is, or ought to be, so great, that they must be removed, and others, who have shown more talents and patriotism, put in their place.

There are men in England, to whom the system, which has just been recommended, if acted upon to its fullest extent, may appear an improper interference in the domestic affairs of Spain, contrary to the law of nations. If they reflected a little more upon the subject, they would perhaps see the fallacy of such a notion: I shall, however, say a few words in explanation.

In the first place, I must observe, that, by the usages of all civilized nations, in modern times, the government of every state has been allowed a right to interfere by art, or by persuasion, in the domestic affairs of all other states, with which it is at peace; much more so, if united to them by an alliance offensive and defensive; in which case, it may require not merely the letter, but the spirit, of the contract to be adhered to. The justice of such conduct is perfectly understood all over the world, only that, from a proper regard for the dignity of every government, and for the feelings of the people of all countries, it is never publicly admitted by either

party, that any change in the domestic affairs of a nation has been effected by the interference of a foreign power.[1] A writer, however, who lays before his readers any system of policy, which he thinks ought to be adopted towards another state, cannot possibly mince the matter, like the actual politician; he must necessarily state his meaning in strong and plain language, without sparing the prejudices or feelings of any class of men, either in his own country, or in that of its allies; otherwise he will be unintelligible.

If what has been practised, and allowed to be practised, by all governments, our own not excepted, from the earliest times up to the present day, be the law of nations (and perhaps the nicest casuist would be puzzled to give any other definition of it); then it must be admitted, that the kind of interference, which I have recommended, in Spanish affairs, is perfectly just and proper.

[1] For instance, a nation's affairs are certainly changed, when its revenue is diminished, without any actual disaster, by a considerable sum, such as half a million yearly. The Sicilian government, by art and by persuasion, prevailed upon us to grant them a sum little inferior to what I have mentioned. Every family in England pays its portion of that sum. It therefore comes home to us in the most literal sense of the word, and was a direct change for the worse in our domestic affairs, effected by a foreign government. No one will pretend to say, that the court of Palermo acted unjustly, by thus interfering.

Let us examine into the instructions which are usually given to ambassadors, with their inferior agents, resident in foreign countries. Are they not directed, in the first place, by every possible art to influence the government of the country to which they are sent, and make it adopt measures suited to the views of their own; secondly, to create amongst the people, wherever they are employed, an interest favourable to their own nation; thirdly, to see that strict justice be done to their own countrymen, who, from motives of curiosity, pleasure, or gain, may be led to travel or settle abroad; lastly, to use every exertion to procure and transmit to their own government, the best information, both political, military, and commercial, respecting the state of the country in which they act?

That it is just in every government to employ ambassadors in foreign countries; that it is also just in these ambassadors to do their duty; and that the duties of ambassadors are such as have been described, will scarcely be disputed; but, on a moment's reflection, it must appear, that not one of these duties can be done, without interfering more or less in the domestic affairs of some foreign nation. Where then can be the injustice of one government interfering, by art or by persuasion, through its authorized agents in the concerns of another? Should any government send out an ambassador, with a numerous retinue, merely for form's sake, without views of deriving advantage from their

labours; or should it tie their hands, and transform them into state-pageants, from a fear of hurting the feelings of the rulers of a foreign state, or of being thought to act unjustly by the people of a foreign nation; it might fairly be pronounced, that such a government must be sunk in the lowest state of ignorance and barbarism. We have, however, seen no civilized government, in modern times, so completely lost to the true principles of justice, as to have ever been diverted from the duty, which it owes to its own subjects by such absurd punctilios.[1]

[1] When two nations, at war with each other, have each their ambassadors resident at a neutral court, is not that ambassador, of the two, the most applauded by all mankind, who persuades the ruler or rulers of the neutral nation to take a part in the contest, in favour of his own government; which can seldom or never be effected without a change in the cabinet of the neutral state? Have we not even heard, without any marked disapprobation, of ambassadors, in order to gain their ends, mixing in intrigues of all kinds, provided they have used no force, nor instigated others to any violent or atrocious measures?

If we have, for instance, been at war with France, but at peace with Russia, and have read some angry extract from a Paris gazette, ascribing a sudden revolution in Russian politics, prejudicial to French interests, to the effect of British intrigues, or of British gold, I believe few men amongst us have, for a moment, seriously lamented such conduct of our own superiors, as inconsistent with the law of nations, or with the honour of the British name.

When, on the contrary, we have read of some change in the councils of Russia, unfavourable to ourselves, said to have

Whilst it is thus perfectly just and proper for every government to interfere in the domestic concerns of another nation, in the manner described, it is also equally just, for the rulers of that nation, to resist such interference, if prejudicial to its prosperity, by every means in their power. They can, for instance, evade or refuse to accede to the proposals of an ambassador; they can counteract the arts by which he endeavours to form an interest amongst the people whom they govern; they can watch over his conduct, and prevent him and his agents from acquiring any very accurate insight into the state of their country; and if they find that he is of too firm a mind to be deterred from his purposes by any hints, which they may throw out of their displeasure or jealousy, they have it in their power to resent his conduct, by insisting that he shall be recalled.

In most cases, however, they will gain little by this irritable mode of managing their foreign affairs. The liberty and influence of their own ambassadors and agents, in the rival country, will be abridged in proportion to their violence; their demands may be refused with equal acrimony, and their complaints set aside with contempt and indignation;

arisen from the intrigues of a French ambassador, instead of launching out into invectives against the villany of the Frenchman, have we not been more apt to regret, that our own government should have opposed him by an ambassador less skilful, or less experienced in the mysteries of diplomacy?

and if the friendship of the power, with which they treat, be necessary to them, by their peevish conduct they may lose that friendship; or, if its enmity be dangerous, they may find themselves obliged to submit to some gross humiliation, or to incur some serious disaster, in consequence of their ill-judged petulancy.

Such, therefore, stands the case between the Spaniards and ourselves at the present moment. We have a decided right to interfere in their domestic affairs by art or by persuasion; and they have a most undeniable right to reject our interference, if they think that our views are contrary to their dignity and welfare. There lies the justice of the question, equal on both sides.

Keeping these principles in mind, let us return to the consideration of the objections that may be urged against the vigorous prosecution of the war in Spain; and let us next suppose, that the members of the supreme central junta, or ostensible government of that country, should be so insensible to the true interests of the Spanish nation, as to persist in turning a deaf ear to our advice; let us suppose, that they refuse to take the command of their armies out of unworthy hands; that they will not intrust our generals with the powers which we require; or that after having acceded to our demands, and promised us every thing which was necessary to render our co-operation effectual, they should afterwards break their word, and either counteract us

in some important enterprise, or starve our army; then it is evident, that by all or any of these suppositions, the junta would prove one of the greatest obstacles to the success of the war in Spain; they would be as much our enemies as if they were actually hired by Buonaparte to betray us; and it would therefore be our business to deprive them of their power as soon as possible. Are there any well-grounded objections that can be urged against this necessary measure?

On the first hasty view of the subject, it may be said, that it would be shameful for us to withdraw our support from a government, which we ourselves acknowledged, and which, in fact, we have been the only nation to acknowledge. In my mind, this, so far from being a check upon us, gives us a double right to resent any offence committed against us by the members of the supreme junta of Spain. They professed themselves to be our friends; as such we supplied them with money and arms, and gave them every other assistance in our power, not for their own advantage, but for a specific object which they undertook to perform, and in which they have failed. They invited our armies into their country, under condition of treating them well, and of supplying them with the necessaries of life, for which we engaged to pay. After our troops, at the imminent hazard of total destruction, had retrieved their affairs by a glorious victory, where was the gratitude, where was the

good faith, of the government of Spain? Did they not, partly by their own measures, partly through their officers, who may have had secret orders of which we know nothing, shamefully starve that very army which had saved them? Should they aggravate their past misconduct towards us, by refusing us the proper security for preventing these evils in future, we may then fairly say, that the junta must have erred, not from ignorance, but from perfidy; they will have failed in every part of their contract, and consequently we shall be absolved from ours.

There are precedents of sovereigns having by their influence excited, or by their power assisted, the people of other countries to throw off their allegiance to an established and legitimate government, with which they have been themselves at peace. Some have even been applauded by historians for so doing; as for instance Queen Elizabeth, who aided the people of Holland and of the Netherlands against Philip the second, when she was not at war with that monarch. Yet, according to the strict principles of the law of nations, it may be doubted whether such conduct on her part was correct.

If, therefore, the junta of Spain were an established government, however perfidiously they might behave to us, we should not, perhaps, be justified in using our influence to induce the

Spaniards to revolt against their authority, and to set up another government in their place. Our only resource, in that case, would be openly to break with them, and leave them to their fate. Having once renounced all friendship with them, if they prevailed against Buonaparte, so much the better; if he on the contrary succeeded in his object, we, being at war with France, should be authorized by the law of nations to attack and expel our enemy wherever we found him in quiet possession; we should therefore have a right, under such circumstances, after driving him out of those parts of Spain which he had subdued, to defend our conquests, as we gained them, by the sword, even against the Spanish government itself.

Should the supreme junta of Spain, however, prove to have no just claim to the title of an established or legitimate government, then we are allies, not to the individuals composing that body, but to the Spanish nation; and the moment that these individuals, by any perfidious conduct, forfeit our friendship, it is not necessary for us, on that account, formally to renounce our alliance with Spain; on the contrary, we are fully justified in coming to the point at once, by using all our influence in that country to overthrow them, instead of allowing them to remain in office, to the certain ruin of Spanish independence, and to our own great detriment.

Let us clear up this doubt before we go farther, in order that we may have justice on our side, whichever way we act.

The supreme junta of Spain, whilst they have exercised all the functions of sovereign power, have issued no orders in their own name. They style themselves merely the ministers of Ferdinand the Seventh; but to look upon them in that light would be ridiculous, since they got into office without his consent, and even without his knowledge. It is certainly, however, the most convenient title which they could have assumed; for if they could persuade the people of Spain, to consider them in reality as the ministers of that prince, their power might be absolute and perpetual; because it is utterly impossible for him, and it would be high treason, under this supposition, for any of those who acknowledge themselves his subjects, to attempt to displace them.

If the deeds either of Charles the Fourth, or of Ferdinand the Seventh, which they signed under terror of their lives, were considered valid at this moment by the people of Spain, they would be forced to allow that Joseph Napoleon, to whom their princes transferred their authority, is their lawful king. But since they have shown, that they were not to be trifled out of their national independence, by the bare signature of their legitimate sovereigns, we shall, as the Spaniards themselves in fact do, leave Ferdinand the Seventh out of the question, till we see him at liberty to act

for himself; whilst we prosecute our inquiry into the real, not the assumed, or ostensible, title, by which the members of the supreme central junta hold their power.

At the commencement of the present war in Spain, the various provinces of that country, which to the present day retain their ancient appellation of kingdoms, principalities, &c. acted completely independent of each other. Every province had its own supreme junta, or council of government, residing in its capital city, and composed of a certain number of the leading men in point of birth or influence. Every great city and town had also its junta, subordinate to the former. The orders of these authorities were put in execution by means of the ordinary magistrates, throughout the country, and were implicitly obeyed by the people, who showed nothing revolutionary in their spirit.[1] All

[1] The only documents that evinced a revolutionary spirit in Spain, are the official papers of the supreme central junta, and of the provincial governments. The members of these bodies were generally men of the best education and information amongst their countrymen. They were sensible, that all the evils of Spain had arisen from its corrupted government; and being suddenly permitted to express their feelings, they launched forth against former abuses, in a strain of indignation, which gave rise to expectations that they were afterwards unwilling to fulfil.

Without pretending to judge of those parts of Spain which I have not seen, the people of Galicia, of Asturias, of Santander, and of Leon, the two former of which provinces

the provinces, like so many independent states, sent their deputies to throw themselves upon the protection, and implore the assistance, of Great Britain;

showed themselves inferior in resolution to none, never discovered, as far as I could observe, the smallest tincture of that semi-revolutionary spirit, which breathes in the official documents alluded to.

I only met with three individuals who seemed to feel deeply the necessity of a great change in their political constitution. Two of them were officers, both of whom had studied the English writers through the medium of translations. The third was a lawyer, who was conversant with Voltaire and the other French authors.

The great body of the people attributed all their evils to wicked counsellors about the person of Charles the Fourth: it was a change of men, not of laws, which they desired. They thought very little upon affairs of government. "Our "first duty," as I once heard a respectable Spaniard say, when that subject was introduced, "is to drive the French "beyond the Pyrenees. When that is effected, not before, "it will be time for us to think of constitutions." Such was the spirit of the Spaniards; and it struck me the more forcibly, as being so different from what I had expected.

In the metropolis, however, in Seville, in Cadiz, &c. and in some particular provinces, such as Catalonia, Arragon, and Biscay, I am inclined to believe that the people are more enlarged in their views respecting government; but I have not been able to learn that a revolutionary, by which I mean a democratical and levelling spirit, any where exists in Spain.

The spirit which has been described, was very unfavourable to the views of Buonaparte, who addressed himself to revolutionary feelings which the Spaniards did not possess; and offered to introduce changes for their benefit, of which they did not see the necessity: whilst, at the same time, he shocked

of which the little principality of Asturias, proud of its former glory, in having preserved its liberty against the Moors, when they had subjected almost every other part of Spain, was the first to show the example. In the mean time, the supreme junta of every province raised its troops to the best of its power and means; so that the Spanish nation at once transformed itself into a great, but irregular, army. And certainly it was a noble sight, to see the Spaniards marching in their tumultuary array, to meet the most experienced warriors of modern times, without uniforms or proper accoutrements, badly armed, ignorant of tactics, but full of patriotism, and of that enthusiasm, which has given occasion to so much idle dispute in England, and which afterwards proved to be a poor substitute for other more essential military qualities. For my part I must confess, that this spectacle was more gratifying, and more congenial to my feelings as a man, if not as a soldier, than a view of the finest Russian or Prussian army would have been.

The want of concert, and other inconveniencies arising from this state of things, were soon felt; and the general wish and feeling in Spain demanded that some superior authority should be appointed, with full powers to issue orders to the provinces,

them by his outrageous and perfidious conduct, trampling upon their loyalty, their national pride, and their love of independence.

and thereby to bring the whole energy of the nation properly into action against its enemy. Accordingly, the provincial juntas, in whose hands the supreme power had hitherto rested, nominated each their deputies for this purpose. These, assembling in the metropolis, after it had been evacuated by the French troops, composed the supreme central junta, ruling nominally by authority of Ferdinand the Seventh, but virtually by authority of their constituents. Thus they were appointed solely by a few leading individuals in the kingdom; yet as their countrymen had depended upon these individuals, and voluntarily obeyed their orders in every thing, although the people of Spain had no share in the election of the supreme junta, they were at first disposed to place every confidence in the exertions of that body, to which they looked up for success in war, for an equal and faithful management and improvement of their finances, and even a constitution; for it was expected from the members of the supreme central junta, that they would assemble the Cortes, in order to take the sense of the nation upon this important subject, as indeed, soon after their appointment, they pledged themselves to do. Hence, although no one in Spain was disposed to disobey any exercise of their ill-defined authority, they were, in reality, nothing more than a provisional or temporary government, ruling for the public good, under certain conditions

fully understood, both by themselves, by their own countrymen, and by the British government.[1]

We need not observe, that the supreme central junta have miserably disappointed the people of Spain in all these expectations, not merely in such as may have been partly frustrated by uncontroulable

[1] Extract of an official letter from Mr. Stuart to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Lugo, the 1st of September, 1808, announcing the establishment of the supreme central junta.

"The first duty of the sovereign junta will, I understand, "be the convocation of the *Cortes*, according to ancient form, "which body will determine whether the power shall remain "in their hands, or whether, agreeable to the laws of the "*Partido*, they shall elect a council of five to hold the reins "of government. The junta will, as Mr. Valdez assures me, "recal the deputies" (or ambassadors from the provinces, acting independent of each other) "in London without "delay, and send a person in their confidence to treat with "Great Britain."

In a dispatch from the same gentleman, dated Aranjuez, October the 14th, 1808, only three weeks after the supreme junta publicly entered upon their functions, he stated, as was afterwards verified, an opinion that their paramount object seemed to be the preservation of their own power, and that they had no intention of performing any duty, or of fulfilling any expectation formed by their country, that was likely to interfere with their selfish ambition. In his letter of the 25th ditto, he states the discontents that were beginning to arise amongst the people of Madrid, and prognosticates the other evils likely to follow, in consequence of the policy, which the supreme junta seemed to have adopted, of acting as usurpers instead of legislators.

events, but in those which it was fully in their power to have realized. They have, for instance, broken their promise of calling the Cortes, or at least deferred that step under various pretences, till the whole of Spain being either over-run by the French armies, or in a state of tumultuary warfare, the assembly of deputies that could be considered a fair representation of the people of that country, for the purposes of legislature, has become impossible. Will any man say that, under such circumstances, the supreme junta can possibly be popular in Spain?

They stand, in fact, with respect to their own countrymen, exactly in the same relation which the Decemvirs bore to the senate and people of Rome. The history of the world can scarcely furnish two cases more strongly parallel. They were appointed for similar purposes, and invested with powers exactly similar. There is only this difference to be observed, that the Roman Decemvirs began with using their provisional power to the good of their subjects. The Spanish junta, on the contrary, have never been acknowledged to have rendered any essential service to their country; and if, with an equal zeal to retain their authority to the last extremity, they have never, like the Roman Decemvirs, broken out into any outrageous acts of violence, it may perhaps be imputed solely to the state of weakness, to which the failure of all their measures, with the non-performance of all their promises, has reduced them: so that fear, not humanity, may

probably have been the true cause of their moderation.[1]

[1] "The constitution of the supreme central junta," according to Lord Wellesley, "is not founded on any well-understood "system of union among the provinces, and still less on any "just or wise distribution of the elements or powers of "government; the confederacy of the provinces yet exists; "the executive power is weakened and dispersed in the hands "of an assembly, too numerous for unity of council or "promptitude of action, and too contracted for the purpose "of representing the body of the Spanish nation. The "supreme central junta is neither an adequate representative "of the crown, nor of the aristocracy, nor of the people; "nor does it comprise any useful quality, either of an executive council, or of a deliberative assembly, while it com- "bines many defects which tend to disturb both deliberation "and action, &c. &c. its strange and anomalous constitution "unites the contradictory inconveniences of every known "form of government, without possessing the advantages of "any, &c." (See the dispatch from the Marquis Wellesley to Mr. Canning, dated Seville, the 15th of September, 1809, giving a picture of Spanish affairs.)

Now the members of an oligarchy, so badly constituted as the above, will, from the nature of mankind, certainly not lay down their power, unless forced by some superior influence to do so; but they will, at the same time, be unable to preserve more than the shadow of power (and scarcely that), without proscribing, or at least exercising, the most violent tyranny upon, their own countrymen. Of this, the conduct of the thirty tyrants of Athens, of the various demagogues of Syracuse, of the Roman Decemvirs, &c. &c. not forgetting the revolutionary rulers of France, affords a sufficient proof.

That the supreme central junta saw, that it was necessary

Reflecting in this manner upon the present state of Spain, I cannot help believing, that the countenance of the British government, whose assistance the Spaniards now feel is necessary to their exist-

for them to resort to similar measures, or to lose their power, and that they would have preferred the former alternative, however shocking to every principle of patriotism and of humanity, appears to me sufficiently evident, from the edict of the tribunal of public security, published at Seville, the 15th of April, 1809, in which, threats, worthy of Robespierre, are held out against those "who endeavour to raise "distrust of the supreme central junta," &c.; their lives and fortunes are declared forfeited, and rewards are offered to informers, whose names are promised never to be divulged. See Mr. Frere's dispatch dated Seville, the 29th of May, 1809, containing, amongst other inclosures, this horrible proclamation.

The committee acting under that formidable title, which must evidently have been constituted in imitation of the sanguinary tribunal of the same name at Paris, had been, Mr. Frere observes, long since established, and was composed of active and energetic men, but had hitherto remained inactive and inefficient.

Since the supreme central junta (for this tribunal acted by their authority) were not ashamed to avow such principles, what motives could possibly have prevented them from putting these threats into execution, but weakness or fear? It certainly could not have been a feeling of justice or of humanity. If they published their empty menaces from policy, it was a very mistaken one; for if they did not mean to act according to their words, they ought to have foreseen, that the hatred and contempt of their own countrymen must be the natural consequence of such conduct.

ence as a nation, has been the sole support that has for some time upheld the supreme central junta, in its tottering situation, at the head of the state; and if this supposition be true, it follows as a matter of necessity, that we must share, in a great degree, the odium into which the supreme junta has gradually been sinking.

As long as that body showed a readiness to co-operate with us, in the most cordial manner, for the preservation of their own country, it might have been politic in us to have supported them under a temporary unpopularity; because the success that would have arisen from such effectual co-operation, might have retrieved their character, and strengthened them in public opinion; but by the hypothesis under which we are now reasoning, the contrary being the case, the sooner we make it understood, in Spain, that we are no longer the friends of the junta, the better. Our influence was a principal cause of the elevation of these men: let us use the same influence to deprive them of that power which they have abused. Both these measures are, in point of justice, exactly equal; both, in my mind, perfectly just: as the former measure was wise and politic at the time, so is the latter now; and although on a superficial view they may be considered directly contrary to each other, the general policy will be found precisely the same, circumstances only having altered. In the former case it did not, nor in the latter ought it to appear

to the world, that the British interfered.[1] As the Spaniards themselves set up their supreme junta, they themselves will pull it down, without our taking a conspicuous part, or using any other influence,

[1] That the supreme central junta, or any other general government for the nation, could scarcely have been set up in Spain, although a thing universally desired by the people, without the powerful exertion of British influence in the various provinces, and that in fact the elevation of that body was owing as much, or more, to our influence, than to any other cause, will appear evident, by reading the dispatch from Mr. Canning to Mr. Stuart, dated the 6th of July, 1808, also that of the 27th of July, 1808, of which a duplicate was sent to Mr. Hunter, and which, or something similar, we may presume, was circular to all the British agents in Spain. The proceedings of Mr. Stuart, in consequence of these instructions, the great difficulties that were to be surmounted, and the final consent of the province, to which he was deputed, to this measure, are detailed in his official letters to Mr. Canning, dated the 22d July, the 7th, 15th, and 17th of August, and the 1st of September of the same year.

The junta was, therefore, the work of the influence of the British government, exerted by approbation of the people of Spain. These are its two real constituents. It has by its measures betrayed both, and fears both; but cannot stand against either, without the support of the other; and it cannot have that support, without having recourse to further deception, by playing off the one against the other, and destroying (as it has done) the harmony and affection, which ought to subsist between the Spanish and British nations, whose interests are the same.

than what we are entitled by the law of nations to do.

It will not be a difficult task to persuade the provincial governments, which have always been jealous of, and it would appear, in some cases, hostile to, the views of the members of the supreme junta, to resume their power. Nor can it require much eloquence to convince the people, after what has past, that any state of affairs will be better, than what they have to expect from a continuation of the present system. Paint to them the situation of Spain, when the junta was first appointed; paint to them its present situation; the flower of its armies annihilated, carried into captivity in France, or reduced to a life of misery and despair; its provinces depopulated; its cities, villages and farms in ruins; its own great exertions frustrated; the money, arms and clothing, which we advanced, out of friendship, not to the junta, but to the Spanish nation, applied to no useful purpose; the British troops, after shedding their blood in the cause of Spain, forced to retreat, and to extort by violence that food which nature required, from the unfortunate peasants, whom it was their first wish to save, and whom they would have saved, and even enriched, but for such an iniquitous government.

Let us publish these things to the people of Spain, in the language of honour and of sincerity. They know them not. They only know the evils

which they have suffered, but they are ignorant of the causes of them. They only know that the British troops advanced, that the British troops retreated, without knowing our reasons either for the one measure or for the other; they know that, on numberless occasions, our soldiers robbed and ill-treated them without ceremony;[1] and that after

[1] That this was the case in Sir John Moore's army, I can vouch as an eye-witness; and I presume Lord Wellington's army must have behaved in a similar way, though as it was more stationary, and did not retire by forced marches, the officers may have been able to keep the outrageous spirit of the soldiers under greater controul. General Cuesta, in an acrimonious letter to the British general of the 10th of August, 1809, complains of the misconduct of the troops. In answer, dated the 11th ditto, the latter, although he rejects with indignation most of the charges as false and absurd, does not deny that individual acts of rapine may have been committed, but recriminates, in the following words. "I am "concerned that you should conceive that you had any "reason to complain of the British troops; but when troops "are starving, which these under my command have been, "as I have repeatedly told your excellency, since I joined you "on the 22d of last month, and particularly had no bread "whatever from the 3d to the 8th instant, it is not astonish-"ing, that they should go to the villages, and even to "the mountains, to look for food, where they think they "can get it. The complaints of the inhabitants, however, "should not have been confined to the conduct of the British "troops: in this village I have seen the Spanish soldiers, "who ought to have been elsewhere, take off the doors "of the houses, which were locked up, in order that they

our armies disappeared, their affairs got into a worse state than before. Let them know the truth, and their resentment will be transferred from us, to such of their own superiors as were the real causes of all these evils; who must naturally, in order to plead their own apology, have circulated secret whispers all over Spain, accusing the British army of a ferocious, malignant, and treacherous disposition towards its allies, and imputing all its retrograde movements to the most unworthy and degrading motives.[1]

As long as we leave the people of Spain in the dark, they must of necessity hate us, because they have only heard one side of the question:[2] but

" might' plunder the houses, and they afterwards burnt " the doors," &c.

This misconduct, in both armies, arose from the nature of things. When soldiers are not fed, they will always plunder.

[1] See particularly, as a proof of this, the Marquis Wellesley's dispatch to Mr. Canning, dated Seville, the 24th of August, 1809.

[2] Lord Wellington observes, in his letter to Lord Wellesley, dated the 12th of August, 1809, " it is useless to " complain; but we are certainly not treated as friends, " much less as the only prop on which the cause of Spain " can depend. But besides this want of good will, which " can easily be traced to the temper and disposition of the " General commanding the Spanish army," &c. &c.

this hatred will naturally be kept to themselves, whilst they stand in need of our assistance. If they have hitherto been silent, it may be a proof of their good sense and moderation: probably they may have made more allowances for the situation of our army, than we have generally been willing to

In a dispatch, dated Truxillo, the 21st of August, 1810, the same general remarks, " I find that it is intended to " justify the Spanish government for their neglect of us, by " circulating a report, that my complaints of want of " supplies, of means of transport, and, I might have added, " of the common attention, and even of humanity towards " the army, and particularly the wounded, were mere pre- " texts, &c. &c. These reports against me may do very " well for the people of Seville," &c.

The Marquis Wellesley, in his dispatch from Seville, of the 2d of September, 1809, confirms the above observations.

" According to the usual course of human affairs, the " Spanish government have reproached us with the conse- " quences of a calamity which they had occasioned; and " have endeavoured to ascribe the retirement of a British " army to any cause rather than to their own misconduct." Afterwards he adds, " whatever delusion may prevail for " a moment, the true causes of the retreat of our army cannot " long be concealed from the Spanish nation," &c.

This conduct, on the part of the supreme central junta, and of their officers, will not appear wonderful, when we consider the unworthy artifices, which individuals and bodies of men have often condescended to make use of, in our own country, in order to clear themselves, at the expense of the whole world besides, when their conduct has been called in question.

make for them; but it is impossible to suppose, that they must not have deeply felt the injurious effects apparently resulting from our measures, which we have never condescended to explain.' With our usual haughtiness and reserve, conscious of our own integrity, we have not published a single manifesto or proclamation, whilst the French have been inundating the country with thousands, in order to paint our conduct and views in the blackest light. If we have done any thing in explanation of our operations, it has been confined to invectives in our newspapers, too often, I am sorry to say, directed against the whole Spanish nation; which is certainly not the way to conciliate the only allies we have in

* When Sir David Baird received his orders to retreat from Astorga, and re-embark, an operation which he actually commenced, but which was afterwards countermanded by Sir John Moore, he had a proclamation printed, with a view of encouraging the people of Leon and Galicia, accounting in a satisfactory way for his retreat, by a declaration, that the abandonment of Spain was not intended.

The Marquis de la Romana requested that the publication of this proclamation might be delayed, which may be considered very fortunate, because Sir John Moore so soon after had reason to change his mind in regard to the junction with Sir David Baird, which was at first supposed by him to be impracticable.

The above is the only explanation which, to my knowledge, has been given, or rather was intended to have been given, to the people of Spain, of the movements of a British army.

the world, still less to discourage the views or to depress the hopes of our common enemy.

Should the members of the supreme central junta be once more reduced to the humbler walks of private life, a new difficulty may be supposed to present itself, in finding proper successors to the sovereign power in Spain. This is a difficulty certainly to be provided for, but with which, it appears to me, we have no occasion to embarrass ourselves for some time to come.

From the former state of the Spanish nation, we may presume that it at present possesses few men qualified, from their knowledge, and none from their experience, to act as supreme governors of their country in military and political affairs, in such very critical times; and the chances are, that such men either could not get into power, or would be thwarted (if in power) by the ignorance and obstinacy of their colleagues. The members of the supreme central junta, perhaps, as much possessed, at one time, the confidence of their own countrymen, as any government which is likely hereafter to be formed in their place.

But waving all consideration of these disadvantages attending the people of Spain, who, it may at least be allowed, fully possess the seeds of patriotism, and of all the military virtues; when we consider the difficulty of totally reforming, or, more properly speaking, of creating, a complete system of war and government for a great nation, which the members

of the supreme central junta undertook to do; this difficulty, unless they could have kept their enemy upon the frontier, which was impracticable, owing to the badness of the military part of the system that they had to reform, bordered so closely upon impossibility, that it may account for the failures of that body, without judging unfavourably of the talents or unanimity of the individuals who composed it.

On the other hand, allowing equal zeal and knowledge in the members of the provincial juntas, as they have to direct the resources of a comparatively small portion of country, and to excite the energy of men over whom they have an immediate local influence, and whose confidence they possess in a way that no disasters can entirely extinguish;[1] their task is in every respect so much easier, that it is no wonder if the efforts of the provinces have at all times surpassed any thing that could be said to be the immediate act of the supreme government.

If the supreme central junta, therefore, was a necessary experiment, tried not without fair hopes of success, but which, from the nature of things,

[1] I do not mean to say by this, that disasters will not occasion a change of leaders in the provinces, from time to time, but that nothing can totally extinguish the local influence of that class of men, from whom these leaders will be chosen, or, more properly speaking, will spring up.

has failed; why renew, until circumstances so far change as again to render it a measure of necessity, the same experiment of another general government for Spain, which is not likely, at this moment, to promise much better success than the former?

As long as the enemy keeps possession of all the central parts of Spain, a supreme national government, however good, would perhaps prove more a disadvantage than a benefit to that country. It would only deaden the energy and exertions of the armies and of the people, in the remote provinces, of whose situation it would be incapable of judging, and whom its orders could seldom or never reach in time to meet emergencies. Its authority must, under such circumstances, be merely nominal; and, in fact, such has actually been the case in Spain, where, to speak only of what I have myself observed, the provincial juntas of the northern provinces, exercised their former powers without waiting for, or even adhering to, any orders, after Madrid had fallen, and their communication with the suprême central junta was interrupted by the French troops.

Into whatever part of Spain we may hereafter carry our arms, under the present circumstances, we should therefore come to a direct negociation with one or more of the provinces, without the intervention of any such unnecessary obstacle, as a supreme junta invested with the insignia, without possessing the substance, of sovereign power. Let

us fairly state our views, name the conditions upon which alone our co-operation can be of any use to the common cause, and insist upon having sufficient power to enforce the execution of these conditions put into our own hands; making the Spaniards sensible, at the same time, that we require this, not from a doubt of their sincerity or good-will, but from a conviction founded upon the experience of both nations, that whilst the affairs of Spain remain in their present state of confusion, it is not only absolutely impossible to reorganize them without our assistance, but it is equally impossible for a native government to execute of itself, without delegating to us a portion of its power, any engagement entered into with us, for the benefit of its own subjects.

In short, we must act, in respect to those provinces of Spain, from which we shall be able to expel the enemy, by venturing to carry on the war on a greater scale, exactly as we have done in Portugal; where, without interfering in civil concerns,[1] we have been appointed to the chief command and direction of military affairs, which, by all rules both of justice and of policy, ought

[1] I mean not openly interfering; but we should certainly interfere by our influence, as much as we can, in order to make the cause, for which we fight, popular. If we neglect to do this (whether we do it or not, I know not), our non-interference in the civil affairs of Portugal is more to be blamed than commended.

to belong, amongst allied nations, when they take the field with nearly equal numbers, to that which has the best disciplined troops, and is, upon the whole, the most experienced and skilful in war. The natives of the peninsula have seen the salutary effects of this arrangement. The Portuguese have enjoyed a year's respite from the horrors of the war, under which every province of Spain has been bleeding; and their own troops, as well as ours, have been constantly supplied with every thing in abundance, although Portugal is not so rich in resources, as that part of the Spanish territory, in which both Cuesta's and Lord Wellington's armies were starving.[1]

[1] Extract from Lord Wellington's letter to Mr. Frere, dated Talavera, the 24th of July, 1809. "It is ridiculous to "pretend that the country cannot supply our wants. The "French army is well fed; the horses of the cavalry in "excellent condition, and the soldiers, who are taken, in "good health and well supplied with bread, of which, "indeed, they left a small magazine behind them. This is a "rich country in corn, in comparison with Portugal; and "yet, during the whole of my operations in that country, "we never wanted bread, but one day, on the frontiers of "Galicia."

Afterwards his lordship adds in the same letter, "The "Spanish army has plenty of every thing;" but I presume, by this observation, that he must have meant in point of quantity only; because it appears from the general tenor of the correspondence laid before parliament, particularly from Lord Wellington's own letters of a subsequent date,

At the same time, I do not mean that we should engross the whole of the military commands in Spain. The war in that country, if carried on with vigour on both sides, must necessarily be a war of several armies spread over great tracts, often at a considerable distance from each other; but two or three of which may occasionally concentrate themselves into a grand army, either in hopes of destroying some corps of the enemy, or with a view to repel a similar effort of his. It is absolutely necessary for us to have more than one British army in the peninsula, or we lose all the advantages which we ought to derive from our superior naval power; and wherever we have an army of our own, there ought to be a native army attached to it, of an equal

that the actual distress of the Spanish troops was little inferior to our own. All military men of experience may have observed, that want of arrangement, even in a small detachment of an army, may produce the same injurious effects as actual scarcity.

It will be understood, that whenever I have quoted these official documents with a view to prove any fact, I have chosen some particular passage, coincident with, and strongly expressive of, what results from an attentive perusal of the whole. To quote in a different way, by taking some single passage without its context, such as the last part of the above extract, which may bear a construction contrary to the general mass of evidence, is what I have carefully avoided, and what no man, whose object is to investigate the truth, should

or greater number of men, under orders of the British general.

The more troops we send into Spain, the more easy it will be for the Spaniards to organize themselves, and to form armies, either to act in direct co-operation with or at a distance from any of ours. Some men, it is true, are of a different opinion, and have asserted, that the less we do for Spain, and the more desperate we leave its affairs, the more that country will do for itself; by which opinion, (although I admit that it was in some measure just at the commencement of the contest,) if they do not reckon our own troops for nothing, they appear to me to maintain as extraordinary a doctrine, under the present circumstances, as he that should object to send a boat to pick up a drowning man, because the sight of approaching succour would discourage him from swimming for his life.

Some of the combined armies in the Spanish peninsula may be so situated, in respect to others, that they cannot form a junction if they wished it. A general concert should, however, be established, as far as possible, which can only be done by making the commander in chief of the British force generalissimo of the whole: but in those provinces where we do not ourselves come forward with a respectable force, it would be both unnecessary and unreasonable to make any demands in respect to the immediate military command.

On the contrary, we ought to treat the Spanish

generals, who have shown themselves true patriots and able soldiers, with the same confidence which we expect from them, supplying all their wants to the best of our power, and doing every thing to convince them, that we interfere no farther than is absolutely necessary to bring the war to a successful issue. We ought to give them officers to intermix with their own, and even occasionally to put detachments of our troops under their orders. The best regiments in the British service might think it an honour to serve under some of the Spanish generals of the present day, whose battles, had their military system been well organized, and had the discipline equalled the spirit of their troops, instead of defeats, might have been glorious victories.

As, by the mode which I recommend, Great Britain would, in reality, act as the general protector of Spain, and engross a considerable degree of power in that country, it may appear to many, that so great is the jealousy of the Spaniards, that they would never agree to an alliance upon such a system.

Their jealousy is consequently a difficulty, not to be deplored, but to be surmounted; and we shall never surmount that, or any other difficulty, without attempting to do it. All nations have their pride, and their jealousy; and I should have thought poorly of the Spaniards, had they not possessed both these feelings. But the obstacles, which arose from their national pride, have

gradually vanished, as was before observed: and whatever jealousy they may at first have felt of our assistance, ought to have vanished at the same time, because it arose more from a laudable wish of doing as much as possible for their own glory, than from any suspicion of our sincerity. It is very probable, however, that they may have become jealous of us now, on the latter account; for although we have succeeded in preserving a great influence in all their political and military measures,*

* This chapter was written before I had an opportunity of perusing the interesting documents relating to Spain and Portugal, printed by order of the House of Commons, in the months of March and April, 1810.

By these it appears, that the influence of the British in Spain has been much greater and more powerfully exerted, than I was aware of.

I knew that Major General Leith had so much weight in the province to which he was deputed, that his suggestions were almost equivalent to orders. Sir D. Baird (before the junction) requested the junta of Galicia to send a detachment of troops to occupy Puebla de Sanabria, which was done accordingly. Sir John Moore never, to my knowledge, expressed any thing in the shape of wish, suggestion, or advice, to the government or people of that province, in respect to their military affairs. I was, however, of opinion, which I have at all times expressed, that he might have obtained the chief command there, had he wished it: but I did not know, that the supreme command of the Spanish armies had actually been offered him, and that he had declined it. (See Mr. Secretary Canning's dispatch to the Marquis Wellesley, dated the 12th of August, 1809.)

which, owing to the natural ambition and jealousy of men in office and command, not merely of

I suspected that we had, by our influence, effected the establishment of a provincial government for Spain, but did not know it; nor did I know that that government, the Spanish generals, and in short, all parties amongst the Spaniards, had not merely consulted, but requested the countenance and assistance of the British ambassadors and generals in every measure both political and military. To give only one proof of this, out of many, we find the supreme central junta, who wished to displace Cuesta, but feared his popularity, first insinuating a desire, and afterwards directly requesting, that the British ambassadors would make an official demand to that purpose. (See particularly paper B, No. 3.)

It also appears, as I had personally observed in the province of Galicia, that the jealousy of our assistance has diminished, and that our influence has increased exactly in proportion to the danger.

We were, for instance, last year, refused admittance into Cadiz, from a very natural and sufficient reason, that the Spaniards did not at that time see the state of their affairs in such an unfavourable light, as to believe that a French army was likely to be able to appear before that fortress. All mankind must be jealous of measures, of which (whether right or wrong in their opinions) they cannot see the necessity.

The supreme central junta, in their negociation with Mr. Frere upon that head, appear to me to have acted with great candour. They assign a very manly reason for their refusal, namely, that they could not admit our troops into Cadiz at the time proposed, without a violent outrage upon public opinion, which they fairly acknowledged to be "the first "and principal spring of their power." (See Don Martin

foreigners, but of their own countrymen, is by far the most difficult task of the two; yet we have totally neglected to cultivate those sentiments of

de Garay's letter to Mr. Frere, dated Seville, the 1st of March, 1809.)

Affairs having since changed, and the necessity having been made manifest, we are now assisting in the defence of that city.

The respectable and distinguished authorities, whose signatures appear to these papers, agree, that whatever jealousy or ill-will may exist in Spain against the English, is to be traced to the government or to its officers, who have created it for reasons, which as men we cannot help resenting, but which may be considered as a necessary result of the circumstances under which they acted. It is also agreed, that the people of Spain show the best spirit, that they afford excellent materials for a good military system, and that they even possess the elements for a good political constitution, neither of which they will (if I reason justly) be able to attain without our assistance and constant interference.

I have trespassed upon the patience of the reader, and have perhaps taken a liberty for which some apology may be due, by so often quoting or referring to the above documents; but it was absolutely necessary for me, as I conceive, that they remove the greatest part of the objections that have been made against increasing our force in the Spanish peninsula, by proving, that the Spaniards are of a persevering, but not of a stubborn and untractable character; that the people of Spain are zealous in their own cause; that they have no jealousy of our assistance; and that our influence has been great, and may be greater.

If my reader will admit these data, then we shall reason upon equal grounds; and so many difficulties will still remain,

gratitude, which the people of Spain, as far as I had an opportunity of judging, at first universally felt towards us, for the generous manner in which we flew to their assistance.[1] If the supposition be

that contrary opinions may be formed, after all, as to the hopes of success. I shall only notice one more objection that may be urged against prosecuting the war in Spain.

This is the question which I foresee will naturally be put by every reader; "supposing that by our address we were to overcome all the scruples of the Spaniards, in the manner proposed, where is our army? Where are the soldiers to be found?"

This query, I must frankly confess, that I am unable to answer, not having access to the reports of the war office; but if I know not where the army is now, I know where it was. I know where we had seventy or eighty thousand of the bravest and best equipped troops in the world, in the month of July, 1809. As the reader may not at once penetrate my allusion, one half of this formidable British army was preparing to embark for Walcheren, under the command of the Earl of Chatham; the other half of it was in Spain and Portugal, under the orders of Lord Wellington (then Sir A. Wellesley).

[1] Major General Leith, when employed on a mission in the north of Spain, ordered the officers under his command to reconnoitre and report upon various parts of that country. A portion of Asturias fell to my share. And nothing, it will be allowed, can be more calculated to give umbrage to the people of a country, than to see foreign officers employed in such a manner. Yet, so far from evincing any tokens of jealousy or of indignation (as for suspicion, that was out of the question, because I always told them who I was, and what I was about), they vied with each other, who should give

true, that this favourable impression is now effaced from their hearts, let us consider appearances, and

me the best information, and show me the greatest civility. The other officers met with the same favourable reception. Had any jealousy of the English existed at that time, it is impossible that it could have escaped our observation. On the contrary, the people breathed nothing but gratitude to the British government; and, what surprised me, in the wildest places of the mountains, they expressed great satisfaction at the prospect of having a free circulation of our manufactures in Spain.

When I was afterwards sent by the same general from Santander to Reynosa, to join Blake's army, after his defeats in Biscay, the extent of which was at that time not fully known to us, I met a great number of fugitives, all of the new levies, upon the road, ignorant of the situation of the main body of the army, of which I informed them; and endeavoured, but in vain, to persuade the officers to rally their men, and march to Reynosa. They, on their part, advised me to go back, asserting that the communication must be cut off by the French troops, and it was even rumoured by some of them, that that place was actually in possession of the enemy. Proceeding, in this state of uncertainty, without giving full credit to these reports, and convinced that, at all events, I should be able to discover the truth, and escape the danger, before it was too late, I found a detachment of more than twenty men of the veteran troops very much exhausted, at a house upon the road, who offered to put themselves under my command, and make good their way to the army with me wherever it might be, if I would wait till morning. When I declined this proposal, not liking the delay, they determined that I should not go without a guard; and four of the least fatigued volunteered to accompany me. From what I

we shall have little cause to complain of the Spanish nation.

saw of the spirit of these men, I should have placed the same confidence in them, which they seemed to place in me.

Such anecdotes, trifling in themselves, afford the strongest proofs of the good-will of the Spaniards, at that period, since these are situations in which it may be admitted, that no orders of superiors could have forced the peasants of the mountains to affect a civility or kindness towards us which they did not feel; and when an army is dispersed, subordination is lost to such a degree, that nothing but a real sentiment of friendship could have caused the Spanish soldiers to follow, or even to respect, British officers in the way that they did, of which I have given the above as an example. Not merely the veteran troops, the stragglers of all kinds, in their greatest distress, even the most undisciplined, respected us as much as, if not more than, their own officers, of the conduct of some of whom they bitterly complained: indeed, I felt so assured that they would obey me, that if a detachment of French cavalry had presented itself, it was my intention to have ridden back, and put myself at the head of a party of Spaniards of any description; the nature of the country being much in our favour. I was afterwards sorry to see that the stragglers of the British army did not behave with proper respect to the Spanish officers.

Whilst the British head-quarters were at Salamanca, " Lord " Proby was at Tordesillas, reconnoitring, when a party of " French cavalry came into the town. They staid some time. " Every man knew that Proby was there, for he had been two " days among them; yet not a man betrayed him. And " when the cavalry left the place, and his lordship came into " the street, they all testified their satisfaction, and declared " that, though they had no arms, they would have died

Let us, therefore, not hastily suppose, as has been done by many in England, that the Spaniards are a race of men insensible to conviction, mulishly

" rather than have allowed him to be taken." (See Mr. James Moore's Narrative, &c.)

A similar incident happened to me, about the same time, on my way from General Blake's army to Astorga, in which, for a whole day's journey, I generally passed within a few miles of the enemy's posts; an experiment that I should certainly not have hazarded, had I doubted the good-will of the Spaniards. About dusk the second evening of my journey, I reached a town in the kingdom of Leon, where I thought myself in security; but two hours afterwards, it was entered by the French cavalry. A priest, who had been in company with me was taken (as I afterwards learned) by a parole of the enemy's dragoons, at the door of a house, not more than two minutes after I had quitted it. Nothing could exceed the anxiety which the people of the town showed on my account. It was with great difficulty, that I could prevail upon the guides who attended me that night, to accept of any recompense, although they were of the lower class of people. One man, in particular, who had assisted me with great inconvenience to himself, absolutely refused it. Under such circumstances, they seemed to think that serving a British officer was a point of duty, and of honour. Such incidents speak for the character of the Spaniards, and prove the affection which at that time they bore to the English.

When Sir John Moore's army afterwards advanced for the purpose of attacking Soult, I was lodged in the same house, where my quarters had formerly been beat up in the manner described, and had the mortification of seeing a British officer who did not understand a word of the Spanish language, behave in the most outrageous way to the very man who had been most instrumental in saving me from being taken prisoner

stubborn, and jealous, to a brutish degree, of their best, their only friends; let us try whether they are not to be moved, like the rest of mankind, by an appeal to their feelings, to their reason, and to their interest. After thus doing our best, should we fail in removing their jealousy, then let us represent them in what light we please; but if we have not yet fairly made the attempt, let us either divide the blame, or blame ourselves, not them, for whatever jealousy may at present exist between us.

In fair weather and gentle breezes, when no land is in sight, all manner of jealousies may exist in an ill-regulated ship, and boys or landsmen may be

When I inquired into the cause of the dispute, I found that this officer had got a notion in his head, that the Spaniards had such a thorough detestation of us, that they concealed the greatest part of their goods, and would not sell any thing to the British army, even for ready money. Under this impression, he had quarrelled with the poor Spaniard, who was a shop-keeper, and seemed disposed to tear the shop to pieces, because the man could not sell him what he had not got. Had this gentleman reflected for a moment, he must have seen the absurdity of supposing, that any tradesman would not grasp at the offer of converting his perishable goods into money, when, his country being the seat of war, he knew that, from day to day, his house, with all that it contained, was liable to be plundered or burnt.

Upon such grounds as these was the opinion, which the soldiers and part of the officers of the British army entertained of the jealous and unfriendly character of the Spaniards. formed,

appointed to steer: but when the storm rises, and the vessel is tost amongst rocks and shoals; or when the battle rages, and the decks are covered with mangled bodies; ignorance and cowardice sneak down below, or are driven from the helm, and the brave and skilful quarter-master takes his proper place. Spain is a ship assailed by foes without, full of leaks, surrounded by dangerous reefs, and with feeble or unskilful hands at the wheel. Every Spaniard must see that this is the case. Let Britain step forward, let her promise to sink or swim with the vessel, and let her claim her place. She has the strong arm, the daring heart, and the experienced mind. Her station is the helm by right. Who would either have the wish or the power to dispute it?

"Spaniards," we might say to our allies, "on "what plea can you doubt our sincerity? If we "thought you were able to save yourselves, would "it not be for our interest, to increase our own "power, by attacking our common enemy, in some "other point, where we could reap all the advan- "tages of conquest? Would we not go, in "preference, to some country, whose inhabitants "are equally weary of the French yoke with "yourselves, but at the same time disgusted with "native governments, and indifferent about na- "tional independence? Look around you, and you "must own that many such countries offer them- "selves as the prize of our valour. Should we abuse

"your confidence, and attempt, after driving out "the French, to make you a province of Britain, "could we preserve our power, in the present state "of the world, contrary to your wishes? You will "say, certainly not; and we ourselves feel that we "could not. At the same time, we shall not "attempt to conceal from you, that, highly as we "respect you, and much as we applaud your "generous love of freedom, so congenial to our "own feelings, we serve you principally from selfish "views. If we were not afraid of France, we "should probably have done very little to assist "you; but as that enormous power threatens our "own destruction, it is our interest, since we see "that we cannot conquer you, to save you, and to "make you as strong and flourishing as possible, "in order that your alliance may hereafter be of "use to us, which it is not at present.

"Weigh well your situation, consider whether "you will be able to save yourselves, before you "reject our assistance, and prefer our enmity to "our friendship; for we are resolved, that you "shall no longer be our friends by halves.

"Have we not, at any moment we please, the "power of making peace with France, and "acknowledging Joseph Buonaparte? Even with- "out coming to any accommodation with France, "may we not withdraw the aids of money and "of military stores with which we have hitherto "supplied you? Were you yourselves so fully

" provided with all these articles, as not to want
" our assistance, may we not remove our cruizers
" from your coast? And in any of these supposi-
" tions, what will become of Spanish independence?

" You have, we repeat, only one alternative
" before you: you must either be the slaves of
" France, or the friends of Britain: and you must
" prove yourselves our friends, by giving us as
" much military power and political influence, in
" your affairs, as we demand; without which we
" cannot possibly save you.

" We have now stated our wishes and our
" opinions in the plainest language. If you still
" doubt the purity of our intentions, defend
" yourselves the best way you can: but be not
" offended or surprised, if we withdraw our assist-
" ance; for we have need of all our resources to
" serve ourselves, and such allies as we may find
" disposed to grant us that confidence, which you
" deny us.

" Much as we regret the prospect, if you decline
" our offers, we foresee that we shall never again
" meet as friends, upon equal terms. In that case,
" we must bid you farewell, till we meet as enemies;
" till you either see us, once more, fighting in your
" fields against the French, not as your allies, but
" disputing with them, whether they or we are to
" rule in Spain; or till we see you dragged as
" conscripts in the train of France, endeavouring
" to reduce us, or our posterity, to the same state

"of degradation, which you will have chosen for "yourselves.

"We wait your decision with anxiety, but "without apprehension. We know that our "numbers are limited, but you have not yet seen "our powers exerted to their full extent. We are "now determined to display them, and the world "shall bear witness to our energy. If you choose "our friendship, we promise never to abandon "you; if our enmity, we trust that you will find "us valiant and resolute enemies."

For my part, I must confess that I can see no great difficulty in removing the jealousy of the Spaniards, by thus coming forward, now that circumstances admit, and even require, some such explanation, and speaking our sentiments to them in the language of truth, without the smallest reserve or disguise. All nations, however jealous of others, have banished suspicion from their hearts, when they have found themselves in a similar situation. The independent republics of Greece, when threatened with subjection by the Persian monarch, allowed themselves to be commanded, sometimes by the Spartans, sometimes by the Athenians. The Syracusans, who destroyed the formidable army of Nicias, afterwards submitted to the orders of Timoleon. The Dutch, when they first shook off the yoke of despotism, offered to put themselves under the command of any power, that would protect them against their formidable adversary. The

sovereign princes and cities of Germany obeyed Gustavus. Our own forefathers, who were neither less national, nor less proud than the Spaniards of the present day, probably much more so, invited the Prince of Orange to assist, and afterwards to govern, them; and yet England neither became a province of Holland, nor Holland of England. The confederates appointed the duke of Marlborough to the chief command of their armies, although the British troops appear, at that time, to have been inferior in every thing, but valour, to those of their allies.[1] Are we fallen so low, in the present day, that we may not aspire to the chief command in Spain? a country where our own Peterborough commanded in former times, with universal applause of the Spaniards, in spite of national jealousy, religious prejudices, the smallness of his force, and of every other difficulty which ought to have affected him much more than us; one only excepted, of our own creation, the poor opinion which the present breed of Englishmen seem to entertain of themselves; a difficulty certainly unknown in the days of Peterborough, when our high-minded ancestors felt themselves worthy to command the world, by land as well as by sea; and neither looked forward with awe to the science, or tactics, or discipline, of those whom they were to

[1] See Bland's Military Discipline, chap. ix. art. xiv.

encounter, even when they were the most deficient in all these qualities themselves.

Should we, by acting on some such decided system as has been above recommended, expel the French from Spain (how we are to expel them by any other system, I am at a loss to see); then let us lay down our authority, having previously made arrangements, that will leave the Spaniards in a state of real independence, not a prey to anarchy,* such as that to which Flaminius consigned

* I shall not pretend to enter into discussions so far above my sphere: but it appears to me, that it will be impossible for us to save Spain, without having so much power and influence in that country, as will enable us, in a great measure, to settle its future constitution. That we ought, therefore, not to allow an ambitious oligarchy to usurp and hold the chief authority, a second time, in Spain, contrary to the ancient laws of that monarchy, and in contempt both of the Spanish nation and of ourselves. If we do so, our expulsion of the French may prove to have been labour in vain; because anarchy and civil war, or a disunion of the provinces, will follow; and if Buonaparte be not called in by one of the factions, at all events, Spain cannot be expected to afford us any assistance, or to be any effectual counterpoise to the French power.

It will not be understood by this remark, that I think we ought to use our influence, in Spain, to revolutionize that country, by throwing it into the hands of a democracy. What would be the consequence? We should have a new junta, or oligarchy, which in my opinion would be equally impotent against the common enemy; with this difference only, that it

the Greeks, when he proclaimed their liberty at the Isthmian games; an act, for which he so little deserved the gratitude of that nation, or the applause which has been heaped upon him by many modern writers. If we act in such a manner, our conduct, although not resulting from pure generosity to a foreign nation, will be truly worthy of British principles; it will be more magnanimous, and more applauded by future ages, than that of the Romans in the most virtuous times of their commonwealth; and whatever feuds or wars may hereafter arise between the two governments, the people of Spain will, to the latest generations, revere the name of a Briton, and will rank on a par with that of their

would rule, not like the present one by fraud and intrigues, but by bloodshed and confiscations: for I have already shown, in the note to page 260, that the supreme central junta is, in nature and principles, exactly the same as the late revolutionary government of France, when it stood mid-way between pure democracy and despotism.

When a great nation has been long subject to such a degrading government as that which formerly ruled Spain, it must be allowed by all men, that a change is desirable: but from the present state of affairs in that country, should its independence be hereafter established, a change is not merely a thing to be wished; no human power will be able to prevent it. Spain has the example of two revolutions before her, similar to each other only in name: one, the revolution of Great Britain in 1688; the other, that of France within our memory: the former to be applauded and imitated, the latter to be execrated and avoided.

own most illustrious patriots, the memory of British statesmen and warriors, who may either have planned for them in the cabinet, or fought for them in the field.

This, in my mind, would be true glory, true justice, and true generosity; and should we shrink from making the attempt, lest we should be thought to act unjustly, or from a still more womanish fear of exciting the jealousy of our allies,[1] the chances

[1] A woman may be afraid of exciting the jealousy of her husband or lover, and model her conduct accordingly; but that the second, if not the first, nation in the world, in point of power, that Great Britain should act upon this kind of womanish policy, suited to such states as the former republic of San Marino, is re co... ne reserved for our timid newspaper politicians of th... ambitiou... day, who seem to know the strength of every nat... second tim... ir own; who see with a lynx's eye, all the difficulti... narchy, ... way of our success, whilst they are blind to every obs... le that impedes the progress of our enemies.

I am happy to find, by a perusal of the documents so often alluded to in former notes, that the British government has not been biassed, in its conduct in Spain, by such miserable doubts and scruples; that it has interfered in every thing, as far as it thought necessary; that it saw the necessity of demanding the chief command of the armies, and that such a demand would have been made, had the British troops remained in Spain, after the battle of Talavera. As the events in Spain appear to me to afford a great lesson in war, I have not altered any thing in this chapter, in consequence of afterwards knowing these circumstances. Nor is it to be understood, that in labouring to establish the justice of interfering in the

are that we shall fail, and in that case, in spite of the delicacy and purity of our motives, we may be held in detestation by the present generation of men, both in Spain and in Portugal.

But whether they may think well or ill of us hereafter, may justly be reckoned a trifling consideration; except so far as it may mortify our vanity, when we find, that the measures taken with a view of gaining their good opinion shall have produced quite the contrary effect. This mortification, like former ones of the same kind, we shall

domestic affairs of other governments, my view is to defend our interference in Spain in particular, of which I knew very little at the time I wrote. My object was to lay down general principles, without adopting which, we cannot succeed in war; and if I did not think them perfectly just, I should not recommend them.

Is it then just for us, it will be said, to apply such principles in any way we please? Certainly not. In the practical application of them lies the merit or the disgrace, the justice or the injustice, of the conduct of one independent nation towards another.

In one thing I reckon myself fortunate. The supreme central junta, of whose immediate dissolution I saw no prospect, when this chapter was first written, has since ceased to exist. Hence my animadversions upon the constitution and measures of that body, may appear less invidious, and may be discussed with greater calmness, than if it still held its place among the sovereign powers of Europe. Let us hope that the new provisional government, now at the head of affairs in Spain, may be better constituted, and prove more efficient and prosperous.

soon get over, by charging them with ingratitude. A more serious evil remains. The natives of Spain and Portugal, whom we omitted, or despaired of being able, to discipline, will be disciplined by our enemies; they, whom we knew not how to lead, will be driven by the French; and if we should hereafter find it impossible to maintain our preponderating naval superiority against the world; it must be recollected, that the resources of the Spanish peninsula will be, of themselves, sufficient to fit out a fleet and an army strong enough for the conquest of Ireland; leaving the rest of the mighty continental empire of France at liberty to wield all its strength against Great Britain. For the conquest of Ireland did I say! Three centuries ago, the energy and valour of Spain threatened the subjugation of all Europe. These things we leave to our reader to reflect upon, before we proceed further in our Essay.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the necessity of mixing Politics with War.—That a vigorous martial policy insures success in diplomacy.—Of the impolicy of granting subsidies to foreign powers.

THE necessity of mixing politics with war will have been fully inferred from a consideration of the principles of martial policy, laid down and illustrated in the four last chapters of this work. It is in vain, as we have seen, that the general understands his art; it is in vain, that he commands valiant and well disciplined troops; in vain, that he gains victories; unless his way be smoothed, and the fruits of his success consolidated, by the labours of the statesman and the legislator. He ought himself, if not equally fit for negociating as for fighting, to have a just and distinct idea of the policy most proper to be pursued towards the country in which he acts; and should be fully capable of pointing out to his superiors at home

and to his colleague, the ambassador, abroad, the ever-varying obstacles that from time to time oppose his success; which he will leave to their superior power, or influence and address, to set aside, as far as he finds that he cannot himself overcome them by force of arms.

On the other hand, the politician or statesman, who has not a general knowledge of the art of war, must ever go to work blindly. It is his business to decide; but he will find himself obliged to trust to the opinions of soldiers, and he may either fall into the hands of weak and ignorant, but self-sufficient men; or if he should happen to consult and employ those who have the proper talents, he may prove incapable of supporting them, or of persevering in a well-concerted, well-begun enterprise, when some unforeseen difficulty presents itself, or when some new object, equally tempting, comes in his way.

The studies of war and of politics, ought therefore never to be divided. Art and force must always go hand in hand; and, of the two, as a Roman historian has observed, the former may even be deemed the more powerful agent in war.[1]

[1] "Diu magnum inter mortales certamen fuit; vine corporis, an virtute animi res militaris magis procederet," says Sallust, at the commencement of his history of Catiline's conspiracy; and after discussing the question, he makes the decision alluded to in the text; "Tum demum periculo atque negotiis compertum est, in bello plurimùm ingenium posse."

The erroneous notion, which prevails amongst the British officers, that they neither ought to have, nor to assume, any responsibility out of the routine of their military duties, has very much embarrassed, and has greatly tended to the failure of their operations. It has, as it were, stinted the growth of their mental faculties, and has caused them to limit their views and conduct by the maxims of the plodding tactician, when they ought to have chosen heroes for their models. It has made them look up for further instructions, when they ought to have been acting; and wait, in a helpless state, for the assistance of others, to whom they themselves ought to have dictated, or commanded, what was proper to be done.

One would think that no man is so ignorant, as not to know that, even if this country were invaded, martial law will be proclaimed in those parts of it which may be the seat of war; nor does it require any great depth of research to discover the reason that first led a nation, so jealous of military authority, to adopt this arrangement. Experience taught our ancestors, that the civil magistrate could not possibly inforce obedience to his orders in the neighbourhood of contending armies, without the support of the military. Yet the British officers, when they cross the sea to encounter the enemy, seem so insensible to the change of scene, as not to understand that martial law is in force wherever they act. Accustomed, in the

bosom of peace, at home or in our colonies, to be subordinate, as they ought to be, in every thing to the civil magistrate, and not to move a step without his permission or authority, they carry these habits and feelings into countries in a state of actual warfare; and blame the civil magistrate for not doing, in their behalf, what it is not in his power to do, and what it is their own duty either to do, or to see done, for themselves.

In the mean time, the civil magistrates of foreign nations, of whom we so absurdly complain, may perhaps look upon us with secret contempt, and suppose us to be the most unaccountably weak and stupid people in the world; when they know, that by the laws and constitution of their own countries, as well as by the nature of things, they are bound to comply with the demands of our generals in every thing; and yet, notwithstanding all this, they find that the latter, instead of issuing orders, which they would neither wish nor dare to disobey, come before them with humble requests and petitions. Is it in human nature, that those men can be obeyed, respected, well-treated, or even beloved, in any country, or in any situation or office in life, who will not assert their own power, claim their rights, and who, when they ought to speak in the language of firmness and resolution, either mildly or sternly as occasion may require, break out into the prayers, lamentations, and complaints, of suppliants?

Let us not, however, imagine, that the general is to waste his time, by entering into all the refined subtleties, or profound mysteries, that are supposed by the uninitiated to form the study of the diplomatic corps; or that the statesman is to bewilder himself with the practice of military manœuvres, or with the theories of gunnery and of engineering. Firmness is the most useful (I had almost said, the only useful) quality in diplomacy. Decision, inflexible perseverance, and greatness of mind, are the best military guides for a minister of war. If he has these counsellors in his own bosom, they are worth all the fortification and tactics in the world. The ancient Romans, an ignorant, unpolished people, who never sacrificed either to the muses or to the graces, always prospered in their diplomatic affairs; because the princes and commonwealths, with whom they had to treat, although they might inwardly despise the youth and ignorance, or be disgusted by the rudeness, of the Roman envoy, knew that his employers were in earnest: they knew that the legions could be got ready to march, or to embark at a moment's warning; and that, if they refused his demands, sooner or later he would be followed by a consular army, to make them good by force of arms.[1] Some centuries afterwards, when the poste-

[1] Antiochus Epiphanes had made war against the two Ptolemies, brothers and joint kings of Egypt; the whole of which country he had reduced, except Alexandria; and by

rity of these semi-barbarians had become versed in all the arts of Greece, of Asia, and of Egypt, the Roman ambassadors, in spite of their eloquence, their politeness, and of their thorough skill in every

one of his generals he had also nearly effected the conquest of Cyprus. Such was the state of the war, when C. Popillius Lænas arrived as ambassador from the Romans, to mediate between the contending parties. The manner in which he conducted this negociation is thus briefly related by Appian.—Καὶ αὐτῷ σϱατοπεδεύοντι πεϱὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδϱειαν, Ποπίλλιος παϱὰ Ῥωμαίων πϱεσβευτὴς ἦκε, φέϱων δέλτον, ἐν ᾗ τάδε ἐγέγϱαπτο· Μὴ πολεμεῖν Πτολεμαίοις Ἀντίοχον. Ἀναγνόντι δὲ αὐτῷ, καὶ λέγοντι βουλεύσεσθαι, κύκλον τῇ ϱάβδῳ πεϱιέγϱαψεν ὁ Ποπίλλιος, καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐνταῦθα βουλεύου. Ὁ μὲν δὴ καταπλαγεὶς ἀνέζευξε, &c. (Appian. de rebus Syriacis, cap. lxvi.) "After he (Antio-" chus) had formed his camp before Alexandria, Popillius, " the Roman ambassador, arrived, bearing a dispatch, " in which was written, 'Antiochus must not make war " against the Ptolemies.' When he had read this, he " answered, that he would consider upon the subject; on " which, Popillius drew a circle round him with his stick, and " said, 'Consider here.' He being frightened, broke up his " camp," &c.

Polybius has entered into more particulars, and it is easy to see that he is much disgusted by the unnecessary insolence of Popillius, whose proposals (he perhaps justly observes) Antiochus might have rejected, but for the previous successes of the Roman arms against Perses, king of Macedon. But how did the Romans negociate with Perses? Was it not with equal, or with greater firmness, even at the time when fortune frowned upon them? See page 215, where I have alluded to that transaction. These two instances, out of a thousand, may serve to illustrate the spirit of Roman diplomacy.

branch of diplomacy, were treated with contempt wherever they went; because the martial spirit of the legions, which would have been the best support to a good cause, and which might have palliated, or even given weight to a bad one, was unfortunately extinct.

Sovereign powers have, in all ages of which we have any authentic account, shown themselves so stubborn and so deaf to reason, that the ablest arguments, used in support of the justest claims, have invariably been thrown away, when those who maintained them were unprovided with fleets and armies to back their representations. James the First, it may be allowed, was one of our most learned monarchs, and no prince, in any age, ever displayed greater perseverance, probably none, of his own times, made use of sounder or more logical reasoning, than he did, in negociation; the law of nations was also on his side; yet, so far from being listened to, he was treated at all times with neglect, often with derision, by the other powers of Europe, and even by their inferior officers;[1] because they found out, in course of time, that he feared or scrupled to go to war: and whatever might have been the case in the golden age, Astræa has never since been acknowledged upon earth, when she has forgotten to bring her sword along with her.

[1] See Hume's History of England, chap. xlix.

Without expatiating farther in similar observations, it will appear almost a self-evident truth, that the nation, which acts upon the most vigorous system of martial policy, will always have the most successful, if not the most accomplished diplomatic agents: so that if we choose to adopt, in our national councils, the determined and persevering spirit of the Romans, without their arrogance, which is not to be commended, we shall seldom or never fail to carry our point, in foreign negociations. And as mankind are always dazzled by success, the people of England, who now have a wonderful notion of the talents of the diplomatic agents of other states, will come by degrees to talk of their intrigues with contempt; whilst foreign nations will look up to our own ambassadors with admiration, and will stand in awe of these very men, whom of late (I am sorry to say, from all that I can read or hear of public opinion in other countries) it has been considered no difficult task to dupe or to intimidate.

Our system of indiscriminately purchasing the friendship of other nations, is probably the cause, that has sunk us so low in the estimation of the world as diplomatists. The meanness of this system has already been noticed: let us now proceed to analyze it more fully.

It has been a favourite topic with every opposition, to declaim against every ministry, for tempting the continental powers, by large subsidies, to take a

part in our contests with France: such conduct has been represented highly reprehensible, in as much as it has involved the pacific people of other countries in unnecessary wars; highly impolitic, because it has awakened the dormant ambition of France, and paved the way through the destruction of our allies to our own. On the other hand, the partizans of every ministry have always celebrated each new coalition, as a master-stroke of policy, and have prognosticated the happiest results from the wise distribution of our public money amongst our brave, but needy allies; and when the princes whom we have thus engaged to make war against France, as it were, by contract, have been stripped of their dominions, or have suddenly turned against us, it has been ascribed to some unforeseen events, which Divine Providence, for mysterious purposes, has brought about, to confound the wisest plans of mortals.

However, as all parties successively have followed the same system when in power, and have all equally failed, it follows, that this, our national system, must be in itself radically bad; and if we go back into past history, we shall find stronger proofs of the impolicy of it, than any which even our own experience, woeful as it is, can yet afford; for the Almighty having thought proper, in his infinite wisdom, to govern the universe by fixed laws, has allowed, for the improvement of mankind, the same

effects in the political world to result, in every age, from the same causes.

The first striking example of this policy is to be found in the history of the Persian monarchs, who, neglecting the art of war, provided for the security of their dominions, by subsidizing and maintaining a kind of balance of power amongst the little states of Greece, as we have lately done in Europe. Every one knows the result. The Greeks, after being exercised in constant wars with each other, were at length united, and led against Persia, under the standard of Alexander; and that great and populous empire, in spite of the wealth to which it had vainly trusted its defence, was instantly destroyed.

The absurdity and danger of the conduct of those nations, who buy foreign defenders, and arm foreign powers against each other, instead of taking the field themselves as principals in their own wars, is no less strongly proved by the fate of the feeble successors of the first Cæsars, both in Italy and at Constantinople, who persevered with wonderful obstinacy in this policy, till it led to the destruction of their respective empires.

There is only one degree of humiliation to which this Byzantine policy has not yet caused us to stoop. We have never condescended to purchase a peace of our enemies: but we have often done something very like it. For example, at the commencement of the present war, when Naples

became tributary to France, instead of declaring war against that power, as a vassal of our enemy, we (at least, so it was generally understood,) agreed to pay it a subsidy, in order to enable it to make good the demands of Buonaparte, so that we were actually subsidizing France to make war against ourselves; which I fear may, by posterity, who will judge of measures by their results, not by their secret motives, be considered as the most absurd act, that was ever committed by a civilized nation.[1]

In another point, our policy may be said to have been more absurd than that of those degenerate empires which have been our prototypes in the subsidizing system. They always hired nations to fight for them, more warlike than themselves: but we, who may dispute the palm of valour with any nation of the present or of former times, have been ready to hire any kind of armies, no matter how ill constituted, cowardly, or contemptible, that have come in our way. What rational hope could have been entertained, had circumstances enabled us to put in execution our plan of bringing forward the dregs of the effeminate Neapolitan nation to encoun-

[1] I have often heard this transaction publicly talked of in Malta and Sicily, and the truth of it never once called in question. Mr. Leckie, who mentions it in the second edition of his work, states that, by order of the Neapolitan government, the money was paid direct, by the British agent, into the hands of the French banker, at Naples.

ter the French, in the north of Italy, in 1805? Would these discontented and dastardly troops have fought better there, than they afterwards did in Calabria? I do not mean by these remarks to offer any disparagement to that nation, nor even to the great body of individuals composing its army, whom I am very far from looking upon with contempt; but this was, unfortunately for them, the character which the imbecility of their rulers had stamped upon both: consequently, subsidizing such a state, on the terms we did, was to be reprobated in every point of view.

The policy of our granting subsidies to such powers as Austria and Russia, may be defended by plausible reasons. It may be said, for instance, that it is proper that the people of England, if they have not spirit enough to fight their own battles, should pay foreign armies for fighting in a cause conducive to the preservation of their liberties; as he, who shrinks from military service, is obliged to find his substitute. But, instead of this, let us suppose the substitute voluntarily to pay a principal, for being allowed to serve in his place; and all mankind will admit that a greater absurdity can scarcely be imagined than such conduct. Yet this is precisely what we are now doing in Sicily; an arrangement by which we have inverted the natural order of things, and have committed the most flagrant act of injustice to ourselves as a nation. In short, our whole conduct towards Naples and Sicily, from first

to last, is so little to be accounted for by any ordinary maxims of prudence; that it may appear, in history, as a wonderful example of the gross and palpable errors, into which any general system of policy, applied to all foreign powers, without distinction of circumstances, may lead the most enlightened nation.

In reflecting further upon the nature of the foreign alliances, generally supposed to have been effected by our subsidies, I cannot help thinking, that this notion is completely erroneous; that the same coalitions would have been formed in our favour, had we been as poor as the Lacedæmonians; and that, consequently, the successive ministers of this country, great as their talents have been, can claim no merit, as politicians, in the mode by which they have, at various times, endeavoured to induce the continental nations to take an active part in our wars with France.

Princes and commonwealths, it is true, have often appeared to act, as it were, by the caprice, or passion, of the moment, without regarding, what, after-events proved, would have been their wisest policy; but there are, in reality, only two causes (neither of them connected with foreign gold in any kind of way) that will induce a sovereign state to engage, or at least to persevere, with the smallest degree of vigour or firmness, in war against another state of respectable resources. These are, either the hope of increasing its own power at the expense

of its adversary, or of successfully anticipating some destructive attack, apprehended from the ambition of the latter. These have been the true, and the only causes, that have led Austria, Russia, Prussia, &c. at various times, to enter into hostilities with France. It is absurd to suppose, that without hopes and fears of this kind, any subsidies, which we could have offered to these powers, would have induced them to embark in so serious a contest.

The celebrated king of Prussia, in his history of his own times, has avowed to the world, that he was impelled to draw the sword solely by his ambitious desire of increasing his own power at the expense of the house of Austria; but that he found he could not carry on the war so vigorously as he wished, without persuading us, that it was for our interest to subsidize him.[1] We all know, or at least we have always been told, that the first coalition against the French republic, was formed without a reference to British aid of any kind; and the true object of the two invading powers, is supposed to have been the dismemberment of France, under a pretext of restoring the monarchy. If Austria could have foreseen all the evils which she has since suffered; or had she not feared these evils, and hoped to prevent them; is it to be supposed, that she would have persevered, in concert with us,

[1] See the note to page 173.

to her own ruin, for such a paltry consideration as money? Would even a promise of the full enjoyment of the vast revenues of the British empire, as long as the contest should last, have been considered, by the present king of Prussia, a sufficient compensation for the loss of his dominions, had he foreseen that such would have been the issue of his late war with France? So far from this, just before he entered into that war, he had shown the most marked contempt for us and for our subsidies; although the moment that he declared himself against Buonaparte, he seemed to expect, as if by matter of right, that we should not only pardon, but again become tributary to him.

If our various administrations have little or no merit in this point, it is the height of injustice to throw upon them any part of a blame not their own, by ascribing to them, and to their subsidies, the injurious effects of the ambition and folly either of our enemies or of our allies. Ambition would have been a sufficient motive, for all the other powers of Europe to engage in general wars, and to commit the most unjust acts towards each other, had no such nation as Great Britain existed; or had she, for the last twenty years, not interfered, either by men or money; nor could she even have prevented these wars, in Europe, if she had wished it. Was it either any subsidy, furnished by our ministers, that caused, or could any subsidy of ours have possibly prevented, the partition of Poland?

Was it a secret subsidy, furnished by us to the Swiss, to induce them to arm against the French, that made the revolutionary government of France invade Switzerland, or that caused Buonaparte, a few years afterwards, to destroy the Helvetic republic constituted by his predecessors? Was it a subsidy of ours, advanced or promised to the various provinces of Spain, that awoke his dormant ambition, and impelled him shamefully to usurp the government of that kingdom, and to commence his career by the cruel massacre of the people of Madrid? The futility of such suppositions is so apparent, that they would not have been worthy of my notice, had not the fear of provoking the further ambition of a nation, which professedly acts upon a system of aggrandizement, been often used, by men in England, as an argument against having recourse ourselves, to vigorous political and military measures, which is the only possible way of resisting an enemy of such a character. What should we think, if the general, commanding an army in the field, were to call in his outposts, and order all his soldiers to throw off their accoutrements, enjoining them to compose themselves to sleep, if possible, and strictly prohibiting any sentinel, vedette, or picket, to be posted in front of his camp; lest, by a show of military alertness, he might awake the enterprise of a vigilant enemy, who was threatening an hourly attack; but whose activity, either was supposed by him to be dormant,

or capable of being lulled asleep by such a stupid manœuvre? Yet, where is the difference between such conduct in a general, and the policy of those, who recommend the British nation to fall asleep, or tremble, within its wooden walls, dropping the sabre and the bayonet, in hopes that its enemy may also forget the use of these weapons?

To return to the baser metal, to which we have hitherto principally trusted, in our wars by land; our subsidies, I must again repeat, have never been the cause of any measure whatever. As the export merchant will use all his influence to obtain a drawback for every branch of commerce in which he is concerned; and will persuade his government, if he can, that money, thus taken out of the public treasury, and put into his own private pocket, will be expended in the most beneficial way possible to the nation; although if his demands be refused, he finds it his interest to persevere in trade without them: in like manner, the rulers of other states, who have always acted in war according to their own feelings and interests alone, have found it convenient, the moment that it suited their views to join with us, to persuade us, that they either would not, or could not do so, unless we took their armies into pay. Thus we have been systematically deluded by almost every nation in the world; and unhappily, none of these demands upon our treasury, by other states, have ever been rejected; or it might have been proved, that they were, in reality, the allies of

our power, not of our wealth; and that they were coming forward to fight for themselves, instead of being reluctantly drawn in to fight for us.

As a farther illustration of this doctrine, when we consider the state of affairs, from the commencement of the present war to the time when Naples and Sicily acceded to our alliance, it may equally appear, that our money could not have had the smallest weight in their determinations. All that they could do, if it be true that Buonaparte would not leave them neutral, was to choose their side in the war; and accordingly, the first thing they did, was to throw themselves into the scale of France. This is generally supposed to have been a measure forced upon the Neapolitans by the French: for my part, I have great doubts upon the subject; because, if they had voluntarily put themselves in a state of vassalage under Buonaparte, and had been animated by the sincerest desire of serving him, and of effecting our ruin, they could not possibly have devised any plan better calculated for that purpose than the one actually pursued. Nor is this supposition at all improbable. The weak have, in all ages, been more or less the vassals of the strong; and, by the laws of nature, have always furnished money, troops, or ships, to the latter, in return for protection received. The only thing which could have been said to be truly improbable is, that, as we have since done in respect to the same power, the strong should ever have voluntarily become the

vassal of the weak; a thing so contrary to all former experience, and received notions of what was just or proper, that Vattel, in his work on the law of nations, where he has fully treated of the relations between the strong and the weak when in alliance with each other, has not, even in imagination, hinted at the possibility of such an unnatural union.[1]

Now it will be recollected, that Buonaparte has always declared his determination of excluding us from the Mediterranean; but this could not well have been effected, without getting French troops into Sicily. All the wisest preliminary steps for this purpose were taken. He marched a respectable body of troops into the Neapolitan territories; but kept them in situations the least likely to excite suspicion. Shipping might have been collected for him by his vassal, under some plausible pretext, such as an apprehension of the French army making a sudden attack upon Naples, and a wish, on the part of the court, to take refuge once more, under our protection, at Palermo. The French troops might then have rapidly marched to the coast, embarked in the fleet thus provided, and, as soon as they had got a footing in Sicily, the mask would have been thrown off, and we should have had a formal declaration of war from king Ferdinand the

[1] See Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. chap. xvi

Fourth, who would have been placed upon the same footing with the other auxiliary princes under the orders of the French emperor.

As Buonaparte must fully see into the nature of our unambitious timid policy, but is at the same time too good a soldier not to feel the weight of our vast military resources; it was evidently his interest, and that of his ally, to avoid exciting our ambition, which has literally been dormant; lest they should put us upon our mettle, and draw upon them, unprepared, some vigorous effort of our latent strength. Hence may be explained the conduct of the court of Naples, in taking advantage of the weak points of our national character, and persuading us to that most unaccountable act of making a transfer of our money into the hands of an enemy that has sworn our destruction. All circumstances considered, a plot of this kind, between Buonaparte and the Neapolitan court, to our prejudice, appears as probable a way as any other, of accounting for the measures of both up to the period of the great coalition in 1805; and the loud complaints which he afterwards made of the treachery and ingratitude of that court, with his implacable denunciations of revenge against it, give additional weight to this hypothesis. Had such a plot existed, the insolence with which Buonaparte presumed upon our moderation, added to the deceit and hypocrisy of the Neapolitans (if the experiments of insolence and

cunning, upon a credulity arising from honourable principles, have any claim to the title of wisdom), may justly be considered as a master-piece of policy.

I am sensible that the most probable and reasonable is not always the truest mode of accounting for the actions of weak, ignorant, and effeminate governments; but, admitting the above supposition to be true, offensive as such duplicity may be to our feelings as Englishmen, we have no just cause to complain of the conduct of the ministers of the court of Naples. We must recollect that France and England were equally foreign to them: they had a right to choose between the two; and they joined Buonaparte when he was the strongest, and served him most strenuously. At the same time, they implored our pity, under the pretence that they were our secret friends, and we thought proper to believe them, to spare them, and even to subsidize them.

If money was granted to them under any conditions at all, it must have been on a promise, that they would join us the moment that we became the strongest party, which they afterwards did. Hence, even their good faith would, under every supposition, have proved as unimpeachable as that of the oracle to Pyrrhus. For if Buonaparte had continued the strongest from first to last, they would most assuredly, in process of time, have publicly declared war, and entered into direct hostilities, against us: but they would, no doubt, have continued to make

the same solemn professions of unalterable friendship to us in their hearts; which, as we, by our previous conduct, had admitted their secret friendship to be a claim upon our treasury, they might have justly urged as a plea for our increasing their subsidy; for the more vigorously that the French (of whom, according to their own account, they were the secret enemies) made them act against us, it is evident that the greater the expense of them, our secret friends, must necessarily be.

Who does not see, that by allowing ourselves to be influenced, as we have too often done, by such professions, whether true or false, we may be made the blind instruments of our own ruin? We may leave neutral all the vulnerable parts of the French empire, and omit every just and favourable opportunity of increasing our own power; forgetting, out of pity to foreign princes who may be our bitter enemies in their hearts, the sacred duty which we owe to the memory of our ancestors, to ourselves, and to our posterity; and continuing to waste, upon strangers to our language, to our feelings, and to our principles, those treasures, which, if employed in arming British hands, might enable us to conquer half the world; till, at last, we may find out our error too late; when a mighty army of Norwegians, Neapolitans, Sicilians, Dutch, Swedes and Germans, originally raised, trained and supported by our own money, may come, and drive us out of Ireland, or burn London to the ground before our faces; all

the while professing to be extremely sorry for the necessity they are under of acting against their best friends; and deriding us by promises of ranging themselves under the British standard, the moment that we, in our turn, shall become stronger than the French?

To return to the policy of the court of Naples; after Russia and Austria joined us, although subsequent events did not justify the public opinion, every one must allow that the most splendid results were expected from this formidable coalition: a considerable diminution of the French power was, at least, prognosticated as a matter of certainty. What merit, therefore, had the Neapolitans in joining us and our allies at that period? They knew that Buonaparte admitted of no neutrality; and it might have been dangerous to trust any longer to our forbearance, particularly as the Russians[1] and Austrians, nations that are more famous for levying contributions, than for making disbursements, in neutral countries, were coming into play. Had they either declared against us and our allies, or we against them, how could they have hoped to resist us a moment, if the French, as was expected, had been driven back within the limits of their own frontiers?

[1] The Russians, when they co-operated with us, in aid of the Neapolitans, in 1799, made the latter supply them with clothing, &c. (See a letter from Sir T. Troubridge to Lord Nelson, dated Naples, 7th of September of that year.)

Let these circumstances be fully considered, together with the feeble character of that government, as well as the state of its people and of its army, and it may be allowed, that the present court of Palermo (had it never received a shilling of our public money) neither could nor would have acted otherwise than it has done; that it would have submitted to Buonaparte, and joined in all his schemes for our destruction, at the time it did; and that it would afterwards have shaken him off, and courted our alliance, exactly at the time it did; I shall not merely say, had we refused to subsidize it, but had we demanded, as the price of our friendship and pardon, that Naples and Sicily should pay an annual subsidy to us.

Reflecting in the above manner, it appears to me, that the greater part of the money expended by us in subsidies, has been uselessly thrown away; that experience having proved the absurdity of attempting to break the power of France, by a war of finance, of hired coalitions, of temporary occupations, and of little diversions; we must recur to the only method, which we have not yet tried, that of fighting on a great scale for ourselves, and of attacking our enemy, upon every element, and in every part of the world, where he is to be found, without distinction; for all elements, all climates, all seasons, are alike to the brave.

I have admitted, in former parts of this work, the necessity of having allies, of a proper descrip-

tion, and of adhering to them to the last extremity. The only thing which I objected to in our external relations, was the mode in which we took a part in the wars of the continent; a mode which was gradually leading us to the fate of the Byzantine empire, and had already brought us to that intermediate state, which is the sure symptom of the downfal of a nation; a want of confidence in, or rather a total ignorance of, its own strength, and a belief of the inferiority of its own troops to those of every other nation.

Trusting always to foreign bayonets, never to our own, first we formed to ourselves the most magnificent ideas of Austrian, Prussian, and Russian armies. Their soldier-like appearance, and wonderful steadiness under arms, their discipline, their valour, their tactics, their every thing, were subjects of our enthusiastic admiration, or rather of stupid amazement, insomuch that, at last, we seemed to fancy them more than mortals; when, to our utter astonishment the French came forward, and beat them all, one after the other. Then French enthusiasm, French valour, French manœuvres, French generals, in their turn, became the subjects of our amazement and terror; and we talked of the dreadful power of Buonaparte with the same reverential awe, that the child feels for the more than human prowess of Jack the Giant-killer; because this self-made emperor had subdued the modern giants of our own creation. All the while, we looked upon

ourselves as a race of pigmies, in comparison with these mighty warriors of the continent; and by other nations, the very name of an English soldier could not be mentioned without a sneer of derision. When lo! to confound the universe, and ourselves most of all, it was proved, that the humble, despised, inexperienced, British troops could beat these conquerors of the world!

Had not our national spirit been sunk very low (and what could have sunk it so low, but our unhappy mode of making war with money, not with gunpowder?); had we not become so unwarlike, so degraded in our own eyes, so ignorant of our own powers, as to be tutored, in a manner, by our fears, to prepare for bending the knee, and bowing the neck to the yoke; would the victories of Alexandria and of Maida, which our ancestors would have considered simple and natural occurrences, have been received with such extravagant joy, and even held up as wonderful discoveries in England? Those who are adverse to any vigorous exertion of our military power, and are preaching the timid, defensive, unambitious, unwarlike, evacuating system, are at this moment fond of asking, "What can be the use of exposing the lives of "our valuable troops? If to prove the superiority "of British valour to that of the French; that," they say "is already known to the whole world." But although it be known now, it was neither known nor suspected a few years ago; nor would

it ever have been known, but for occasional deviations from that very policy, which these gentlemen recommend; and it may, at the same time, be observed, that the lives of the officers and soldiers of our regular army are, in no respect, more valuable to the state, than those of women or children; if they are to be pampered up in idleness, in time of war, instead of being daily exposed in the face of an enemy.

Even now, after having beaten the French with inferior numbers in so many battles, we scarcely seem yet to understand these simple facts in their true light; nor to see, that it is absolutely impossible, that there can be any thing wonderful, either in the science, the tactics, or the manœuvres of our enemies. On the contrary, we, their conquerors, must either be superior to them, and to those whom they have conquered, in these respects; or admitting that we are inferior to them in all, a still more satisfactory and flattering inference must of necessity be drawn: for if we, with all our present imperfections, contrive to beat them wherever we meet them, it is evident, that by improving ourselves in those points in which we are deficient, where we now repulse, we shall be able totally to defeat, and where we now defeat, we shall be able to annihilate, any French army, that may come in our way, let who will be its general. But how are we to improve the deficiencies of our military system, and to acquire greater skill in the art of war? Not, certainly, by

remaining inactive; by never venturing to attack our enemy; by running away from every country, in which we know that he can attack us; and by even running away from some countries, without waiting to ascertain whether it be possible for him to get at us or not; lest we should, by any accident, risk the lives of our valuable soldiers.

It is remarkable, that we have had no canting about valuable lives ever urged as a reason for neglecting any opportunity, however hazardous, of destroying the enemy's ships; and yet life is fully as dear to the mariner as to the soldier. Such is the difference between our naval and our military policy. In the former we are all fire and enterprise: in the latter, we are not ashamed to broach the maxims of downright cowardice, under the mask of prudence. Yet we have had sufficient encouragement to induce us to embrace an equally daring policy in our wars by land; for, it must be allowed, that when we have trusted to our own arms, we have always beaten the enemy; whilst all the foreign armies, subsidized by us, have invariably been beaten. As a nation, too, in consequence of the increasing vigour of our late operations, we have assumed a more martial spirit; and have, by degrees, begun to feel our own strength: so that, although the comparative power of France is, in reality, greater than it was at the commencement of the present war; yet, in point of public opinion, we, not the French, have every where been rising

in the scale. The British troops now strike terror into their enemies, and fill their friends with confidence, wherever they go; and the conquest of England, formerly considered by all other nations as an easy task, is now scarcely contemplated even in imagination; nor can it ever be attempted, with the smallest prospect of success, as long as we shall preserve our naval superiority, and continue to find employment for our enemy abroad.

Let us, therefore, trust in future to our valour, and to our daring and persevering spirit: these will gain us allies; these will preserve them. As for our wealth, we need it all for ourselves, to make ourselves stronger and more formidable, and consequently more courted by other nations.

Looking back to the past history of Europe, it appears, that the Russians, Austrians, and all other foreign powers, have been very well able to find money for those wars, in which we have either taken no interest, or in which they have fought against us. Let them find money in the same way, when they act, as our allies. The fact is, that no government ever raises, or has in readiness, at any time, more troops, than it hopes to be able to maintain by its own resources; so that if we send a British army to the assistance of an ally, it is evident, that we shall serve him as effectually as if we gave him a subsidy to enable him to maintain an extra army, of his own, of the same numbers. By either of these two modes, our object may, on a

hasty view, be supposed to be equally served; but on a closer examination of the subject, the former will be found to be the only politic mode of assisting an ally.

Let us suppose, for instance, that we have it in deliberation, whether to send a British army of sixty thousand men to co-operate with an ally, or as much money, as will enable him to set on foot sixty thousand native troops more than he could have maintained without our assistance.

By adopting the former measure, we give a large British army an opportunity of learning the art of war. Our own officers and soldiers measure their talents and valour with those of their friends and of their enemies, and find themselves, in all probability, superior to both. By their exploits they increase the glory of the state, and make us be considered terrible and respectable, as a nation, all over the world. By exchanges, promotions, and movements of corps, every regiment in the service becomes full of officers and men inured to war. Hope and energy take place of inactivity and despondency, in our national councils; and should our external wars, after all, turn out badly, we have a regular army for our home defence, insensible to fear, despising hardships and misery, fully capable of instructing, and, what is more essential, of showing a proper example to our new levies, and thereby exciting their courage and emulation; so that by this system, whilst it affords the only hope

of breaking the enemy's power, we prepare ourselves, if we fail, to meet invasion in the most warlike and formidable attitude possible.

Should we prefer the latter alternative, and subsidize an army of sixty thousand foreigners, keeping our own population at home, within the magic circle of our wooden walls, employed solely in the arts of peace; then we are known to the nations merely by our prodigious wealth, a quality in itself only calculated to excite their envy, to tempt their ambition, and to set their minds to work, in forming plans for robbing us of it, the first favourable opportunity. If our allies succeed in the war, by the help of our guineas, then we gain nothing; neither increase of territory, nor of glory, nor even (what is hardest of all) do we gain the gratitude or respect of those whom we have been serving. Should they, the same allies, afterwards, either in consequence of defeats, or impelled by that fickleness which is so common amongst sovereign states, declare against us; then the additional army of sixty thousand men, formed at our own expense, will be a ready and powerful weapon, in the hands of our enemies for our destruction. As by this system we can have no officers or soldiers of our own, of any skill or experience in war, or with any confidence in themselves, to defend the country, when it comes to be attacked; the nation may feel itself, in the day of invasion, so completely paralyzed by

ignorance, effeminacy and despondency, as to fall an easy prey to its more warlike assailants.

To show, in a still stronger light, the impolicy of the subsidizing-system; it may be observed, that its effects are, in all cases, more ruinous, than the worst disasters, which a nation, acting upon the warlike system, can incur. By the latter, as has just been observed, the whole body of a national army, however numerous, becomes gradually inured to war, by hazarding a part of it; so that the loss of a corps of thirty or forty thousand men, cut to pieces, or taken prisoners, can be replaced in a moment, by troops equally good: and serious as the loss of such a corps must be allowed to be, the hostile army that acted against it, has evidently gained no immediate addition to its own positive strength or numbers, by destroying it. A subsidizing nation, on the contrary, if its hopes in war are disappointed (and they are always liable to be disappointed by the caprice of those to whom it trusts for protection); may find itself all at once exposed, in a completely helpless and defenceless state, to the whole united force, of its original enemy and of its former friends, unexpectedly combining together for its destruction.

These reflections may, it is presumed, sufficiently explain the simple and obvious process, by which all governments that have acted upon the subsidizing system, have brought about the downfal of the

nations over which they have ruled; however great, or powerful, or populous, or even naturally brave and high spirited, the people of these nations may have been. Let us hope, now that we stand on the brink of the precipice, that we may see the danger into which our subsidizing policy has been leading us, and that we shall abandon this faithless guide for ever.

It is true, that by the same sum of money, if faithfully managed, we might bring into the field a greater number of continental troops, than we can furnish of our own; but if the numbers were even double, it would not counterbalance the many disadvantages of the former system. If success in the war, in which we lend our aid, be essential to the safety of the country (and it would be absurd for us to interfere in any other kind of war), it may perhaps be allowed, that 40,000 British soldiers, whose courage and fidelity may be depended upon in the rudest shocks of fortune, will be fully as efficient, at any time, as 60,000 foreigners, who will be glad to spunge upon us in our prosperity, but who are likely to abandon us, when we most need their assistance, at the command of some ungrateful prince of their own, over whose conduct we have no manner of controul; and whom our enemies, who only subsidize the ministers, and mistresses, and generals of foreign potentates,[1] may turn against us for the

[1] Bribery, which is said to have greatly contributed to the successes of the French, is certainly a less ruinous system, than

thousandth part of the sums which we have been expending upon his armies.

But as it is impossible, or next to impossible, for us to have any proper security, that the money, bestowed by us in subsidies, may not be embezzled by the agents, or favourites, of the allied prince, misapplied by himself to the purposes of his own pleasures and magnificence, or even hoarded up to pay the contributions, which he foresees may be required of him by our enemy, if he fails in the war;[1] I am inclined to believe, that our subsidies never have brought into the field so many effective men, in addition to what our allies would have employed without them, as we ourselves might, for the same sum, have sent to their assistance. So that, in every light in which this system can be viewed, it appears to me the most impolitic, degrading, and ruinous, that could have been invented.

Let us only consider in what a state we should have

subsidizing; but I cannot believe that either of these two despicable modes of making war with money, can have any great effect, in contributing to its success. The promises of men in office, who are base enough to engage that they will use their influence to involve their own country in an unnecessary war with another state, on condition of receiving a bribe from a third power, are evidently little to be depended upon.

[1] How opportunely the subsidies, paid by us to the Austrians, last year, came to enable them to make good the expenses, to which they were afterwards put, by certain articles of their peace with Buonaparte!

been, had we also set out upon a system of subsidizing all the other maritime powers, great and small, from the Dutch, Spaniards, and Danes, down to the Venetians and Genoese, in order to fight against the French by sea; whilst we hired Austrians, Russians, &c. to oppose them by land. We should most certainly have been a province of France, at this moment; and, as I have so often had occasion to observe, the principles of war are the same, upon all elements. If it would be impolitic in us now, to go to the Americans, and furnish them with as much money as would enable them to build, equip, man, and maintain eighty sail of the line, and two hundred frigates and smaller vessels of war, on condition that they would join us against the French; it must be equally impolitic for us to persevere in the same system by land. Were we to make such an offer, no doubt the Americans would join us in a moment; for they have long wished for a navy, and seem even to have been desirous of going to war; but how long could we make sure that they would not turn that navy against us. If such a system, by sea, would evidently lead to our ruin, and every one, perhaps, will allow this, because it is contrary to our national policy; it follows, that the same system, by land, although it happens to coincide with our present national policy, must, of necessity, be equally ruinous.

Whilst, therefore, it ought to be a general rule never to subsidize, except in occasions of extraor-

dinary distress on the part of a very deserving ally; when such cases do actually occur, and the necessity is fully proved, we must require ample security for the repayment of our loans, which, if the allied nation be naturally rich and powerful, is the only way in which we ought to advance money; but if its affairs are in so very bad a state, that repayment cannot be expected, or that it would be ungenerous to demand it, we must insist upon having as much controul over the management of our own money as possible. For instance, should we advance a certain subsidy, on condition that an ally keeps on foot an army of a certain force; British generals should be sent to the head-quarters of every corps of the allied army, with a few officers under them, who ought to have, by the conditions of the agreement, a positive right and power, to inspect and review the troops, to inquire both into the state of their discipline and of their pay, and to report upon the same to our government. The bills for the payment of the subsidy should be drawn, for as short periods as possible; and none of them accepted, upon any account whatever, without the certificates of these military inspectors. It would be still better, perhaps, after settling the terms of the subsidy, to see what portion of the allied troops it would be able to maintain, and to take the payment of some particular corps, according to this calculation, into our own hands, by means of a British paymaster-general, acting under orders of the chief

military inspector of the whole allied army. By this means our money will be sure to go direct to a part of the allied troops, at least, who will feel grateful to us on that account; and the moment that the pay of this particular corps is stopped, they will know, that the fault does not rest with us, but with their own government, who are not doing justice to the articles of the agreement, by either diminishing the numbers, or withholding the allowances, of some other corps.

Had this system been adopted in Spain, and had we sent our supplies of all kinds direct to the Spanish armies, without the intervention, in some cases, of the provincial juntas, and in others of the supreme central junta, a great deal of money, supposed, by the Spaniards themselves, to have been embezzled, would have been usefully applied; and our stores of arms and clothing, which were often stowed away in magazines in the capital of some province, when the poor soldiers were half-armed, half-naked, in front of the enemy, would have reached them in time to be of proper service, or have been saved from falling into the hands of the French. The affairs of Spain would have been in a better state than they are now; and our own influence, founded upon the gratitude of those whom we should have effectually served, would have been much greater in that country than it is. In some cases of emergency, in which a British agent who had the power, took upon himself the

responsibility, of ordering supplies straight to one of the Spanish armies, instead of sending them to a provincial junta, to whom it was intended that they should have been consigned, and by whom, combining local circumstances, and the season of the year, with the events that afterwards took place, it is my opinion that they never could have been forwarded to the soldiers; I had occasion personally to observe all the beneficial effects resulting from this arrangement,[1] such as have been described.

[1] The members of the provincial junta alluded to were by no means satisfied with this arrangement: it would have been much more agreeable to them to have had the supplies sent to them in the capital of their province; that by having the complete disposal of them in their own hands, they might increase their influence and power amongst their countrymen. The supineness of the provincial juntas of Spain, in respect to the proper equipment of their troops, when they had the means in their power, has often and justly been reprobated. But the same provinces, which showed great want of energy in this respect, have proved their patriotism, by adhering manfully to the cause of their country to the last. Hence their neglect cannot, in justice, be ascribed to treachery; which those, who judge harshly or despondingly of the Spaniards, are so apt to insinuate as the cause of every disaster. The fact is, that it was unreasonable in us to expect, all at once, the activity and energy of warriors, from a gentry who had been educated, and passed their lives, under such a government as that which formerly ruled Spain. Since we did form such expectations, it is no wonder that we were disappointed.

Indeed, exclusive of troops, which appears to me almost the only politic way of assisting an ally, if aids or supplies of any kind, involving expense are to be granted; it is much better to provide and send out arms, clothing, or necessaries for his soldiers; the value of which will be gratefully felt by so many thousand men, and by which we encourage our own manufactures of warlike stores; than to grant him an equal sum in money, which may be embezzled, or employed in intrigues subversive of our own interest, and of which the obligation can never be properly felt, either by the soldiers or the people of the allied nation.

It may be said, that a great power (Russia or Austria, for instance) would not submit to such conditions; which might be felt as a degradation to the dignity of the emperor. This is exactly the point to which I wish to bring the question; because as no subsidy of ours, if I reason rightly, ever was, or ever can possibly be, the cause of any state engaging or persevering in war, in alliance with us, it is highly impolitic in us to grant one, without the most urgent and imperious necessity on the part of our ally; whose dignity is obliged, if he wishes to negociate a loan in his capital, to submit to give proper security and receipts, even to merchants and bankers, who are his own subjects. Consequently, if an ally, however great or powerful, objects to receiving a subsidy, which he requests of us, upon any terms or conditions that we choose to name; it

fully proves that he can either carry on the war without it, or that he means to deceive us: and, therefore, whilst he saves his dignity, we shall save our money; and, at the same time, we shall have his alliance (as long as he thinks it his interest to be our ally) upon the best terms possible for ourselves. Should the same ally, after a fruitless negociation of this kind, again come upon us with a request to subsidize him, then his dignity will have yielded to ours, which ought to be dearer to us, as a nation, than that of any foreign king, emperor, or commonwealth in the world: and if we do not lay harder conditions upon him than those to which he formerly objected; he will feel that we treat him with more magnanimity and generosity than he deserves. But it would be better for us to go to war with the whole world, than to allow the rulers or people of any foreign nation to imagine, for a moment, that we cannot defend ourselves without subsidizing them; a supposition, which our ill-judged mode of making war with money has spread to our prejudice all over the globe: so that there is scarcely a nation, from the Persians and Affgans, on the frontiers of our Indian territory, to the extremities of Barbary and Scandinavia, that is not grasping at our gold; whilst they have not the smallest intention or wish to serve us, and feel for us no other sentiment, than the secret contempt, which all the rest of mankind must necessarily feel, for a

state, acting upon such a base and unwarlike, but, at the same time, prodigal and ruinous system.

We shall conclude this chapter, by a few observations upon the mode, in which we have acted in the East; which affords a striking contrast to our European policy. The British East India Company, from the period of their first establishment in those remote regions, have felt, in every contest with their neighbours, the necessity of conquering, or of being conquered; and, accordingly, have never made war by halves. They have never had in pay a single soldier who was not under their own immediate command and controul. Instead of subsidizing foreign powers in India, to attack their enemies, they have, although never without allies, always acted as principals in their own wars; and in cases where they have sent assistance of troops to a weaker state, they have very properly, and most justly, made that state maintain their troops at its own expense. For example, they kept in their ally the Nizam's country, without the smallest expense to themselves, a strong well-disciplined corps, totally commanded by British officers; which afterwards formed a considerable portion of the army that destroyed Tippoo, and subsequently composed half of Lord Wellington's army in the Mahratta war. It is evident, that had our European policy got out to India, we should have been subsidizing the Nizam, and all our other allies, perhaps, even our enemies, instead of making them subsidize us;

so that when our friends, either from fickleness, or dismayed by some disaster, turned against us, which the conduct of our European allies shows must have been the case sooner or later, Tippoo would most assuredly have driven us out of India.

The policy of the East India Company, therefore, considered as a sovereign state, when it comes to be analyzed, proves radically contrary to the national policy of the mother country; and has, by its contrary effects, afforded another striking proof of the superiority of the warlike over the subsidizing system. By acting upon the former, a company, originally consisting of a few London merchants, have, like the commonwealth of Carthage, which grew by the same principles, raised themselves from the dust to the rank of sovereign princes, giving law to mighty nations, and having victorious armies at their command; whilst the parent state, to which they, by the vigour and wisdom of their martial policy, have added this immense territory, has, by following a contrary one, remained stationary in positive strength; and has allowed its enemy to attain such a vast superiority of comparative strength and resources, as may, after a sufficient interval of peace, enable him to overwhelm it.

I foresee that it may be said, of this particular exemplification of the principles upon which I reason, that the policy, which may suit the effeminate people of the east, would not apply to the

warlike continental nations of Europe: but for my part, I doubt whether the oriental nations may not, in reality, be more warlike in their character, than those who hold them cheap; and certainly, if we compare the exploits of the founders of the Mahratta states, of Hyder Ali, and of some of the present Indian native chiefs, with the conduct of most of the continental princes, the former appear very much superior, both as warriors and politicians; inasmuch as they who founded formidable states, must be allowed to possess greater personal merit, than those who found themselves at the head of great nations, but knew not how to preserve their power; and of whom it cannot even be said (as of Tippoo) that their fall was glorious. But whether the natives of the East be more or less warlike than those of Europe, is of no importance. They are men. And the policy, that increases the power of a state composed of men in India, must necessarily increase the power of a state composed of men in Europe; for the grand principles of war, as I must so often repeat, are the same, in all ages and in all countries; and if we should hereafter have a history of the New Zealanders, we may safely venture to assert, that it will most certainly be found, that the tribe, which subsidized its allies, was invariably conquered.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the reasons for acting upon the offensive, in war with France: and of the preliminary steps necessary. Of the impolicy and injustice of replacing foreign princes, unconditionally, in their former dominions.

I HAVE stated, in the second chapter of this work, the probability that the French empire may, in course of time, acquire a superiority over us in naval power, commerce, revenue, &c. in proportion to its superiority of population; and that the principal or the only impediment, which prevents, or can possibly prevent, its attainment of this great increase of comparative strength, is the continuation of the present war. If, however, we confine ourselves to a war purely defensive, straining our naval and military powers to the utmost extent of which they are capable, without deriving proper benefit even from the former, and keeping the latter totally inactive and useless; whilst we thus waste our own resources to no purpose,

without injuring, or even attempting to injure, those of the enemy; it will be an easy task for him to consolidate his own power, and to extinguish all hopes of resistance, amongst the people of the countries already subdued by him; and to overawe those princes, who still possess a precarious independence, but who seem, even at this moment, half conquered by their own contemptible fears: so that we who, by the defensive system, must always pin our faith, and rest our hopes, upon the exertions of foreign princes and mobs, shall be left without a straw to lean upon; and shall, in all human probability, be forced to make peace by the ruinous effects of our own enterprising policy, after an inglorious and useless war. Then, it appears more a matter of certainty than of doubt, that, without some wonderful combination of chances in our favour, we shall sink from our present flourishing and formidable condition, to the most lamentable state of comparative weakness and insignificancy; and that soon after the renewal of war with France, at some future period, we may find ourselves shut up in our own island, without commerce and colonies, without a naval power, and what is worse, without hope or courage in our national councils, to protect us.

But, whatever the resources of the French empire may be hereafter, if we consider the present state of them, according to the most authentic accounts, France is so impoverished and exhausted in every

kind of way, by the loss of her commerce, by the continual state of exertion, which she has undergone, by the dreadful oppressions and extortions of her sanguinary rulers in the time of the republic, as well as by those of her present despot, and his officers; that were we, at this moment, to stake France proper, and Great Britain, single-handed, in Spain, in Germany, or in Italy; I have not the smallest doubt, but that we should be able to encounter the French with armies equal to, or greater in numbers than any that they could bring into the field against us: for it must be recollected, that it is unnecessary and absurd in us, who rule by sea, to waste our force in numerous garrisons; and population alone, without a corresponding revenue, is not the standard of the military strength of any nation in external war. Hence the importance of lopping off the conquered countries, upon which the power of Buonaparte is principally founded; and of either establishing their permanent independence, or of adding them to our own empire.

One of the strongest encouragements that we can have, to urge us still further to the attempt of this necessary object, is the reflection, that all tyrannical governments are weak at home, although when they carry their arms abroad, having the whole resources of the empires over which they rule, fully at their command (perhaps more fully than any just and benign government could possibly have), they are

strong and formidable in offensive war. Now it is allowed by all mankind, that Buonaparte acts in a very tyrannical and oppressive manner, even in France, and most insufferably so in his other dominions. We should therefore, whilst we have the power, attack such an enemy at home, where he is weak and detested, and strike at the fountain-head of his resources, as soon as possible, and with all the vigour of which our own will admit.

Objections, however, and very just ones, may be made against carrying the war direct into France. Much as Buonaparte may be hated by the people of that country, it is the interest of all the men of influence amongst hem to support him, in preference to a restoration of the house of Bourbon, which would be bound to replace the nobility, priests, &c. in their confiscated lands; by which the whole nation would, a second time, be thrown into a state of confusion, little short of that occasioned by its late revolution. There are also reasons of a military nature, which shall be mentioned in their proper place, that render an attack upon France precarious. Nothing, on the contrary, can be more tempting to our arms, or can afford us fairer hopes of a successful issue, than the other continental countries, either conquered by the French, or in a state of vassalage under the French empire. We have only, by abandoning our own timid policy, to remove the principal, perhaps the only cause, which has hitherto prevented us from

deriving assistance from the people of other countries; and, as I before observed, they will flock to our standard by myriads. Buonaparte, from the nature of things, will be unable to draw the ordinary revenue, or to profit by the population, and other resources, of countries vigorously attacked by us. He will not even be able to depend upon the foreign troops in his service, who form the great strength of his armies; for soldiers partake of the national spirit and feelings of the people from amongst whom they are raised; and, as a body, are always inclined to follow the fate of their own country. Hence he will be forced to subsist his armies by still greater rapine and extortions in the conquered countries, than he has yet been guilty of; and at the same time must press upon his French subjects with more rigorous taxes and conscriptions. This will render him more odious in France, and will irritate against him to such a pitch of horror and detestation, the angry and revengeful feelings of the people of the conquered countries, as will go a great way towards insuring our success, wherever we act.

It does not seem to me advisable, that we should, at the present moment, divide our force, by making an attack upon the French, any where, except in the Spanish peninsula: but we should lose no time in preparing ourselves, and in forming our plans for taking advantages of new opportunities hereafter, which will most certainly present themselves; for

favourable opportunities in war can never be wanting to us, if we determine, instead of idly wasting our time in deploring past errors and neglect, to act with greater foresight and energy in future.

Had we kept possession of Walcheren, the navigation of the Scheldt would have been rendered, in a great measure, useless to the enemy; any armament which he could have assembled in that river, for the invasion of England, would have been liable to an attack, on our part, under circumstances the most disadvantageous to him; and we there had the finest point from whence to attempt, not merely the destruction of ships and gun-boats, but the permanent conquest of Holland, a thing which we ought always to have in view.

As a military position, it appears to me, that Walcheren would have been, by the assistance of a flotilla, almost as defensible as Gibraltar; nor would it have required a much greater garrison than that fortress does, in time of war with Spain.[1]

[1] If nothing had yet appeared before the public, in support of this opinion, which I gave when examined before the House of Commons, as an evidence, upon the Inquiry into the late expedition to the Scheldt, I should think myself bound to explain it. But the author of the Narrative of that expedition, has (in his 2d edition) made observations upon the strength of Walcheren, which appear to me very judicious, and to which I refer. The plan, upon which he says Flushing might have been defended, is similar to one which was actually transmitted to Lord Chatham by me, for that

Under our management it might again have been the point, from which better laws were to be expected by the people of Holland; and, certainly, considered in a naval, commercial, and military point of view, it was invaluable. Whether the loss of men by its climate, acting upon a small garrison, not exposed to hardships, provided with proper conveniences, and having all possible precautions taken to prevent sickness amongst them, would have been serious, so serious at least, as to counterbalance all its advantages, I do not pretend to decide.

If the loss of Walcheren may be considered, in many respects, a matter of regret, our evacuation of Danish Zealand, in 1807, is a measure which cannot be too deeply lamented. The latter island possesses all the advantages which render the former of importance; whilst it is much superior to it in population and resources, and is blest with a pure salubrious air. Without Zealand, it will be impossible for us to take advantage of any new turn of affairs, in order to carry our arms into Germany;

particular purpose, on the 28th of August, 1809. It happened, that no opinion of any officer of rank in the British army, was produced in favour of the strength of Walcheren; but I know that this might have been done. Buonaparte, it afterwards appeared, had ordered Flushing to be defended upon the same principle recommended by me; only that I proposed a partial inundation, which could have done little or no injury to the island: his orders were positive, to lay the whole of it under salt-water.

for it would be the height of imprudence, or rather of madness, to leave our enemies, the Danes, in strength behind us. Had we been established in Zealand, at the time when Schill got possession of Stralsund, how easy it would have been for us to have sent a detachment to occupy that city, which, with the adjacent isle of Rugen,[1] affords the most favourable rendezvous for an army destined to act upon the neighbouring part of the continent.

Preparatory, therefore, to any operations in the north of Europe, it is absolutely necessary, that we have possession of the Danish islands, and the sooner we make our attack upon them the better; lest, by deferring this indispensable preliminary measure, we may lose some opportunity of striking a decisive blow against the French power.

To say nothing of the chances of war, which are always doubtful; when we reflect, that a second expedition against Zealand may demand, at least, as great an armament, as that which formerly acted under Lord Cathcart; the loss of the services of so

[1] Rugen is a fine island, and perfectly open and defenceless; but it would not be worth our while to occupy it, unless we had ulterior views. Should we hereafter venture to act in any part of Germany, Stralsund and Rugen, if in our possession, will afford us excellent points of retreat and reimbarkation; if, according to our usual fate, we should happen to discover some unforeseen cause, for despairing of success, and evacuating every thing that we had gained by fortune or by valour.

considerable a force, for the period that may be required, before the island can be reduced and settled in a proper state of tranquillity, will be so great a disadvantage to us, in our general operations in other parts of the world, that the impolicy of our evacuating system appears evident. It is probable, also, that the Danes may be prepared to make a much more vigorous defence than their former one: this, however, should be no discouragement to us; for our naval superiority gives us every advantage, that the heart of man could wish for, in insular warfare. Indeed it would be a thing highly desirable for our purposes, that the Danish government would collect all their resources, and assemble every soldier whom they can possibly muster, for the defence of Zealand; because they would thereby give us the noblest opportunity, if we chose to embrace it, of crushing the whole military force of Denmark at one blow.

Our troops in Sicily stand in a commanding position, from whence we ought hereafter to attempt the conquest of Italy. In the mean time, we should always loudly announce our intention of so doing, in order, by our threats, to throw our enemy into a state of terror and alarm; as well as to keep the minds of the people of Italy in a constant ferment, to feed their hopes, and to make them look up to us as their future deliverers and protectors. But the first thing necessary, in order to prepare ourselves for the various contingencies of fortune, is to

establish ourselves upon a firmer basis in Sicily. Nothing can be more precarious than our present footing in that island.

By the late operations of the combined armies in the Spanish peninsula, the absolute necessity of having the chief command, when we act in concert with an allied force inferior to ourselves, in the art of war, has been fully proved. Now the native Sicilian army, although composed of old soldiers, is, on account of the vices of its military constitution, and of a discontented spirit arising from bad usage, still less to be depended upon, than the rawest levies that ever took the field in the Spanish peninsula: the officers at its head are more jealous of us, and will prove, when put to the test, infinitely more untractable than any of the Spanish chiefs; for they are without the patriotic and manly spirit which checks these selfish feelings in the latter:[1] and a total independence of command,

[1] The men highest in office and command, or, at least, in influence with the court of Sicily, are equally foreign, by birth, both to that island and to Great Britain. It is their interest to keep us as much in the back ground as possible, lest we should look into the management of our own money. The countries from whence those men sprung, and whither they will naturally wish to retire, in order to enjoy the rich harvest of their diplomatic and official labours, which they have reaped out of the taxes levied both in England and in Sicily, being subject to Buonaparte; it is natural that they should seek opportunities to do him some service, in order to make their peace with him.

with a most complete want of concert, at present exists between the Sicilian and the British troops. Hence, that we should derive any effectual assistance

At a time when we were paying a large subsidy to the government of Naples, as our secret friends, they kept their friendship so very secret, that it looked like the bitterest enmity. They refused us even the most paltry accommodations, which could have put them to no possible expence or trouble. They would not permit a British captain of a man of war, anchored in Naples bay, the trifling convenience of repairing a boat, with his own carpenters and with his own materials, in their dock-yard; nor would they even allow him to make use of a raft in the Mole for that purpose; and the only reason alledged by the minister of Marine for his refusal, was, that this insignificant act of civility would give offence to the French party: so completely were they the friends or vassals of France. Soon after the time alluded to, they took the preliminary step for excluding us from the ports of Sicily, by putting Malta in quarantine; a thing which can be accounted for by no public reason, except their fear or love of the French, and hatred of us. It was certainly a hostile act; and the odium of it was not diminished, when we knew, that all the ports of Sicily were, at that time, swarming with French privateers; and heard, that a British squadron had been actually refused the common refreshments of water and vegetables at Palermo. This squadron had not come from Malta; consequently the quarantine, had it been a just one, could not have applied to it.

This state of affairs cannot be called neutrality. In my humble opinion, it was open war against us; for the refusal of water may cause the destruction of a fleet. But, as the British commander was told, the government of Naples and Sicily were our secret friends; and this, it seems, gave them a right to do us as much mischief as they pleased.

from our allies, in case the island were attacked, is a perfect chimera: nor can we, as things now stand, diminish our force, for the purpose of attacking the enemy in some other point, with any degree of prudence. In short, all things considered, our present alliance with the government of Sicily, is upon the very worst terms, which the imagination of man could have contrived, for ourselves, for the people of that island, and for its king, as far as he takes any interest in the preservation of the remaining part of his dominions.

Having sufficiently lamented these evils, let us now inquire into the proper mode of remedying them.

The first step is to point out to the court of Palermo, the total insecurity of the island, under the present circumstances; and to request that they will, for the common good of the allied powers, appoint the British general, in Sicily, commander in chief of their army; at the same time placing their own commissariat and paymaster general's departments, under direction of the gentlemen who are at the head of the same departments in the British army. If the Sicilian government accede to these requests, we shall subsidize them on the only terms upon which we ought ever to subsidize a foreign power; by having the chief command of their army entirely in our own hands, and by providing for all its wants ourselves, without allowing a single guinea of our subsidy to enter the treasury of our ally. By these

means, although the improvement of many of the officers, who have grown grey under the present vicious system, may be despaired of; the great body of the officers, and all the soldiers, when they find themselves well-treated, may recover, or acquire, a proper spirit, and become zealous in the cause; and the condition of all ranks being bettered, the envy, and perhaps hatred, with which the Sicilian now look upon the British troops, may give place to attachment, and a necessary emulation may be excited in the minds of the former.

Should our alliance with Sicily be modified in this manner, the terms, although better than they are at present, would still remain very disadvantageous to Great Britain: for nothing can be more unfair and unjust, than that the whole resources of so rich and great an island as Sicily, should be solely applied to the pomp and pleasures of its court, and to the charges of its civil administration; without leaving at least some surplus of revenue for us, who have been, and are still, providing the whole of the troops necessary for its defence. By such an arrangement, however, we should find ourselves much more secure in Sicily, as a military station.

But, as it is likely, from their former diplomatic transactions with us, that the court of Palermo may have formed a very poor opinion of our firmness and penetration; it is by no means improbable, that they may endeavour to evade or baffle us in our requests, or that they may even give us a downright

refusal. They may tell us, for instance, "that they "are not convinced by our arguments, as to the "necessity of the measures which we propose; that "the proper time to have made such stipulations, "was when we first entered into alliance with "them; that we are now bound by a treaty, which "we cannot, in justice, infringe; that no alteration "can be made without mutual consent; and that "they, as one of the high contracting parties, do "not admit of the propriety of any."

Such a refusal on the part of the court of Palermo, although very pernicious to the defence of Sicily, would, in point of justice, be perfectly correct; provided they themselves have at all times preserved good faith towards us. But treaties are binding upon two parties: and they, on their side, by the articles of their treaty with us, engaged to keep constantly on foot a well-disciplined regular army of a certain strength. If, on inquiry into the present and past state of their army, we should find that its discipline is bad; that the soldiers have not been properly clothed, fed, and paid, and that the just claims of the officers have not been attended to; so that upon the whole, their conduct to their troops has been shameful and oppressive; as both officers and soldiers have no scruple in publicly asserting;[1]

[1] When I first visited Sicily, as I was preparing to step into a boat at one of the sea port towns, a soldier, upon guard at the wharf, addressed me, and entered into the most violent

if we further find that they have always deceived us by false musters, nev r at any time keeping on foot

abuse of the Sicilian service. He said that their allowances of every kind were shamefully scanty; and that, miserable as they were, a great portion of them was embezzled by the villany of their superiors. I reproved him so severely for the impropriety of his language, that he went off. His comrades, several of whom had been listening to the conversation, told me that he was considered a bad subject in his regiment, and admitted the justice of what I had said; but, at the same time, they all confirmed the truth of the information which he had given me. I had afterwards opportunities of seeing a great deal of the Sicilian troops. A dragoon once asked me, how it was to be expected that he and his countrymen were to fight like our English soldiers, who were properly treated and taken care of, in every respect? "Even "my horse," to use the man's own words, "is fed twice a day, "but I myself am allowed only one meal, and that a poor "one Is this treatment for a soldier?" The officers are, from similar causes, equally, if not more, discontented. After the defeat of Damas in Calabria, a young officer of my acquaintance, who had been eight years in the service, and had been present in all their campaigns, found himself, on his arrival in Sicily, a supernumerary second lieutenant on two-thirds pay; and even that, he told me, was not to be had without bribing the clerks in the war-office. He, and many of his comrades of equal or greater standing, would have been glad to have given up their prospects for an ensigncy in the Sicilian regiment in our service, raised by Sir John Stuart, with temporary rank. At the time when I was in the habit of associating constantly with the Neapolitans, I remarked, that whenever they mentioned those officers who had gone over to the French, although they reprobated their conduct for so doing, they invariably spoke with respect of their talents

the number of troops engaged; a thing which I have heard from the best authorities in the British army, and which is talked of as a matter of noto-

and courage; and indeed, such is the state of this service, that none but the most degraded and stupid of men are contented with it, although the principles or poverty of many, who most repine at their situation, will not permit them to quit it.

To give one sweeping instance of the manner in which the Sicilian troops are treated. When Sir John Stuart was at Ischia, where he had several thousands of them attached to him, he ordered the British Commissary-general to supply them with rations, in order to encourage them to go through the service cheerfully. In a short time after, they came and begged that the rations might be stopped; because their own government had deducted out of their pay, on account of these rations, although furnished at our expense, a much greater sum than the soldiers could afford; greater even than the rations were worth. Thus these poor men were obliged to look on, in a starving condition, and see the British troops enjoying plenty of every thing; and the benevolent and wise intentions of the British general, in their favour, were frustrated; since the necessary food, which he bestowed upon them (oh shame!) was made a pretext for a government to plunder its own army. How can an army, so treated, possibly be depended upon in battle?

Even if the native army, in Sicily, were put upon a better footing, it is to be observed, that those who are Neapolitans born, will never be fully trust-worthy, unless they feel that we are determined to attempt the reconquest of Naples. Nor can we ever hope to preserve the friendship or confidence of the Sicilian soldiers, if we allow it for a moment to be supposed that any motive whatever will induce us to abandon Sicily.

riety all over Sicily: then it will be absurd in us to admit of any refusal, on the part of the court of Palermo, to our proposals; for they having failed in their engagements to us, we shall be no longer bound to adhere to ours; and, consequently, the least thing which we can do, is to withdraw our subsidy, and to leave them to maintain their army, the best way they can, by their own resources. We may then, by means of the money thus saved, in a short time, raise a much more efficient army of our own, than we should ever be able to make out of theirs, were it put under our command. Hence the refusal of our demands, by the court of Palermo, would be very much to our advantage; for they would thereby forfeit all claim to our national generosity, which they have already so much abused.

It may be said, that should we withdraw our subsidy, in consequence of such a refusal, the court of Palermo might feel themselves so much aggrieved by this just and necessary measure, as to make peace with Buonaparte, and call the French into Sicily.

This rash step, by which they would insure their own destruction, would be the most fortunate thing for us that could happen; for, as I have before observed, in treating of the state of that island, we shall have a much better chance of success, by

Our timid, evacuating policy, unless we shake it off, will make us despised, suspected, and hated, by all mankind, and perhaps deservedly.

fighting there, as the enemies, than as the allies, of the present government. This would be the case, even if the French had an army of thirty thousand men in Sicily; but it must be recollected, that they are, at present, blustering on the opposite shore, and before the Sicilian government could profit by the assistance of French troops to drive us out of their island, they must beg our permission to let them cross over; which we, it may be presumed, shall not be weak enough to grant. As for the government of Sicily making war against us, without the assistance of the French, by their own resources alone; unless they have been most egregiously duping us, for the last five years, that is a thing absolutely impossible: for, by their own account, they have never been able to maintain their troops without our subsidies; so that the moment they declare against us, their army must disperse without a battle, for want of pay. Admitting, however, that their poverty was a mere pretext, in order to delude us out of our money; and that Sicily might have been very well able to support an army without our assistance; to say nothing of the peasants, whom we might easily arm in our favour, the regular native army in Sicily is not now, and never has been, strong enough to match us in the field. Any hostilities, therefore, on the part of the court of Palermo, are by no means a thing to be dreaded; on the contrary, they would give us a right, once more, to take possession of Sicily for ourselves; which would be attended with

the most beneficial effects to our national power and prosperity: nor ought we to have the smallest scruple in adopting this vigorous measure, if the court of Palermo, by their misconduct, give us just reason for it. Unless they even know, and feel, that we are prepared for acting in this way, it will be impossible for us ever to depend upon their sincerity. It is absurd to suppose, that any allied government in this world, will not either shake us off, or betray us, when it fancies it to be for its interest so to do; unless it is fully convinced, that we are not merely powerful, sincere, and good-natured friends; but that our enmity, when provoked, is terrible, and our vengeance destructive.

If the court of Palermo, after having received nearly two millions sterling of British money, without having fulfilled the stipulations by which they bound themselves, since they became our allies, should think, however, that it with contempt our moderate an order to delude us est, that we should command ally might have be Ourselves pay; and should aggrap, by how whole, by going over with their booty to the French; they would certainly commit a most gross violation of the law of nations, and of the faith of treaties: and if we meanly and tamely allowed them to offer us all these insults and injuries with impunity; our own conduct would be contrary to every principle of reason and of justice, and would make us the laughing-stock of the whole world.

Having, therefore, by just and necessary arrangements, which it rests solely with ourselves to make, established ourselves, as a military power, in Sicily, upon a new footing, more or less advantageous to Great Britain, in a political point of view, according to circumstances depending upon the conduct of the civil government of that island;[1] we should be able to meet any invasion, and might certainly, if we chose to act vigorously, defend Sicily against the world; at least, so long as we maintain our naval superiority. But, as it is always better to make war in a hostile country, at the expense of an enemy, than to allow him to attack you in your own; the neighbouring continent is the theatre of war, upon which Sicily may hereafter be the most profitably and the most effectually defended by us.

The peninsular form of Italy, with its great extent of coast, and the generally strong and mountainous face of the country; these are all great advantages to us, who are masters of the ocean, and who propose to arm the people in our cause. On the other hand, the length of sea voyage from England is against us: but Sicily affords a convenient place of arms, where we may assemble our troops, and make our preparations for the war; and certainly a

[1] The government of Sicily not being able to maintain a single soldier without our subsidy, and having no command over the voluntary services of its people, is, in the strictest sense of the word, a civil government, and nothing more.

march of French soldiers, with the forwarding of supplies, from any other part of their continental dominions over land, into the southern extremity of Italy, is no trifling operation. So much for physical circumstances, which may be allowed to be in our favour. Then, the universal hatred of the people of Italy to the French, which we know that, in the kingdom of Naples, at least, the smallest spark will kindle into a flame; the hardy and naturally warlike character of the Italian peasants, who are in most parts accustomed to the use of fire arms from their infancy; and who, under British officers, will make as good soldiers, at least, as the French;[1] these are the moral inducements that may encourage us boldly to carry our arms into the heart of Italy, at some

[1] In giving this favourable opinion of the Italians, I can only judge, personally, by what I have seen of the people of various parts of the kingdom of Naples. The conscripts, who were levied there in 1805, of whom we met several thousands marching to the capital to be embodied, were as fine young men as I have ever seen, in any country, and seemed full of spirit. What has sunk the Neapolitans so low in public estimation, is the badness or rather the imbecility of their government, and the effeminacy of the gentry; which have so degraded the character, and broken the spirit of their armies, that, contrary to the common course of things, the untrained peasants of the same country are more formidable enemies, than an equal number of their regular troops. Indeed, it was remarked in the defence of Gaeta, in 1806, that the oldest soldiers, in most cases, showed the least courage. But, if ever we carried our arms into the kingdom of Naples, it is not to be supposed that we should go and search for

future opportunity. Thirty thousand men, by gaining one victory, might shake the French power there to its centre; but if we land such a number, we ought, in order to make sure of permanent conquest, to increase it to at least fifty or sixty thousand, and never to allow our own national army to sink under that force, augmenting it, to the best of our power, by auxiliary troops raised in the country.

In one respect, Italy is a more inviting scene of action even than Spain. Having been, for so many centuries, parcelled out into a number of small states, generally under foreign masters or protectors, the Italians could not, from the nature of things, unite themselves under one native government, even were the French to evacuate their country. Moreover, they see that they have not strength enough to effect or maintain their own independence without external aid. Hence they will enter into our service with enthusiasm; if instead of attempting to re-establish their former anarchy, the memory of which they detest almost as much as they now do the French yoke; we, in a wise and manly manner, set up our own standard in their country, promising to improve their condition, and offering them a participation in the prosperity of the British empire. If we succeed in our object, Italy will be united to Great Britain by

officers, to put over the hardy peasants, in the boxes of the opera-house, or amongst the gaming tables and brothels of the metropolis.

the bonds of common government and interests; so that we shall, by the revenue and resources of that princely country, be fully repaid for the expenses of the war, and enabled even to undertake further enterprises with increased vigour: whereas, our success in Spain, important as it certainly will be, by breaking the power and reputation of France, may, in a great measure, fall a dead burthen upon ourselves; because the Spaniards, when established in independence, may not be able, if they were willing, to reimburse us for our assistance.

Before we proceed further, it may be proper to explain a passage of a former chapter, in which I reprobated diversions in war: by this I did not mean to say, that it may not have been, or may not at times hereafter be, politic in us to divide our force. Could we carry on a vigorous attack against the French empire, in any two points; could we, for instance, undertake the conquest of Italy, with such a force as would give us a fair prospect of success, without hazarding the total ruin of our hopes in Spain; and were we fully prepared and determined to keep up the strength of our armies, and to maintain, to the last extremity, the fruits of our success in both these great theatres of action; then it might perhaps be more advisable for us to divide our force, than to keep it in one great body.

But it is evident, that an attack upon Italy, of the nature supposed, although it will effect all the

all the purposes, does not come under the strict definition, of a diversion; because it would be an attempt to break the enemy's power, and to increase our own at his expense; not merely to put his troops upon their legs, and, after making them march from one end of Europe to the other, to run away before them, and leave our adherents to their fury. This last is the kind of diversion, which cannot be too strongly reprobated. Permanent conquest is the only object worth attempting in war. To destroy a fleet, or burn a dock-yard, may be desirable; but new fleets may be built, and new dock-yards fitted out, if we leave our enemy in quiet possession of the countries which supply him with men, money, and naval stores. We can never deprive him of these by temporary occupations; and, therefore, reason dictates, if we cannot hope to effect permanent conquest in several places at the same time, that we ought to make sure of one point, and go on progressively, rather than fail in all, by attempting many.

The Romans generally acted upon the overwhelming system, in preference to dividing their force. Yet, it is to be observed, that the latter is, in some cases, more proper; and if the military institutions of a nation be sufficiently vigorous to admit of its being adopted with proper effect, it certainly gives it an air of greater magnanimity, and may strike greater terror into an adversary, than

the other. When the Romans, notwithstanding the many terrible defeats which they sustained in their own country, carried on a war against the Carthaginians, at the same time, in Sardinia, in Sicily, and in Spain, and even reinforced their armies abroad, when in the greatest state of danger at home; they acted much more wisely, than if they had limited their efforts to the defence of Italy. For the force, which they reserved for that purpose, was probably as numerous as their resources could have enabled them to maintain there; so that, by supporting these detached armies, at the expense of countries which either formed a part of, or otherwise would have submitted to the Carthaginian empire; they broke the power of that mighty state, and prevented Hannibal from overwhelming them at home; thus employing, in the most profitable manner, a surplus force, which, if kept in Italy, might have remained idle and useless, for want of pay. But as their detached armies in Sicily and in Sardinia, obtained full possession of both these islands; and their army in Spain, after carrying on a successful contest, passed over to Africa, and there decided the fate of the war; the Romans cannot be said, by thus dividing their force, to have undertaken diversions of such a nature as we have constantly been attempting. In fact, the Romans seldom or never attempted a diversion in war; and this forms so striking a feature in their military operations, that I am astonished, that it has not been noticed by modern

authors, who have written expressly upon the Roman policy.[1]

Whether it be deemed better for us, when equally tempting opportunities occur, to make a vigorous attack upon the French empire, hereafter, in the north, or in the Mediterranean, it will be useful and necessary for us to have allies; and we shall no doubt have it in our power to form alliances; for new wars are always to be foreseen: but, as was before observed, there are only three powers, Russia, Spain, and Austria, with which we ought to act as allies. The lesser powers, as well as all countries that have submitted to the French yoke, we ought either to reduce into vassals of our own, or to allow our friends to conquer them. We must, therefore, act in Holland, in certain parts of Germany, and in Italy, as professed conquerors, or we shall most assuredly fail, for reasons stated in a former chapter: but as this policy will interfere with the claims of deposed princes, some of whom were formerly our own allies; before we adopt it hastily, let us inquire whether this necessary ambition on our part be consonant or contrary to the strict principles of the law of nations. If it

[1] Not at least to my knowledge. The expedition of the Proconsul Lævinus against king Philip, after the latter entered into an alliance with Hannibal, is one of the few instances (indeed, to my recollection, the only instance) in which the Romans attempted a mere diversion in war.

be perfectly just in itself, our not attempting it will be ascribed by posterity to a dastardly spirit; if it be unjust, the voluntarily abstaining from an ambition necessary to our own existence as a state, will be considered a most extraordinary instance of a whole nation sacrificing the most free and perfect government that has been known, with every thing that renders a country dear to man, lest it should violate an abstract principle of justice towards strangers, who have been more often its enemies than its friends.

In the first place, it will be allowed by every one, that there are rights of war as well as of peace; and that conquest, one of these rights of war, gives a just title to the sovereignty of a conquered country. We are now at war with France; consequently, it is perfectly just in the French to conquer us if they can; and it is equally just in us to conquer France, or any part of the French dominions: for instance, we have most certainly a right to drive the French out of Holland, out of Germany, and out of Italy, by force of arms. This no reasonable man, in any part of the world, will deny. The only point of the question, therefore, that remains doubtful is, are we bound, or are we not bound, to deliver up these conquests, after we shall have made them, to their former sovereigns? I say, that we are not bound to do so by any principle of justice.

The pope was turned out of his dominions, immediately after he had performed the greatest possible act of friendship to Buonaparte, and had excluded our ships from his ports; the greatest act of hostility, which his limited power enabled him to commit against us: consequently, he was our enemy, at that time, and we had a right to conquer his territories, even before they became a province of the French empire. All that can be said, in favour of his claims, is this, that if we should hereafter become masters of the Roman states he will have a right to expel us, whenever he shall be able to raise fleets and armies strong enough to cope with ours. As the Austrians, who also were once established in certain parts of Italy, voluntarily ceded their claims in that country, and in Tyrol, by their late treaty with Buonaparte; it follows, upon the whole, that we, the British nation, have a most undeniable right, at this moment, to drive the French out of all Italy, and to keep for ourselves, without asking further questions, the whole of that noble country, from the Alps, on every side, as far as the frontiers of the kingdom of Naples. This cannot be disputed upon any principle of justice.

For the same reasons, we have a decided right to attempt the conquest of Switzerland, which we see is a province of France; and if we succeeded in this enterprise, we should most certainly be lawful sovereigns in that country: but as every nation, recently subdued, has also a right to its former inde-

pendence, the Swiss would be fully justified, if they did not like our mode of ruling them, in taking up arms against us, in order to re-establish their ancient government, if they could.

In a war of the nature, and under the circumstances above supposed, between the Swiss and ourselves, the justice would be equal upon both sides: and this is a case which often occurs in the law of nations. There may even be more than two powers or princes pretending to the sovereignty of the same country, with rights, in point of justice, perfectly equal to each other; in which case the only arbiter is the sword. For example, we, as enemies of the French; they, as conquerors; and the princes deposed by them, as pretenders; have all an equally just title to dominion, in certain countries. In others, where the French have made war unjustly, in Rome and Venice, for instance, our title is as good as that of the pope, and of the former Venetian senate; but it is much better than that of the French, which arose from violence and usurpation alone, in manifest breach of the law of nations.

Since, therefore, in most countries conquered by the French, we have just as good a right to the sovereign power, as their deposed princes; nothing can be more impolitic, than for us to waste our resources in vain attempts to re-establish these princes, contrary to our own interest, and to the wishes of the people of other countries.

Setting aside, at all events, as absurd, the claims of those who lost their power, when totally unconnected with us by any political relation, and still more the impudent pretensions of those who lost it when at war with us; we now come to the only truly doubtful part of the question, a consideration of how far the rights of princes, who were in alliance with ourselves at the time they fell, may justly interfere with our views. The only two who have any claims in this respect, are the present Prince of Orange, and the King of Sicily. Let us begin with the former.

In the first place, it may be remarked, that the Stadtholder never had any personal claims to the friendship of the British government. We knew him only as the first magistrate of the former republic of Holland, a state which was destroyed in the course of the last war; and if we must be reminded of our ancient treaties with Holland, since the facility with which that country was conquered by the French, arose; not from any want of good faith on our part, but from the errors and weakness of its own government, and from the disaffection of its people, we have a much better right to complain to the nominal representative of that government, for its having allowed itself to be destroyed, to our prejudice, and in violation of the spirit of the treaty, than he has to demand of us, that we should endeavour to recal it into existence.

Moreover, if it be allowed, that all former engagements, in respect to foreign countries, are cancelled by subsequent treaties, in which the same countries are concerned (and this, I believe, is a point in the law of nations, which cannot be disputed), then, I say, that at the signature of the peace of Amiens, when we acknowledged a new order of things in Holland, all our previous relations with that country were totally set aside: our alliance with its extinct government was formally renounced; and the Stadtholder, from that moment, became a private nobleman, entitled to our favour and hospitality, and even by the articles of the peace to certain stipulations for his own private benefit, but to nothing more; and certainly no longer having the smallest claim to our consideration or notice as a sovereign prince.

He might have said, it is true, that the British government had no right to make such a peace; but ought either to have carried on the war, till it was itself destroyed, or till he was re-established in his power; and such an objection, in point of strict, theoretical, abstract justice, might perhaps have been literally correct: because, by the terms of all alliances entered into between sovereign states, they are said to be binding, not only upon the high contracting parties themselves, but upon their heirs, representatives, successors, &c. &c. for ever. Just or unjust, however, the thing was done; and we do not hear that the Stadtholder ever remonstrated, or issued any manifesto or protest upon the occasion,

so that even he himself acknowledged the justice of our setting aside his claims upon us as an allied power: and certainly admitting the peace of Amiens to be a valid measure, these claims became extinct for ever. Our having subsequently entered into a new war with Buonaparte, did not, by any means, restore to the Prince of Orange his former rights to our alliance; because a new war with Holland, at the same time, did not follow as a matter of necessity. On the contrary, we might, and would have been at peace with Holland to this very moment, if it had suited the politics of the two belligerent powers to leave that country neutral; and had this been the case, it would have been the height of injustice on our side, and a most scandalous infraction of the treaty of Amiens, as far as regarded Holland, to have admitted of any claims of the Prince of Orange, to the prejudice of the new government of that country, acknowledged by us in 1802. Nor does even the circumstance, of our having actually gone to war with the Dutch a second time, give him any right to be again considered, or treated by us, as a sovereign prince. It has totally broken off our new relations with Holland, formed at the peace; but it is absurd to say, that it can have restored our old ones. We are now, in fact, bound by no treaty whatever, in respect to Holland: neither the Prince of Orange nor the representatives (if there be any) of the late Batavian republic, have the smallest claim to be consulted, much less to dictate to us, or

to command our services in Holland. We have as good a right to rule there as any government that ever did, or ever will, rule in it. And if we make good our claims, which we can only do by the sword, we shall have a right to preserve our power in the same way that we gained it, in spite of Buonaparte, of his brother Louis, of the Batavian republic, and even of the original republic of Holland, formerly known in Europe by the name of the Seven United Provinces.

If the advocates of the Prince of Orange were to say, that we are bound in justice to deliver up to him all the Dutch ships of war now in our possession, as well as all Dutch ships that may hereafter be captured by us; which, in other words, implies, that in fighting against the Dutch by sea, our naval commanders have no right to fight for the glory or benefit of their own country; if it were further urged, that we have no right to keep the Cape of Good Hope, or the other Dutch colonies taken in the course of the war, but ought immediately to strike the British flag, and surrender them to the superior claims of that prince; such language would, in all probability, sound very strange and harsh to British ears; for we are not accustomed hastily to forego our rights in colonial, still less in maritime affairs. We should, in all probability, take fire at such demands, and reject them as unreasonable and unjust. "The ships and colonies," we would say, "are our own; we purchased them

" with our blood; and we deny, that our obsolete " treaties, of the last century, can give the titular " head of a republic, which has ceased to exist, " any claim to the fruits of our valour." But if it were in reality unjust to conquer Holland for ourselves, at the present moment; it must be admitted, that it would be equally unjust to keep the Dutch ships or colonies: for the Prince of Orange has fully as good a right to the fruits of our victories upon the ocean, as to our conquests upon the land; that is to say, he has no right to either.

Now that the Dutch have got thoroughly discontented with the French yoke, and are ripe for insurrection, if the Prince of Orange were to go over, at his own risk and expense, and put himself at their head, in the way that his ancestors did, who, by their extraordinary virtue and merit, raised themselves from private noblemen to the rank of sovereign princes; then the whole world would applaud his conduct; the British government, although they have certainly a just right to throw impediments in his way,[1] would, most probably,

[1] That the British government has such a right, will appear from the following considerations. In the first place, it is evident, that the Prince of Orange cannot raise troops, or fit out ships, in this, or in any other country, without permission of the rulers of that country: nor can he navigate, without a letter of mark from some established government; because, if he sent armed ships to sea, without this

with their usual generosity, afford him their countenance in this laudable enterprise; and, if he succeeded, might perhaps be the first power to acknowledge him once more as a lawful sovereign: but we should certainly be under no obligation to do so by the law of nations; and it would be very impolitic in us to grant the Prince of Orange our alliance and protection, if he were re-established in Holland, by any means or upon any terms whatsoever, unless he gave us sufficient security that he would not go over to our enemy, as soon as he found it convenient.

But if the partizans of the Prince of Orange expect, that we are to send forty or fifty thousand British troops into Holland, in order to expel the

necessary precaution, the first British admiral, or indeed, the first admiral of any nation, who fell in with this Orange squadron, seeing an unknown flag upon the ocean, would require these strangers to strike; and if they refused, he would be justified in taking possession of them by force of arms. The same applies to military operations by land: for if we suppose a British army to be acting in Holland at any future period; as the general commanding in an enemy's country, has always a right to the supreme authority for the time being; if the agents or partizans of the Prince of Orange were to take upon themselves to interfere in public affairs, civil or military, in any part of Holland, occupied by the British troops, without proper permission from his Majesty; such conduct would be a direct violation of the powers of the general commanding, which he might punish, or put a stop to, in any way he pleased.

French; that we are to incur all the risks and expenses of the war, with the disgrace of failure, if we fail; whilst he is to reap all the advantages of our success, to enjoy the revenue, and step into the supreme command, wherever we conquer; this, I must beg leave to say, is an expectation unjust in the extreme. In recompense for all these great exertions, the least that the Prince of Orange can offer to us, if he wish to be restored to the dignity formerly held by his ancestors, through our assistance, is to rule as a viceroy of Great Britain, to pay tribute, and furnish troops to us, not we to him: and that this is a thing most just and reasonable in us to demand, is proved by the past history of his renowned forefathers and countrymen, who voluntarily offered to become the vassals of Queen Elizabeth; provided that she would protect them, under exactly similar circumstances, against Philip the Second of Spain, an enemy no less formidable to Holland in those days, than Buonaparte is in these.

Having set aside all claims of the Prince of Orange to our assistance (for, by the law of nations, he has none) we now come to consider those of the king of Sicily. I have already discussed the relations upon which we stand with that monarch in Sicily; and have shown, that we have a right to look into his conduct, and to act accordingly: let us suppose the affairs of that island settled as they ought to be; our interests, and his pretensions, in respect to

Naple , as far as they interfere with each other, remain to be considered.

An alliance offensive and defensive, it is true, exists, and has for several years existed, between ourselves and the present king of Sicily, lawful sovereign of Naples; but no man will pretend to say, that we are at all bound to reconquer the kingdom of Naples. For if we suppose that the court of Palermo made such a demand upon us; that they, for example, required us to employ an army of forty thousand men in that enterprise, and to commence our operations by the month of March following, at latest; we might tell them, that we had no troops to spare; that we wanted to send more men to the Spanish peninsula; that we had in view a second attack upon Copenhagen; or that we thought Ireland had too slender a garrison; and they could not possibly dispute the justice of these objections.

Our restoring the king of Sicily to his former continental dominions, is, therefore, a thing which depends solely upon our own pleasure; and before he can expect us to attempt it, he must agree to arrange all the minor, but most important points of the treaty, as far as it regards offensive operations against the enemy in Naples, in such a way as will be the most for our benefit, and will afford us proper security for his future good behaviour.

The first thing which we must demand, is, that the king grant permission to the British general to

raise troops in all parts of the country, from which we may expel the enemy. Nothing can be more just than this demand; for the power with which we are in alliance, has no resources of its own, wherewithal to form a new army; and, therefore, we, who offer to take upon ourselves the whole risk and expenses of the war, ought to be allowed to manage it in our own way. Moreover, this condition is, not only reasonable in itself, but a point of indispensable necessity; for if we were weak enough to grant money to the court of Palermo, for a similar purpose, there are no officers, whom that government could possibly appoint, that would ever enjoy the confidence of the new levies; and, if this difficulty were not in itself insurmountable, neither officers nor soldiers would place any confidence in, nor could they ever feel any attachment to, a government, which has made itself notorious for arbitrary and oppressive conduct towards its army.[1] These evils are not supposed to originate

[1] To explain this more fully, as far as it regards the officers. When the French troops took possession of Naples, during the last war, the Neapolitan army was dispersed; and the court, being totally unable to give employment to its officers, disbanded great numbers of them, all at once, without any means of support whatever. The French offered them employment, which many of them accepted. When the king re-entered his dominions, several of them were executed as traitors. The same happened in the present war. After the wretched remains of the Neapolitan army, under

from the sovereign himself, who never intermeddles with public affairs; but as they have been perpetuated for a great number of years, the people of his dominions, who would be willing to form them-

General Damas, were collected in Sicily, the government turned adrift great number of the officers, granting them positive permission to submit to the French. Almost all of these men would have adhered to the cause of their own sovereign to the last, had Naples, their native country, not been abandoned; but they were not even left free to choose. They had no alternative between dying of hunger in Sicily, and going back to Naples; and even there, it is probable, that many of them may literally starve, unless they enter the French service. I was in habits of intimacy, in the year 1805, with a Neapolitan artillery officer, who was active and zealous, and seemed a very loyal subject. This man was disbanded in Sicily, and returned to Naples, by permission of his government, early in 1806, to his wife and family. It is probable, that he may be in the French service now. Should this be true, if the king recovered his dominions again, the former comrades of this disbanded officer, whose superior loyalty, perhaps, only arose from their having better interest, might be the first to propose shooting him.

Such would be the prospects of Neapolitan officers entering an army, raised by the court of Palermo. No encouragement whilst actually employed; disgusting flights and abandonments of their native country, which they may hold very dear; beggary every moment staring them in the face, whenever their government, from want or from caprice, chooses to disband them; and the death of traitors, if they afterwards embrace the only mode of subsistence left open to many of them.' Evidently, none but men of the most desperate fortunes will venture into a service so void of hope.

selves into armies, in order to act against the French, can have no possible security for their proper treatment, unless the king grant full powers, in all military affairs, to the British general. Then, they may confidently expect, that the same justice will be done to them, which they have seen is done to all officers and soldiers, whether native or foreign, in the British service.

The next and final stipulation, which we must make, resolves itself into two heads: first, that the king give a general order to all constituted civil authorities, to obey the commands of the British general; secondly, that he consent to farm out to the British government the revenues of his continental states, for a certain sum annually, as long as British troops shall act in Italy. Both these conditions are just and moderate, and both essential to the success of the operations; indeed, the former is an authority which the British general may lawfully assume: the second is a thing not merely proper in itself; because we have a right to demand, that the greatest portion of the revenue of a country saved by us should come into our own coffers, in order to make us some compensation, however inadequate, for the expenses of the war; but it is absolutely necessary, as the past conduct of the government, with which we are in alliance, has shown. For if we neglect to make these stipulations, the moment that the British army shall have established itself in the country, it will be followed

by judges, civil governors, and tax-gatherers from Palermo: the former, by their savage cruelty, the latter, by their bad faith and horrible extortions, will make the cause in which we are fighting hateful to the whole Neapolitan nation, and to the whole world. We know, that all these detestable acts of tyranny and oppression were committed by the ministers of the king of Naples, our present ally, after his former restoration to his continental dominions;[1] we know,

[1] The pusillanimity, and want of zeal for their master's service, shown by the superior officers civil and military, and the horrible injustice and cruelties committed in the name of the Sicilian government, are well depicted in Sir T. Troubridge's dispatches to Lord Nelson, from which a few extracts are subjoined.

Naples, August the 20th, 1799. "To day eleven of the "principal Jacobins, princes, dukes, commoners, and ladies, "were executed. I sincerely hope they will soon finish on a "great scale, and then pass an act of oblivion. Death is a "trifle to the prisons."

September the 12th. "They (the court appointed by the king to try cases of high treason) must finish soon; or every "family here will be interested in making a disturbance. "They should make some examples, and pass an act of "oblivion, and let all be forgot; at present there are upwards "of 40,000 families who have relations confined."

September the 16th. "The innocent and guilty are all "afraid of being accused, and thrown into jail; and pro- "bably of having their houses plundered when set at liberty, "after a considerable time, with nothing to exist on. Constant "efforts are made to get a man taken up, in order to rob him. "I have seen many instances, which induce me to make this "representation."

that they violated promises made to the people in their adversity; we know, that the Calabrians, who had rendered the most signal services to their sovereign, afterwards evinced a hostile disposition to the Neapolitan army, commanded by General Damas,[1] and that, although they obeyed the orders of Sir John Stuart, they showed no cordiality to the Prince of Hesse, in 1807; a change of sentiment towards their own superiors, which, as their hatred of the French remains the same, can only be accounted for by ill usage received. In fact, the oppression and tyranny of the Neapolitan government, both to its army and to its people, were the true causes of its destruction. In perilous times, no government can possibly stand, without the support both of its army and of its people: in ordinary times it may stand,

[1] The Neapolitan officers, who were employed upon that service, informed me of this circumstance. The people of a Calabrian village, after refusing to comply with some trifling demands upon their assistance, made by authority of the general, threatened to fire upon a Neapolitan regiment, whose commanding officer seemed inclined to make good his claims by force. They also attempted to surprise a vessel laden with ammunition for the use of the Neapolitan army, under charge of an artillery officer of my acquaintance.

I have often heard the Calabrians complain of their having been deceived, in respect to taxes, by their own government; but I did not make myself master of particulars. In Mr. Leckie's work, various acts of bad faith, of cruelty, and of oppression, committed by the ministers of the court of Palermo, towards their fellow-subjects, are stated.

with the support of one of them; but to expect that a government should stand, or recover its power, without the affection and confidence of either the one or the other, is the dream of a madman. Now, the present sovereign of Sicily, can appoint no ministers, either for civil or military affairs, whom the people of his dominions can trust;* nor have we ourselves any security for the good faith of those whom he may be pleased to name, unless he consent to vest the British general with these necessary powers. By making these arrangements, he will also best promote his own interest; for if we grant him, personally, an annual sum, adequate to the support of his dignity, in Naples; it will be a certain and fixed income, which he could not possibly derive from the management of the revenues of that country, through his own officers, without sacrificing the interests of the state. Indeed, the poverty of the government was probably one cause of the violence and injustice, that led to its ruin. In many cases in war, it is proper that the people of a particular district, who have suffered, should be exempt from taxes for a limited period; but how can so poor a government as that of Palermo, with a set of harpies for its inferior officers, ever practise this just and necessary forbearance?

* Extract of a letter from Sir T. Troubridge to Lord Nelson, dated Naples, the 3d of September, 1799. "The "truth is, it is the interest of many here to keep the king

These are the only terms and conditions, upon which it is possible for us to have the smallest hope of success, in any operations in the kingdom of

" away; they constantly send villainous reports to deter him
" from coming: I know this game has been practised some
" time. In short, my lord, they all dread reform, I mean the
" people in office; the villanies are so deeply rooted, that if
" some method is not taken to dig them out, this government
" cannot hold together. Out of twenty millions of ducats
" collected as the revenue, only thirteen millions reach the
" treasury, and the king pays five ducats where he should pay
" one. His majesty is surrounded by thieves," &c.

That the officers of the Sicilian government are as little to be trusted now, as they were ten or eleven years ago, is proved by the following incident, which I have heard from very respectable authority, but with which I was not acquainted, when the first edition of this part of my work was published.

After Sir John Stuart had taken the islands of Ischia and Procida, Prince Leopold, who had at first accompanied the armament as a volunteer, began to assume authority; and had ordered courts-martial for the purpose of trying, as rebels, such of his father's former subjects, as had been found upon these islands, either in the service of, or in a state of quiet submission and supposed good will to the French. It is almost needless to say, that Sir John Stuart, with that regard for justice and humanity, which it is to be hoped will always be the characteristic of a British commander, put an immediate stop to these absurd and atrocious measures, the object of which was to rob or put to death men, whose lives and property were guarded by the sanctity of a capitulation. Such, it is generally believed, would have been the event, had not he interposed. A similar atrocity was actually committed by order of the court of Palermo, in the year 1799.

Naples; and as, by acting in this way, we should, if we succeeded, do a very great service to our ally, by re-establishing him in his capital, in all the pomp and splendour of sovereign power, with a sufficient income to support him in his dignity, without the smallest risk or expense to himself; he granting us nothing more, in return, than the sanction of his name, which, after what has passed, can be of little or no use, perhaps rather an impediment to our success; it follows that we ought to admit of no objections to this arrangement; for, as I said before, in treating of Sicily, every thing depends upon ourselves, who have the power in our hands; and provided that we satisfy ourselves, as to the justice of our own proposals, we are not to listen to the cavils of the ministers of our ally, who, by the whole tenor of their conduct, both to us, to their army, and to their people, have shown that they are not proper judges of what faith and justice mean.'

Whilst the above affords fresh proof of the incorrigible folly and wickedness of the advisers, by whom the royal family of Sicily are guided; I am persuaded that young Prince Leopold, who is said to be naturally of a good disposition, is more to be pitied than blamed, for the share which he was unhappily led to take in this transaction.

† If the consent of the Sicilian government to these arrangements be refused, it will evidently be the act of the ministers and inferior officers, who will object to any thing that will take the fingering of British money out of their own hands, regardless of the safety and interests both of their master and of

There is another thing to be observed, in support of the measures which I have recommended, in respect to Naples and Sicily. The moment that it is allowed that these measures are necessary for the success of the war, whether offensively or defensively managed, it may be denied that the government of this country has any right to continue its alliance with Sicily on its present terms. For extra taxes ought only to be levied upon the people of Great Britain for public purposes, such as the successful prosecution of the war. But if our money be expended, as it now is in Sicily, upon a foreign prince and his ministers, in a way not tending to our success, but to our ruin, as a nation; then, I know not, whether it may not be truly urged, that our alliance with Sicily is in itself unjust, inasmuch as it is contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the British constitution: nor can it even be construed into a laudable exercise of our national generosity to the king of Sicily, or to his subjects; because, unless he be under secret terms of reconciliation

Great Britain. As their refusal would be totally unreasonable, we may take advantage of the just rights of war, and act in Naples as in an enemy's country; without denying the claims of its former sovereign, but, at the same time, not allowing any person whatever to interfere in political or military affairs, without the consent of the British general; because such interference would be a positive impediment to his success, which, by the law of nations, he is entitled to set aside in any enemy's country.

with Buonaparte, our present alliance tends to his certain destruction; and it rivets the chains of a most execrable tyranny, upon the people over whom he rules, contrary to his interest as well as to theirs; for the true interests of sovereigns, and of their subjects, are always the same.

If it be a thing perfectly unreasonable, for even those of the deposed princes, who have the greatest claims upon us, to expect, and most unjust in them to demand, that we are to reinstate them, unconditionally, in their former dominions; I know nothing which we ought to treat with greater indignation, than a similar pretension on the part of the king of Prussia. If he saw us, with a strong army, landing in the north of Germany, after having effected the conquest of the Danish islands, he would, no doubt, be the first to propose joining us with his handful of dastardly fugitives, the refuse of the battle of Jena; and might modestly demand, as the price of this great condescension and assistance, that we should give him a few millions of our revenue, and yield up all our conquests to him. We are, however, fortunately, once more at war with him; and, by the law of nations, have a right to continue the war for ever, or to make peace on our own terms. And the only terms, which will not be ten times worse for us than eternal war, are, that he submit to become our tributary, and maintain a British army in his dominions, as proper security for his not again infamously betraying us. Prussia is

said, in time of peace, to have been formerly able to keep on foot two hundred thousand men; she may, therefore, very well maintain eighty thousand British troops, besides an auxiliary force to act under our orders. These are the terms upon which we ought to treat with the Prussian monarch. If he does not like these, let him destroy us if he can; but, at all events, let us never again advance him money, wherewithal to make war against ourselves.

The extraordinary notion, which has been advanced by many men in this country, in the present day, that it is unjust in us to conquer, for ourselves, the dominions which foreign princes or republics (whether our friends or our enemies) have lost, owing to their weakness, or more commonly, to their own corrupt, imbecile, and dastardly measures, appears to me as absurd, as if it were asserted, that every man who bought a valuable estate, was bound in justice to give it up to some former proprietor, who had either ruined himself by speculations and law-suits, above his means, or who had forfeited the inheritance of his ancestors, by gaming, prodigality, and every kind of vice.

By acting upon such principles, we not only, as was observed, commit the most flagrant injustice to ourselves as a nation, but we act most unjustly and tyrannically to the people of other countries. Now, although it may be denied that our conduct, as far as it affects ourselves, can be called unjust, because it may be said, that states, as well as individuals,

have a right by law, to squander their income, and to reduce themselves to ruin, in any way they please; upon what principle can we justify the wrongs which we do to other nations, by forcing upon them ancient forms of government, which have lost their confidence, and which even, if re-established, would be totally unable to protect them? I shall give only one example of the pernicious nature of our measures in this respect; which, as our intentions, fortunately, were not carried into effect, it may be less mortifying to us to view in its proper light.

The knights of St. John, either corrupted by French gold, or actuated by the most contemptible pusillanimity, surrendered the island of Malta to Buonaparte, in 1798;[1] who having left there a

[1] The substance of the terms upon which the islands of Malta, Gozo, &c. were surrendered to the French, by the Order of St. John, may be comprised under the following heads: 1st, That France should use her interest, at the congress of Rastadt, to procure, for the Grand Master of the order, a principality of equal value, for life; in the mean time, engaging to pay him a pension of 300,000 livres a year, besides a gratuity of 600,000 livres to begin with: 2dly, That the French knights, then resident at Malta, should be entitled to the privileges of French citizens, when they returned to their native country; and that they should all receive pensions for life from the French government, varying according to their actual age at the time of capitulation: 3dly, That France should use her influence with the subject republics, to grant similar pensions to the knights of their respective countries: 4thly, That France use her interest with the other

garrison of five thousand men, proceeded to Egypt, forcing along with him all who had borne arms in the naval and military establishments of the order. The people of Malta, the great body of whom, from what I have been able to learn, were fully determined upon resistance, although the knights, to palliate their own shameful misconduct, have thought proper to assert the contrary, sullenly submitted to necessity; but when the French, with their usual insolence and rapacity, began to make them feel the weight of oppression, neither respecting the property of the poor, nor the ornaments of the churches; then the Maltese manfully shook off the yoke, overpowered and put to the sword a detachment at Citta Vecchia, drove the rest of the French force within the fortifications, repulsed them in several sorties, and actually reduced them to a state of complete and effectual blockade, without any assistance whatever.[1] Every Maltese, capable of

powers of Europe, to allow the knights of their several nations to keep possession of the estates of the order situated within their territories. There were other provisions made in favour of the knights, and some for the people of Malta. Whether the former were observed, we know not; but I think I have stated enough to show, that the manner in which the sovereignty of Malta was made over to Buonaparte, bears as much the air of buying and selling, as any transaction that ever took place in Smithfield market. (See State Papers for 1798.)

[1] Malta was surrendered to the French by capitulation, the 12th of June, 1798. On the 2d of September following, the

bearing arms, who was not shut up within the walls, in company with the French, was employed in this just and righteous cause; even women and boys took a part in the war; and the numbers of the blockading force were constantly increased by those who made their escape from the city.

By what has been related, the Maltese had sufficiently shown both their strength and their courage; but they felt, that without external assistance, they could scarcely hope to succeed in asserting their independence; because they had neither proper arms, nor had they a sufficient stock of provisions, nor of ammunition. They therefore threw themselves upon our protection; and as it did not enter into the minds of these honest, unsuspicious,

Maltese took up arms against the French, who in the short interval between these two periods, had violated every article of the capitulation, respecting Malta, and seemed by their conduct to meditate a total subversion of all institutions, and a general plunder of every thing valuable. Their interference with, and subsequent seizure of, the property in the *Monte di Pietà*, a fund established for the benefit of the poor, was particularly offensive. As soon as the Maltese rose, they sent out boats in quest of the British fleet; but the first naval assistance they got, was from a Portuguese squadron of four sail, who drove in the French vessels that were cruizing round the island. A small detachment of British artillery was the first military force sent to their assistance; afterwards some marines from the fleet, besides two battalions of British, and latterly, two of Neapolitan infantry, co-operated in the blockade. The French garrison surrendered on the 4th of September, 1800.

untutored peasants, that we or any other nation, would assist them, in the way that we now assist the government of Sicily, at our own expense and detriment, without deriving any advantage or recompense whatever; and as they felt this grand truth, that gratitude and obedience are due, in all cases, where protection is received, they offered us, in return for our services, the supreme power and government of their civil and military affairs, which we accepted. Nothing could be more flattering to us, as a nation, than this confidence on the part of the Maltese; for it is well known that they dreaded, above all things, the idea of passing into the hands of Russia, or of any other power, except ourselves. The government of Naples they despised; and that of the Order of St. John, after what had passed, they not only despised, but detested.

Now, it is to be observed, that had we landed in Malta, with a large force, at the time when the inhabitants were in a state of quiet submission to the French, we should have been entitled to use all the rights of war in an enemy's country; and after expelling the French, either with or without the assistance of the islanders, we ourselves being principals in the war, we should have been fully justified in making over the sovereignty of Malta, after having obtained it by force of arms, to any power we pleased; to our friend the emperor of Russia, or to our allies the Turks, or to the Algerines, for instance; and although the Maltese would after-

wards have had the same right, under similar circumstances, to resist the government thus set up by us, which they had to resist the French, still they would have had no right to complain of our conduct in point of justice, for it would have been perfectly consonant to the law of nations.

But the case, which I have related, and which actually existed, was widely different. The Maltese did not take up arms to assist us. They (not we) were the principals in the war: and we went to their assistance, at a time when they had, from circumstances, a right to treat with us as an independent state, upon terms binding to both parties. It was they (not we) who may claim the principal share of the merit of expelling the French garrison; for although we had power enough to have conquered both them and the French, such an enterprise would have required almost as great a force as that which we sent to Egypt, and might have cost us much blood. But with such a handful of men, as that which we actually employed in Malta,[1] so far from expelling the French, we could not even have remained one moment upon the island, without the powerful co-operation of its natives.

After having thus been called to the supreme power in Malta, by the wishes of its people; and

[1] The number of whom, during the first year of the blockade, never exceeded 500 men, principally British and Portuguese marines.

having established our dominion solely by their aid, what was the use which we made of our authority? The very first public act of ours, was to abuse their confidence; by transferring them, even without asking their consent, to their former unworthy masters, the knights; by a treaty made, unknown to them, with the very same tyrants, whose cruelty and oppression had, a little before, driven them to despair, and induced them to become voluntary subjects of Great Britain. I fear that little can be said in favour of the policy, and nothing in defence of the justice, of this conduct.

The knights of St. John, all men must allow, had shown themselves the enemies of the Maltese; whom they had, without any plea of necessity, betrayed into the hands of the French; consequently they had forfeited all claim to the allegiance of that people. They were no less our enemies. If they had not most unaccountably surrendered the strongest place in the world, without a shadow of resistance, Lord Nelson would have had the finest opportunity of totally destroying the great armament commanded by Buonaparte; for not only the French fleet, which he afterwards destroyed at Abukir, but their army, in all human probability, must, in that case, have fallen a prey to him. What claims, therefore, had the Knights of St. John, either upon Great Britain, or upon Malta? Ample claims, certainly they had, to the hatred and contempt of both; but to nothing more. They had, as a body,

become extinct; and if we can compare political and natural death, the Order of St. John, by the acts which have been related, may fairly be said to have committed the crime of suicide. Its natural decay had taken place long before. The purposes for which it was created, had ceased to exist. We certainly had no right to destroy it, as long as it did not offend us; but after it had destroyed itself, that we should, to our own prejudice, recal into existence that phantom of the dark ages, that useless and contemptible body of men, who, with the vices and overbearing spirit which sometimes disgrace individuals of the clerical and military professions, pretended, in the same person, to combine these anomalous characters, without performing any of the services, or possessing any of the merits, either of the priest or of the warrior; such a measure, it must be allowed, bore absurdity upon the face of it; and it may be presumed, that the British government either was, or soon became, fully sensible of the impolicy of it; since they afterwards evaded the execution of their engagements.

In the garrison of Malta, at the time when the conditions of the peace of Amiens were announced, were officers, who, having served during the whole of the blockade, had acquired, for the people of that island, the attachment which generous minds always feel towards those who have participated in the same dangers and hardships. If even these officers lamented our abandonment of Malta, as an act that

would, in some degree, tarnish the national honour;[1] what must the feelings of the Maltese have been?

Under the protection of the British government, a government too great to be jealous of them, and too good to oppress them, they had formed an expectation of enjoying more freedom, honour and prosperity, than under their former government, whose system of ruling them was to keep them ignorant, weak and degraded. It will not be difficult to conceive the astonishment and indignation of the Maltese, when they found all these hopes disappointed, their confidence in us misplaced, and the power which they had conferred upon us, used for the purpose of making them over again to their former masters, once more to be treated by them as animals of an inferior species; a thing doubly degrading, since events had exposed the worthlessness, the pusillanimity and treachery of these haughty rulers.

This is not the worst part of our conduct. Although we nominally gave up Malta to the Knights of St. John; I believe there was not a single man upon that island, British or Maltese, who was not

[1] Whilst the renewal of war was expected by everyone, but before the official accounts of it had yet reached us, in Malta, Captain Gordon, a gallant and zealous officer, then dangerously ill, who had been commanding engineer during the blockade, expressed to me his joy at the prospect of our keeping the island; and in a few minutes afterwards, expired. So deeply did he feel the sentiments described in the text!

fully convinced, that the same farce would be acted over again by that unworthy body, and that the immediate consequence of this arrangement, when carried into effect, would be a second treacherous or cowardly surrender of Malta to the French.*

* The French had long had it in contemplation to seize upon Malta; I should presume for more than half a century, before the plan was actually put in execution by Buonaparte. In a manuscript memoir preserved in the engineer's office, at Malta, written by a Frenchman of the name of Bourlemaque, in the year 1761, an opinion is stated, that the island was not then in a condition capable of resisting a vigorous attack, which the Turks might make upon it, if they chose; but as it might be said, that the Turks could not prepare a sufficient armament, without exciting suspicion; "is the Turk, "(he observes,) the only enemy whom the Order of St. John "has to fear? Supposing that a certain great power, mistress "of the sea, were to make an attempt upon Malta, which is "extremely probable, since she acknowledges no law but her "own interest, having abjured the holy catholic communion, "what would be the consequences?" In throwing out this false insinuation against Great Britain, the man must have been conscious of the secret views of his own court. Ambition is always jealous, treachery always suspicious.

By all that I have been able to learn, the insufferable pride of the knights, the extraordinary respect which every individual of the Order exacted from every Maltese, and the insolence and violence, with which any thing derogatory to their personal dignity was resented, were extremely galling to the Maltese. These evils were most felt by the people of the city, amongst whom French principles began to make some progress; but at the same time, the leading individuals amongst them depended upon the Order for various employ-

This was not only to be inferred from what was known of the character of the Order, but from

ments; and their spirit was so broken, by being thus habitually trampled upon, that their exertions either for or against the Order, had the Knights chosen to resist the French, would have been confined to wishes alone.

The pretensions of the Order of St. John to the priestly character, sometimes involved them in disputes with the bishop and native clergy of Malta, in consequence of which, there was an insurrection of some Maltese priests, in 1775, but nobody joined them.

The peasants without the walls, who form the strength of the population of the island, are an unmixed race of people, very few amongst them understanding any language but their own, which is a dialect of the Arabic; and they were totally ignorant of republican principles. They saw little of the Knights, whom they felt it no degradation to treat with all the respect which the latter desired; indeed, it is common for them now to show great respect, whether from good-will or from politeness, to British officers, who visit their villages. Occupied in the labours of agriculture, under a burning sun, they are patient and capable of sustaining hardships and fatigues; and they were formed into a militia under the orders of the Knights, to whose government I never could discover that they were in the least disaffected at that time; and as the latter had a regular force besides, I say that the Grand Master had it in his power, not merely to have defended himself, but by assistance of the British squadron, to have effected the destruction of the French armament under Buonaparte. He could not complain of the weakness of the place which he had to defend. It was ten times weaker, when it resisted the whole force of the Ottoman empire, under one of his predecessors. Indeed, the strength of the place was fully proved, by this remarkable fact, that the French garrison

an almost exactly parallel event that took place at the same period, Porto Ferrajo, in the island of

held out, afterwards, for two years, against a very superior force; a thing which speaks little in favour of the Knights of Malta, who might have opposed Buonaparte with a much more numerous garrison, and yet shamefully surrendered in four and twenty hours, without making any defence at all.

To whatever motive we may ascribe the conduct of the Grand Master, it is impossible to acquit the great body of the Order, of treason. Indeed, the French knights are suspected to have been at all times ready to join in the ambitious views, which their own government entertained in respect to Malta; but after the revolution, when the property of the Order was confiscated in France, and in the countries occupied by the French armies, they were thrown into a state of indigence, which rendered them totally subservient to the republic, much more so than they had formerly been to the monarchy. The other powers of Europe had also shown a disposition to appropriate to themselves the treasures of the Order, within their respective dominions; so that no reasonable man could have expected it to continue much longer in existence; and I believe, that when Buonaparte made his appearance in 1798, there were, in reality, only two parties amongst the Knights: one, the French party, strongest in point of numbers, and having many followers amongst the people of the city; the other, a Russian party, wishing, but scarcely hoping, to enjoy such of the foreign revenues of the Order as were not already confiscated, and disposed either to rule under the protection of Russia, or to surrender the sovereignty of the island to that power.

As for, what properly could be called, an independent party, anxious for the rights and neutrality of the Order, I fear, that these once renowned knights had so much lost the

Elba, a fortress in the defence of which we had been co-operating, was, the moment that we evacu-

spirit of chivalry, that they considered these objects altogether chimerical.

Mr. de Boisgelin, however, a French knight, who has published a history of the Order, which did not fall into my hands till a few months ago, has, without absolutely denying the misconduct of his own brethren, which was but too notorious, thought proper to assert, that the disloyalty of the Maltese soldiers and people was the principal cause, which forced the Grand Master to surrender. It is not wonderful, that the partizans of the Order should endeavour to shake off as much of the disgrace as possible; but this attack upon the Maltese astonished me not a little; because the French party, which Mr. Boisgelin represents as so very formidable, was, to my knowledge (and I had as good opportunities of judging of it as any knight who was not privy to it), composed of the most effeminate, indeed of the only effeminate, part of the population of Malta; follows that would have trembled even at the sight of a musket. If the disloyalty and treachery of the Maltese actually forced the Grand Master to submit to Buonaparte, did they also force him to make such excellent terms, for his own private interest, as appear upon the face of the capitulation?

It is true, as Mr. de Boisgelin relates, that the Maltese showed an insubordinate spirit, and put several of the knights to death, after the French landed. But I deny that this was done by any individuals in the French interest. These outrages arose from a belief, on the part of the Maltese soldiers, that a party amongst the knights, intended to betray them and their island to the French; a suspicion which that author himself admits to have been true. When the Maltese militia were drawn up to oppose the landing of the French troops, it

ated it, in consequence of the peace of Amiens, taken possession of by the French troops, who had

being supposed by them that a mixture of charcoal had been served out, instead of gunpowder, they thought that their own fire took no effect; and it was under this impression, that, in their retreat from the coast, they first tore some of the knights to pieces. When there are any grounds for suspecting treachery in superiors, the belief of it is often carried to extravagant lengths. The French volunteers, at the commencement of their revolutionary war, as well as the Spanish levies lately, have often acted under this impression, sometimes when we may suppose their suspicions to have been groundless. But there is one thing most certain: when soldiers are themselves discontented, but their officers true, they confine themselves to running away in battle, or deserting; it is only when they themselves are faithful, but believe their officers to be traitors to the cause in which they are fighting, that they will ever lift their hands against the latter, in presence of an enemy.

Indeed, I was informed, that so far from any inclination on the part of the Maltese troops to submit to the French, it was with great difficulty that they could be restrained from firing upon them, even after the Grand Master had sent to request a cessation of arms.

If Mr. de Boisgelin's statements were correct, it must be admitted, that a more striking proof of the worthlessness of the Order, of which he was a member, results from what he has himself advanced, in order to justify it, than any thing which I have ever heard urged against it by the Maltese. What kind of government must that have been, which, by his account, had scarcely a partizan amongst a people whom it had ruled for more than two centuries? What kind of warriors must his brethren of the Order of St. John have been,

not been able to reduce it before. A Maltese corps, in British pay, was witness to this transaction; and scarcely had the officers and soldiers of that corps returned to their native island, when they were followed by young men of the best families of Porto Ferrajo, whom they had seen fighting in the same cause with themselves and with the British, but, who immediately after, and by reason of our treaty, had lost their country, and were reduced

who could not command the obedience of soldiers whom it had been their sole business to train and form to discipline? Admitting the mutinous spirit of the Maltese to have been true, was it not the duty of the knights to have quelled every species of mutiny, or to have perished, rather than disgracefully submit to an enemy, when, by their own account, they had 3600 regular soldiers and seamen, 3000 regular, and 7000 irregular, militia at their command? If the Maltese had been so deeply infected with revolutionary principles, as Mr. Boisgelin pretends, the total change of their sentiments, towards the French, in less than three months, must be considered as the most extraordinary phenomenon, that has ever taken place in political affairs; indeed, so extraordinary, that had we no other information upon the subject, the truth of such an assertion must appear, in itself, highly questionable.

I am ready to acknowledge, that many of the knights possessed great merit individually; but as a body, they deserved nothing but contempt: nor can I, without indignation, hear a member of that body endeavour to patch up its lost character, by calumniating so brave and trustworthy a people as the Maltese.

to beggary?' What could the Maltese have expected, had the French got possession of their island a second time; after the determined and even ferocious manner in which they had resisted the tyranny of that nation? It was generally supposed, that Buonaparte would exercise the most signal and unrelenting vengeance upon them. Many believed, that he would transport the greater part of them to St. Domingo, and replace a people who had made themselves so odious to him, by French or Italian colonists: nor does this supposition appear to me, by any means, improbable.

Such being the prospects of the Maltese, an impartial reader, who will put himself into their situation, may allow that they had no small cause to complain of us. They did not scruple publicly to say, that if we did not choose to retain the sovereignty of their island, we had no right whatever to transfer them to another power without their own consent; and if those amongst them, who had most reason to dread the fury of the French, did not give vent to their angry feelings by any open acts of

[1] "The French troops shall evacuate the kingdom of "Naples, and the Roman states; the English forces shall also "evacuate Porto Ferrajo, and generally all the ports and "islands in the Mediterranean, or the Adriatic." Did this (the eleventh) article of the Treaty of Amiens give the French any right to seize Porto Ferrajo? Perhaps not: but they did it, and in the most barefaced, insulting way possible.

violence. I am persuaded, that this moderation must have arisen from a hope, that the British government would rather renew the war, than consent to the total abandonment of their country; a supposition which was afterwards verified.*

Let us suppose, that the Maltese had reproached us with the injustice and treachery of our conduct towards them, and had brought it home to our own feelings, by asking us, whether our making them over to a government, which had forfeited all claim to their confidence,† was not as scandalous a breach of faith, as if the Prince of Orange, after being called to the head of affairs in England, had made use of the power voluntarily conferred upon him by our own ancestors, to betray them again into the hands of King James, or to reduce England into a province of France, under Louis the Fourteenth, for some selfish stipulation, which he might have thought

* When the arrangements for giving up Malta to the knights (alias to the French) were made known; the great body of the people were actuated by the feelings described in the text; but a French party, of which the advocates of the dead government were the most strenuous supporters, instantly sprung up in the city. This party was solely created by our own evacuating policy, which forms parties against us, or is ruinous to our interests, amongst the people of all countries.

† After the Maltese took up arms against the French, they would not allow any of the knights, some of whom were desirous of taking a part in the blockade, even to land upon their island. (See Mr. de Boisgelin's work.)

useful or necessary to the prosperity of Holland? The parallel between this supposition and our own conduct, I must confess, appears to me so painfully correct, that we can draw no other distinction between these measures, than the difference of magnitude of the British and Maltese nations. The Maltese, however, might tell us, that this is no extenuation of the moral turpitude of our intended conduct towards them; because the sacred and eternal laws of justice remain the same, whether the nation or party, betrayed or injured, be weak or strong. "We bow," they might have said, "to "the superior might of Britain and of France; "which we, the poor insignificant Maltese, as you "may think us, are unable to resist. Buonaparte "and you, combined, may govern the world in any "way you please; but still we must protest against "the tyranny and injustice of you both. Only "that, as it is less painful for mankind to yield to "open force, which they can have the satisfaction "of resisting with arms in their hands, than to fall "the victims of unexpected perfidy, against which "nothing is safe or sacred, we must take the "liberty of telling you, that of the two, your insi- "dious conduct towards us, in effecting our destruc- "tion under the mask of friendship, has more "deeply wounded our feelings, than all the oppres- "sion and rapacity of the French."

Mankind are governed by power, resulting either from force, from public opinion, or from a mixture

of both. The power of states may be increased, and their dominion extended, by violence and usurpation; and the empires thus formed, by sheer force, may, for a certain time, flourish, from an opinion of their irresistible might; but it is by justice and good faith alone, that a nation can insure the permanency of its power, or depend upon the fidelity of the people of its foreign possessions. In recommending a scrupulous adherence to the law of nations, and an inflexible constancy to the cause of deserving allies, I have, therefore, not only followed the dictates of honour and of sincerity, but have developed the only policy, by which this country can aggrandize itself sufficiently to break the power of France. Hence our non-performance of the treaty of Amiens, and the renewal of war, by which, in some degree, we saved our character with the Maltese, and with the other people of the Mediterranean, have always been considered by me as most fortunate events.

There are, however, certain limits, beyond which, abstract principles, generally true, ought not to be carried in human affairs; and I cannot, therefore, coincide with those, who say, "that they would "rather see this country perish, than violate what "they themselves call justice towards foreign "states." For there are not wanting men, who have held such doctrines of late in England. It is desirable, that this scrupulous integrity, justice, and purity of conduct, were applied, in its fullest extent,

to all our transactions in private life. One thing only is to be lamented in our foreign affairs, that those who talk the most loudly about the law of nations, never seem to have taken the trouble of studying it. Every question in the law of nations has manifold bearings, and branches out into a great variety of heads, all of which ought to be considered by those who really wish to act with justice; otherwise they expose themselves to the same imputation, as he who should decide upon an important and intricate cause, after hearing only one witness. This imperfect view, which we have often taken of the law of nations, may sometimes have been caused by the confusion arising from our unhappy mode of reasoning upon external affairs, with minds biassed by feelings growing out of our internal politics; which, in reality, neither have, nor ought to have, any thing to do with the former. But be its origin what it will, the indiscriminate application of abstract theoretical principles of justice, as the only rule of conduct towards foreign nations, has often caused us to applaud actions and measures, from a belief of their being founded upon good faith, which were in reality contrary to every principle of justice; and the absurdity of this system is in nothing more glaring, than in the subject of which we have just been treating.

That deposed governments have fair claims and pretensions to their former power, no man, who is possessed of common sense, will deny; and here,

unfortunately, many amongst us have stopped short at the very surface of the question, and have most falsely advanced, that these pretensions are paramount to all other considerations: and that, consequently, we are bound in justice to restore to life every dead government, and to prop up every falling one; reckoning for nothing our own self-preservation; foregoing all the rights of war, which have been acknowledged to form a part of the law of nations from the earliest times; and turning a deaf ear to the wishes, to the interests, and even to the rights and privileges of the people of other countries.

It is with a view to correct such a pernicious prejudice, as far as lies in my power, that I have expatiated upon this point; and have attempted to prove what, perhaps, at any other period, might have been considered a truism; namely, "that so "far from being bound by justice to adopt such "measures, our replacing deposed foreign princes, "or extinct republics, unconditionally, in their "former power, is, in all cases, a grievous injus-"tice to ourselves, and may be a heinous act "of oppression to others;" as was particularly exemplified by our plan of restoring the Order of St. John, which, if put in execution, would certainly have been represented to posterity, by the injured people of Malta, as a most atrocious act of perfidy; and, perhaps, justly so, unless we could have pleaded extreme necessity in defence of our conduct.

The inconsistencies, into which the measuring of all our external affairs by the standard of abstract principles of justice may lead us, are not less striking. For another favourite doctrine of the advocates of this system is, that we have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations; a thing, which it is evidently impossible to reconcile with their former principle of restoring dead governments by force of arms. Even when all is done by seeming approbation of the people of other countries, the measures, in which this principle involves us, on being analyzed, will be found almost always as compulsory, as if actual force were used. Let us suppose that some nation, driven to despair by the horrible oppressions of the French, takes up arms, and implores our assistance; then, instead of acting as principals in the war ourselves, if we invariably set up amongst them the standard of some extinct government, whose corruption and imbecility may have formerly led to their ruin; it is evident that we leave them only the choice between two evils. They must either perish, or consent to acknowledge, once more, that ancient government, which they may dread, detest, and despise; because they cannot hope to receive our succours through any other channel. Hence, the principle of reinstating all extinct governments, may cause us, in reality, to interfere, as invidiously, in the domestic affairs of other nations, as if we were to imitate the French revolutionists, who set out upon another

abstract principle, which they also maintained to be just and proper, that of overturning every government that came in their way.

Both these abstract principles, indiscriminately applied, are, in my mind, equally unjust: only, that the French system did, from the state of public opinion in most countries, at the time of the revolution, materially conduce to the successes of the republic. The contrary system, which I have described, now asserted to be the only just policy by many men in England, and on some occasions adopted by our government, has greatly contributed to our failures, and may, if persevered in, lead to our destruction.

The claims of deposed governments are, therefore, as far as concerns Great Britain, a question not of justice, but of expediency; and sound policy seems to me to dictate to us, that we set them totally aside. No man, more than myself, applauds the hospitality which has been shown by the government and people of this country to foreign princes and their adherents; and I have always studiously abstained from saying any thing that might remind them of their misfortunes, But when the advocates of foreign princes presume to set up their rights in opposition to our interests, then I conceive that they hold a language ungrateful as well as insolent in the extreme; and that since they show no delicacy in their pretensions, we ourselves ought to drop that feeling for the moment, and reject them with suitable indignation. They maintain, that the treasures

of Great Britain ought, in justice, to be lavished, and that torrents of British blood ought to flow, in the cause of deposed princes, without any advantage, or recompense, or security, to ourselves. What more could they ask of us, had our own gracious sovereign been born their vassal, and we their slaves? We know, that to our own king and country, our wealth and blood are due; and we trust, that if Divine Providence will be pleased to leave us the same degree of valour and public spirit which animated our ancestors, and which we hope that we ourselves at this moment possess, the British flag shall fly in these islands, as long as a man exists who speaks the English language; and the British constitution shall remain an established government for ever. But in what does our boasted liberty consist, if we are not, exclusively, the subjects of our own sovereign, and of our own laws; but if the representatives of any thing in the shape of a foreign government, good or bad, that ever existed, have also a right to command our services?

If we would form a just notion of the true nature of the claims of these foreign governments, let us look back into the past history of the world. There we find, that all of them have, at various times, waged bitter wars against us; some of them have even attempted our destruction, with as much ardour as Buonaparte does now. What claims, therefore, have they upon us?

They derive rights from their ancestors, it is true,

but not to our assistance; for these ancestors were our enemies. On the contrary, when they urge any such unjust and absurd demands, we may tell them, that by the very same, and the only principle, upon which they take upon themselves to dictate to us, were they, at this moment, by some happy turn of affairs, re-established in their power, we should have a just right to make war against them, and to destroy them; for surely we may pretend to that, which was a right often enjoyed by our ancestors, upon as good grounds, as they can claim any of the rights formerly belonging to theirs. They will scarcely forget themselves so far, as to say, that the representatives of all other states have indefeasible rights for ever, whilst the British nation, alone, has no hereditary rights at all, not even to defend itself: for I say, that it is equally impossible for a nation, as for an individual, to defend itself by parrying the blows of an adversary alone. Of what use is our shield, which the advocates of the deposed governments graciously leave us, if they deprive us of our sword? According to them, we must not strike, but as they choose to permit us: indeed, if we admit their claims, we completely tie our own hands, and render it impossible for us to strike an antagonist, who is aiming at our life, in such a manner as to do him the smallest injury. Death to individuals, destruction to nations, are the certain consequences of fighting upon such a system.

CHAPTER X.

General view of Foreign Affairs; and of the terms, upon which we ought to treat with our Allies, and with our Enemies.

HAVING sufficiently discussed the subject of dead governments, we shall now proceed to treat of the living.

Austria, by her late political and domestic alliance with Buonaparte, is at present our enemy; but the history of the world has shown, that the latter forms a poor bond of union between sovereign princes. The King of Wurtemburg is, we see, although married to a Princess Royal of England, a humble follower of Buonaparte. Austria, having no ships or colonies, and no wish for either, has nothing to fear from Great Britain, and nothing to gain by being at war with us; but she has much to gain, and more to fear, by entering, or being forced, into a new war with France. Austria and Great Britain

are, therefore, natural allies; and it is our interest to support her with our whole strength. There are two ways of supporting Austria in a future war; the first, by sending a corps to serve with some Austrian army; the second, by attacking the French vigorously in Italy, in Holland, or in the north of Europe, leaving the whole force of Austria, free and undivided, to act upon her own frontier. Many advantages will result from the latter mode of carrying on the war.

In the first place, all jealousies between the allied armies will be avoided. The Austrians would probably be able to take the field with an army, double in numbers to any that we could send to their assistance; unless we gave up the contest in the Spanish peninsula, which must not be done. It would, therefore, be highly unreasonable in us to pretend to the chief command, if the combined armies served together, particularly in the Austrian territories. Still this is a point upon which we ought always to be very tenacious; for by increasing the military fame, and supporting the dignity of a nation, it highly contributes to promote its views in war; and therefore, since we could scarcely hope that the Austrians would yield this point, it will be better for us to act in a way that will set the question completely aside.

Here it may be proper formally to remark, that we have too much overlooked the great importance of aspiring to the chief command of combined

armies; and this neglect, as I have already noticed, has often been prejudicial to us. The Romans always insisted upon this privilege, even from the earliest periods, although their Italian allies generally brought as many troops into the field as they did. When they afterwards carried their arms abroad, and acted in concert with foreign nations, every sovereign prince, as well as every chief or general of a republic, who joined a Roman commander, invariably received his orders from the latter. And this was considered, by them, so much the just and natural order of things, that in their civil war, when King Juba, acting in concert with the Pompeian party, in Africa, assumed the chief command of the whole, his conduct seems to have been felt as a great indignity, and an invidious usurpation of Roman rights.[1]

An objection may be urged against this policy, founded upon an opinion which is advanced, by

[1] See those parts of Cæsar's Commentaries, where the operations in Africa are related. Juba's ordering Scipio to lay aside the habit of a commander in chief, appears to have been particularly offensive. "Atque etiam superbius Jubæ "factum, non in M. Aquinium hominem novum, parvumque "senatorem, sed in Scipionem, hominem illâ familiâ, digni- "tate, honoribusque præstantem. Nam cùm Scipio sagulo "purpureo ante regis adventum uti solitus esset, dicitur Juba "cum eo egisse, non oportere illum eodem uti vestitu, atque "ipse uteretur. Itaque factum est ut Scipio ad album sese "vestitum transferret, et Jubæ homini superbissimo, inertis "simoque obtemperaret." (De Bello Africano, cap. lvii.)

some one or other, in every conversation upon our military affairs; namely, that we have not generals qualified from their experience, for commanding armies on a great scale. Nothing can be more futile than such an objection. If our generals have not experience, give them opportunities of acquiring it; and let them gain the confidence of their country, the terror of their enemies, and the applause of the world, in the same way that other great generals have done before them. Trust them, and try them. When they come in contact with the French, their intrinsic value will soon be discovered. Luckily, our troops are not so bad, that any common blunder of a general is likely to cause the destruction of an army; nor is it to be supposed, that the most unpromising officers will always be selected for commands.

It is remarkable, in this as well as in other points, whilst our military policy is so contrary to that of the Romans, how exactly, in maritime affairs, we have been acting upon Roman maxims; which proves, that those who make war upon any element or in any age, with an ardent desire of success, must naturally adopt the same spirit in conducting it. When we had much less naval power than at present, we insisted that the fleets of pacific states should do homage to our flag, upon the narrow seas. "Britannia rule the waves," is as lofty a pretention, and must be fully as offensive to the pride of other nations, as that of the Romans, who styled themselves the lords of the earth. This we have lit-

rally been blowing hot and cold with the same breath; by sea, high spirited and commanding, wisely disregarding the jealousy of others, victorious, and respected; by land, tame, humble, unaspiring, and fearful of offending, consequently always unsuccessful, and, till lately, despised.

The British troops, under Sir James Craig, in 1805, were put under the command of a Russian general,[1] who brought a force, very little superior to our own into the field; and the Neapolitans, our other allies in that hopeful coalition, were commanded by Count Damas, a French emigrant. Now, as we paid both Russians and Neapolitans, and as the latter had long adopted a system, to which they still adhere, in Sicily, of exclusively employing foreigners at the head of their armies, surely we were as much to be trusted by them, as any other foreigners; so that, upon the whole, we might have demanded the chief command of the combined army, upon that

[1] I have been informed, that the last act of the Russian general, by whom we were commanded, was to call a council of war; in which he proposed to evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and leave our allies to their fate. When he found objections made to this measure, he produced a positive order from his sovereign, to withdraw the Russian troops. This order, had we readily embraced the proposal, would have been kept secret; so that the Russians, after pocketing our gold, might have thrown all the disgrace of abandoning the Neapolitans upon us. We have so many sins of our own of that kind to lament, that it would be hard upon us, also to have our character blackened by those of others.

occasion, as a matter of right. Let us suppose, that a Russian fleet had been sent, about the same period, to co-operate with a British squadron of equal force; would the government of this country have consented, that the Russian admiral should have commanded the whole? Never. The thing would have been unwise, and might, perhaps, have been considered degrading: indeed, so widely different are our naval and military systems, that I fully believe, that the idea, that any admiral of an allied power should pretend to the command of a British fleet, is a thing which has never entered into the imagination of man. But, in my mind, it was equally unwise, and much more degrading, to allow a Russian general, at the head of an army paid by us, to command Sir James Craig; for there is no other definition of a vassal or tributary, than he who both pays and serves at the same time. If, therefore, we have any regard for our dignity, we should always peremptorily insist upon issuing orders to every army which we subsidize. We consider our own generals worthy of commanding British soldiers; and shall we permit an ally to presume to tell us, that they are not worthy to command those of any other nation in the world?

To return to our probable future relations with Austria, the system of sending a corps, to act with some Austrian army, is objectionable in other respects, independent of the difficulty just stated. Our army would, in that case, encounter the usual

hardships and sufferings of war, no part of which should we have any means of remedying, but through application to our allies. Irritating, and probably ineffectual, complaints would consequently be bandied backwards and forwards between the head quarters of the two armies. The British officers, would, as usual, get discontented with this situation; despondency would follow; all ranks would be sighing to return to England; and the government would be thrown into the utmost perplexity; and might, perhaps, be induced to recal the troops; a measure, of which the pernicious effects might afterwards be found out, when it was too late to remedy them.

If, on the contrary, we act totally independent of any Austrian army, we shall be saved a great many sufferings; and, at least, half of our wonted temptations to despair, and reimbark. Going as principals in the war, as we shall have a right every where to demand and to enforce our claims to the necessary supplies, without any reference to our allies, it will be our business to inspire the civil magistrates with proper zeal and activity in our behalf; and if we allow ourselves to perish of hunger, in an enemy's country, with arms in one hand and money in the other, we shall neither be able to hope for, nor shall we deserve, the smallest pity in our misfortunes. Being completely unshackled, or having got out of leading strings, if I may be permitted the expression, we shall be forced to exert all our

energy in removing, or manfully bearing up against difficulties, instead of peevishly lamenting them; for if we fail, or give up our point, we shall be left without the shadow of a pretext, to ascribe the disappointment of our hopes to the remissness of others. In short, by acting upon this system, we shall feel that our own character is at stake, a thing which cannot so well be understood, if we adopt any other; and this feeling, of itself, must contribute most materially to our success.

Had the operations of last year been well combined, and the propriety of dividing our force admitted, the army under Lord Chatham, acting vigorously upon this system, might certainly have been of the greatest service to the common cause; for Buonaparte, after collecting almost every soldier he had (exclusive of those left in Spain) upon the banks of the Danube, was not able to out-number the Austrians there, after all. Unfortunately, we were neither seen nor heard of on or near the enemy's coast, till our allies had been beaten, and submitted to the terms of their conqueror.

It may be said of the policy which I recommend, that Austria would never agree to our keeping for ourselves any conquests which we may make upon the continent. Nothing is more probable, than that such objections may be made; indeed, from our past mode of treating with all allied powers, they must be made: for, notwithstanding that we are the most commercial nation in the world, we have, in

our public affairs, so far forgotten all those maxims of frugality and prudence, which form the very spirit of commerce, that we seem generally to have acted the part of prodigals, by lavishing our resources upon every other nation, indiscriminately, without making any bargain, or exacting any security, for our own advantage. Austria will, therefore, no doubt, demand, on the first overture for negociation, that we are to pour our millions into her lap, besides making over the fruits of our victories, either to her or to such miserable governments as Venice, or the Pope; which she, if by our assistance re-established in her former strength, will afterwards be able to conquer or to overawe. If such demands are made, all that we have to do is to give the Austrians a flat refusal. It is to be recollected, that although Austria must be annihilated without our assistance, we can defy the whole world, whilst we preserve our naval power; and the loss of that is so problematical, that many men in this country, and some even in other countries, think that we shall maintain it for ever: at all events, it is a very remote contingency. We are, therefore, completely independent of all other nations, at the present moment; but every nation that wishes to resist the French, is dependent upon us. Holding so high a rank, and consequently having a right to hold high language, amongst sovereign powers, if we allow Austria, or any other state, to dictate to us, the terms upon which we shall be pleased to grant them our assist-

ance, we shall deserve to be despised and trampled upon by all mankind.

We must tell the Austrians, that we have seen reason to place more confidence in our own troops, than in any whom we can hire from a foreign power; that we are willing to send forty or fifty thousand men to attack our common enemy; but that we will grant no money, having none to spare; and that we are determined to keep our conquests, because we must, in justice, always have something to reimburse us for the expenses of the war; unless our allies choose to take the British troops into pay; and then, but not otherwise, we might, perhaps, relax in our demands, or rather wave our rights, to territorial acquisitions.

It is absurd to suppose, that the Austrians, when they found us in earnest, could so far forget their own situation and ours, as to persist in objecting to these just and moderate proposals. Would not our abandonment of Prussia, their former rival and inveterate enemy, be a great point conceded to them?[1] Would there not be sufficient room for their aggrandizement, without interfering with ours? And above all, would not the more vigorous martial

[1] Our policy of indiscriminately subsidizing any thing, or any body, to fight against France, has often led us to attempt forming coalitions out of powers thoroughly hostile to each other. Such unnatural mixtures may be compared to the jumbling oil and water together, with a view of obtaining a chemical combination.

policy recommended, if adopted by us, give them a better prospect of success, and inspire them with greater confidence in our assistance, than if we were to make over to them half the revenue of Great Britain? If all these considerations have no weight with Austria, we must look upon her as an enemy; and should she afterwards enter, or be forced, into hostilities with France, let her do it upon her own bottom, unless she lower her tone. We can take advantage of the contest, in order to make ourselves stronger; and if she perishes, such being her temper towards us, we shall have lost but little.

The emperor of Russia, it is true, cannot be urged to join us, by such powerful motives as we may hold forth to Austria; but it may not, perhaps, be altogether impossible to persuade him and his nobles, that our friendship will be more useful to them than that of the French, who every moment give them fresh cause of jealousy. We, too, have it in our power to threaten Russia, and may thwart her in many points if she exasperates us. As long as we are at war with her, we cannot either speak or act towards her too firmly; and no opportunity of injuring her ought to be lost. The destruction of Cronstadt must, as I before observed, be kept in view, an exploit, by which we are more likely to conciliate the Russians, than if we were to give them twenty sail of the line.

I have already fully stated the pernicious effects of our policy of sparing the smaller states, which

declare against us, from a mistaken principle of pity; if to this we add the policy, which has also been so much inculcated, of sparing the greater states, under similar circumstances, with a view to conciliate them; it forms, upon the whole, a system, which must make us laughed at by all, on account of our credulity, and held in the most sovereign contempt by the latter, for (what they must consider) the sneaking, pusillanimous way, in which we court their friendship; a system, in short, by which, in our hatred to the government of France, we tamely allow the governments of all other nations, not only to abandon and betray us, when in alliance with us, after having flourished by our assistance, and fattened upon our bounty, but to injure us as much and as long as they please; certain of perfect impunity whilst they remain at war with us, and even of being again received into our warmest friendship, and treated with the most unbounded generosity, in spite of all their former ill-conduct towards us, the moment that it shall suit their purposes to change their sides a second time; so that, all things considered, if we persevere in this system, the enmity and friendship of other states will be equally ruinous to us. Indeed, if a distinction can be drawn between the two, I should say, that this country will be more likely to be destroyed by having many secret, or declared, professed friends, amongst foreign powers, than by having every other state in the world her open, active, and inveterate enemy.

For the truth is, that although the people of one nation may have strong feelings of friendship, of gratitude, or of aversion towards the government or people of another, it is impossible or next to impossible, that the government of any one country, whether monarchy or republic, can either feel or be actuated by the smallest spark of true friendship, or of gratitude, towards the government of any other country. This is a truth which will be acknowledged not only by those who may have had access to the secret history of cabinets, or who may have been themselves employed in diplomatic affairs, but it is so clearly discernible, through the artificial veil of state papers and manifestos, and so evident, even upon the most superficial review of the history of past ages, that to reflecting minds it will be unnecessary, and to those who do not almost at once see its obviousness it might be labour lost, to attempt to prove it.

Since, then, governments act not from principle or feeling towards each other, but from interest, it is indispensibly necessary for us, if we wish to prosper in our foreign affairs, to make other states fully sensible, that it will be contrary to their interests, if not dangerous to their existence, to venture to offend us. Consequently (to return to Russia), we must do every thing to make the Russians feel and dread our power, as they would now, most certainly, make us feel theirs, if they could. It was too long the fashion amongst us, at least in our newspapers and

political writings, to look up with a sentiment almost like religious veneration to the emperors of that country, and to breathe out humble and anxious hopes and wishes (not, alas! unmixed with fears), that they would magnanimously step forward as the saviours of Europe, and of Great Britain, from the French yoke. It is now time for us to show the world, that we can, not only save ourselves, independent of foreign assistance, but that we are fully determined to humble or destroy all our enemies, or to perish in the attempt. In holding such language, lofty as it may appear, there is nothing that can be considered a bravado; for the history of mankind has shown, that by these maxims alone can a nation either increase its power, or preserve its existence in perilous times. The sooner, therefore, that we act upon this policy the better, although we certainly should have had greater merit, had we done so some years back, than if we adopt it now from necessity; for nations, who profit by the disasters of others, have more claim to the character of wisdom, than those whose conduct is regulated solely in consequence of their own: happy, however, and not altogether undeserving of praise, are they, who will allow themselves to be instructed by either!

The next power which may claim our attention is Sweden. Much as the late sovereign of that country was to be applauded for his exhibiting the solitary instance, in Europe, of a monarch risking every thing, rather than abandon just principles;

much too, as we must reprobate the manner, in which he was deprived of his crown: still, as we ourselves are not subjects of Sweden, but of Great Britain, that event may be considered highly fortunate for us, as it released us from the ruinous obligation of paying the monstrous sum of twelve hundred thousand pounds a year to the government of the former country, merely on condition (for no other hopes, latterly, could be formed from its alliance) that it should protect its own independence.[1] To the present government of Sweden we are, fortunately, bound by no ties: we have even a right, on account of its hostile measures towards us, to declare war against it, and to subvert it, whenever we please. In speaking of Sweden, surely no one will pretend that it can be proper for us, either to pity, or to place the smallest confidence in, its present ruler or rulers; for they themselves showed no pity to their own sovereign, and they have already broken their faith with every body. They shamefully deposed their king, under the false and hypocritical pretext, that his measures were totally incompatible with the existence of their country; and yet, the first use

[1] Faithful as the King of Sweden was to us, we cannot be said to owe him much, for not having violated an alliance so exclusively to his own advantage. Had he possessed the talents of a hero, and the confidence of his subjects, the principles in which he persevered, appear to me to have been the wisest, and safest, as well as most honourable, that he could have adopted.

which they themselves made of their usurped authority, was to resign the finest province of Sweden to Russia, and afterwards to settle the reversion of their crown upon a French general. Thus they have shown themselves doubly traitors, by launching forth in a career, more infamous than that of Catiline, under professions similar to those of the elder Brutus.

We ought to act upon no half-measures against enemies of this description; and in any attack, which we may hereafter make upon them, it may reasonably be presumed, that we shall have almost the whole Swedish nation for our allies. The leading men in Sweden have long been considered secret pensioners of France, or of Russia, which the late events seem to have fully proved; but it is not to be supposed, that the people can either approve of, or that they will long submit to, their country being betrayed or sold, by the cowardice and villany of a few, into the state of a province of the most tyrannical government that exists. We ought, therefore, to carry the war into Sweden, not as enemies, but as deliverers, stretching forth our protecting arm, to save her from the bondage which awaits her, and to aid her in avenging her wrongs.

I have already shown, that we are not bound by any principle of justice to replace extinct governments; let, therefore, the Swedes themselves, when they shall have got rid of their base usurpers, by our assistance, decide, whether they will reinstate

their former government or not. As for any attempt, on our part, to force it upon them, contrary to their own wishes and consent, it would not only be highly impolitic, but the final success of such a measure would be absolutely impossible. Setting out upon this principle of consulting in every thing the wishes and interests of the great body of the Swedish nation; after having overthrown the French party, we may offer them either an alliance with us as an independent state; not like our former treaty, prejudicial to our own interests, but beneficial to both: or we may propose to them a federal union with Great Britain, upon conditions favourable to their freedom and prosperity; and it appears to me very possible, that they may prefer this to a precarious and turbulent independence under any native government.

If the Swedes yet retain any spark of their ancient spirit, they must spurn at the idea of becoming the slaves of a slave of Buonaparte; and they will either anticipate our views, by imitating the noble example of their own ancestors, under Gustavus Vasa, certain, like the Spaniards of the present day, of our aid and protection in so just and generous a cause; or, at least, they will be ready to fly to arms, upon our appearance, and when the moment of action shall arrive, a very small British force will suffice to deliver them from the yoke of oppression. If on the contrary they, whose warlike ancestors often gave law to the North, are become such recreants, as

tamely and basely to wear the chains of France and of Russia, then we may mournfully say, that the mighty are fallen indeed. But we shall have no cause ourselves to despair of our object on that account, although it may be necessary for us to defer the execution of it to a more distant period, and to employ greater means in the enterprise: for the time must come, when the Swedes will repent the not having accepted our friendship, after the same experience, which has opened the eyes of other nations, shall have taught them the detestable character of their new government, which we ought to watch our opportunity of destroying, as the lion watches for his prey. In the mean time we must always hold out a threat of invading Sweden; and do that country, whilst at war with us, all the mischief in our power, in order to aggravate, and make it fully feel, all the evils of its degrading state of subjection to France.

A similar policy may insure our success, when we carry our arms into Norway. On the first hasty view of the state of that country, a contrary result might, however, be expected, on account of the attachment felt by the people towards the Danish government, which is acknowledged to have ruled them, in general, with justice and moderation, without attempting to encroach upon their privileges, although much greater than those of its other subjects. Hence the Norwegians have always supported the cause of their government, and

resisted invasion in a manner that does them the highest honour; but there are reasons which render it very improbable that they will oppose us, with the same spirit with which they have formerly fought against the Swedes.

Had the government of Denmark retained to the present moment any claim to the title of independence, I do not entertain so mean an opinion of the character of the Norwegians, as to imagine that any offers, however advantageous, which we could address to their private interests, would induce them to abandon its cause. But that government is at this moment totally and notoriously under subjection to Buonaparte; nor do his partizans speak of it in any other terms, than as a trembling vassal, prepared to do, to grant, and to suffer, every thing which he may require. Is it then to be supposed that the Norwegians, happy as their union with Denmark has hitherto been, will think themselves bound to sacrifice their freedom, upon the funeral pile of the extinct government of the sister country? Buonaparte does not even affect to disguise his views respecting them. In the French and Swedish papers, there are as many cool speculations about who is to receive the sovereignty of Norway at his hands, as if he had both the same power and right to dispose of it, which he has to give away the horses in his stables. Even were he to condescend to use more delicacy in his language, respecting the subjects of what is, by a strange perversion of terms, sometimes

called an independent government; his conduct in Switzerland, in Spain, and latterly to Sweden, shows the Norwegians the dreadful fate which they have to expect. The true question, therefore, when a British army shall land in their country, will be, whether they choose to accept our offers of a fair and equal union with Great Britain, or to become the slaves of France.

Not only will self-preservation impel them to throw themselves upon our protection, in order to save themselves from the iron yoke of despotism; but their feelings, as a people who have enjoyed a considerable portion of personal freedom, may induce them to glory in the prospect of an union with the freest nation upon earth, which will be mutually beneficial to both parties. The timber of Norway will render it a valuable acquisition to us, as a naval power. Its people, who, from their moral qualities, are worthy of our friendship and respect, will furnish numerous and excellent recruits for our navy and army; whilst they themselves will equally profit by having a wider field thrown open for the exertion of their talents, of their enterprise, and of their industry. The strength of their country baffles invasion; so that we should be at a very trifling expense in our defensive establishments; besides that the people of Sweden, by whose resources alone our enemies can attack us in Norway, will be more ready to declare in our favour, than to act against us.

No enterprise in Sweden ought to be attempted before Norway is secured; but the preliminary step to the whole, is an attack upon the Danish islands; a measure indispensable to the success of our views in Scandinavia, no less than in Germany; and of the propriety and necessity of which, if any doubts remained in our minds before, surely they must now be removed, by the late extraordinary settlement of the succession to the crown of Sweden.*

If in our operations, in the north of Europe, we adopt the vigorous policy of which I have traced the outline, this new usurpation of Buonaparte, whereby, no doubt, he imagines that he has drawn the net of destruction more closely around us, may only tend, like his former usurpation of Spain, to his confusion and disgrace, and to our glory and benefit. And we shall found, in every thing, our own aggrandizement, upon the prosperity of the countries in which we act; effecting our views, not by bribes, distributed amongst a few despicable traitors, but by the favour of brave and renowned nations freed from slavery. Should we fully succeed in this policy, it only remains for me now to explain by what means Sweden ought to be defended. If in alliance with us, as an independent state, she must either defend herself by her own resources; or if

* Which had not transpired when I last mentioned the Danish islands.

she cannot do it without subsidies from us, she must consent to put the troops, whom we pay, under our orders. If incorporated with Great Britain, then we ought to defend Sweden, and indeed all our possessions in the north, in the same manner that Gustavus Adolphus defended his; that is to say, by vigorously attacking every enemy who threatens to invade them.

We shall now proceed to consider our relations with the Turks, a nation, who seem as much to excel their continental neighbours in resolution, as they are inferior to them in military skill: for, had they entertained that poor opinion of themselves, and that terrible notion of the superior prowess of their enemies, which we are told that they ought to do; or if they had been at all tinctured with our own unhappy, evacuating policy; the Turkish empire must long ago have been stripped of its European provinces, if not totally destroyed. Its immediate downfal has been predicted by almost every traveller, for more than half a century; and yet it still stands, whilst others supposed strong and warlike states (Prussia, for example) have been crumbled into dust. Such is the superiority, in war, of that manly, unyielding, undesponding spirit, which obliges an enemy to fight for every inch of ground he gains, over mere tactics and discipline, which the Prussian government had fully at its command; and which even the Neapolitan army possessed in sufficient perfection to have made it formidable,

had those, who directed its operations, been gifted with any thing like Turkish obstinacy.

We are now at peace with Turkey; nor should a new war rashly or hastily be undertaken; but the possibility of it ought to be foreseen, and the operations digested beforehand. Our recent acquisitions in the Ionian sea (unless we should unfortunately evacuate them, in some gloomy moment, without being attacked) must, of necessity, lead the Greeks to believe that we have ulterior views of aggrandizement in that part of the world; and will, at the same time, give them an opportunity of contrasting our system of government, with the rapacity and brutality of their former masters; so that we may hope to gain both their confidence and their affection, which will be of the utmost importance to us hereafter; because they are no longer the trembling slaves that they were some centuries ago: they have recovered a portion of their ancient spirit; their bravery, at least that of their seamen, has been put to the test; and they are ready to join the standard of any nation, that will assist in freeing them from the Turkish yoke.* If we omit so glorious an

* The greater part of the seamen in the Turkish navy are Greeks, who would, in all probability, desert to us, if at war with the Turks, whenever they had an opportunity. In our second expedition to Egypt, this was proved by the following incident. A British midshipman, who had charge of one of the Turkish prizes, taken by us at Alexandria,

opportunity, the French or Russians, the only other powers that have any influence in Greece,[1] may embrace it, to our own detriment, and to the disappointment of the people of that unhappy country, who may find that, whether they are plundered by a Turkish pasha, or by a French or Russian general, will in the end make little difference in their situation; for all military despotisms must act upon the same principles; and those who shake off one,

making a due discrimination, treated the Greek seamen left on board, not as prisoners, but with kindness and confidence; carrying on the usual harbour-duties, by their assistance, employing the same boat's-crew who had served the Turkish captain, and even giving some of them leave to go on shore occasionally. They seemed always contented, and were perfectly subordinate. He once, however, found one of them, involved in a desperate quarrel in the city, to which he put a stop, by ordering the man away, who immediately obeyed him. Upon inquiry, it appeared, that some of the Arabs had been talking very disrespectfully of the English; which the Greek, who at that time considered himself as belonging to our service, had felt it incumbent upon him to resent as a personal insult.

The courage of the Greek seamen was fully proved, in former wars between the Turks and Russians, and is now well known to our navy; for they have shewn more spirit, in defending their vessels against boarding, than those of most other nations.

[1] The Greeks place much less confidence in the Russians now, than formerly, on account of the bad faith of the latter towards them in the reign of Catharine the Second.

in order to throw themselves under the protection of another, may meet with stronger, but certainly not with more just or benign, masters.

Although we ought undoubtedly to establish as strong a British party as possible amongst the Greeks in general, and to keep the ultimate emancipation of them in view, it appears to me that it would not be advisable for us to attempt more than the conquest of the Greek islands, and of Egypt, at the first commencement of a new Turkish war. To do more, would require too great a portion of our disposable force, which may act to better advantage, in a less remote scene of action; indeed, as long as we find employment for the French armies, by attacking them in Spain, in the north of Europe, or in Italy, it will be impossible for Buonaparte to do any thing in Greece: and after we shall have stript the Turks of the possessions which have just been mentioned, it would even, for obvious reasons, be politic in us to leave them unmolested, or to conclude a truce with them, for a certain time.

When we throw our eyes across the Atlantic, the proceedings of the United States of North America, afford one of the strongest proofs of what was before advanced, that the conduct of governments towards each other, cannot be regulated by principles of friendship. At the head of a nation speaking the same language, and having inherited from common ancestors the same love of freedom with our-

selves, it might have been hoped, that when Great Britain stood forth as the champion of the world against an universal and most horrible despotism, the American government would have shown a fellow-feeling for a cause so congenial to its own principles, even to the sacrifice, if necessary, of some paltry pecuniary interest. On the contrary, during the whole of the contest, between the two hostile empires, the rulers of America seem to have been the favourers and admirers of the despotic, not of the free. The gross outrages committed upon their subjects, by the French, have been kept in the back ground; whilst every cause of complaint against us, however trivial, has been represented in the most atrocious light: our concessions on certain heads, because not absolutely mean and degrading to ourselves, have proved unsatisfactory: and upon every occasion, the fury of the populace has been inflamed and kept up against us, in America, by methods unworthy of a great state. Nor has the government of America shown much dignity, by the extraordinary declaration, that they would join with whichever nation, France or England, would first rescind its commercial decrees; by which they may be said to have carried the friendship of America, as it were, into market, and to have publicly offered it to the highest bidder.

We may hope, however, that the American government will see better its real interest, than to enter into a war with this country, which would be

highly disadvantageous for the people of both nations. What could the Americans gain by a war with us? or, what evils have they to prevent by an attack upon us? Ever since they made good their independence, we have been, and are likely to remain, very quiet neighbours. Of what advantage would it be to them, to deprive us of our remaining possessions? They would gain a little more territory, and some addition to their population, it is true; but they have already more land than they can properly cultivate, and their numbers, too (in consequence of this advantage), are constantly increasing in a wonderful ratio. Have they a wish to rob Great Britain of the commerce of the world, and to rival or eclipse her in maritime power and renown? Most of the great nations of the ancient hemisphere have already been actuated by this wish; nor is it wonderful that the Americans, who are in a state of rapidly-progressive strength, should, in their turn, feel the same, and long for an opportunity of making good their ambitious pretensions by force of arms; like the high-spirited boy, who ardently looks forward to manhood, and forms a thousand schemes of future honours to be won by his wisdom and valour. But the time for America to launch forth in the career of glory amidst warlike nations, does not yet seem to be arrived. Considering the present power and resources of the two countries, every reflecting citizen of America, who is unwarped by passion or prejudice, must see, that

by declaring against us, she is more likely to lose the whole of the valuable commerce which she has, or may have, at this moment, than to increase it at our expense. In short, the Americans have no solid advantage to fight for: but they must necessarily submit to heavy taxes and a public debt, in order to equip and maintain a navy and a standing army:[1] the new powers created by this new state of things may be dangerous to such a weak form of government; and the unusual burthens, with the certain hardships and sufferings, of the war, may so disgust the fickle, but all-powerful multitude, with their rulers, as to lead to some internal revolution, subversive of this overgrown democracy; which would only be a just punishment of its premature ambition.[2]

[1] In a country where labour is so high, these establishments will be unusually burthensome; and although thousands may be ruined in the course of the war, which may occasion a fall in the price of labour, the American people will only be so much the less able and willing to pay taxes; but it will be impossible for the government to take advantage of this circumstance, in order to reduce the pay of its navy and army, after these have once been fixed.

[2] In giving the reasons which may act upon the mind of an American, to dissuade him from a war with us, I have omitted one that ought to be the strongest, namely, that complete success would be more prejudicial to his country, than failure: for if Great Britain were destroyed, France, thereby rendered irresistible, would immediately destroy America. This I have

On the other hand, a war with America would also be very disadvantageous to us. Conquests in that country would, in all probability, be more difficult to effect, as well as more precarious to maintain, than in Europe.[1] Besides that, the most ample successes in Transatlantic warfare, however they might add to our own power, would in nothing diminish, or prevent, that of France; and these two objects should always be combined by us, if possible, in every enterprise, under the present circumstances of the world. Hence, it

done, because it is a general fault amongst all nations to despise remote dangers, however great, whilst they often shrink from present, of the most trifling nature; but of all others, a democracy like America is the most blindly confident in its future good fortune, and the least likely to attend to the grave maxims of foresight, when opposed to the interests and passions of the moment. I have, therefore, only stated the most obvious, because the most immediate, evils, which America may bring upon herself by the war.

[1] I do not mean by this to compliment the Americans at the expense of the people of Europe, in general, nor do I think that they are likely to show more spirit, in self-defence, than the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Tyrolese, have done. It is their situation and circumstances, as much as their love of independence, which certainly is great and laudable, that present greater difficulties against an invader, than in Europe; and it is their indefinite prospect of increasing strength (a thing which can be felt by no other nation), that must render permanent conquests precarious.

appears to me, that our policy, in respect to the United States of America, should be perfectly friendly and unambitious.

But there is a point, beyond which, conciliatory measures, towards any other nation, would degenerate from wisdom into weakness. If, therefore, we should be forced into a war, contrary to our interest, by any unreasonable and unjust demands of the government of America; as the contest, by preventing us from acting with so much energy and vigour in Europe, upon which our safety depends, will be highly pernicious to us; we ought to consider the United States as the wanton and bitter enemies of our existence, and treat them accordingly. In order to make them weary of the war, we should use our naval force, not only to destroy their shipping, but to harrass and alarm them by frequent descents, so as to keep their troops employed on the defensive, along their vast extent of sea coast; by which we shall also prevent them from overpowering us with superior numbers, in our own possessions. In short, according to the maxim, which I have already so often repeated, but which cannot be too deeply impressed on our minds, we ought not to make war against them by halves, but to do them all the mischief possible. By so doing, instead of adding to the present absurd and groundless hatred, which the populace of many parts of America now seem to feel against us, (although I admit, that whether they hate us or

not is of little importance), we shall only make them respect us; and as we ought always to hold out, that we have no views of conquest (for this, as was observed, is not our policy), but that we are ready at a moment's warning, to renew a friendly intercourse, either with the general government, or with any separate province, or provinces, of the United States, upon reasonable terms; the stream of popularity may even, in course of time, run in our favour throughout the Union. Hence this moderation on our part, if accompanied with vigour in our warlike operations, without which it would be mistaken for fear, will, in case of any future rupture, be the surest and speediest way of restoring peace; a thing which will be equally desirable for the mutual benefit of both countries.

The most vital interests of Great Britain, if I reason rightly, lie not beyond the Atlantic, but in Europe. We should take care, therefore, not to pursue any schemes in the new, which may interfere with our success in the old, world. The freedom of the Spanish peninsula is more precious to us, than all the mines, or commerce, of the Spanish American colonies. The whole of the latter evidently wish to shake off their dependence upon the mother country; indeed, they have long wished to attempt it, but have hitherto had no favourable opportunity. The great distress and weakness of Spain, however, have now given them the power, and circumstances have afforded them a specious

pretext, of effecting their object, under a pretended loyalty to Ferdinand the Seventh, whom they would probably no more respect, if hereafter restored to his throne, than the long parliament of England respected Charles the First, against whom they made war in his own name. It is perfectly unnecessary, and would be impolitic, in us to take any active part in the dispute, in favour of Spain against her colonies; but it would be highly selfish, ungenerous, and no less impolitic, to aid or countenance the latter. The present government of Spain, our ally, has (whether wisely or not, I shall not pretend to decide), thought proper to declare the revolted colonies, in a state of naval blockade;[1] and let our own merchants, who choose to violate that blockade, take the consequences. It may be mortifying to those, who suffer by it, to see their ships carried as prizes into Cadiz, or the Havannah; and they may even, perhaps, endeavour to mislead the country, by representing the thing as a degradation to the British flag: but our national honour ought to be dearer to us, than the private interests of traders and manufacturers; and as long as we ourselves assert our own rights to maritime blockade, it would be the height of injustice to object to the exercise of the same right in any other power, particularly in the Spanish nation, the most deserving ally that we have ever had.

[1] This alluded to an act of the supreme junta of regency, previous to the opening of the Cortes.

Having now analyzed the spirit and principles, which cause a nation to succeed in war; having shown how little we have hitherto studied or attended to these, in our military affairs in general; having also traced the outline of a more vigorous martial policy; and having considered the probable relations in which the adoption of such a system would involve us, with every power which can affect, or be affected by, our warlike operations; let us pause for a moment, in order to survey the prospects which will thereby be opened to us.

The enlightened author of the Wealth of Nations has well observed, that "in every country, the "progressive state is the cheerful and hearty state "to all the different orders of society; but that "the stationary is dull; and the declining, melan-"choly."[1] This observation he has, however, only applied to the pursuit of riches; but it is no less true, and much more striking, if we extend it also to the subjects of national power and glory. What can be more dull and stupid, than a war, in which a nation struggles for its existence, acting constantly and exclusively upon defensive principles? What can be more melancholy, or more dismal, than a war so managed, should it prove unsuccessful? Human life affords no calamities, the prospect of which can appear half so dreadful to the man who loves his country. On the other hand, can any thing be more cheerful, or more

[1] Book I. chap. viii.

animating, to the subject of a free, an independent, and a warlike state, than the prospect of increasing power and glory, resulting from a war undertaken, not from a wanton lust of conquest, but into which his country has been forced by the injustice of some sanguinary despot, who regards no laws human or divine. Such are the prospects which we have before us, if we choose to embrace a vigorous offensive system, and it appears to me, that the practicability of realizing them depends solely upon ourselves.

The British nation had, no one will say from want of strength or of courage, but from a truly moderate and generous spirit, renounced all wish of increasing its own power by the conquest of any integral part of the territory of other independent nations, limiting its efforts, when at war with them, merely to the capture of their ships and colonies. In short, its measures have been of the most moderate nature possibly compatible with a state of warfare; either entirely defensive, or, where they tended to aggrandizement, that object has been pursued, at some trifling expense to the prosperity of a rival, but never with a view to the destruction even of the bitterest enemy. This moderation, however, laudable as it may, perhaps, formerly have been, is totally misplaced in the present times. We are no longer surrounded by independent nations. Even the names, of some of those with which we were wont to treat, are blotted out of the map of the world. The rest are vassals of France. On every side we see nothing

but deadly enemies. War we cannot avoid; and in war we cannot succeed by merely displaying the valour, unless we also assume the ardour, and the ambition of conquerors. Were we to assume this spirit, apprehension and despondency would at once fly from our hearts. When we cast our eyes around us, every thing would appear in cheerful and inviting colours, and we might exult in the noble and arduous career which we have to run; for the world would lie before us, and we have antagonists to contend with, not unworthy of our arms. We have won the empire of the seas; but that of the land is in the hands of our enemies. We cannot preserve the former, without aspiring to the latter; and as we gained the former, so may we the latter: for they who tremble at the sight of the British flag upon the ocean, must strike to it upon the land.

Such are the sentiments which would best become us in our present situation, and which are recommended to us, no less powerfully by the voice of prudence, than by the dictates of manly courage. Whilst I confess, that I am most deeply persuaded of the propriety of these sentiments, let it not thence be inferred that I am a lover of war. Like other pursuits, war is certainly not without its charms,[1]

[1] Schiller, in his tragedy of the Bride of Messina, makes the chorus, after singing the praises of peace, express this sentiment.

Aber der krieg auch hat seine ehre,
Der kraeger des menschengeschicks;

even to the most humane and generous minds; but it must first be ennobled by its cause: and what can be a better and more sacred cause, than that in which we are now fighting; in which, whilst we defend our own king and country, we may also stand forth as the general protectors and deliverers of the rest of mankind, from a state of slavery, that, after exhibiting to the world a second race of imperial monsters and ideots, like those of Rome, of Ravenna, and of Byzantium, would end in a renewal of the history of the dark ages?

Whilst we ought thus to attempt, with the utmost energy, the humiliation, if not the absolute destruction of every enemy, with whom we have to contend in so just and necessary a war, I by no means wish it to be understood, that these are the objects for which we ought to fight. On the contrary, they are merely the principles of action, or means, which if steadily pursued, will conduce to our final success, and which alone can enable us to obtain the great and only end that ought to be kept in view, in every war, by those who wish to blend humanity with valour, namely, the being able to command a safe and honourable peace.

Mir gefällt ein lebendiges leben,
Mir ein ewiges schwanken, und schwingen, und
schweben,
Auf der steigenden, fallenden welle des glücks.
Den der Mensch verkümmert im frieden,
Müssige ruh ist das grab des muths, &c.

It is now universally allowed, that we cannot hope for a peace of this description, from the present restless and unprincipled ruler of France. But it appears to me, that the true, and by far the greatest danger, which we have to apprehend, is, from the present comparative power of the French empire, more than from the character of its emperor. Indeed, the latter circumstance may be considered highly to our advantage; because, if Buonaparte, in his general conduct, after his accession to the supreme power in France, had shown the smallest regard to the law of nations, to the faith of treaties, and to the dictates of justice and of humanity, he must have totally disarmed our suspicions; and when we had consequently allowed our defensive establishments to go to decay, he might have attacked us, almost under as disadvantageous circumstances as those in which he found the unfortunate Spaniards. Much as Buonaparte may personally be detested by his subjects, were he to effect the destruction of Great Britain, there is scarcely a man in France who would not applaud him, and rejoice at his success, with the same enthusiasm, with which men of all parties amongst ourselves forget their disputes, in order to commemorate the joyful tidings of some naval victory. France and England are natural rivals; and every Frenchman is our enemy from his cradle. Were the former country even ruled, at some future period, by a mild, unambitious, humane government, in every thing, in short, the reverse of its

present one (which, to those who remember the Bourbons and the republic, must appear a very improbable supposition); and were this supposed new government of France once more at peace with us, what would be the consequence? As there never have been, so there never can be, wanting causes of war between two countries situated like France and England, which the governments and people of both may, in many cases, reconcile to the strictest feelings of justice and of national honour;[1] and when the sword is once drawn between any two nations, although they may have quarrelled about a straw, we may say, in the language of Brennus, Woe be to the weakest![2]

To have a safe, a permanent, and honourable peace, therefore, with France, let the character of its rulers be what it may, will be utterly impossible, until we increase our own strength, and diminish that of our enemies, so much, by a vigorous system of warfare, as to make them feel that their safety will depend as much upon our moderation as upon

[1] The trivial nature of our disputes with America is a proof of the truth of this remark; yet these might have led to a war, which would, in all probability, have been considered just in both countries; and which, had America more power, or we no other enemies, might occasion the total destruction of one of the two states.

[2] Væ victis! words, always to be kept in mind by those who are at war.

their own power of resistance. It is base, and unworthy of the British nation, to aspire to any thing short of this, or to hold out a tone of less defiance towards our inveterate and implacable enemies, the French, than they express and feel towards us. It is also impolitic for a thousand reasons, which may be fully inferred from what I have already said.

Should the French offer to make peace with us, before we shall have achieved this desirable change, as such a peace can only be proposed, from a consciousness that it will very much forward their ultimate views of effecting our destruction (for the notion of their being actuated, in political affairs, by any sentiments but those of jealousy and of hatred towards Great Britain, is absurd; so absurd, indeed, that one would think it could scarcely gull the most ignorant, unreflecting man, in this or in any other country); we must either totally reject their insidious overtures, or, what may appear the same thing, we must refuse to negociate, except upon such conditions as will give us proper security for their future good conduct. Preliminary, for instance, to any negociation for a definitive treaty, we may consent to an armistice, on condition that they evacuate the Spanish peninsula, and the kingdom of Naples; and, not to enter into needless details, as one indispensable point which we must afterwards insist upon, in order to provide for ourselves, as well as for our allies, is, that the

French consent to renounce maritime affairs for ever: another condition of the armistice must be, that Buonaparte send over to England, and deliver up to us every vessel belonging to him, which is intitled to carry a pendent, from the three decker to the gun-boat, inclusive.

He will, no doubt, object to these proposals, which he will consider very injurious to his dignity, as well as disadvantageous to his interests. Then we may tell him, that our own national safety and honour are dearer to us than his personal feelings. We may represent to him, that the only causes, which he assigned for seizing upon Spain, namely, his desire of preventing the effusion of human blood in that country, and his wish for a general peace,[a] cannot, in the present state of things, be promoted, otherwise than by his consenting to leave our allies, the Spaniards, to settle their own

[a] The preamble to the resignation of the crown of Spain, by Charles the Fourth, is as follows: "Napoleon, emperor of "the French, &c. &c. and Charles IV. king of Spain and the "Indies, animated equally by a desire to put an end to the "anarchy to which Spain is a prey, and to save that brave "nation from the agitation of faction, and the *convulsions of* "*civil* and *foreign war*, and place it in the sole position, "which, in the extraordinary circumstances in which it is "now found, can maintain its integrity, *guarantee* its *colo-*"*nies*, and enable it to unite all its means to those of France, "to obtain a *maritime peace*, have resolved, &c." This was a good confutation of the pamphlets, of that day, clamouring for peace with the *unambitious, sincere*, Buonaparte.

affairs. We may also observe, that by giving up all his ships of war to us, he will be eased of an useless expense, and thereby have his revenues more disengaged for his magnificent schemes of internal improvement; besides that his great talents, which we know would, as long as he had hopes of encountering us upon the ocean, be employed in forming plans of operation for a future invasion of England, might, by the terms we proposed, be solely applied to the perfection of the Napoleon code, &c. so that, upon the whole, he would have the finest opportunity, if he wished it, of making good his claim to the title of father of his country, which his senate has given him, and in which he himself seems to take so much delight; and consequently the evils and miseries which he has inflicted upon mankind, might come, in process of time, to be forgotten; in the same manner, that the crimes of Octavius were blotted from the memory of the people of the Roman world, in their after-admiration of the justice and beneficence of Augustus.

If by these rational arguments, dictated by a love of mankind, we could excite any humane and generous feelings in the breast of this mighty emperor, and persuade him to make peace with us and our allies, upon the only terms consistent with our safety in the present state of affairs, then, the sooner it is made, the better.[1] But if he treats

[1] Having discussed the terms upon which we may treat with France, it may be proper to add a few remarks upon those

such proposals with indignation or contempt, then we must tell him, that we cannot mistake the

which we might offer to Denmark, should that power propose to shake off its vassalage to Buonaparte, and beg a separate peace of us.

It is to be observed, that at the commencement of the present war, the governments of Sicily and of Denmark were both neutral, both nearly equal in point of strength, and alike in situation, the territories of both being partly continental, partly insular. Hence their relations to the two belligerent powers were then exactly parallel; and it appears to me that the very same policy might, with propriety, have been adopted by us to regulate our conduct towards both, under all possible circumstances that were to be foreseen. By the course of events, however, we have now become allies of Sicily, and enemies of Denmark; but the same reasoning, which I have used, in various parts of this work, in treating of the government of the former country, will still hold good, in general, towards that of the latter, under similar circumstances. This being premised, it is to be hoped, that if Denmark should seek a reconciliation with us, we will avoid falling into the same errors, which have been so pernicious to us, in our negociations with Sicily, as has been already explained.

A war with Denmark is certainly much more to our advantage, than any alliance which we could possibly form with that country. In order, however, to show our moderation, we may grant her a peace upon the following terms:

First, That she give up Zealand to us, to be garrisoned by British troops, until the conclusion of a general peace.

Secondly, That she furnish to us a contingent of Danish troops, equal in numbers to those whose services we shall thus lose by the occupation of Zealand; that these troops shall be employed in general service, in any part of Europe we

ulterior, and the only views, which must guide the usurper of Spain and of Switzerland, in his pacific overtures to other countries; we must remind him that they, whose views a peace would promote, must yield to the terms of those whose dearest interests depend upon the vigorous prosecution of the war; that he being in the former, we in the latter, predicament, it is our business to dictate, his to accept; and that, if he does not choose to submit

please; and that we shall take all the expenses of their pay, clothing, recruiting, &c. upon ourselves, provided that Denmark grant the British government a subsidy for the adequate maintenance of our own garrison in Zealand.

Should a treaty be concluded with Denmark upon these conditions, that government will be able to defend itself against France, in Norway and the islands, which it could not do without our assistance; and should we prosper in the contest, it will recover all its former dominions; whilst, at the same time, we ourselves shall be put to no extra expense; and by the temporary occupation of Zealand, we shall only have proper security, to prevent our ally from betraying us in the course of the war: nor can the Danish government think it extraordinary, or unreasonable, if we demand something of this kind; for we cannot forget the two armed neutralities, in which they thought proper to join to our prejudice; the last of which, if they had succeeded, would have led to the invasion of England. The above are, in short, the most favourable terms of peace, which we can grant to the government of Denmark, without totally sacrificing our own interests and safety. If they reject these, we should, therefore, admit of no further communication, but prosecute the war against them with the utmost vigour, and destroy them, if possible.

to our demands, we and our posterity will make war with him and his successors for ever.[1]

[1] In the concluding passages of this chapter, I have endeavoured to correct an obscurity which, I apprehend, must have prevailed in the first and second editions; since it appears that my meaning has not been generally understood. When I recommended that terms of peace should be offered to Buonaparte, to which it was obviously chimerical to suppose, that he, or any man in his situation, would accede; my readers may do me the credit to believe, that I never for a moment speculated, in earnest, upon the probability of such a negociation. My object was merely to illustrate, that, in the present state of things, all negociation is out of the question; that our only hope lies in the sword; and that, therefore, should we, by any chance, come to a parley with our adversary, we ought to set him at total defiance.

This is exactly the spirit with which the Roman senate met the overtures of King Pyrrhus, when, as the basis of negociation, they required him to resign all the fruits of his victories, by immediately evacuating Italy. Yet, although it was judged wise to lay down such conditions, it is not to be supposed, that any Roman seriously believed, that the King would accept of them.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the true definition of a military nation. That a free government is essential, commerce advantageous, and other arts not prejudicial, to the views of a military nation.

A KIND of obscure feeling seems generally to exist in England, that we shall never succeed in war by land, until we become a military nation. The only proper definition of a military nation, that can be given, is one that prospers in war; to attempt to demonstrate the truth of the above proposition would consequently be superfluous: but as this definition is much too vague to convey any distinct notion, to the minds of those who have not deeply reflected upon the subject, an inquiry into what truly constitutes a military nation, may be

of the greatest service, particularly as no author, to my knowledge, has yet attempted it.

We confess that we ourselves are not a military nation; but it is generally admitted that the French are; and certainly they have a better claim to that title, at the present moment, than the people of any other country. But as it is impossible to think of the French, without the long train of crimes and miseries which they have inflicted and suffered; without anarchy, despotism, confiscations, massacres, and conscriptions, passing in review before us; we are unfortunately too apt to associate these horrible ideas with their success in war, and consequently the very thought of our becoming a military nation (which we fancy the French to be,) always makes us shudder, in spite of our secret sense of the necessity of it. Nothing, however, can be more erroneous than such a notion. The successes of the French have been gained, not by means, but in spite, of their sufferings and injustice. Cruelty and heroism are so seldom combined in the same person, that the notion, that those hands only which have been stained with the blood of fellow-citizens are fit to wield the sword of war, is very unphilosophical; and the opinion, that they alone, who have trampled upon the laws at home, or who tremble for their lives and property, at the smallest caprice of a domestic tyrant, are capable of vanquishing the enemies of the state abroad, is, in itself, equally false and pernicious.

If a sanguinary democracy, such as the late, or a degrading despotism, like the present, government of France, had ever, in the history of mankind, conquered a well-regulated mixed monarchy, or even a well-regulated commonwealth, not democratical, of equal resources, acting upon martial principles equally vigorous; then I should be ready to admit the notion, which seems to have been hastily adopted by many Englishmen, that unless it be ruled by the despotism of the one, or by that of the many, no country can become a military nation. The very contrary inference, however, ought to be drawn, even from the history of the present times. What has raised Great Britain to a rank, amongst the nations, so much higher than other states originally of greater resources? What is it, that has preserved her existence, whilst the nations around her have been destroyed by France? Let us speak with proper veneration and gratitude of the constitution with which Divine Providence has blessed us; the superior excellence of which over a more popular form of government, has been allowed even by the citizens of other free states.[1] The British constitution alone has been the source of our grandeur; that alone has preserved our independence. Democracy against democracy; or despotism against despotism; Britain never could have been

[1] See De Lolme on the British Constitution, and Adams on Republics.

able, nor will she ever be able, if we unfortunately should hereafter have a revolution in our country, to resist France.

The triumphs of the French over other nations prove nothing. The resources of France were much greater than those of her neighbours: and where is the merit of one kind of despotism, acting upon vigorous martial principles, having destroyed other despotisms, weaker in themselves, and managing their affairs with less vigour and firmness? As far as we ourselves have fairly entered into competition with the French, which has hitherto been upon the ocean alone, we have constantly proved their masters, both in the time of the republic and of the despotism; and we have not only destroyed the fleets of France, but those of all our other enemies; and so may we destroy their armies, if we choose to go to war with them by land in earnest. The Scriptures say, that the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong. How can the swift win the race, if they are too lazy to run? or how can the strong prevail in the fight, if they are either afraid or unwilling to exert their strength? The trident of Neptune has been called the sceptre of the world; and so it would be, if we used it as a spear to strike our enemy, not as a defensive weapon to ward off his blows. When we shall be tired out, by using it in such an unprofitable manner as the latter, then it must inevitably drop from our hands.

We have never yet properly exerted either our strength or our courage in war, by land, and for this reason, and this alone, we have failed; not on account of any defects in our constitution, in which our strength principally consists, and from which our courage is derived.

In the time of Charles the Fifth, and of his successor, the Spaniards had the same right to the title of a military nation which the French have at present, yet their glory was of a very transient nature. The Austrians afterwards may, with fair grounds, have asserted their claim to that title, which, however, they have forfeited for more than a century. The Swedes for a short time had fair pretensions to it. The French, in the time of Louis the Fourteenth, were no less a military nation than they are now; for war was as much the exclusive profession of the French nobility of those days, as it is of the revolutionary noblesse of the present. In the reign of his immediate successor, the French lost their military vigour and reputation, and they were certainly considered very unwarlike, when the revolution first broke out. At that time Prussia was at the height of her glory, and was believed in Europe to be the most perfect model of a military nation.[1] To go a little farther back, without recur-

[1] The Prussians compared themselves to the Romans from the time of Frederic the Great, till very lately. "Ainsi, loin de profiter de cette tranquillité pour s'amollir, la paix

ring for the present to ancient history, the Saracens, and even the Turks, have had their day. The latter, not many centuries ago, were considered the most thoroughly warlike nation in the world. To give more instances, would be superfluous; but it sufficiently appears from the above, that a nation ruled by a despotic or arbitrary government, has seldom enjoyed the reputation of being a military nation for more than one or two reigns at the utmost, although it may, during the course of its existence as an independent state, have been engaged in almost constant wars. The reason is obvious. In an arbitrary government, every thing depends upon the personal character of the prince alone. Should he happen to possess great talents for war, and know how to gain the confidence of his subjects (as it is seldom that more than one monarch of this character is to be found in the world at the same time, because such great qualities are rare in themselves, and in absolute princes, are generally stifled by their unhappy education); it will be easy for such a prince to enlarge a small state into a great kingdom, or, out of a great kingdom, to

devint pour les troupes Prussiennes une école de guerre, &c. et toutes les parties du militaire concouroient à l'affermissement de cette discipline qui rendit autrefois les Romains vainqueurs de toutes les nations." (Histoire de mon temps, chap. vii.)

establish an almost universal empire, by the conquest of other despotisms around him; in consequence of which, the people over whom he originally ruled, will suddenly acquire great renown, and may be considered the first military nation in the world. A Philip, however, is seldom followed by an Alexander. A successor, less ambitious, or less wise and active, comes to the throne, who either gives up war entirely, or neglects his armies, which, of all human establishments, are the most liable to abuse, and in which abuses are the most pernicious; at the same time, from a tyrannical disposition, he probably oppresses his people, or from ignorance and indolence allows his inferiors to oppress them. Hence, after one or two generations, when this mighty empire comes to be vigorously attacked, it proves totally unable to defend itself; the courage of its armies is found deficient, and the military spirit of its people is buried in the same grave with the hero who first called it into existence; so that the seemly, but ill-cemented, fabric of despotism may be destroyed with the same ease with which it was erected.[2] This is exactly the

[1] That the warlike king of Prussia felt the possibility, or rather the facility of this, I infer from a saying ascribed to him, that the finest dream for a king would be to dream, that he were king of France.

[2] Unless, like the Roman empire in the time of the Cæsars, it shall first have destroyed every vigorous state around it.

picture of the rise and fall of the Prussian monarchy. Indeed, this is so much the inevitable fate of arbitrary governments, that it appears absolutely impossible that the people of a country so governed, can ever be, properly speaking, a military nation; least of all, if they groan under the yoke of what is called a military despotism; a government the most thoroughly destructive of the martial spirit, and which has nothing military in its constitution, but the name.

A pure democracy, on the contrary, is favourable to the martial spirit; although it has justly been considered a more unhappy form of government than the tyranny of one. The lower orders of the people, who command with absolute authority, must be high spirited in proportion to their power. The great and rich, who are engaged in constant and tumultous struggles for place, in which they often fall the victims of popular fury, are embarked in a career of hope, mixed with danger, and checkered with extremes of good and evil, which very much resemble the cares, the hazards, and vicissitudes of the military life. Hence a warlike democracy will never want enterprising officers and brave soldiers: indeed, the martial spirit of the French seamen and soldiers was never so great as under the republic;

If Buonaparte should conquer Great Britain, the French empire may last like the former for many centuries, to the bane of mankind: but we may prevent that if we please.

but, in spite of these advantages, this form of government is subject to such sudden changes in its measures, owing to popular commotions producing partial revolutions, which seem to be inseparable from it, that it is by no means calculated for carrying on war with vigour and perseverance. The energy of the French republic seemed to have nearly evaporated, when Buonaparte usurped the government: that of the United States of North America, has not yet been tried in external war. But when we look back to the free states of antiquity, we find that those, whose governments have been the least democratical, revolutionary, and turbulent, have invariably proved the most successful in war.

What is worthy of our most serious attention; the three most warlike nations of antiquity, that flourished in martial vigour for many centuries, the Spartans, the Romans, and the Carthaginians, who, from slender beginnings, attained a degree of power and glory, which others, of much greater original strength, failed to gain; all these nations did, in their political constitution, more nearly resemble that of Great Britain, than any which have since been known.

Aristotle praises the governments of Lacedæmon and of Carthage, in particular, on account of their having a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The latter he admires, as the most

perfect form of government then known. Polybius, in like manner, says, that the Romans owed their successes, in a great measure, to their government, which was a happy combination of the above three simple forms, and much more perfect than any of them: that of Carthage, he admits to have been, at first, equally good; but he observes, that in the second Punic war, whilst Rome was still in full vigour, Carthage had begun to decline, the people of that state having by degrees obtained too great a portion of power in the government, and this he assigns as a principal cause of its downfal. Besides which, the experiments of England and France seem to have proved, that, in extensive and populous countries, the existence, and consequently the martial greatness of a democracy, is only for a moment.

I have most distinctly stated, in a former part of this work, an opinion, that the form of government in any country is a secondary consideration in war, unless its military policy and institutions be equal or superior to those of its adversaries. But when two nations, in the latter points, are equal at any given period, and there is not an overwhelming disparity of force on the one side, then the contest will terminate in favour of that which has the best form of government. In a democracy, where the sovereign people at one moment plunge headlong into a war, with a fury approaching to madness; but the next are equally clamorous for peace, and ready to tear

the war faction to pieces; or in a despotism where all depends upon the character of one individual, who cannot always be expected to create a warlike spirit where it so seldom exists; it is impossible that there can be the same perseverance in vigorous principles, as there must be in any well-regulated free government, not democratical. Hence the conclusion of Harrington, whom I before quoted, that a free nation, acting upon a wise and vigorous martial policy, may easily destroy all its enemies, and obtain the empire of the world, appears strictly philosophical, and has been fully warranted by the history of all ages,[1] subsequent as well as prior to

[1] Harrington, it is to be observed, draws a distinction between ancient prudence, and modern prudence; by the former, he means the system of the free governments of antiquity; by the latter, that of the feudal governments of Europe, our own not excepted, as it existed in his time. Now the present constitution of Great Britain (unknown to him), does infinitely more resemble the former than the latter; although it still retains the names and titles used in feudal times.

It appeared necessary to make this explanation, lest those who are caught by sounds, might object that the quotation made from Harrington, in the 4th chapter, was irrelevant. When we compare his Oceana, with the present constitution of Great Britain; we may observe of its author, in the words of Montesquieu, " On peut dire de lui, qu'il n'a cherché cette liberté qu'après l'avoir méconnue; et qu'il a bâti Chalcédoine, ayant le rivage de Bisance devant les yeux." (Esprit de Lois, l. xi. chap. vi.)

that in which he wrote. The constitution of Great Britain seems, therefore, as well adapted for a military nation, as any that has yet been seen; much more so, certainly, than that of France, or of any other modern state.

The latter period of the Roman commonwealth having been disgraced by the same cruelties and sufferings, which have lately been exhibited in France, this has tended to confirm the crude notion before-mentioned, that these evils must be inseparable from a military nation. It is to be observed, however, that when the Romans first launched forth into this horrible career of guilt and misery, they were decidedly upon the decline, and soon afterwards became completely degenerate and unwarlike, as a nation. In the earlier ages of their history, their constitution, character and principles were, in every thing, the reverse of those of the modern French. All the changes in their government were gradual. Massacres, or proscriptions, were unknown amongst them. They disdained to take advantage of any base or traitorous means, in order to effect the destruction of an adversary; and they generally acted with the greatest generosity and moderation to the vanquished. In short, it was by their superior freedom and justice, as much as by their superior valour and military skill, that the Romans conquered the world. These alone raised them to irresistible power; and although they greatly extended their dominion, in consequence of

the power thus gained, after they had lost all pretension to these virtues; had they not possessed them in the first ages of their commonwealth, they must have been exterminated by their neighbours, and in all probability we never should have heard of the Roman name; or, at all events, they never could have recovered after their dreadful disasters in the second Punic war.

Another question remains to be discussed. Is it necessary for a military nation to give up all other pursuits, and dedicate itself, exclusively, to warlike affairs, like the Romans, who considered no professions honourable, or worthy of a gentleman, or indeed of a free citizen, excepting war and agriculture? The great successes of the Romans; their destruction of Carthage, a rival, commercial as well as military; together with the example of the French, whom it is supposed to have been the policy of the republic formerly, as well as of Buonaparte now, to mould exclusively to military habits; have caused it generally to be taken for granted, that this question ought to be answered in the affirmative; and this supposition has, I believe, not a little contributed to the horror with which the notion of our becoming a military nation has been viewed. This opinion does not, however, seem to be warranted by sound reasoning, or by experience.

The Spartans were still more exclusively a military nation than the Romans. Even agriculture was not permitted amongst them. Their mode of

living, at all times, was like that of soldiers; being more rigid, even at home, than their discipline in camps before an enemy. They deprived themselves of every thing like luxury, banished all the arts, voluntarily exposed themselves to unnecessary hardships, and led, in short, the comfortless life of savages amongst civilized nations; yet it does not appear that their rivals, the Athenians, who cultivated learning, the fine arts, and even commerce, showed less valour in war. The discipline of the latter, it is true, was less perfect; but a democratical constitution seems almost incompatible with so strict a subordination, as may be enforced under any other. I am at a loss, therefore, to discover any advantage as a military nation, which the Spartans derived from their self-tormenting system.

In the ancient commonwealths, every man was forced to learn military exercises, and was liable to be called upon to serve as a soldier. This arose, partly from the practice of domestic slavery, which by rendering the greater portion of the population of a state, enemies of the government, made it absolutely necessary that the few should be constantly armed, in order to defend themselves against the many, as is the case now with our West-India planters; partly from the small territory of these states, whose wars being always carried on in their own country, or within a few days march of it, required those who were not actually in the field, to be ready to turn out armed, at a moment's warning.

Both these causes acting upon the Romans for several centuries, with their semi-barbarous state, and the prejudices and contempt which it was natural for them to entertain towards the arts of the conquered, were the causes of their exclusively military habits, which in the Spartans arose from the policy of their legislator.

When a nation is so vigorously attacked by a superior force, in its own country, that the enemy's troops are able to spread themselves, and to manœuvre in any direction they please; public credit will necessarily come to a stand; foreign commerce will be suspended, or cut off; manufactures will be ruined; and it will not only be absolutely necessary for the safety of a nation, so attacked, to become exclusively soldiers; but it will be utterly impossible that the thing can be otherwise, as there will be scarcely any means of subsistence left but war, or rapine, for those who before maintained themselves by their daily labour; and many, once in affluence, will be reduced to the same condition. This is the state of Spain at this moment, and will be ours, whenever we shall have a powerful invasion in our own country, which will and must make us a nation of soldiers, to the exclusion of all other pursuits. The same necessity, fortunately, does not exist at present.

When a nation can either carry on war upon her own frontier, without allowing the enemy to penetrate into the interior, like the ancient mo-

narchy of France, or when she can fight her battles beyond sea, like Great Britain, it is impossible to employ above a certain, and that a small, proportion of her population, in the contest: the notion, therefore, that it is necessary for a military nation to attach itself exclusively to warlike pursuits, in order to enable it to conquer its foreign enemies, does not hold good: on the contrary, this policy, when it comes to be analyzed, will perhaps be found calculated completely to defeat its own object, although it has been sanctioned by the authority of one of our most illustrious writers.

Lord Bacon, in treating of the means of enlarging kingdoms, lays down in the first place, this incontrovertible truth, "that of all things tending to the "greatness of any kingdom or state, the principal "is, to have a race of military men." Afterwards, in the course of the same essay, having premised that mechanical, sedentary arts, and delicate manufactures, that require rather the finger than the arm, have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition, he observes, that it was a great advantage to Sparta, Athens, Rome, and other ancient states, that they had commonly, not freemen, but slaves employed in these manufactures; but the use of slaves being abolished, he recommends, in lieu of them, to leave those arts entirely to foreigners; whilst the lower order of native subjects of the state should consist of three sorts of men only, tillers of the ground, free servants, and handicraftsmen of strong

and manly arts, as smiths, masons, carpenters, &c. not reckoning professed soldiers.

The number of manufacturers and artisans of every description, in any country, is exactly proportioned to the demand for their labour. Whilst we must admit, therefore, with lord Bacon, that weavers or taylors are not likely to make such efficient soldiers as ploughmen or masons, we may deny the advantages supposed to have resulted from the ancient state of society in Europe, or that any would result from the expedient which he recommends. By employing slaves or foreigners in the former trades, it is evidently impossible to add to the number of men practising the latter. What, therefore, shall we have gained, after excluding free citizens from sedentary and effeminate employments? The number of recruits for offensive war, that can conveniently be furnished by the nation in general, will be smaller; that from the hardy occupations, in particular, will certainly not be greater: and in defensive war, a formidable and numerous band of deadly enemies will be introduced into the heart of the state, in place of loyal, and even valiant subjects, which native taylors and weavers may be; for if the rest of their fellow-countrymen are brave, they will not be cowardly. Lord Bacon's advice, therefore, to discourage certain manufactures, with a view of rendering a nation warlike, would tend, in reality, to diminish its military strength.

Excepting, when a country has the misfortune to

be overrun by hostile armies, all arts may, and generally do, flourish best together: so that war, letters, agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, may be successfully cultivated by the same nation at the same time. A legislator, who represses one of these pursuits, with the hope of encouraging some other, which he judges more useful or necessary, may certainly give a momentary spur to his favourite object; but he will weaken even that in the end, and may lead by his ill-judged partiality to the destruction of the state, after having, in the mean time, needlessly curtailed the wealth or happiness of the society. Luxury, creeping in by degrees, proved the ruin of Sparta; the same contributed to subvert the Roman commonwealth, where no career but that of war being left open for ambitious and enterprising men, when they had no longer foreign enemies to contend with, they turned their arms against each other: but in Great Britain, where no such exclusively warlike habits exist, and where so wide a field for exertion presents itself to the whole community both in peace and war, the luxury of individuals is infinitely more beneficial than dangerous to the state.

The Abbé Raynal has happily observed, that the merchant, who successfully cultivates his profession, renders all nations tributary to his own, and even contributes to the general welfare of mankind. So far, commerce is a noble art: but it must be recollected that its professors, who promote these great

objects, do it by each following individually his own private interest, in striving to acquire wealth. Beneficial, therefore, as commerce is to a nation cultivating other arts at the same time, nothing can be more dangerous than an exclusively commercial spirit; which tends to throw too much influence and honour into the hands of the mercantile body. The subjects of an exclusively commercial state will be taught, from their infancy, to consider the national wealth as the only definition of the national glory. Individually, wealth will be power, and will be believed to confer happiness. Every thing will be calculated by notions of profit and loss. Valour and learning will be trampled under foot, or may altogether desert such an ungenial soil; and the laws will be destroyed either by a foreign conqueror, or by a domestic tyrant. The fate of the Dutch affords us a useful lesson, to prevent us from carrying our own commercial spirit to excess.

That commerce is, however, more peculiarly unfavourable to the martial spirit, than most of the other pacific arts, I cannot admit. From the very nature of things, in a free country, commercial merit will always be at the head of the mercantile body. Integrity forms the very soul of commerce; perseverance, and even enterprise, are essential to it; qualities all highly congenial to the military character. In Great Britain, the hereditary nobility and gentry, composing the landed interest, by their weight in the state and personal respectability, form,

at all times, a useful and a necessary check upon the mercantile body, which did not exist in Holland. Hence the merchants of this country, probably out of a generous emulation, have displayed a munificence and a liberality of mind, which it is vain to look for in those of other commercial states. Consequently, we have hitherto had no reason to be otherwise than proud of our commercial spirit; but we must take care to keep it within due bounds, and not to allow the supposed interests of our merchants to divert us from carrying on the war with vigour: this can never be their real interest; for by the sabre and the bayonet, and by these alone, we may establish a free market wherever we please; opening an outlet for our wares as wide as the coasts of the whole world, instead of smuggling them over to the continent, by boat-loads at a time, from such miserable places as Heligoland.

To a nation acting upon a vigorous policy, commerce appears to be of the greatest advantage in war; indeed, the warlike has so often been combined in the highest degree with the commercial spirit, in the same state, that it would perhaps be more just to infer, that the latter serves rather to stimulate than to damp the former. Tyre, Athens, Carthage, Rhodes, in ancient, Genoa, Venice, Holland, and Great Britain in modern, times, seem to afford strong proofs of this doctrine.

The French, whose fleets we fairly destroyed by force of arms, instead of accounting for their having

no commerce, by their own inferiority of courage, which rendered them unable to defend it, are naturally anxious to conceal from others, and from themselves, if possible, a cause so mortifying to their vanity. Hence their exclusively military habits are ascribed to their imitation of Roman policy, and they enviously decry the commerce which we wrested from them by the sword, as putting us on a level with Carthage. Could we admit the comparison to be so far just, that we, in our character, exactly resembled the Carthaginians, a very contrary inference must be drawn, as to the fate of the two empires, from that which our enemies are so fond of prognosticating.

The Carthaginians, a small colony of foreigners, settling on the northern coast of Africa, by the superior wisdom and vigour of their measures, not only established their empire by conquest, or by irresistible influence over the greatest part of that extensive continent, as far as the desert, but they likewise conquered almost all Sicily. Sardinia, Corsica, and the other Mediterranean islands to the westward of Italy, yielded to their arms; and even the warlike nations of Spain were subdued by them. In the first Punic war, Polybius allows that the Carthaginians were in generalship much superior to the Romans, and in perseverance and greatness of mind equal to them. In the second, they brought better soldiers into the field than their antagonists; and, as a commander, Hannibal cer-

tainly outshone all his competitors. At that time, too, their discipline must have been admirable, since they achieved such great actions with armies composed of foreigners of various nations and languages, whom it must have been exceedingly difficult to train, to regulate, and to keep in proper subordination. No nation ever acted with greater ambition or energy in war than the Carthaginians. Even by the accounts of their enemies, and of the subjects of their enemies (unfortunately we have no other accounts of them), they must have been of a very heroic character. The downfal of Carthage arose, not from her commerce (that was an advantage in war), not from her want of martial spirit (no nation ever had more), but from a political error committed by the first founders of the commonwealth.

Carthage and Rome, both single cities in their origin, became the heads of mighty empires. Rome, as she conquered in Italy, extended the rights of citizenship, consequently giving the vanquished a share and an interest in the government: indeed it is probable, that this may have been the effect of necessity as much as of wisdom; because the high-spirited little states of Italy might not otherwise have been so easily brought under subjection. Even the allies of Rome, in the early periods of her history, seem to have had as much power in the government as they wished; because afterwards, when they asked more, the Romans found themselves forced to submit to their demands. Hence, when

Hannibal invaded Italy, he found the greatest part of its people Romans in their hearts. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, having established their dominion in Africa, amongst barbarous tribes, probably without meeting much resistance, instead of endeavouring to civilize, and grant such privileges to their new subjects, as would give them a national feeling and an interest in the state, treated them always as a conquered people; thinking them, perhaps, too brutish and stupid to be worthy of being put on a footing with themselves; without considering, that the character of nations is stamped by the way in which they are treated. Consequently, the people of Africa looked upon their conquerors as foreigners and oppressors, and were always ripe for rebellion;[1] and as the free citizens of Carthage, by reason of this narrow policy, bore a very small proportion to the population even of her African subjects, it evidently was impossible for that commonwealth, to employ any great army, which could, properly speaking, be composed of native Carthaginians.

The progressive power of the Romans in Italy, being thus founded upon an equal and honourable union with their kindred tribes, like that of Scotland and England, Rome was strong at home; whilst the situation of the Carthaginians in Africa, being exactly like that of the English protestants in Ireland

[1] See Polybius, book I. chap. lxxi lxxii.

a century ago, Carthage was weak at home; and therefore she fell, as soon as she proved unable to keep the war out of her own country.

From these considerations it will appear that the French empire, which is an uniform system of slavery and oppression, both at home and abroad, labours throughout under the very same disease which proved the ruin of Carthage, from which we ourselves are happily exempt. If the French be Romans, it must be recollected, that the Romans, under their imperial despots, were not very formidable enemies. If we ourselves are like the Carthaginians in our commercial spirit, so much the better. Let us imitate them in the vigour of their martial policy, the only point in which we are inferior to them; and we, the foundation of whose power does not consist in a single city, but in fifteen millions of brave, active, and ingenious people; we, who are not obliged to trust to mercenaries either at home or abroad, but may bring almost as many native subjects into the field as any nation that exists, may easily effect what they, with their poor resources, had so nearly accomplished.

To recapitulate: if the being engaged in constant wars both by land and sea, constitute a military nation, we have almost as good a claim to that title as any that ever existed: if the vanquishing hostile armies, superior in numbers, constitute a military nation, we have a better claim to it than any nation of the present times; much better, certainly, than

the French, whom we have so often beaten in the field. What then is wanting to make us a military people, according to the only true definition of the word? Nothing, but a more daring and vigorous martial policy, such as has been traced in the preceding chapters of this work; which requires no change in our political constitution, no sacrifice of our commercial pursuits as a nation, nor of our personal comforts as individuals; and which, so far from involving us in any imitation of French principles or practices, is as contrary to them as light is to darkness.

CHAPTER XII.

That if we act in future with greater energy and perseverance, Great Britain has a sufficient military force, and a favourable opportunity, for destroying the French empire: Of the despondency hitherto evinced in our operations by land; and of the valuable possessions, which we have consequently abandoned without necessity.

ONE of the principal objections, likely to be urged against the system of martial policy above inculcated, will, in all probability be, that Great Britain cannot furnish troops enough to make any impression on the French empire: indeed, nothing is more common than to hear it asserted, that for every soldier, whom we can send into the field, in any part of Europe, the French may send five; and what is extraordinary, they who are the readiest to make such vague assertions,

scruple not, with equal confidence, to say that we, on the other hand, will always be able to oppose our adversaries with superior numbers by sea; although these two propositions involve, what appears to me, a most palpable contradiction.

It is from a conviction, already sufficiently developed, that the French may, in process of time, if we allow them to conquer the continent, bring against us five times our numbers of ships and of seamen, as well as of soldiers, that I have recommended a vigorous attack upon them by land, in order to prevent that evil: and no after-period can be expected to afford us a better opportunity of effecting our views, than the present; when it appears, that we may not only overwhelm any fleet that they can send to sea, but that we may also cope with the greatest army which they can possibly bring into the field.

The reasons which induced me to form this favourable estimate of our comparative military strength at this present period, are founded, as far as regards the force of the French armies, only upon an attempt at an approximation to the truth; yet such as I hope will not prove, by any means, unsatisfactory to the mind of my reader: as far as regards our own, they are supported by the most authentic and incontrovertible documents.

How are we to judge of the number of troops whom Buonaparte has at his command? Not by his own accounts, certainly; because it is his interest

to deceive us: and he may create upon paper an effective army of eight hundred thousand, or even of a million of men, in order to astonish weak minds, with the same ease with which he can raise a single battalion. Let the strength of his army be what it will, all his soldiers must have been properly clothed, fed, and exercised, for a considerable time, or they are good for nothing. This could not have been done without money. Admitting, therefore, that the disposable revenue of the French empire, for the last two years, has been, and now is, nearly double of our own, which from the distracted state of the continent, seems doubtful; and that, consequently, Buonaparte may equip double our number of soldiers; can he bring above half of his effective force to act in the same country; he who, by our naval superiority, may be threatened with invasion, and who, from his own tyranny, is in danger of insurrection, in every part of his vast empire? If he sends half of his effective force into Spain, Italy, or any remote country, what portion of that moiety can he collect and feed in one body, for any length of time, upon the resources of the neighbouring districts transported to his camp by land-carriage? On reflection, this will not appear so great a number, but that we ourselves may easily match it in the field. Facts seem fully to warrant us in drawing such a conclusion, which would result from the above hypothesis; and it is by facts alone that we ought to judge, without listening to the visionary theories

of those, who estimate the strength of empires by their size upon the map.

The French have, in all their bulletins, as well as by means of their secret emissaries, endeavoured to spread an opinion that their power is irresistible, and almost, as it were, omnipotent; first, on account of the numbers of their military establishment, which they exaggerate in the most absurd manner; secondly, on account of their own superior generalship, tactics, manœuvres, valour, &c. which they extol to the skies. In spite, however, of the irresistible numbers with which they threaten to overwhelm every adversary, both at the outset, and during the whole course of a war; whenever they come to give an account either of the operations in general, or of any action in particular, they forget all consistency, and dwell upon nothing but the insignificance of their own force, compared with the amazing numbers of the hostile troops with which they had to contend. In short, they are the complete bullies of the world; and, like all habitual liars, they cannot tell the same story twice in the same way. In the views, too, which have caused them to circulate these shallow impostures, they have been aided by the ignorance, and even by the vanity of their adversaries, and for a very obvious reason. When the Prussian monarchy, for instance, was destroyed, it was more natural for the great body of officers and soldiers of the vanquished army, to ascribe their disasters to the wonderful talents and

valour of the French, than to the wonderful imbecility of their own government, to the wonderful errors of their own generals, and to their own wonderful and unmanly cowardice; yet the latter appear to have been the true causes of that catastrophe.

Indeed, by what I have read and heard of the late continental wars of the French, even comparing the accounts of both parties, no great valour seems ever to have been displayed by any of their antagonists. Yet we know, that the Germans are naturally a warlike people: and I am not only ready to acknowledge, but can bear witness to, the merit of those employed in our own service; who have often distinguished themselves by their zeal and good conduct in the field. If, therefore, these men who, when attached to a British army, find no difficulty in beating the French, are not a match for the latter in their own national services; the paradox can only be explained, by supposing, that something rotten must exist in the constitution of the continental armies. A general discontent may probably pervade all ranks; and ignorance and effeminacy may be at, or near, the head of their military departments. In short, if the matter could be investigated, I have no doubt but that the same evils, which I have described as acting upon the army of our ally the king of Sicily, and which rendered it, although formed out of a warlike peasantry, unfit to cope with the French, must have produced, to a certain degree, the very same pernicious effects in the Russian, Prussian, and

Austrian services.[1] Had Englishmen, on their travels, been less attentive to the external appearance and dress of the foreign troops, whom they met with, but looked more narrowly into their inward character, these disasters either might or must have been foreseen. But the root of all these evils lies deeper. Well-governed states never could have been subverted by one or two defeats, nor even by one or two unsuccessful campaigns. The only general cause, therefore, that can be assigned for the late extraordinary successes of the French arms, is the great political cowardice of the continental governments. That this must have been the true cause, will, at the present moment, scarcely be disputed; since we see that Spain, which had no regular armies, nor generals, nor reputation either

[1] At the time when the troops of our continental allies were the most cried up in England, we find the conduct of an Austrian army thus described, in a private letter from Lord Nelson, who had been co-operating with it, on the coast of Genoa.

"Agamemnon, at sea, 2d of December, 1795. The Aus-
"trians, by all accounts, did not stand firm. Except a part
"of the army under General Wallis, of about ten thousand
"men, it was, 'the devil take the hindmost.' I had a
"lieutenant, two midshipmen, and sixteen men taken at
"Vado; the purser of the ship, who was there, ran with the
"Austrians eighteen miles without stopping, the men without
"any arms whatever, officers without soldiers, women with-
"out assistance."

for skill or valour, at the commencement of the contest, has completely outdone them all: and nothing in particular can more strongly prove this, than the operations of last year. At that period, Austria once more entered the lists with a formidable force, and under the most favourable circumstances. She met, however, with some disasters, and after the feeble efforts of a few months, she submitted to her enemy. What a contrast between such splendid hopes and feeble conduct, when compared with the magnanimous perseverance of the Spaniards!

We ourselves, by experience, now know the French armies so well, that no man in England will any longer be gulled into a belief of their wonderful valour. Their wonderful generalship appears no less problematical; at least, it produces no great results, when they are opposed to resolute enemies. Even in their operations against the Spaniards, the French papers talk more often of the errors, than of the talents, of their own generals; and whenever they have contended with us, they seem to have committed the most unaccountable blunders. Menou was represented, by Regnier, as the most stupid fellow in the world, because he did not destroy us at Alexandria. Regnier himself was afterwards considered a bungler, in the art of war, because he got a drubbing in Calabria, from a much smaller British force. Soult, according to Buonaparte, was no general, because he had it in his

power to have cut us to pieces at Corunna, but failed; and in all the wise French heads that were laid together at Talavera, it seems that very little common sense was to be found; for the Moniteur tell us, that but for some wonderful blunders of the French chiefs, Lord Wellington must of necessity have been destroyed. What is to be inferred from all this? Do the French consider the British nation as their evil genius, so that the sight of our troops clouds the faculties of their commanders, and agitates the nerves of their veteran soldiers? One might suppose so, by the wonderful talents and valour which we are told that they display in all their wars with others, and by the great mediocrity of both which they bring into the field against ourselves.

When Flaminius was told of the immense fleets and armies which Antiochus had at his command; of his clouds of horse and foot, variously armed, and composed of divers nations, with uncouth and pompous names; he described an entertainment that he had once been at, where, on admiring the variety of venison which was procured for the company at an unusual season, his friend told him that every thing upon the table was nothing but common pork, which his cook had contrived to disguise, and had given the dishes different names; although, in reality, they were all made out of one tame sow. In like manner, said Flaminius, these formidable armies of Antiochus, although disguised

by such strange and terrible names, are all made out of one sort of men; effeminate Syrians, fitter to be slaves than soldiers. The same comparison has often struck me, when I hear of the numberless French troops, with their Nageurs, Voltigeurs, and other fantastic names, which, since the time of the revolution, they have changed almost as often as their uniforms; and still more, when I hear of the wonderful French generals of the present day, who are now kings, granddukes, and princes; but were once private soldiers, or otherwise sprung from the lower orders of society. That in revolutionary times, this class of men should have risen to the top, particularly in a country deserted by its nobility, is not by any means wonderful; but these sudden elevations are as often a proof of extraordinary depravity, as of extraordinary merit or talents of any kind. Without making any comments, however, upon the private character of the present French generals, they are certainly, in their public capacity, neither more skilful nor more formidable antagonists, than the Condés and Turennes of former times, who were all princes and noblemen born. Compare them with their predecessors for the last two centuries, and they will be found to be of the same breed; all Frenchmen, but differently educated; in short, they are exactly like Flaminius's pork, the same substance, differently dressed and disguised: and our business is neither to wonder at

them,[1] nor to inquire into their past adventures, but to take them, as we ourselves find them, to fight them and to beat them, in the same way, that our ancestors beat the wonderful generals of Louis the Fourteenth, and as we now beat their wonderful admirals by sea; although the latter, for aught I know, with a fortune similar to that of their upstart generals, may have been transferred, all at once, from the deck of a privateer, to the command of a fleet. Let every man, in his station, do the duty which England expects of him, according to Lord Nelson's rule: nothing more is wanting to insure our success, upon every element.

That it was a true character, which I gave, of the official publications of the French government, as well as of the views with which these fictions are fabricated; will, I trust, have been sufficiently evident to every one who has been in the habit

[1] Since the revolution, it seems to have become the fashion for all other nations, to wonder at every thing the French have done, however simple or easy. See the description of the *Dépôt de la Guerre*, by an American traveller, in the note to page 183. The Dépôts of French wines, to be found in the cellars of private gentlemen, all over England, are equally wonderful: and to compare the labours of the French government with those of individuals (our own government not having entered the lists); the collection of foreign maps in private shops, in London, is more wonderful, considering the means, than the *Bureau Topographique* of Paris. "Nil admirari," is a wise maxim.

of reading them with attention. Yet it may not be amiss to notice the great change of tone, observable of late, in those which treat of Spanish affairs. When Buonaparte first crossed the Pyrenees, he said that his imperial standard would, in a few months, fly on the towers of Lisbon. The resisting part of the population of Spain and Portugal was to be immediately exterminated; and above all, he gloried in the opportunity which was afforded him, of driving a British army into the sea. Two years having elapsed, much having been tried by him, but little done, Spain being unsubdued, Portugal more warlike, and we much stronger than at the commencement of the contest; he no longer talks in such a sanguinary or threatening style, either towards us or our allies; but confines himself to peevish criticisms, or rather lamentations, of the obstinate, imprudent, and criminal conduct of the British ministers, in still risking the flower of their army, and the best interests of their own country, in what he calls the hopeless cause of Spain and Portugal.

When an enemy vaunts of his own immense numbers, and irresistible prowess, we ought to despise him as a bully; when he tells us, that it is utterly impossible for us to make any impression upon him, and consequently advises us, for our own sake, to run away from the scene of action, we ought to laugh at such counsel, and to attack him only so much the more vigorously. In short, to follow in any thing the advice of an enemy, is

evidently so contrary to reason, and to be intimidated by his threats, is so base, as well as foolish; that it has often astonished me to hear arguments, the very echo of the stupid and contradictory bravados of Buonaparte, seriously used by Englishmen in reasoning upon our military affairs.

There is one thing, however, in which the sincerity of an enemy can never be suspected, and in which so much instruction may be derived from his observations, that they cannot be too deeply pondered, by those who wish to act wisely. This is, when an adversary, public or private, whose measures have succeeded, reproaches and insults us with our past errors, and throws in our teeth all the opportunities of checking his own advancement, which we from ignorance or want of enterprise have allowed to slip through our hands. Now Buonaparte, although he tells us the same thing, which he has always been telling us, namely, that the time for our opposing him is totally gone by; yet he admits, that had we sent British troops to the continent, to assist our allies, on former occasions, they would have been of the utmost weight in the scale, and might have blasted all his own prospects. He tells us, for instance, that when he was encountering the Russians on the banks of the Vistula, thirty or forty thousand English would have ruined him; but then, as he says, we would not spare a single soldier, to assist our allies, being occupied solely in insular and colonial enterprises

for our own advantage. He also tells us, that the army sent to Walcheren, to endeavour to take a few ships, could not possibly have been worse, or more perniciously disposed of; had it been sent to Spain, he admits, that it might have decided the fate of that country; and that even in Germany, or in Italy, a well-timed expedition might have had the greatest hopes of success. So far he seems to reason well, and certainly he is the best judge of the harm that we might have done him; but when he adds, that it is now too late for us to act upon such a vigorous policy in future, his own anxiety and fears, lest we should adopt it, clearly betray themselves. Even were he a friend, we might tell him, that it is never too late to change a bad system for a better; but as he is an enemy, we may thank him for his remarks on our past conduct, and follow the useful lesson that they afford us, by ardently embracing a policy, which, by his own confession, had we acted upon it from the first, would have ruined him.

Difficult as it is to form a precise estimate of the present or past force of the French armies, it never appears to have been such, nor does it now appear to be such, as we may not encounter with the fairest and most promising hopes of success. Lord Hutchinson, who, whatever his opportunities may have been of judging of the French, must be allowed a proper judge of the Russian army with which he served, said, that it only amounted to one hundred

thousand men, of whom more than seventy thousand were never collected in a body. Now, as these seventy thousand men, although by his lordship's account, they were by no means well organized, or well supplied, kept the French in check for a long time; the truth of Buonaparte's remark, that we had it in our power to have decided the fate of that war, to his prejudice, appears to me fully evident.[1]

To take a period, however, in which the whole military force of the French empire was brought into action at once, namely, the summer of last year, and to judge of it, not by the gasconades in the Moniteur, but by an estimate of the force opposed to them: the Spaniards, even before Blake's defeats, by the most authentic accounts,

[1] See the returns of the strength of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer Departments, for the 1st of January, 1807, signed by Brigadier General Macleod and General Morse, in which the number of men of Ordnance Corps kept upon home service, at that period, is specified; which amounted to no less than 16,972 (exclusive of commissioned officers). For the proportion of Cavalry and Infantry, kept upon home service in February, 1807, see the Adjutant General's returns, in which it is stated to have been 89,617.

Thus it appears, by official documents laid before parliament, that we must have had about 106,000 regular soldiers, kept inactive in the British islands, exclusive of our numerous militia, volunteers, &c. at the time that the battle of Prussian Eylau was fought, between the French, and our then allies, the Russians.

never had more than a hundred and twenty thousand armed men, embodied at one time: if to these we add Sir John Moore's army, and the Portuguese, the total force which the French had to encounter in the peninsula, cannot have been more than a hundred and seventy thousand men. This force was never properly combined; the greatest part of it, namely, the Spaniards and Portuguese, being also undisciplined and disorganized, so that, in reality, they could scarcely be considered as a match for much more than half their numbers of well-commanded veteran troops, in battle. In the year 1809, when great part of Spain had been overrun by the enemy, we cannot suppose the combined force of Spaniards, English, and Portuguese, to have been so much as a hundred and twenty thousand men. At that time, Buonaparte was on the Danube. The Austrian army, under the Archduke Charles, in the battle of Aspern, when he repulsed Buonaparte, was only seventy-five thousand men. In the battle of Wagram, its force is computed to have been a hundred thousand; nor would it have been so much as a hundred and twenty thousand, had the Archduke John arrived in time to have borne a part in that action. It is well known, that at that time there was scarcely a single French soldier in any other part of Germany; Holland was left almost destitute of troops; France itself was in a state of great alarm, being totally unprotected, except by a set of miserable conscripts: and if we

may trust the Archduke Charles's account of his own troops, it seems to have been their misconduct, more than the numbers or valour of the enemy, that caused his defeat in the last battle.' Where, then,

[1] Extracts from the Archduke Charles's general order of the 7th of July (as published in Lieut. Müller's Relation of the Operations, &c. of the Austrian and French armies, in the year 1809.)

"In the battle of yesterday, the troops on the left wing in "no respect answered the expectations I had cherished "respecting them, nor the hopes I had formed, the import- "ance of that day considered, from their strong and advan- "tageous position.

"The disastrous result of that battle must be ascribed to "the conduct of these troops; for as the confusion was gene- "ral amongst them, they retreated with too great precipita- "tion and disorder. I am also, with some exceptions, far "from being satisfied with the infantry. Several regiments "marched forward too soon, and began to fire without com- "mand. They were, besides, so crowded together, that "they galled each other with their fire. The officers were "not able to rally the larger bodies, which fled in disorder, "and thus the ground was lost. The confused cry, which "was heard among the troops, drowned the voice of the "commanding officer.

"In every regiment which shall hereafter conduct itself in a "similar manner, the tenth man shall be condemned to die, "and the rest distributed among other regiments. The com- "manding officers shall be cashiered, and all other officers dis- "missed. Cries of alarm among the troops shall be punished "with death.

"It is to the shame of the army that so many stragglers "and plunderers are found on all the roads, and in all the "villages."

was the wonderful French force? where were the million of warriors, whom Buonaparte is said to have had at his command, if 120,000 Austrians, seemingly deficient in discipline, brought him to a stand in Germany,[1] and 120,000 mixed troops, most of them irregulars, kept him in check in Spain; whilst Murat, who was loudly threatening a descent in Sicily, if the truth was known, may not have been without his apprehensions himself; for out of the forty thousand soldiers, whom he is said to have under his orders, I cannot suppose that above one half are French troops, or men whom he can fully depend upon. More than a year has now elapsed, since, by the submission of Austria, Buonaparte so fortunately got rid of half the force that was opposed to him. There has been, subsequent to that event, no truce, no cessation of arms between him and his other enemies; and yet, what has he done during the interval? He has been threatening a great deal, it is true, but sum up his operations, and they savour more of impotency,

[1] I am informed by a gentleman, who has been in Paris subsequent to the last Austrian campaign, and who had good opportunities of procuring information, that Buonaparte's army, in the battle of Wagram, although all the French territories, north of the Pyrenees on one side, and of Naples on the other, were drained of soldiers, in order to compose it, did not exceed 80,000 men. That these should have beaten 100,000 Austrians, is accounted for in the preceding note.

than of that omnipotency in war, which he so impiously affects, and which his slaves in France, and his slavish or panic-struck admirers in other countries, are so fond of ascribing to him.

Whilst we have thus seen, that 240,000 men, neither generally well disciplined nor well combined, have checked the whole force of the French empire, it is evident, that the troops, whom Buonaparte can bring into the field, cannot exceed that number; but if we choose to give his armies credit for any thing wonderful, or vastly superior to the rest of mankind, in their generalship, valour, &c. we must necessarily make an abatement from the above supposition, and suppose his effective military force to be a great deal less than 240,000 men. Hence, the second observation, which I have extracted from the Moniteurs, that the 40,000 British, who were sent to Walcheren, if seasonably employed in Spain, or if employed in Italy or in Germany, before the Austrians had submitted, might have completely ruined Buonaparte's affairs, appears to me perfectly just; because his force was then divided in points a thousand miles distant from each other, and he was already at bay, at every point.

To judge of our own force only, in the same manner in which we have judged of that of the French, the two armies of Spain and of Walcheren combined, would have amounted to more than seventy thousand men; but as we have never yet

acted upon the vigorous system of the French; as we keep a large force often in garrison, in places which cannot be attacked; as we do not, also, seem to have adverted sufficiently to this circumstance, that an attack upon any of our own possessions, whilst the enemy is warmly employed on the continent, would be exceedingly precarious, even if we had not a naval superiority; but, by reason of that great advantage, any attempt of the kind, at the present moment, is next to impossible; and, at all events, must lead to the certain destruction of the French troops employed in it; it appears to me that we may, without the smallest danger to our safety, at home or in the colonies, employ 120,000 soldiers upon constant service against the enemy; which would be by far the most politic mode of carrying on the war, the most saving both of men and of money, and the most effectual for bringing it to a glorious and speedy conclusion. As we might, in this case, always meet the French with equal, often with superior numbers, we might totally abandon the defensive system upon which we have hitherto acted. Instead of offering battle, according to our common practice, we might always attack our enemy; and instead of allowing him to rally, or to treat with us upon equal terms, after a victory, which we have generally done; we might push every success to the utmost, and continue the action, or the pursuit, night and day, until we totally destroyed him. And by this system, destroy him

we must, unless he chose to throw down his arms; for such must be the fate of a French army, completely defeated in Spain, in Portugal, in Italy, and in most countries of Europe; so much are the French detested by the peasants. And as I put no faith in the miracles, which it is said may be effected by the French power, I cannot help thinking, that the destruction of an army would be a greater blow to Buonaparte than to ourselves.

If we set aside the embodied militia of the British islands, which is, at this moment, equal in discipline to most regular armies, adding to it a sufficient proportion of British cavalry and artillery, in order to render it efficient; we shall thus have an army for home defence, equal in numbers to those with which Buonaparte gained most of his late victories. Add to this the body of more than three hundred thousand well-equipped volunteers and local militia-men, who may be called out, in case of invasion, for the defence of Great Britain in particular; and it must be allowed, that without a single soldier of the line, native or foreign, we are superabundantly strong in England, much stronger than Spain was, when Buonaparte poured his legions into that country. Hence, with the exception of a proportion of cavalry and artillery, as before observed, and of a few regiments of the line, which it would be prudent to keep in Ireland, in order to insure the internal tranquillity of that island, the whole mass of the regular army of Great Britain is disposable

at the present moment. The number of troops usually kept in India need not be increased, and, with the exception of Sicily, all our other colonies are perfectly unassailable.

Such being the circumstances of the world, and considering the immense body of regular soldiers kept on constant pay by this country, it does not seem at all necessary that we should increase our national military establishment, which appears strong enough to furnish a force of 120,000 men, for incessant actual service;[1] and this will be amply

[1] Without entering into a detailed account of our estimated military establishment, which, if complete, would have been considerably greater; it appears, from the official returns laid before parliament, that the effective force of the British army, on the 1st of February 1808, was as follows: Cavalry 26,520: Infantry, including the foot-guards, 178,295: Ordnance corps (consisting of Artillery, Horse Artillery, and Artillery Drivers, besides Engineers, and Military Artificers), 24,781: total 229,596 effective regular troops. The effective force of the Militia at the same period was 77,164, exclusive of men inrolled but not joined, the number of whom in Great Britain alone amounted to 9,589. Hence the total of our effective force, of men under arms kept on constant pay, at the commencement of the year 1808, was no less than 306,760; of whom, probably, about 9-10ths were British.

I have seen no general official return, of a later date than the above period; but the royal artillery has since been augmented; we hear of no reductions in the line; and the Brunswickers and Portuguese army have been taken into pay; so that the force at the disposal of the British empire must now be much greater, than it was then.

sufficient to effect the destruction of the French empire, because it is as great a number as Buonaparte has ever been able to act with, in the same part of the continent; and the events of the last two years certainly cannot be supposed, either to have increased his resources or his reputation, so as to enable him to display greater energy in future.[1]

Nor does it appear to me, if we adopt this vigorous system, that the annual casualties of the British army, in the generally healthy climates of the continent, will much exceed those of former periods of the war, which we know by experience, that the country is fully capable of making good; for it is an undoubted fact, that, in spite of our destructive West India campaigns, now happily terminated, both the strength of the army, and the population of the British islands, have been constantly upon the increase from the time that we first

[1] Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that our resources were much less, than I have estimated them, so that they would not permit us to employ above 70,000 British troops in constant warfare; the enemy could not bring a greater number than the above to bear upon us in one body, on any part of the continent; and the country which we choose for the scene of action, must be very poor in men and still poorer in courage, if its resources will not, in a short time, enable us to put 70,000 British upon a par with 120,000 French. Besides, it is to be observed, that the average proportion of native Frenchmen out of that number, whom we might have to encounter, can seldom or never be supposed to exceed two thirds of the whole.

commenced hostilities with the French republic. Indeed, the average yearly mortality in our army, when employed upon the hardest service, must bear so small a ratio to our total population, that were the former even double of what it has hitherto been, the loss of men could never be felt by us.

The population of every country has a natural tendency, at all times, to increase beyond, and is only limited by, the means of subsistence, which its agriculture and other arts afford to its natives. Increase the industry of a poor, inactive, nation, and its numbers will increase: diminish the industry of a prosperous nation, and its population will suffer. On the other hand, if the numbers of the people, whether from a sudden desire of emigration, from unhealthy seasons, from furnishing large armies for foreign wars, or from any other cause whatsoever, be diminished in an unusual proportion, in any country; the increased average loss of men will, in all cases, be made good, by a proportional increase in the population; provided that the industry of those who survive or remain at home be not diminished, or the means of exercising it cut off from any branch of the community.

A defensive war, against invading armies spread over a country, is therefore not merely destructive to the troops employed, but it wastes and destroys, in a still greater degree, the mass of the pacific population; because, as I before observed, it necessarily robs them of almost all their former means

of subsistence. Hence, internal war of any kind, whether against a domestic or a foreign enemy, may be compared to the heat of a deadly fever preying upon the vitals, whilst external wars, like the heat of the sun, may be often beneficial; sometimes oppressive, but never dangerous to the existence of a state.[1]

The number of men, in any country in general, and of those employed in any profession in particular, are, in short, exactly proportioned to the demand, not to the casualties;[2] and the same reasoning holds

[1] Lord Bacon, and after him Gibbon, from whom I have borrowed this simile, make the comparison between foreign and civil war only, but it is no less just and striking in the more extensive manner in which I have used it.

[2] The Romans, notwithstanding their prodigious losses in the incessant wars, which they carried on for centuries, never experienced any want of men in the early periods of the commonwealth; but were even able to send colonies abroad, out of their redundant population. Afterwards, in the time of the emperors, when the armies were generally kept in camps and garrisons, where a soldier is perhaps the healthiest of all professions; the Roman population in Italy had greatly diminished and was visibly declining every day, owing to a change in the division of property, and to the pernicious and monstrous increase of domestic slavery, which had left the poorer class of free citizens without any means of subsistence, but public charity. Nothing can afford a stronger proof, that the total average population in any country can never be affected by the annual number of deaths, but depends, solely and exclusively, upon the means of subsistence afforded to the living.

good in war as well as in peace, with respect to the warlike as well as to the pacific professions. Some trades are more unhealthy than others; a manufacturer for instance is more unhealthy than a farmer, and an officer or soldier, upon actual service before an enemy, may be said to be the most unhealthy of all; but as men are always found in abundance to serve as manufacturers, wherever there is a demand, and as manufacturers, although confessedly an unhealthy employment, are found to increase, not to diminish, the numbers of a nation; so will there be no want of men for soldiers, as long as there is a demand for them. Consequently, after the military establishment of a country shall once have been fixed, in proportion to its resources, if it can prevent an enemy from striking at its domestic industry, which it can only do by a vigorous offensive system, it may carry on war for ever, sometimes losing more, sometimes fewer men annually, without its population being in the least diminished.

It might certainly, on the first view of the question, be apprehended, that the annual losses of 120,000 men, constantly exposed to the hazards of war, could not be repaired, without detriment to the population of this country; but if the principles, upon which I have just reasoned, be admitted, any objections to a vigorous continental warfare, founded upon such an apprehension, however natural, must be allowed to be perfectly groundless and chimerical. And these principles, which had before received the sanction of some of our most

eminent writers,[1] have lately been elucidated in the most ample manner by Mr. Malthus in his Essay on Population, to which I refer those who entertain doubts upon the subjects, for a complete demonstration of them.

It even appears to me, that when an opulent nation like Great Britain suddenly sets on foot a large navy and army after a peace, or when during a war she increases these establishments; by thus affording greater employment for men of all ranks of society, she will, in the course of a few years, find her population, not merely not diminished, but greatly augmented, in consequence of the war, in the same manner, as if some new branch of industry that required many thousand hands, had been set on foot by the enterprise of individuals.[2]

But as the introduction of a new manufacture, although beneficial to the nation at large, and to the labouring poor in particular, will, by causing a temporary rise in the price of labour, be obnoxious to all master manufacturers previously established in a country; in like manner the equipment, and the recruiting of fleets and

[1] See particularly the Wealth of Nations, Book I. chap. viii.

[2] After a long war, though the total population of a state may be increased, the number of women in the country will bear rather a greater ratio to that of men, than it would have done during an equal interval of peace. This circumstance, which can be no disadvantage any where, would only tend, in England, to give a greater scope for female industry, many branches of which have been usurped by the male sex.

of armies in time of war, which produces the same effect, will always be complained of by the short-sighted policy of farmers, as well as of master manufacturers and artificers of every description, although it gives a stimulus, not a check, to the industry and population of the country in general. The notion, that a large army can be prejudicial to agriculture, commerce or manufactures, is therefore as fallacious, but if carried into practice would be infinitely more pernicious to the state, than the contrary opinion, advanced by Lord Bacon, which we have before noticed: for the people who buy cloth of foreigners, whether cheaper or dearer than they could make it at home, may, if they have good laws, enjoy happiness, wealth and glory; but every nation which hires foreign valour to defend it must perish.

The wealth of a state consists in, or at least can only be preserved by, its strength and courage; hence, although Hume and Adam Smith strongly deprecate all commercial restrictions and monopolies, enacted with a view to promote the exclusive manufacture or sale of our own commodities, or of those of any allied nation; because they say, that such regulations injure ourselves as much, as they do the rival or enemy, against whose commerce they are directed; yet the latter admits that the navigation act, by which we established a monopoly, tending greatly to increase the numbers of British seamen, who in time of war are the defenders of

the state, was a wise and admirable measure, notwithstanding that we might have got our wares transported somewhat cheaper by a free competition between our own shipping and that of other nations, had no such act existed. But as a nation can neither defend itself, nor extend its power by seamen alone, the same wise principle of policy, that dictated our navigation act, ought to be extended to our military affairs, so as to establish a monopoly in favour of British soldiers as well as of British seamen, to the exclusion of foreigners.

Nothing could have been more radically contrary to this salutary principle, than our subsidizing policy, by which we exclusively encouraged the soldiers, and supported the military establishments, of foreign princes, to the prejudice of our own. The pernicious effects of this policy have already been stated; but the same objections do not apply to taking foreign troops into our own national service, or even an ally's troops occasionally into pay under some peculiar circumstances, provided that, like the Romans, we always have them under complete command and control, and never allow them to form more than half of any efficient army in the field. In countries which are the seat of war, and whose inhabitants take an interest in the event, there can never be a difficulty in raising foreign troops to any number required; and as the revenues of all the countries, which I have recommended us to conquer, will be added to our own, a vigorous conti-

nental warfare, if we enter into it with proper energy, will feed itself, supplying its own extra-consumption of men and money, without any additional burthen to the people of Great Britain.

I have already stated that an unnecessary inadequacy of force has generally been prejudicial to our views; nor can speedy or splendid results ever be expected in war by those who act upon such a system. But it may often be impossible for a nation, however great or populous, to bring a superior or even an equal force into the field against her enemy in every point, which must be contested. In that case, what cannot be effected in one campaign must be pursued in a second, a third, and so on for ever; for the minds of the war-statesman and of the soldier ought to be steeled with inflexible perseverance, the sure forerunner of victory, and the retriever of every disaster; but, I am sorry to say, that the want of this necessary quality, which no numbers can supply, has often been still more pernicious to us in our military affairs, than the inadequacy of our force.

After our evacuation of Toulon, we carried our arms into Corsica, and, although some of our principal military officers seem to have desponded from the first, we succeeded, with a very small force, in getting complete possession of that island, through the assistance of its inhabitants. This harmony was not lasting. Certain financial regulations made by us proving offensive to the warlike peasants, they determined upon resistance; we, on coercion. A

little British army, of two or three thousand men, accordingly, took the field to enforce obedience, but it was in a short time surrounded by very superior numbers, in a hollow of the mountains, where it had neither the means of subsistence, of escape, nor of battle: I have not, however, been able to learn, that, in the convention which followed, the Corsicans demanded more than a repeal of the obnoxious decrees, or that they had the smallest wish to shake off their connexion with Great Britain.

When Spain afterwards joined the French republic, our naval force for a moment became inferior to that of our enemies; and we evacuated Corsica; by which desponding measure we literally made a present of it to the French, after having been at all the trouble and expense of expelling that nation.[*]

[*] Since that period, it has been the fashion, in this country, to undervalue the island, and to revile its inhabitants; yet the former has its importance, and the latter are not without their virtues.

In a private letter dated St. Fiorenzo, Feb. 7, 1795, Lord Nelson says, "however lightly the acquisition of Corsica may "be deemed by many in England, yet I take upon me to "say, it was a measure founded on great wisdom," &c. "Corsica," he afterwards adds, "has always supplied Toulon "with all the strait timbers, beams, decks, and sides for "their ships; they are now deprived of that supply, which "would have enabled them by this time to have built "a small fleet; and besides, the Corsican tar and hemp,

Had we submitted patiently to the humiliation incurred, in our dispute with the Corsicans, from having unfortunately adopted measures, which our numbers proved inadequate to carry into effect by force, we might, by reconciliating that people (or perhaps without it), have defended the fortresses against the French, till our victorious fleets could once more have assumed the superiority in the Mediterranean: and the history of the world has proved, that the possession of the principal sea-ports of such an island as Corsica, although the inhabitants of the interior may at first be independent, or hostile, gives a preponderating influence, and leads, by degrees, to absolute dominion over them.

About the same time, we also evacuated the island of Capraja, which we had taken from the Genoese only a month before.

Next followed our first evacuation of Porto Ferrajo, in the spring of the year 1797, after we had been about nine months in possession of it. Thus we voluntarily excluded ourselves from the Mediterranean: but the want of a footing in that

" formed by no means an inconsiderable resource for the " dock-yard at Toulon."

In addition to these advantages, Corsica produces men of a warlike disposition, who, in all probability, would have afforded us at least 5000 excellent light troops. This, had we not unfortunately abandoned that island, would have been no small advantage to us.

part of the world seems soon to have been felt, for the year following we took Minorca, which we afterwards evacuated at the peace of Amiens.

Our conduct towards Malta has partly been stated; but our timid irresolute measures have not yet been fully developed. We may fairly be said to have got possession of that island in spite of ourselves, if it be true, as was generally believed in the army, that orders from a superior power had actually arrived for evacuating it, a little before the surrender of the French garrison, under an impression that the enterprise was hopeless; which order our commanders on the spot, better informed of the state of things, took upon themselves to dispense with.[1] Our policy too in respect to the people of the island, from first to last, has been the most crooked possible. During the whole of the tedious blockade, it was fully understood and believed by the Maltese, that we, by whom they submitted to be governed, would never abandon them: and although they did not require us to bind ourselves by any positive contract or treaty, to that effect: this only showed so much the greater confidence in our good faith. Whilst they, thus implicitly relying in us,

[1] I have also been told, that previous to the landing of our troops in Egypt in 1801, some of the officers desponded, and wished Sir Ralph Abercromby to go away without attempting any thing, after having paraded his force in Abukir roads.

were manfully fighting in our behalf, it appears that we not only admitted the Sicilian government to entertain hopes of gaining possession of Malta, to which it advanced some obsolete claims;[1] but that we had it even in serious contemplation to give it up

[1] Sir Alexander Ball was first formerly named governor of Malta by the court of Palermo; but the Maltese, whose confidence and affections he had previously gained, and who had already voluntarily appointed him to that situation, obeyed him as a British, never as a Sicilian officer. In advancing these ambitious pretensions, the ministers of his Sicilian Majesty, with an imbecility conspicuous in every thing but their political intrigues, had almost allowed those whom they called their subjects to perish of hunger. Indeed, the power, which unfortunately they possessed for a short time, of starving the Maltese to death, was the only title they had to interfere with the latter. Sir T. Troubridge, who then commanded the blockading squadron at Malta, thus expresses himself upon that occasion (in a letter to Lord Nelson, dated the 1st of January, 1800), "My lord, we are "dying off fast for want. I learn, by letters from Messina, "that prince Luzzi," (one of the ministers of his Sicilian Majesty) "refused corn some time since." In a letter of the 5th, of the same month, after a small supply had arrived, he says, "I have this day saved 30,000 people from dying, but with this day my ability ceases. As the government" (of Palermo) "are bent on starving us, I see no alternative but "to leave these unhappy people to perish, without our being "witnesses to their distress. I curse the day I ever served the "Neapolitan government," &c.

Any one, who peruses at large the correspondence from which I have made the above extracts, might naturally be surprised to conceive, how a famine could possibly take place

to the Russians;[1] a nation, who, in their public treatment of their subjects in the Mediterranean, have shown themselves more rapacious and tyrannical, and in their private deportment more insolent, than the French. Had this project been carried into effect, the Maltese would have considered it as a much more shameful and perfidious act, than they did our arrangement for resubjecting them to the order of St. John, upon which I have already commented.

Even now, our intentions must appear very problematical; for, solemnly as it was requested by the Maltese, through their deputies whom they sent to petition his Majesty against the treaty of Amiens, no public pledge has yet been granted, that the government of this country will not abandon them,

in Malta, at a time, when, as Sir T. Troubridge states, the ports of Sicily were overstocked with corn, and when there was abundance of ready money in the former island to pay for it; did not Mr. Leckie's account of the pernicious corn-laws of Sicily, and of the iniquitous mode of administering them, together with the well-known character of the Sicilian government, (which thousands of British subjects have now had an opportunity of observing) afford us a full explanation.

[1] A general officer, now dead, who was intended for a command in the Mediterranean, during the blockade of Malta, is said to have had his appointment cancelled, because he objected to our supporting the Maltese, in their resistance to France, under any views, which he might not communicate to that people.

in case of another peace. Until we set the minds of that deserving people at ease upon this point, they may be quiet and friendly, but can never think themselves bound in duty to be zealous or even faithful subjects of Great Britain; for any supreme government, which, in its strength and prosperity, seems coldly and unfeelingly to speculate, as a matter of indifference, upon, whether it shall protect or sacrifice its dependencies, can never expect allegiance from the latter in the hour of its adversity. We are fully as capable of defending Malta, as we are of defending the Isle of Wight; and if we hesitate to tell the Maltese, that we will maintain the one with as much obstinacy as the other, we leave them to draw inferences unfavourable either to our good faith, or to our firmness and courage, both equally degrading to the national character, and ruinous to the interests of Great Britain.

When we landed in Egypt, in 1807, we found three parties, Turks, Mamelukes, and Albanians; the first of whom were necessarily our enemies; the second, our friends: the third, hostile to the Turks, would probably have remained neutral, had we left them unmolested; and it might even, perhaps, have been politic to have negociated for the purpose of taking a part of them into our own service. The peasants of Egypt, and their chiefs, were devoted to our interests. The Bedowin Arabs, too, were amicably disposed towards us.

By the fortunate capture of Alexandria, we got a firm footing in the country; and, small as our numbers were, there was no armed force in Egypt capable of encountering us in the open field: so that, all things considered, the noblest prospects of ultimate conquest lay before us;[1] and the blessings of two million of people, with the revenues of, naturally, the richest country in the world, would have rewarded our labours. Our next enterprise was to attack the Albanians in Rosetta, by whom we were twice repulsed. Was that any reason why, instead of seeking to retrieve our disgrace, by drawing these barbarians into a pitched battle, at some future opportunity, we should despair of success, and evacuate Alexandria, without waiting to be attacked? By this unhappy step, the laurels gained in our former campaign have been blighted, and our so much boasted achievements under Abercromby and Hutchinson have only served to throw the unhappy natives of Egypt under the most dreadful of all yokes, that of an undisciplined half-savage army, subsisting by plunder, who acknowledge no law nor government of any kind, setting at total defiance our friends, the Turks, whom we professed to restore in our first, and with whom we nominally capitulated, in our second expedition.

[1] These prospects only opened, after Alexandria, by far the strongest place in Egypt, had surrendered to us without resistance. If we ever go to that country again, we shall do well not to calculate upon such wonderful good fortune.

Three or four years ago, when Charles the Fourth of Spain was a vassal of France, and at war with us, it was a thing perfectly just, and of the greatest importance to our interests, to effect the separation of the Spanish colonies from the mother country. This we attempted, and of all enterprises in which a nation ever engaged, it might reasonably have been supposed the most easy and almost certain of success, and yet we failed.

According to the general opinion of the officers employed in South America, which has been confirmed by recent events, the universal wish of the people of Buenos Ayres, and of other parts of that continent, was independence. This we refused them. Still they would have been contented to place themselves under the British government, provided we would promise never to restore them to their ancient masters; such was their hatred of Old Spain. This we also refused them. Finding, therefore, that brutal force seemed to be the only rule of our conduct, they, who were our natural allies, became our deadly enemies.

In spite of their animosity, however, we took Monte Video by assault, and we certainly had the fairest prospects of conquering the country, at the time when the unfortunate attack upon Buenos Ayres was made. Even after that disaster, there was no reason to despair; for supposing that the project of reducing the town by cannonade proved

ineffectual, and that consequently we had been obliged to reimbark in the face of the enemy, this ought to have been attempted, instead of disgracefully evacuating the country. Nor is it likely that the operation would have been attended with any great risk, because after being baffled in our attack upon the capital, we still should have been strong enough to beat the irregulars, who defended it, in the open field; so that could we once have brought them to action, our reimbarkation would have been perfectly safe. At most, it cannot be supposed, that we could have lost more than our rear-guard in that operation, which I admit is hazardous, but so is every thing in war. Our loss at Buenos Ayres was 2,500 men, which was about one fourth of our army: let us suppose that we had lost 1000 or 1,500 more, before we got into our transports in the Plata, we still had force more than enough to have maintained our footing at Monte Video, and to have kept the country around it in subjection, till, by receiving reinforcements from England, we might have been enabled to attempt new enterprises.

That we should have evacuated South America, without waiting for an opportunity of retrieving the credit of the British arms, and of chastising our presumptuous antagonist, I shall, as a soldier, always lament; but the disappointment of our views of conquest, in that remote region, does not appear

to me a thing to be regretted, because, as I said before, it is not our policy to aggrandize ourselves in the New World.

The next possessions that we evacuated were Danish Zealand, and Walcheren, in consequence of which measures, although we are still at war with the governments of both these countries, we cannot even profit by our success, as it appears was our intention, had we succeeded in South America, to get good terms for ourselves at a general peace.

It must be supposed by other nations, that our only reason for evacuating Zealand, was a fear of not being able to defend it, because it is well known, that we have subsequently been searching for harbours, amongst all the little worthless islands in the Baltic. In a former part of this Essay, I have stated how often, upon an average, the Great Belt is said to be frozen over; but whether it ever was or will be frozen, in such a manner as to permit the march of armies and the transport of military stores, is a thing which yet remains to be proved. And until this is proved, every man who entertains his doubts upon the subject, of which number I am one, may be fully warranted in stating his opinion, that we might have defended Zealand as easily as we may defend Guernsey or Jersey. Besides that, even admitting an attack over the ice to be practicable at stated intervals; nothing could be more favourable to our own views in war, or more absurd on the part of our enemy, than his keeping a large

army, such as would be requisite for this object, waiting ten or twelve years idle and useless in Jutland, in hopes of a hard winter; whose generals might make us laugh, from time to time, by publishing remarks upon the thermometer, still more stupid and absurd, than Murat's blustering dispatches, from what may be called, at this moment, the threatening army of Sicily.

If the people of Walcheren could ascribe our evacuation of their island to a fear of the ridiculous threats of Buonaparte, that, as soon as winter set in, he would march an immense army to attack us, over channels which are never frozen, they must think us the most timid and credulous of nations. If that measure originated from the unhealthiness of the climate, it must be ascribed to our own prudential policy. But in neither case can it be attributed to the means which the enemy had of driving us out. A few undisciplined Dutch and Flemish patriots in former times defended it successfully against the vast military power of Philip the Second of Spain, in spite of both its climate, and of the ice, had any existed.

Here then we see that we had in some countries a firm footing, in others, absolute possession; that in the former, from our naval superiority, we could have brought a greater force to follow up our first successes, or to repair our disasters, against every enemy that opposed us, and that in the latter, by the same advantage, it was doubtful whether our

enemy could even get at us, or at least, attack us with the smallest hope of success; and yet we abandoned them all, either on account of some trifling reverses, or from caprice, if not from imaginary fears. Corsica, Egypt, the province of Buenos Ayres, Danish Zealand, Walcheren, the island of Elba, to which we had nearly added Malta, and to which, so deeply has this spirit infected our minds, I know that an officer of great reputation deceased, would, if his private opinion had been followed, willingly have added Sicily,[1] from whence, if we are hereafter expelled, it will be, by our own feeble desponding measures alone, never by the power of any enemy; all these evacuations, actual or intended, were totally unnecessary. I shall say nothing of our numberless retreats and reimbarkations, in continental expeditions, because, whether they may not have been in general necessary may bear dispute, excepting our abandonment of Galicia, which can scarcely be defended on that plea, it

[1] In the above instances which I have given of our national desponding evacuating spirit, I am sensible, that the same enterprises were not always planned and despaired of by the same men; but that some places occupied by one ministry were abandoned by their successors; some were evacuated by orders from his Majesty's Ministers at home, contrary to the wishes of commanders on the spot; others were evacuated by the latter, without the approbation of the former. I have not entered into these details, for reasons contained in page 11.

having proceeded from an erroneous view of the character and disposition of our allies, and partly, perhaps, from an exaggerated notion of the powers of the French. In consequence of this measure, the British army suffered, in Galicia, all the evils of defeat, before it encountered the enemy; and after all, it proved superior to that very enemy, in battle, from whom we had deemed it necessary to make such a rapid retreat.

When we consider this desponding spirit, which seems to have so often pervaded our operations by land, and which is so pernicious to the national glory and interests, it seems difficult to reconcile so great a want of political courage, with so much personal valour as is displayed by all ranks in the British service. The comparison of our own conduct, too, with that of former nations, is rather humiliating, when we read of the wonders which have often been effected, in war, by the smallest states acting with energy and perseverance.

The little commonwealth of Athens, not possessing the resources of one of our English counties, sent a greater expedition into Sicily than we have ever equipped, excepting those of the last three years. In the twenty-first campaign of their first war against the Romans, the Carthaginians found themselves, after a series of disasters, stripped of all their once numerous possessions in Sicily. Yet, when not a single city or district acknowledged their authority, so that they were masters only of

the ground on which their army stood, they manfully continued to make head against their victorious adversaries, under their famous general Amilcar Barcha; and by taking strong positions on the sea-coast between Palermo and Trapani, spun out the war for three years longer, in hopes of retrieving their affairs, equally disdaining to evacuate the island, or to make peace, until, by the destruction of their fleet, their troops were at last totally deprived of the means of subsistence. What a contrast between this noble perseverance of the Carthaginians, and our own desponding policy!

Venice, originally a little fishing-town situated upon islands too insignificant, in themselves, to have found a place in the map of Italy, entering into the pursuits of war and of commerce, with all the spirit of freedom, grew, by degrees, into a splendid city, the metropolis of a considerable state. Besides Crete, Cyprus, and other great islands, she had made herself mistress of Istria, of Dalmatia, of a compact and valuable territory in the north, and of various detached possessions as far as the south-eastern extremity of Italy; whilst her commercial and warlike fleets covered the Mediterranean.

When almost all Europe combined against them, in the famous league of Cambray, the Venetians, instead of evacuating their continental possessions, without waiting to be attacked, boldly took the field and met their enemies in battle. Crete, they defended against the whole force of the Turkish

empire, then in the zenith of its military power, for more than twenty years; and so far from being dismayed, when they had fairly been beaten out of that island, inch by inch, they, in a few years afterwards, carried their arms into the continent, and drove the Turks out of the Morea, which the latter were subsequently obliged to confirm to them by treaty. Thus the Venetians, in these remarkable cases, and indeed in the whole of their history in the times to which I have alluded, laudably showed a military spirit, not like ours, infinitely inferior, but infinitely superior, to their strength and resources.*

The Carthaginians and Venetians being commercial nations, I have selected these traits, from their history in preference, because they also illustrate my former proposition, that a feeble martial policy is by no means a necessary concomitant of commerce. Contrasts, equally striking, to our own desponding system, might, however, have been found in the history of almost all nations. I shall add one in point.

* The Venetians having since entirely lost their martial spirit, we have seen that once famous commonwealth, after a peace of seventy years, subverted by the same enemy who destroyed the Order of St. John, and falling in the same manner, without resistance, without dignity or honour, and without deserving the smallest pity. Such is the consequence of states, which have been both warlike and commercial, abandoning the more necessary pursuit of the two.

In the year 1768, the French had possession of most of the sea-ports of Corsica, but the people of the interior refused to acknowledge their authority. The former took the field in several points, and were everywhere completely baffled and defeated; the principal corps of their army, in numbers about five or six thousand men, meeting with a disaster exactly similar to our own at Buenos Ayres. What was the consequence? Instead of desponding and evacuating the island, they got over a reinforcement of fifteen battalions from France, and when they renewed the contest next campaign, they subdued all Corsica in a few months.

Previous to the last war, a desponding spirit seems by no means to have actuated even us in our wars by land. Perseverance and valour seem to have been equally conspicuous in our operations. In the most disastrous state of our affairs in India, no one ever seems to have dreamed of evacuating that continent. In Wolfe's private dispatches, we find him, in consequence of the smallness of his force, almost hopeless of success in Canada, yet determined to do his utmost with the means he had; in consequence of which, the enterprise succeeded. This is the true principle upon which war ought always to be conducted.

By some of the late military operations of the British nation, it may in after-times be supposed, that we must have thought that all enterprises, which could not be decided in our favour by a single

attack, were hopeless; and that after any disaster, whether trifling or serious, we might be privileged to give up our point, evacuate the country, which was the scene of our failure, and place the sea between us and our enemy; just as if the great object for which we raised soldiers was to lodge them in barracks and drill them from morning till night, under the protection of our ships of war, making only from time to time a spurt of vigour, in order to show our enemies that we can fight if we please.

The necessity of perseverance in war being once admitted (and who will say that a quality, without which it is impossible to succeed in the simplest and most frivolous employment, can be unnecessary in the most important of all?) a general principle will result for the guidance of military operations; namely, "that it is better for a nation to risk every thing than to give up an object in war; better for an army, a corps, or detachment to perish, than by capitulation, or otherwise, to abandon, without resistance, any country, position, or garrison, which it was sent to occupy or defend against any enemy, however superior in numbers or resources." This, like all other abstract principles, may have its exceptions; but I lay it down as a general rule, because, so far from such an obstinate spirit leading to the destruction of armies, and consequently of states, it is the only spirit by which either can be saved or defended. Hence, although, in a former

chapter, I gave the perilous situation of our army in Portugal as a reason for augmenting its force, I by no means give it as a reason for evacuating the Peninsula, supposing, that at this or at any other period, no more troops could be sent out to reinforce it. Those who act upon the unyielding persevering system, will generally prove victorious in the end. They may, it is true, if very much out-numbered, be sometimes worsted; but when they have got possession or firm footing anywhere, with the good-will of the people in their favour, an enemy must, in all cases, suffer infinitely more in attacking than they in defending. It is also to be observed, that they, who are driven out of any foreign country by an overwhelming superiority, after having made a gallant and obstinate defence, can never be said to have disgraced themselves; nor will they incur any odium unfavourable to their future views, with their partizans amongst the people, how much soever the latter may have suffered by the war; for mankind are generous in their sentiments, and always have a fellow-feeling and respect for the brave and high-minded. Indeed, nothing more increases the military glory of a nation, which is so essential to its success in war, than a long and vigorous resistance against superior armies, or the obstinate defence of a fortified place, even though its efforts in the field should prove unsuccessful, and its garrisons be forced to surrender at last. Amilcar Barcha,

in his extreme adversity, during his last Sicilian campaigns, showed himself, as a commander, no less worthy of admiration than his son, the great Hannibal, so long the favourite of fortune, afterwards proved. Rome was more truly great after the defeat of Cannæ, than when captive kings were led in triumph to the Capitol. The defence of Gibraltar did Elliot as much honour as if he had gained a victory equal to that of Blenheim; and for my part, I admire and esteem the Spaniards more at this moment for their perseverance under calamity, than if, with a better political and military system, they had been able to realize their laudable intention of carrying the war into the heart of France.

In short, the business of an army is to destroy the enemies of its country; nor can it ever be justified in yielding any point, with a view of saving itself. Consequently, they who spare their enemies, from an apprehension of hazarding their own army, seem to me to have lost sight of the only object, for which soldiers, who are so burthensome to the society in general, ever ought to have become a distinct profession.

In the preceding parts of this work, I have generally recommended a system of conquest; from a belief of its necessity to the success of the war, and to the existence of Great Britain: but in using the word conquest, it was very far from my meaning, that we should treat the people of other countries

nquered nations.[1] Where they have good s, and are contented with them, let them enjoy them, on the system recommended in treating of Norway. Where they have bad ones, or badly administered, let us improve their condition, by granting them the same happy security of person and property, which we ourselves enjoy, retaining only the necessary supremacy in their political and military affairs. The ambition of Great Britain, were we to conquer on these principles, would be a blessing to mankind;[2] nor is there any obstacle

[1] Even when I talk of destroying, I mean, solely, the political power of foreign enemies; never, personally, to ill-treat the vanquished.

[2] If we should, however, prefer making other nations independent, let us by all means adopt this disinterested policy, avoiding the following difficulties: First, if we re-establish the former states of Europe, as they existed before the French revolution, we shall have done nothing, because the smaller will be unable to defend themselves against the greater. Secondly, if in order to guard against this evil, we should unite more extensive territories under one head, any bond of union, suddenly established, would prove too feeble, even amongst people who speak the same language, to keep them long together. The difficulties of the Scottish, and the present addresses for a repeal of the Irish, union, sufficiently prove that this would be a great obstacle. Precipitation would, therefore, ruin our views; and it will be impossible for us either to save, or to provide for the permanent independence of, any of the continental states, now subject to France (Spain excepted); unless we not only assume, but retain,

to our success, so serious, as our unhappy degrading national prejudice, that we ought not, or cannot effectually, extend our efforts, in war, beyond the limits of a particular element.

Such a policy has been by no means unparalleled in the history of mankind: but if we continue to persist in it, in times to which it is no longer adapted, we shall show an obstinate attachment to peculiar habits, to our own detriment, of which none but the Jewish nation has yet afforded an example. The Spartans, wedded as they were to the laws of Lycurgus, with the spirit of which maritime affairs were absolutely incompatible, wisely relaxed from their political bigotry, and formed a naval power, as soon as they saw that they could not do without it. The Romans, for several centuries, had a strong prejudice against the sea, to which element they had never trusted themselves; but, in the first Punic war, when they found it absolutely necessary for their success, they equipped a large navy, and by dint of noble perseverance, after having had succes-

the supreme power over them, so long, as to form their habits, extinguish their animosities, reconcile the jarring interests created by former divisions, and render them fully capable of appreciating, by proper experience, all the advantages which must result from an union with former rivals, or enemies, under a good government.

The necessity of these precautions might have been inferred from former parts of my work; but I was anxious to avoid obscurity or misapprehension, upon this point.

sive fleets destroyed by tempests or the enemy, proved victorious in the end.[1] The Carthaginians, during the same contest, finding that ships alone could not decide the fate of war in their favour, altered their system, which had been similar to our present one; abandoned their exclusive attachment to the sea; and applied to military studies with so much success, that in the second Punic war, they showed themselves, in these, superior to the Romans. Let us take for our model, which we please, of these illustrious nations of antiquity, we cannot err; if, like them, we apply the same energy to our military, with which we have conducted our naval affairs, we shall become the most warlike nation, by land, as we are by sea, that ever existed; and shall as certainly, sooner or later, destroy France, as Rome destroyed Macedon.

[1] Polybius, upon this occasion, observes, that the Romans despised all dangers; that they considered nothing impossible which they had once decreed; and that, in their eagerness to overcome every obstacle, disdaining the ordinary maxims of prudence, they would march or sail anywhere, at any season. Hence, says he, in warring against the elements, they have often met with the most dreadful disasters; but through their daring, impetuous, inflexible spirit, they have, with few reverses, triumphed over all the rest of mankind, and the works of man. So may we, if we adopt the same spirit, which every nation, that wishes to prosper in war, ought to do.

Even to the least sanguine observer, the present aspect of affairs seems to prognosticate increasing energy in our military policy, and it is devoutly to be wished, that some new success may encourage us to persevere. It gives me pain, however, in forming this wish, to think that our own vigour, upon which the fate of Great Britain (perhaps, of the world), will depend, is likely to prove the slave of fortune; and that our warlike measures, which ought not to be commanded by, but to command events, may be influenced, like the speculations of a stock-jobber, by good or bad news from abroad. Should our army, in Portugal, meet with any reverse, we shall, in all probability, again relapse into our despouding, evacuating, system. Then it is to be apprehended, that the disease may prove altogether incurable; so that after evacuating our foreign possessions, one after another, until we have nothing more left to evacuate, we shall draw the war into our own country: that, we surely will not think of evacuating; but if we despond then, when we certainly shall have much more reason to despond than we have now, what is to become of us?

Before I proceed to the consideration of our military institutions, and of the nature of a war of invasion, I may be permitted to conclude this part of my work, by expressing a sincere desire, that the merit of the former may never be put to the test on British ground; yet this, I repeat, must prove the

case, unless, whilst it is yet in our power, we embrace the wisest, safest, and most effectual mode, which we have of defending our country, that is to say, by attacking and destroying all its enemies. To the merits of those statesmen and generals amongst us, who shall have been the first to adopt, and to persevere in this salutary system, the gratitude of nations, and the applause of posterity, will do ample justice.

END OF PART I.

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